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Since the end of the Cold War, recurring civil conflicts have been the dominant 
form of violent armed conflict in the world, accounting for 70% of conflicts active 
between 2000-2013. Duration and intensity of episodes within recurring conflicts in 
Africa exhibit four behaviors characteristic of archetypal dynamic system structures. The 
overarching questions asked in this study are whether these patterns are robustly 
correlated with fundamental concepts of resiliency in dynamic systems that scale from 
micro-to macro levels; are they consistent with theoretical risk factors and causal 
mechanisms; and what are the policy implications.  
Econometric analysis and dynamic systems modeling of 36 conflicts in Africa 
between 1989 -2014 are combined with process tracing in a case study of Somalia to 
evaluate correlations between state characteristics, peace operations and foreign aid on 
the likelihood of observed conflict patterns, test hypothesized causal mechanisms across 
scales, and develop policy recommendations for increasing human security while 
decreasing resiliency of belligerents.  Findings are that observed conflict patterns scale 
 
 
from micro to macro levels; are strongly correlated with state characteristics that proxy a 
mix of cooperative (e.g., gender equality) and coercive (e.g., security forces) conflict-
balancing mechanisms; and are weakly correlated with UN and regional peace operations 
and humanitarian aid.  Interactions between peace operations and aid interventions that 
effect conflict persistence at micro levels are not seen in macro level analysis, due to 
interdependent, micro-level feedback mechanisms, sequencing, and lagged effects. 
This study finds that the dynamic system structures associated with observed 
conflict patterns contain tipping points between balancing mechanisms at the interface of 
micro-macro level interactions that are determined as much by factors related to how 
intervention policies are designed and implemented, as what they are. Policy 
implications are that reducing risk of conflict persistence requires that peace operations 
and aid interventions (1) simultaneously increase transparency, promote inclusivity (with 
emphasis on gender equality), and empower local civilian involvement in accountability 
measures at the local levels; (2) build bridges to horizontally and vertically integrate 
across levels; and (3) pave pathways towards conflict transformation mechanisms and 
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For the past twenty years, the rate of new onsets of armed civil conflicts has been 
declining worldwide. Syria notwithstanding, several factors have been suggested to 
explain this decline: the reduction of “proxy” conflicts (common during the Cold War) 
involving military interventions by powerful states on opposing sides; a decrease in 
political ideology as driver of violence (also common during the Cold War); the growing 
number of consolidated democracies; increasing recognition by the international 
community of secession as a legitimate way to defuse ethnic conflict; more substantial 
efforts by the international community to address internal factors seen as root causes of 
civil conflicts; and the increasingly interventionist nature of peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding activities by international organizations (Mack, 2006; Newman, 2009).     
However, during this same time, conflict persistence1 has been increasing, with 
repeated cycles of violence and recurring civil wars the dominant form of armed conflict 
in the world today (Backer et al., 2014; Cliffe & Roberts, 2011). For example, of 94 
different civil conflicts that became active between 2000 and 2013, 65 were recurrences 
of past episodes.  As a result, even as conflict terminations have increased, the overall 
number of ongoing civil conflicts in the world has not decreased at a commensurate level, 
while the number of uniformed personnel involved in peace operations surged to over 
                                                
1 As used here, the term conflict persistence refers to violent, armed conflict between the same actors over 
the same issue for long periods of time (e.g. ten years or more). This is similar to (but more specific than) 
the definition used in the Human Security Report 2012, which defines a persistent conflict as “one that 
involves many years of fighting”(Mack, 2012). 
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100,000 in 2014.2  Between 2003 and 2005 alone, these conflicts affected more than one 
billion people and resulted in an estimated $270 billion in direct and spillover economic 
costs (Human Security Report 2009-2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs 
of War, 2011).  Development aid to countries experiencing recurring conflict increased 
steadily in response, accounting for approximately 20% of all aid worldwide in 2014.3   
This dissertation addresses the following questions:  
• Do existing predictors of conflict persistence (involving both internal and 
external factors) explain observed dynamics of civil conflict trajectories over 
time?  
• Do third party military peace operations and aid interventions in these 
conflicts interact to reduce or increase risk of persistent conflict?  
• What are implications for intervention policies most likely to diminish 
conflict persistence and simultaneously improve human security? 
 
This study finds that state characteristics are highly correlated with, and have 
strong explanatory power for, observed patterns of conflict persistence (overshoot and 
collapse, damped impulse, exponential, and oscillatory behaviors). The most 
significant factors proxy a mix of micro and macro conflict balancing mechanisms 
that include both cooperative and coercive behaviors. While most studies on conflict 
dynamics are conducted at either the macro or the micro level, it is the interaction 
between levels that produces some of the most important structural features, such 
tipping points and shifts in polarity, which determine risk of conflict persistence.  
                                                
2 Data sources: Providingforpeacekeeping.org (Perry & Smith, 2013; Bellamy & Williams, 2015) 
3 Data source: Aiddata.org (Tierney et al., 2011) 
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Similarly, military peace operations and aid interventions are found to interact at 
the mesa- and micro levels to effect conflict persistence. This study shows that what 
matters most in determining whether these interactions reduce or increase risk is how the 
interventions are implemented relative to each other, and not what the interventions are.  
Macro level econometric analysis is not useful for seeing these effects, due to sequencing 
and lag time effects on the balance between cooperative and coercive behaviors in 
dynamic system structures. Policy analysis to reduce conflict persistence requires the 
collection of data and use of methods that account for these complex system effects from 
the micro level to the macro level. 
Because of the importance of these micro-macro level interactions, the study finds 
that reducing conflict persistence requires a focus on how intervention policies are 
designed and implemented as much as what they are.4 Specifically, to reduce the risk of 
conflict persistence, there must be increased transparency in peace operations and aid 
interventions; these interventions must have local ownership at the community level and 
promote inclusivity, with particular emphasis the roles of women in peacebuilding (and 
not just the elite); and they must empower civilian involvement in accountability 
measures for security and law enforcement. Research is required in all these areas to 
understand stabilizing pathways for implementing such policies. Finally, the 
peacebuilding, state-building, and humanitarian goals that these interventions seek to 
                                                
4 This finding echoes the theme of development as freedom, wherein the processes by which development 
activities advance nonmaterial benefits and different types of freedoms (political, social, economic) for 
members of society to “lead the kind of lives they have reason to value” are more important than 
development indicators such as income per capita or consumption (Sen, 2001). Recent trends and research 
by development practitioners in conflict settings reinforce this theme placing emphasis on social cohesion 
and inclusivity in analysis of political settlements (OECD, 2011), transparency, and accountability 




achieve will not be sustainable if they are not eventually coupled with conflict 
transformation mechanisms that bring a sense of justice that scales from individuals, to 
communities, regional, and national levels.  
 
Motivation 
Developing robust policies to diminish the persistence of armed civil conflict is 
important for three reasons. First, armed civil conflict exacts huge costs to human 
security (and the state economies and governing institutions upon which human security 
depends) that demand attention from a normative perspective.  Second, the negative 
consequences of persistent armed conflict are not confined to the immediate locale of the 
conflict and often spillover into the surrounding region.  Third, ignoring persistent armed 
conflict has historically damaged economic interests of the international community due 
to loss of trade and high cost of interventions (military or humanitarian) that eventually 
become necessary.  
The devastating costs to human security—which include low levels of human 
development in addition to deaths from violence, disease, and malnutrition—are well 
documented (Cliffe & Roberts, 2011; Collier, 1999).  Most of today’s civil conflict and 
wars occur in developing countries with high poverty rates and low productivity that are 
exacerbated by the conflict.  Average incomes at the end of civil wars are typically 15 
percent lower than they would have been otherwise, driving even more people into 
extreme poverty. The time to recover from these economic costs can be decades as a 
result of lost infrastructure and capital flight that further reduce productivity, and 
increased military expenditures that tend to follow war (Collier, 2003). The loss of state 
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income, lack of accountability, and competition for resources that accompanies civil war 
further erodes already weak government institutions.  
In addition to destroying productive capacities, conflict persistence tends to lock 
refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) into a perpetual state of homelessness 
and hopelessness. The UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) reported a record 
59.5 million persons forcibly displaced by persecution, conflict and violence worldwide 
at the end of 2014, with the average displaced person spending 17 years in displacement 
situation (World at War: UNHCR Global Trends Forced Displacement in 2014, 2015).  
This was a 16% increase from the year before, representing the highest annual increase 
recorded in a single year.  Of these, 13.9 million were newly displaced. Almost 17 
million of the persons of concern to UNCHR in 2014 were in Sub-Sahara Africa, with 
recurring conflicts in Sudan, Nigeria, and the DRC account for 70% of the regional total 
(Albuja et al., 2014).  
The lack of human security for these refugees and IDPs presents humanitarian 
concerns of enormous proportions that can exacerbate grievances and trigger new 
conflicts in countries that bear the burden of receiving refugees.  These and other spill 
over effects of conflict-generated instabilities provide a second motivation for the 
research.  Persistent conflicts tend to cross-borders and become regional issues as 
demonstrated by conflicts across Africa (Figure 1).  The rise of the extremist Islamic 
State (IS) in the Middle East and Africa illustrates that such instabilities may quickly 
spread regionally, while the Ebola outbreak in West Africa illustrates the risk of rapidly 
spreading global consequences. It is no coincidence that the Ebola outbreak that spread 
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across the globe in 2014 originated in Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone—all countries 
having experienced varying degrees of conflict persistence over the past two decades.   
 
 
Figure 1 Heat Map of Geo-Located Conflict Event Frequency in Africa Illustrates Cross-Border 
Spillover Effects and Within-Country Localization of Conflict Events.  Data Source: Armed Conflict 
Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) Version 5 (Raleigh et al., 2010) 
 
Third, the international community is more involved in interventions in armed 
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interventions in civil conflict being the most likely use of armed force involving both 
major powers and less powerful states in the coming decades (Pickering & Kisangani, 
2009).  External interventions involving coalitions of the willing, regional peacekeepers, 
and international peace operations5 increased tenfold from an average of less than two per 
year during the Cold War to an average of more than 20 per year in the past decade 
(Hewitt et al., 2008). These interventions have entailed both Chapter VI and VII UN 
peacekeeping missions, and peace enforcement missions comprised of military coalitions 
of the willing and/or regional organizations acting under UN authorization or recognition.  
They involve increasing numbers of troop contributing countries (TCCs), rising 
dramatically from an average of just under fifty TCCs per year in 1990 to over 120 TCCs 
per year in 2014 (Human security report 2009-2010, 2011). At the same time, aid from 
the international community to these conflict affected countries has been rising steadily, 
with approximately $50 billion USD in aid going to countries with recurring conflicts in 
2014.6 Of this, approximately 50% is in the form of emergency humanitarian relief.  
In recent years, scholarly research has improved understanding of the macro-level 
conditions under which political instability is likely to break out, the dynamics of conflict 
escalation due to repression and instrumental violence, and the factors that impact 
conflict duration and termination. However, the ability to accurately predict where and 
when political instability will erupt into violent civil conflict, what policies will be most 
effective to prevent conflict, how to reduce the duration of conflict and increase the 
likelihood of sustainable peace are elusive goals of both academic and policy 
communities. In recent years, more than 200 independent variables have been 
                                                
5 These statistics include all peace enforcement, peace keeping, and peacebuilding missions.  
6 Data retrieved from www.aiddata.org on April 20, 2015.  
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quantitatively explored in the literature using large-N, cross-country comparative 
statistical analyses to improve understanding of the conditions that pose the highest risk 
of political instability, onset, and duration of armed civil conflict.  There is some degree 
of consensus on the significance of fewer than thirty of variables for conflict onset, with a 
high degree of consensus on no more than seven (Dixon, 2009; Sambanis, 2002).  
Discrepancies and inconsistencies around contested variables are most commonly 
attributed to different theoretical frameworks, data limitations, lack of methods for 
exploring complex interaction effects between variables, different methods used to 
operationalize measurements, and scaling effects (Buhaug & Lujala, 2005; Collier & 
Hoeffler, 2001; Dixon, 2009; Hirshleifer, 2001; Sambanis, 2002).  
In addition to theoretical understanding of correlations between risk and conflict, 
effective policy design must consider normative, material, economic, and political factors 
in context of causal mechanisms. Research designs based on large-N statistical studies do 
not lend themselves to context specific trade-off analyses. Incorporating system dynamics 
in the research design reveals new insights into possible causal mechanisms for observed 
correlations, and shows how those mechanisms are related to context in a framework that 
explores trade-offs between key policy levers.  These trade-offs include short term and 
long-term goals for resiliency, human security,7 and diminishment of conflict persistence. 
                                                
7 Human security is a people-centric approach to conflict analysis that includes freedom from want as well 





My theoretical framework draws on several research disciplines to formulate an 
integrative approach to policy analysis: political violence and armed civil conflict, 
interventions in civil conflict (security, development, and humanitarian aid) and complex 
adaptive systems, including structural system dynamics and socio-ecological resilience.8  
These theoretical foundations are summarized below and discussed in more detail in the 
literature review in Chapter 1.  
Different research perspectives inform the development of theories for the co-
evolution of civil conflict dynamics and third-party interventions—that of explaining 
conflict onset and duration; that of understanding the impact of foreign aid in conflict 
settings; that of explaining success or failure of peacekeeping operations; and that of 
understanding post-conflict stabilization and peacebuilding. Theories put forward across 
these perspectives to explain conflict persistence include economic risk-based decision-
making by rational actors; identity-based decision-making by marginalized groups; 
opportunity-based decision-making by political actors; and security-based decision-
making by competitors in a Hobbesian world. These theories associate different risk 
factors with conflict onset and those most often correlated with the cessation of hostilities 
and the duration of  “spells of peace”.  
                                                
8 Socio-ecological resilience is a concept introduced by Holling (1973) as a system property with three 
components: (1) the amount of disturbance a system can absorb and still remain with the same state or 
domain of attraction, (2) the degree to which the system is capable of self-organization (versus lack of 
organization, or organization forced by external factors), and (3) the degree to which the system can build 




Each of these theories is supported with some evidence, with no one theory 
dominating in all contexts.  As a result, the inter-relationship between the different risk 
factors and causal mechanisms for lasting peace versus conflict persistence that these 
theories identify remain an ongoing area of research.  Many widely adopted theories 
relating security and development to persistent civil conflict are grounded in the conflict 
trap model, wherein civil wars weaken state economies, reduce human security and 
resiliency, and create leaders and organizations vested in violence in ways that create 
positive feedback loops for increased conflict risk (Collier et al., 2003).   
These theories argue that low-income countries without effective development 
policies and strong governing institutions (to respond to and manage grievances) are at 
most risk of falling into a conflict trap (Collier & Sambanis, 2005; Goldstone et al., 
2010).  The relative explanatory power of development, political and security factors 
varies between researchers, with some focusing more on motivation—suggesting that 
perceived lack of legitimacy and inclusivity of governing institutions provide the most 
powerful explanans for conflict persistence (Call, 2012), while others attribute conflict 
persistence to structural factors – such as relative capacities involving state resources and 
reach (Holtermann, 2012; Merz, 2012; Ross, 2004).  There is general agreement, 
however, that intervention strategies using aid and development for risk reduction are 
more effective at different phases during and after conflict (Human Security Report 2009-
2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War, 2011).  Sequencing scenarios 
are important, and the most likely scenarios for breaking the conflict trap are postulated 
to involve early emphasis on security measures (e.g., external military peace 
enforcement, peacekeepers, and police) to reduce violence between belligerents and 
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protect citizens, followed by a build up of aid and development programs, conditional 
upon reform of government institutions (Collier et al., 2003; Hultman, Kathman, & 
Shannon, 2014; Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl, 2008; Schirch, 2013; Urquhart, 2007).  
These scenarios may require two decades or more to significantly reduce risk of recurring 
violent conflict. 
The necessity of security measures preceding aid and development programs is 
predicated on the logic of violence and hostilities in civil war.  Empirical research has 
shown striking variations of violence within civil wars that are not explained by the 
macro-level causes of war (Verwimp, Justino, & Bruck, 2009).  Some of the literature 
explains micro-level variations based on theories of political violence in which 
interactions between actors are shaped by the logic of asymmetric information (necessary 
to control territory), the dynamics of local rivalries and civilian constituencies (Fjelde & 
Hultman, 2014; Kalyvas, 2006; Kalyvas, 2012), local level economic grievances, which 
may be hidden from macro level statistics (Lu & Thies, 2011), and the exploitation of aid 
resources by belligerents (de Ree & Nillesen, 2009; Strandow, et al., 2010).  
The types of security interventions in civil conflict seem to matter.  Empirical 
analyses using disaggregated data on peace operations involving uniformed military 
personnel in civil conflict (e.g., size, mandate, and composition over time) has shown that 
increasing presence of uniformed UN peacekeeping troops reduces level of hostilities and 
may support enduring peace, independent of the type of conflict (Beardsley, 2011; Doyle 
& Sambanis, 2006; Fortna, 2004; Kathman, 2013).  However, to date, the presence of 
non-UN uniformed peacekeeping troops has not been shown to have a statistically 
significant effect on successful peacebuilding (Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl, 2008), 
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while the presence of UN observers alone is associated with increased levels of hostility 
(Hultman et al., 2014; Kathman, 2013). On the other hand, changes in the balance power 
brought about by external armed military interventions lead to increased violence against 
citizens (Wood et al., 2012).  The literature explains these empirical observations through 
rationalist theories grounded in the security dilemma, instrumental logic, and bargaining 
models.  Key explanatory variables in these theories are the relative capacity of the 
intervening troops, and perceived neutrality.  
Research has shown that humanitarian interventions in conflict settings where 
security is low (and hence where the aid is often most needed) can increase the risk of 
conflict and violence against citizens (Anderson, 1999; Balla & Reinhardt, 2008; Blouin 
& Pallage, 2008; Choi & Salehyan, 2013; de Ree & Nillesen, 2009; Nielsen et al., 2011; 
Strandow, 2014).  The empirical observations are explained through various theoretic 
lenses that include greed and corruption, opportunity exploitation, exclusionary practices, 
and learned dependence (Busse & Gröning, 2009; Gizelis & Kosek, 2005; Natsios, 1995; 
Svensson, 2000; Tavares, 2003).  
Studies of the impact of interventions on conflict persistence most often include 
interaction effects between belligerents and either peace operations or foreign aid but not 
all three, resulting in limited theorizing and testing of dynamic, interactive effects 
between peace operations, conflict, and humanitarian interventions and implications for 
conflict persistence.  For example, studies have shown that both increased aid in conflict 
settings and foreign aid shocks (e.g., severe decreases in aid revenues) can increase the 
likelihood of violence against citizens (Nielsen et al., 2011; Strandow, 2014). However, 
these studies have not tested for the consequent demand that either scenario places on 
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peace operations and the subsequent effects, nor controlled for differing policies of 
NGOs to implement principles of neutrality.  Conversely, studies have suggested that the 
presence of peace operations may reduce violence intensity and result in more lasting 
peace, but they are also associated with longer conflict durations (Beardsley, 2012; Doyle 
& Sambanis, 2006; Hultman et al., 2014).  The consequent demands on aid organizations, 
their responses, and the subsequent effects have not been systematically tested.  
The international community has responded to the research findings discussed 
above with four important trends.  The first is an increased emphasis on development 
assistance as a means of conflict prevention.9  The second is a growing role for Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in providing aid through development and 
humanitarian relief at community levels in conflict settings (Aal, 2000).  The third is 
donor emphasis on community resilience for aid programming in conflict settings 
(Buston & Smith, 2013; Mohamud & Kurtz, 2013a; USAID, 2013).  Finally, 
multidimensional peace operations are increasingly deployed in active conflicts, 
including those that involve regional organizations and coalitions for peace enforcement 
activities as precursors to UN peacekeeping operations (Bellamy & Williams, 2015).  
                                                
9 The US policy trend to emphasize development assistance in Africa over security assistance began in the 
early 1990s at end of the Cold War, based not so much on research into economic causes of civil war as 
belief in the democratic peace theory combined with perceptions of reduced national security threats as 
many communist regimes were being challenged internally (Orr, 1992).  In constant 1995 dollars, US AID 
allocations to its democracy and governance initiatives targeting developing countries around the world 
grew from $121 million to $722 million per year from 1990 to 2003 (Scott & Steele, 2011). This trend was 
amplified after 9/11 when foreign aid became a key weapon in the US global war on terror (Korb, 2008). 
However, the impact of foreign development aid on democratization processes and reducing terrorism is 
contested in the literature.   
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Efforts by the relevant policy communities to coordinate across these domains 
tend to be operationally focused,10 and lack theoretical understanding of interaction 
effects and their impact on resilience of risk factors across these domains at multiple 
levels (Irmer, 2009).11  As pointed out in recent policy research by the World Bank, 
interactive effects are especially important to consider when resources that start out as 
exogenous factors (e.g., those introduced through peacekeepers, humanitarian aid) 
become endogenous to the system over time (Cliffe & Roberts, 2011).    
There is also growing consensus that while macro-level studies (upon which 
much of the current wisdom on conflict management is based) provide important and 
useful insights for assessing conflict risk; they are insufficient to understand how local 
level incentives and constraints shape interactions between the civilian population and the 
armed actors that in turn influence conflict trajectories, dominant peace processes and 
long-term outcomes (Call, 2012; Justino, 2009; Sambanis, 2002; Verwimp et al., 2009).  
As a result, it is difficult to design policy interventions that account for local-level 
heterogeneity within conflicts, to ensure that interventions intended to increase resiliency 
of civilian populations do not also increase resiliency of combatants or spawn new 
grievances, and to understand the connections between local level interventions and 
macro level measures of conflict risk.  
                                                
10 For example, the UN typically appoints a Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
(DSRSDG) and a Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator of the UN country team to ensure 
effective coordination and integration of efforts in multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations.  In 
emergencies, peacekeeping and civilian personnel may participate in cluster meetings and mission level 
Joint Project Teams to coordinate with work of humanitarian actors.  The African Union Mission in 
Somalia (AMISOM) employs a similar model, while the Somalia NGO Consortium facilitates the exchange 
of information among members and between members and the peacekeeping community.   
11 Resilience as used here is the capacity of a system to absorb or re-organize in response to disturbance and 
stressors so as to maintain functionality (Walker et al., 2004).     
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Security and humanitarian aid organizations alike—e.g., US Department of 
Defense  (USDOD), European Union Military Commission (EUMC), the World Bank, 
the US Agency for International Development (USAID), United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC), and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)—recognize 
these interdependencies between different intervention vectors in civil conflict, and the 
need to consider multiple levels of policy implementation. They have accordingly called 
for more system-based approaches to doctrinal policy and operations in conflict 
settings.12  However, as noted during the daylong debate on UNSC Resolution 2171, such 
approaches are often at risk of being “little more than a thematic vision”.13   
                                                
12 For example, the US Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24 published in 2006 calls for explicit 
consideration of interactions between peacekeeping, stabilization, and kinetic operations while prioritizing 
the security of citizens in order to defeat insurgents.  In her foreword to the field manual, former US 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Sarah Sewall calls this systems approach a “radical departure” from 
previous military doctrine.  The EUMC also adopted a systems approach in its revised Concept for Military 
Planning of 2008, which calls for the integrated use of a wide range of tools across “institutions and policy 
areas that comprise political, diplomatic, economic, humanitarian, and military actions.” < 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST 10687 2008 INIT>, accessed August 10, 2015. 
Similarly, in adopting Resolution 2171, which pledges a systems approach to conflict prevention, the 
UNSC recognized in 2014 that early warning, preventive diplomacy, mediation, deployment, 
peacekeeping, disarmament and peacebuilding are “interdependent, complementary and non-sequential” < 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11528.doc.htm> accessed August 10, 2015.  The World Development 
Report of 2011 focuses on the interconnections between security, humanitarian relief, and development 
interventions.  The report notes that failure to address the security of citizens, justice, access to resources, 
and economic development with a systems approach results in repeated cycles of violence in fragile states, 
and makes specific recommendations for layered approaches across multiple levels. 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDRS/Resources/WDR2011_Overview.pdf> accessed August 10, 
2015.  Taking up this theme in 2012, the US AID hosted a summit on “Strengthening Country Systems” to 
explore ways to apply systems approaches being piloted by the Agency to the problems of aid 
effectiveness. <http://usaidlearninglab.org/events/strengthening-country-systems-experience-summit> 
accessed August 7, 2015. More recently, UNDP Administrator Helen Clark highlighted the need for 
systems approaches in her speech at the High Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing, July 14, 2015, 
“Building a New Vision to Address Long-term and Recurrent Humanitarian Crisis”. < 
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/speeches/2015/07/14/helen-clark-speech-at-high-
level-event-on-building-a-new-vision-to-address-long-term-and-recurrent-humanitarian-crisis-.html> 
accessed August 7, 2015.  
13 Remarks made by Carolyn Schwalger, Deputy Permanent Representative of New Zealand at the 7247th 
meeting of the United Nations Security Council, “Speakers in All-Day Debate Cite Early Warning, 
Mediation, Cooperation with Regional Organizations as Effective Tools,” UN Meetings Coverage and 
Press Releases, SC/11528, 21 August 2014. < http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11528.doc.htm>, 
Accessed August 10 2015.  
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The research conducted for this dissertation attempts to bridge the gap from 
policy vision for a systems approach to theoretical understanding and implementation 
through a scalable framework using concepts of complex adaptive systems.14  Dynamics 
in complex adaptive systems depend on the agency and motivation of interactive actors, 
the structures within which they interact, and emergent system properties. This 
theoretical framework (1) integrates motivational and structural theories of conflict and 
tests their explanatory power across levels; and (2) generates and tests new explanatory 
hypotheses for dynamic patterns of conflict persistence that includes interactive effects 
between peace operations and humanitarian aid interventions. Specifically, I use concepts 
from system dynamics and socio-ecological resiliency to (1) empirically examine how 
interactive effects between peace operations, humanitarian aid interventions, and 
endogenous structural factors shape conflict dynamics,  (2) explain these interactive 
effects on patterns of conflict persistence and resiliency of different actors, and (3) 
discuss policy implications.  
System dynamics provides both a theoretical framework and a quantitative 
methodology for policy analysis and design.  Pioneered in the 1970s at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, system dynamics emphasizes a continuous view of situations 
characterized by interdependence, mutual interaction, information feedback, and circular 
causality (Forrester, 1968; Donnatella Meadows, 2008). System dynamics has provided 
insights for diverse policy issues involving different levels of social, technical, political, 
                                                
14 A complex adaptive system is one with characteristics of both randomness and structure in which self-
organizing, goal-seeking entities interact in constrained, yet unpredictable ways that result in emergent 
system properties (Bar-Yam, 1997; Hayden, 2007; Holland, 1998).  
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managerial, economic, and natural systems over a wide range of timeframes.15 One of the 
earliest applications of system dynamics to complex policy analysis resulted in the 
prescient book, Limits to Growth, which sparked a global debate on environmental and 
societal consequences of unchecked development on a planet with finite resources that 
continues to this day (Meadows et al., 1972).   
The concept of reference behaviors is fundamental to system dynamics.  The 
premise is that there are a limited number of archetypal patterns (referred to as reference 
behaviors) of how system properties change over time that represent the dynamic state of 
a system (e.g., stable or unstable, resilient, equilibrium).  Basic reference behaviors are 
exponential growth and decay, S-shaped growth, overshoot and collapse, and oscillations 
(Figure 2). System dynamics explains these behavior patterns as the result of underlying 
structures characterized by balancing and amplifying feedback loops between stocks and 
flows—and the delays within those loops—that determine growth rates, capacity to 
achieve goals, and the resultant system state (Coyle, 1998).  Each feedback loop is a 
closed chain of causal influences and constitutes a unit of analysis for the system.    
Chapter 3 discusses the feedback loop structures that lead to these behaviors and 
application to theoretical understanding of conflict persistence in more detail. 
 
                                                
15 Examples include US industrial competitiveness and climate change legislation; illegal drug use and 
criminal justice reform; corporate leadership, productivity, profitability, and innovation cycles; integrated 
nation-state economic and social policy planning; epidemiology and immune system responses; hospital 
surge capacity during crises; humanitarian relief during natural disasters; transportation systems, land use 
and economic regeneration in urban settings; sustainable water management in developing countries; and 
conduct of military operations during asymmetric warfare (Bruckner et al., 1989; Coyle et al., 1999; 




Figure 2 Reference Behaviors of Dynamic Systems Depend on Feedback Loops and Delays in 
Response to Changes 
 
Drawing on knowledge of the theoretical relationship between these reference 
behaviors and underlying causal structures, one can infer dominant structure from 
observed behavior patterns, and use that inferred knowledge to clarify causal mechanisms 
and better anticipate future behaviors and system properties (e.g., growth, resilience) that 
may obtain from policy interventions (Forrester, 1968; Sterman, 2000).   For sustainable 
change in reference behaviors, interventions must affect variables that shift the relative 
strength of these feedback loops and their directionality.  However, the underlying 
mechanisms through which the feedback loops operate are contained within the structure 
of the system itself (Sterman, 2000) and are often hidden from direct observation. 
Reducing the risk of conflict persistence while enhancing human security requires robust 
intervention strategies that strengthen balancing loops relative to reinforcing loops 
without increasing resiliency of belligerents.   
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Combining concepts of reference behaviors and structure from system dynamics 
and resiliency from socio-ecological research with findings in the conflict literature, my 
theoretical framework explores resiliency of belligerents and civilians as an endogenous 
explanatory variable that interact dynamically with interventions to affect the nature of 
conflict outcomes, where conflict outcomes are evaluated as the quasi-equilibrium state 
represented by reference behaviors, and resiliency is related to capacity and connectivity 
(Figure 3).  This framing facilitates discovery of dynamic structural factors and processes 
as causal mechanisms for conflict persistence across different contexts.  The approach 
requires granularity of conflict data than has only recently become available through two 
data sets on conflict events in Africa—the Uppsala Conflict Data Project Geo-Referenced 
Event Dataset (UCDP-GED) version 1.5-2011, 1989-2010 and the Armed Conflict 
Location and Event Dataset (ACLED) Version 5 1997-2014 (Raleigh et al., 2010; 




Figure 3 Theoretical Framework Integrating Structural Interventions in Conflict with Concepts of 




In 34 cases of persistent conflict in 32 African countries between 1989-2014, the 
frequency of conflict events recorded in both datasets displays patterns that map to four 
of the reference behavior modes of system dynamics shown in Figure 2: overshoot and 
collapse (Group A), highly damped response to an impulse (Group B), exponential 
growth (Group C), and oscillations about a mean (Group D).  The mappings are shown 
in Table 1. The protocol for selecting these cases and assigning reference behaviors is 
discussed in Chapter 2 and in Appendix A; differences in conflict events recorded by 
UCDP/GED and ACLED are discussed in Appendix B.    
Only a few of the cases of overshoot and collapse (Group A) or damped impulse 
(Group B) appear to have achieved a state of relative peace in 2014, with more than ten 
years since the last episode of conflict recurrence (e.g., Sierra Leone, Angola).  The case 
of Sierra Leone is an apparent instance of vulnerability (low resilience) on the part of all 
belligerents, whereas Angola is a case of adaptability with eventual transformation (aided 
by outside interventions).  Many others have recently experienced or are currently in the 
midst of recurrent episodes of conflict (e.g., Mali, Central African Republic, Namibia, 
Liberia, Burundi, Chad, Lesotho). Some of these recurrences follow more than ten years 
of apparent peace (e.g., Mali, Lesotho, Liberia). The theory predicts that recurrence is 
due to a regeneration of capacity for overshoot and collapse, and either a withdrawal of 
an external constraint or an insertion of capacity from external sources for damped 
impulse.  
Cases of exponential growth (Group C, which includes Somalia, Mozambique) 
and oscillatory behavior (Group D, which includes Ivory Coast, Ethiopia) display 
resiliency that supports continuous conflict. While some oscillatory behavior is present in 
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both of these groups, the primary difference between them is the increase in frequency of 
events relative to the amplitude of the oscillations.  For exponential growth (Group C), 
increase in mean frequency of events significantly exceeds the amplitude of the 
oscillations; where as in oscillatory behavior (Group D), the amplitude of the oscillations 
exceeds the annual increase (or in some cases decrease) of the mean frequency of events.    
This suggests that for oscillatory behavior (Group D) balancing structures that dampen 
positive feedback (which increases capacity for conflict) are of the same order of 
influence as the amplifying structures.  
System dynamics theory suggests that these reference behaviors result from 
different structures and processes characterized by feedback loops that are either 
balancing or amplifying, and whose relative strengths derive from resource constraints, 
perceived gaps in reaching goals, and delays in responding to changing conditions. These 
structures are discussed in more detail in Chapter 1.  Building on existing knowledge 
from conflict and peacebuilding literature – my research tests whether this dynamic 
systems framework provides new insights to explain long-term trends of conflict 
persistence and variability, how they relate to resiliency and capacity of belligerents, and   
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Table 1 Conflict Cases and Reference Behavior Types 
 
 
the impact of external interventions. This study systematically examines the explanatory 
power of the relationship between empirically derived conflict reference behaviors and 
hypothesized risk factors and causal mechanisms for the associated dynamic structures 
through the hypotheses presented below.   







Chad a 1966 2 22 18 262 448 558 9200 5869 20
Burundi a 1965 2 20 18 1349 2832 3028 11079 20650 6
Liberia a 1980 2 15 18 550 595 1241 19422 1241 5
Namibia a 1999 2 6 12 22 192 573 76 272 1
Rwanda a 1990 2 10 18 467 503 583 168567 7581 4
South>AfricaBANC a 2 13 18 2653 889 921 5000 921 6
86 102 5303 5459 6904 213344 36534
AngolaB>UNITA b 1975 2 17 14 1801 2454 2955 29616 145504 4
CongoBB b 1993 2 14 17 181 258 332 15569 492 5
Guinea b 2000 2 10 17 68 578 705 1042 3067 4
GuineaBBissau b 1998 2 4 16 22 133 209 706 956 2
Lesotho b 1998 2 1 13 5 59 104 13 174 2
Mali b 1990 1 14 18 69 579 966 1462 2368 4
Sierra>Leone b 1991 2 12 18 1416 1906 4574 13671 150 5
72 113 3562 5967 9845 62079 152711
Bukina>Faso c 1987 2 . 12 . 69 360 . 235 .
Cameroon c 1960 2 13 18 25 246 362 359 0 3
DRC c 1964 2 22 18 1593 6272 8876 93070 70353 7
Gabon c 1964 2 . 10 16 107 19 2
Mauritania c 2010 2 7 13 14 59 345 196 151 4
Mozambique c 1977 2 6 17 263 301 561 5759 273 4
NigeriaBBH c 1966 2 9 17 42 377 415 1438 7415 4
Somalia c 1982 2 22 18 1564 12901 15150 20734 19700 12
Sudan c 1971 3 22 18 1387 5038 6505 42146 53155 9
101 141 4888 25279 32681 163702 151301
Algeria d 1992 2 21 18 3648 2014 2909 19695 11594 7
CARBSeleka d 2003 2 7 12 50 2137 2450 473 1766 5
CARBpolitical d 1992 2 19 18 128 687 765 699 2837 5
Ivory>Coast d 2002 2 16 18 114 950 1564 1432 3957 7
EthiopiaBONLF d 1964 1 17 18 544 137 153 1207 1161 4
Ethiopia:Pol d 1990 2 19 18 431 137 156 3871 1252 2
Kenya_Turk d 1971 1 18 18 108 286 291 1151 1618 4
KenyaBKik d 1966 1 10 18 83 429 464 107 1070 4
Niger d 1991 2 13 18 74 160 355 809 681 6
NigeriaBP d 1966 3 20 18 228 499 521 3469 3190 4
Senegal d 1988 1 20 18 257 222 815 2106 1381 2
Uganda d 1971 2 22 18 1150 3448 4381 12817 14769 8
Zimbabwe d 1967 2 9 18 53 4072 5075 341 354 2























Four hypotheses grounded in the theoretical literature on civil conflict, 
interventions, and resiliencies in dynamic systems test the likelihood of each of the 
observed conflict reference behaviors.  The hypotheses are derived by associating 
likelihood of each conflict reference behavior with predicted risk factors for conflict 
duration derived from country level characteristics (e.g., size and growth rate of 
economy, dependence on commodity exports, poverty, governance and institutional 
capacity, social cohesion, political exclusion); conflict characteristics (e.g., number and 
capacity of belligerent groups, state security capacity, wars on borders, type of war, 
sanctuary); and intervention characteristics (e.g., type, size and duration of intervention, 
intervention actor).  Moreover, different combinations of these risk factors are 
hypothesized to result in different resiliency characteristics associated with each 
reference behavior. 
Overshoot and collapse (Group A) and damped impulse (Group B) are both 
associated with relatively shorter episodes or continuous duration of conflict compared to 
exponential growth (Group C) or oscillatory behavior (Group D), implying stronger 
conflict balancing mechanisms, but the conflict balancing mechanisms between 
overshoot and collapse and damped impulse are hypothesized to be different.  Overshoot 
and collapse is hypothesized to be associated with balancing mechanisms that are based 
on resource constraints coupled with higher opportunity costs cooperative conflict 
management; damped impulse is hypothesized to be associated with balancing 




H-A: Conflict dynamics of overshoot and collapse (Group A) are dominated by 
balancing feedback loops of first order systems with decaying carrying capacity 
(associated with high levels of precariousness of both state and belligerents, low levels of 
system latitude to support conflict but higher levels for cooperative conflict 
management). The decaying capacity is hypothesized to result from conflict resource 
bases that are sufficient to support an initial high conflict escalation rate but are 
insufficient to sustain high conflict rates when balanced by opportunity costs over time, 
absent large infusions of aid, peace operations, or other military interventions.  
Belligerents use high levels of indiscriminant violence through asymmetric strategies to 
attempt to increase reach relative to state and gain control of resources. Control of the 
resource base is inadequate to sustain the high levels of violence and the conflict 
collapses.  Belligerents may be resilient at a later date if they maintain coherence and 
access to a resource based is reconstituted.  All else being equal, this is less likely as long 
as the opportunity costs of conflict remain high.  
These conditions are hypothesized to be most likely with relatively higher levels 
of GDP per capita but low GDP growth, smaller population size, stronger governance, 
lower levels of poverty, higher levels of state reach and equality, less dependence on 
commodity exports, and higher levels of social fragmentation. They should be more 
likely to be associated with lower levels of aid during periods of high conflict intensity, 
negotiated settlements without external military interventions, and more likely to be 
followed by an international peacekeeping presence and higher levels of aid during 
periods of lower conflict intensity. Overall percentage of humanitarian to total aid is 
comparatively low to moderate. The type of conflict is hypothesized to more likely to be 
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political with a relatively lower number of belligerent groups, and is less likely to involve 
nearby conflict on the border. Resilience of actors in Group A is likely to be low due to 
the collapse of capacity of primary contestants, with the exception of a victor when one 
exists.   
 
H-B: Conflict dynamics of damped impulse (Group B) are dominated by a strong 
state response to transient shock that creates temporarily high levels of relative reach and 
capacity for belligerents. Belligerents may be resilient at a later date if they maintain 
coherence and the conflict balancing force is relaxed. All else being equal, this is less 
likely as long as opportunity costs of conflict remain high. These conditions are predicted 
to be associated with a high level of exogenous system latitude (strong connections to 
external events), asymmetric precariousness between state and belligerents (related to 
capacities) and are hypothesized to be more likely in political conflict in the presence of 
conflict on borders or coups, coupled with higher likelihood of dependence on 
commodity exports (which will be correlated with higher GDP per capita), higher state 
security capacity, moderate state reach supported by external military intervention (by ad 
hoc coalitions or unilateral actors), stronger governance coupled with higher corruption, 
lower number of belligerent groups with higher likelihood of sanctuary, and lower 
populations.  Aid shocks are more likely, but with a low to moderate percentage of the 
total expected to be in support of humanitarian relief. Resilience of actors in Group B 
depends on the strength of damping mechanism – whether it be through exogenous 
factors or internal transformation, relative to the impulse function 
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The underlying structure for exponential growth (Group C) is similar to that for 
overshoot and collapse (Group A), with the difference being that the combined potential 
for balancing loops from resource constraints, opportunity costs, or state reach and 
capacity are low compared to conflict resources and drivers.  Oscillatory behavior (Group 
D) is the most common among complex systems, with relative parity between conflict 
amplifying and balancing mechanisms, and has the highest frequency of observations in 
the sample. The longer periods of continuous conflict observed in exponential growth and 
oscillatory behavior (Groups C and D) compared to overshoot and collapse (Groups A 
and B) are hypothesized to result from relatively stronger conflict reinforcing 
mechanisms compared to balancing mechanisms.  However, the balance between these 
mechanisms is hypothesized to differ sufficiently between exponential growth and 
oscillatory behavior to generate distinct reference behaviors. Specifically,  
 
H-C: Conflict dynamics of exponential growth (Group C) are dominated by first 
order effects from conflict amplifying mechanisms (associated with low levels of 
belligerent precariousness) that overwhelm conflict-balancing mechanisms. These 
conditions are hypothesized to be most likely when state and belligerents have parity in 
capacity and reach in the context of low opportunity cost of conflict, so that each side 
engages in escalating, but moderated levels of violence commensurate with resources 
available.  Fungible aid interventions amplify otherwise moderate belligerent reach and 
capacity while peace operations and other military interventions amplify otherwise low to 
moderate state capacity.  All else being equal, the dynamic interactions between these 
interventions create resilience among all belligerents and the state, generating new 
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belligerents (or gatekeepers to allow resource flows to belligerents) that feed economies 
at many scales that are dependent on conflict persistence, with little incentives for peace 
settlements.   These conditions are predicted to be correlated with lower dependence on 
commodity exports, lower GDP per capita; higher male youth unemployment; moderate 
levels of social fractionalization and ethnic polarization; more corruption and weaker 
governance; higher number of belligerent groups, with more influence from religious 
extremists; sanctuary for belligerent groups; higher levels of humanitarian aid as a 
percent of total but low levels of aid effectiveness.  External interventions, if present, are 
hypothesized to be more likely to be regional or international peace enforcement missions 
rather than coalition or unilateral compared to other outcomes. Conflicts in Group C 
exhibit adaptive behaviors by belligerents unconstrained by capacity limitations.  This 
should be ultimately unsustainable and reach a plateau at carrying capacity at which point 
one should see oscillatory behavior or a tipping point to overshoot and collapse. 
 
H-D: Conflict dynamics of oscillatory behavior (Group D) are dominated by low 
to moderately damped responses in higher order systems where “higher order” implies 
more complexity of interactions between balancing and reinforcing feedback mechanisms 
(resulting in moderate to high levels of endogenous system latitude). The balancing 
mechanisms involve resource constraints and state strength, but neither are as strong as 
those in Group A or B due to lower opportunity costs and state capacity.  Amplifying 
mechanisms are more persistent than those for overshoot and collapse or damped 
impulse, but not as strong as for exponential growth   These conditions are hypothesized 
to be most likely for conflict over land, and to be associated with low to medium GDP 
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per capita (supported by small to moderate reliance on commodity exports), higher 
poverty rates, weak governance, moderate state capacity coupled with low state reach, 
higher populations, a moderate number of belligerent groups, low ethnic polarization and 
higher social fragmentation with low equality measures.  Cases in Group D exhibit 
resilient, adaptive behavior on the part of two or more belligerents and state. All else 
being equal, neither side has both the capacity and reach to prevail over the other, yet 
maintain adaptive capacity to perpetuate low intensity conflict over time as long as 
carrying capacity and the relatively low opportunity costs do not change  
 
Research Contributions 
The research, practitioner, and policy communities lack consensus understanding 
of how security, aid, and development intervention vectors interact to shape conflict 
dynamics and outcomes, causal mechanisms for those dynamics and outcomes, and the 
relationships to resiliency of various actors in conflict.   Such an understanding is critical 
for the layering and sequencing of complex interventions (Call, 2008; Fortna, 2008; 
Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl, 2008).    However, most quantitative conflict research 
relies on cross-national statistical models that are more descriptive than structural or 
causal.  As noted by Fearon (2010), these models  
 “have been of great value for making clearer which political, economic, 
and demographic factors are associated with higher propensity in the last 
60 years, which factors are not, and which are associate with onset when 
you control for other factors.  But for many covariates found to be 
statistically and substantively significant in these models, the argument for 
interpreting the estimated coefficients as causal effects is tenuous or 




Factors that make causal interpretation difficult include inadequate data collection 
and analysis at local levels (where many of the interactions between intervention vectors 
occur) and across time; the paucity of studies that examine interaction between relief aid 
and peacekeeping in conflict; and a methodological gap in connecting micro-level agency 
with higher-level structural effects in complex systems.  This research contributes 
understanding to the relationship between dynamic conflict patterns over time and 
feedback between exogenous and endogenous variables to fill this theoretical gap in the 
literature.  
A unique contribution of this research to the literature is to differentiate among 
these causal mechanisms within conflicts of similar durations. For example, overshoot 
and collapse can be differentiated from damped impulse by relative and absolute depth of 
poverty measures, dependence on oil, ethnic polarization, measures of state reach and 
rebel sanctuary, amount of aid as a percentage of GDP, and presence of UN peace 
operations.  Exponential growth can be differentiated from oscillatory dynamics by 
measures of polity, social fragmentation, state reach, and peace operations by regional 
organizations versus ad hoc coalitions, ratio of humanitarian to total aid, and ratio of 
military expenditures to aid.  
Finally, these results show how different dynamics between mixed underlying 
causal mechanisms at micro and macro levels affect resilience of conflict actors. Using 
process tracing results and responses from 100 structured field interviews with 
peacekeeping troops, NGOs and INGOs and the policy community regarding the Somali 
conflict, a simple model is developed to provide insights for how these causal 
mechanisms affect balancing loops involving peace operations and belligerents and 
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reinforcing loops involving humanitarian interventions and local capacity to generate 
competitive market for peace and human security resources. Human security dilemmas 
emerge when the pursuit of short-term humanitarian relief, counter-terrorism or 
counterinsurgency goals confound the achievement of longer-term security and 
stabilization goals by increasing resilience of belligerents.  
This study supplements existing data on military capacities deployed in peace 
operations in conflict settings, advances theoretical understanding into the relationship 
between interventions of aid and peace operations, and contributes to methodological 
tools for policy analysis combining the unique lens of system behaviors with econometric 
analyses for dynamic trend analysis over time.  Specifically, this research illustrates how 
to integrate risk analysis based on econometric analysis with dynamic systems analysis to 
explore system structures and properties that drive complex systems behaviors that 
change over time.   Further research should be conducted to extrapolate this methodology 
to show how structural changes in intervention strategies at the micro-level may 
propagate through system behavior at higher-level scales through the power of balancing 
loops.  Mechanisms in the balancing loops become the policy levers and pathways most 






Chapter 1: Background  
 
In 1991, Mohamed Siad Barre was ousted from power in Somalia, after 22 years 
in power.  As clan-based warlords fought for power, the world media presented images of 
a famine-driven humanitarian crisis demanding intervention by the international 
community to provide secure delivery of relief aid.  The UN was unwilling and unable to 
conduct such operations alone, and requested the help of the US.  At the time, United 
States Ambassador Oakley and the US Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that since 
humanitarian, political and security goals were so interdependent, an integrated policy 
between the United States (US) and the United Nations (UN) must be established. 
Progress had to occur concurrently along all the tracks of this three-track strategy. 
Without a stable government, functioning police forces, and long-term economic aid, 
Somalia would slide back toward disaster (Hirsch & Oakely, 1995; Poole, 2005).   
UNITAF fulfilled its humanitarian task, but when the US and UN pulled out of 
Somalia in 1995, the mandates of the UNSOMI and UNSOM II peace operations were 
left unfulfilled. Security steadily eroded and political reconstruction was stillborn. Now 
more than twenty years later, the long shadows of these events are still felt, as 
underscored by the visit of US Secretary of State John Kerry to Mogadishu in May 2015, 
where he met with leaders of the struggling national government of Somalia and the 
world’s largest military intervention force, AMISOM, to support efforts for political 
stability, security, and economic development in this ravaged country where Al Shabaab 
was born and continues to thrive and threaten the region.  Current crises in Syria, 
Chapter 1 
 32 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen are plagued by the same difficulty in developing 
intervention strategies that can simultaneously be militarily effective, address human 
security concerns, and support long term peacebuilding through political means. 
Additional experiences in Sudan, Ethiopia, India, the DRC, Columbia, and 
Myanmar, to name a few, show that this trajectory of conflict persistence in spite of 
international interventions is not unique to Somalia or today’s headline stories.  More 
than 50% of the 28 armed intrastate conflicts listed by UCDP/PRIO in 2014 as active 
since 2010 were internationalized. All of these conflicts were initiated prior to 2000, with 
some (primarily in Asia) having roots that date back more than 50 years16.  The conflicts 
are spread across four continents, and generate humanitarian crises, threats to security 
interests, and economic costs on an increasingly global scale.  The countries in which 
these conflicts are located received almost $44 billion USD in development assistance 
and aid from the international community in 201317, and more than 130,000 
peacekeeping troops from UN and regional organizations were deployed to these 
conflicts in 2014.   
 
Definition of Terms  
Civil Conflict 
Civil conflict is ubiquitous, sometimes generating productive and positive 
outcomes, but more often creating human misery and far-reaching security threats.   It 
can be armed or unarmed, violent or nonviolent.  This thesis concerns organized, 
persistent, armed intrastate civil conflicts, in which at least one side involves non-state 
                                                
16 Data from UCDP/PRIO armed conflict dataset, version 4.  
17 Data from AIDData.org, http://aiddata.org/aiddata-research-releases; accessed April 15, 2015.  
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actors who regard it as necessary and good to wage violent conflict against hostile 
opponents because of incompatible issues seen to be at stake.  These incompatibilities 
typically pertain to control of the government (type of political system, the replacement 
of the central government, or a change in its composition) or territory (the status of a 
specified territory, e.g., secession or autonomy).  
This definition is consistent with the definition in the ACLED, but departs from 
those in the literature that only consider incompatibilities resulting in at least 25 battle-
related deaths.18  By widening the definition, two conflicts were included that would not 
have been otherwise – the civil conflict in Burkina Faso where large-scale violence 
followed coups in 2014 and 2015,19,20 and the Caprivi secessionist conflict in Namibia 
between 1994-1999.  In addition, many more conflict events are recorded to provide a 
more realistic and rich portrayal of the dynamics of civil conflict.  
Consistent with the literature, conflict events are defined on the basis of 
encounters between belligerents, which may or may not involve violence or death.  Many 
of today’s conflicts consist of episodic sequences of such events that stop and start again 
without clear outcomes.  Using the typology of the Armed Conflict Event and Location 
Data Project, events may be battles (with or without change of territory), violent riots and 
protests, violence against citizens, and remote violence (Raleigh et al., 2010).  For this 
                                                
18 Several thresholds of battlefield deaths for defining civil conflict are used in the literature, resulting in 
different samples for analysis. Fearon (2004) -- who only considers large scale civil war in his analysis of 
conflict duration -- uses a threshold of an average annual 100 deaths, with a total deaths no less than 1000 
over the course of the conflict and at least 100 deaths on both sides;  the Correlates of War project requires 
a minimum of 1000 battle fatalities within a twelve year period (Singer & Small, 1994);  the UCDP/PRIO 
dataset uses a threshold of 25 annual battle deaths (Gleditsch et al., 2002) 
19Herve Taoko, Alan Cowell and Rukmini Callimachi, “Violent Protests Topple Government in Burkina 
Faso”, October 30, 2014.  Retrieved February 2016 from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/31/world/africa/burkina-faso-protests-blaise-compaore.html?_r=0;   





research, a conflict is considered to be persistent if conflict events (associated with the 
same incompatibility) continuously occur from year-to-year for more than ten years, or if 
two or more episodes of the same conflict occurs within a ten year time period, regardless 
of the time length of the episode or the length of time between episodes.  This is similar 
to (but more specific than) the definition used in the Human Security Report 2012, which 
defines a persistent conflict as “one that involves many years of fighting” (Mack, 2012).  
Persistent conflicts may consist of sustained periods of active conflict, or may experience 
apparent “spells of peace” during which there are no observed or recorded violent 
conflict events, but during which time the causal mechanisms for conflict have not been 
resolved.  This definition is also consistent with that used in the UCDP Conflict 
Termination Dataset (Kreutz, 2010a), and allows for studying multiple dimensions of 
conflict and facilitates the analysis of dynamic trends over time (Merz, 2012).  Data for 
conflict events and aid have only recently been available that is coded by incompatibility 
and event type at the sub national level, so as to be able to conduct analysis based on this 
definition of conflict persistence.   
 
Belligerents 
Standard definitions from the literature are used for belligerents and state, 
ensuring consistency with the data sources and previous research.  The following 
definitions from the Uppsala Conflict Data Project are adopted:  
“Belligerents are the parties that form the incompatibility by stating 
incompatible positions. The incompatibility (i.e. the conflict issue) must concern 
governmental power (type of political system, the replacement of the central 
government or the change of its composition), territory (the status of a territory, e.g. 
the change of the state in control of a certain territory - interstate conflict - 




A state is an internationally recognized sovereign government controlling 
a specific territory or an internationally unrecognized government 
controlling a specified territory whose sovereignty is not disputed by 
another internationally recognized sovereign government previously 
controlling the same territory.  
 
Opposition organization: Any non-governmental group of people having 
announced a name for their group and using armed force to influence the 
outcome of the stated incompatibility.”21 
 
 
Peace Operations and Foreign Interventions 
In 1992, UN Secretary–General Boutros-Ghali provided a schema for 
conceptualizing peace operations primarily under Chapter VI of the UN Charter 
involving preventive diplomacy (pre-conflict), peacemaking (during conflict), and 
peacebuilding (post-conflict), within which peacekeeping was defined as  
“The deployment of a UN Presence in the field, hitherto with the consent 
of all the parties concerned, normally involving UN military and/or police 
personnel and frequently civilians.  Peacekeeping is an activity that 
expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the 
making of peace” (Ghali, 1992). 
 
Ghali also argued that collective security concepts as contained in Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter require the UN Security Council to be prepared for peace enforcement 
missions “to maintain or restore international peace and security in the face of a "threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression”.    
The 2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations  (“Brahimi 
Report”) follows Ghali’s conceptualization of peace operations according to tools and 
activities in one of three principle phases—peace making (“use of diplomacy and 
                                                
21 Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research, “Definitions”, 
http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/.   Retrieved January 1, 2015. 
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mediation to bring active conflicts to a halt”); peacekeeping (“primarily military model of 
observing ceasefires and forcing separations after inter-State wars”, as well as “complex 
model of many elements, military and civilian, working together to build peace in the 
dangerous aftermath of civil wars”); and peacebuilding (“activities undertaken on the far 
side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace”) .    
During the 1990s, as the study of peace operations flourished, so too did 
definitions of, and terminology for, peace operations.  The terms “peacebuilding”, 
“peacekeeping”, and “peace operations” are used interchangeably in the literature across 
a confusing variety of definitions that range from broad mandates aimed at any activities 
promoting peace and independent of specific actors, to definitions concerned strictly with 
the organizations involved, the tasks that they perform, or the conflict phase during which 
operations are deployed (Bellamy & Williams, 2011; Paris, 2000). Some definitions 
exclude operations by unilateral or non-UN actors, or predicate definitions on the 
performance of specific tasks.  
In an attempt to bring more analytic clarity to research, (Diehl et al., 1998) define 
peacekeeping operations according to taxonomy of tasks in twelve categories ranging 
from traditional peacekeeping (“the stationing of neutral, lightly armed troops with the 
permission of the host state(s) as an interposition force following a cease-fire to separate 
combatants and promote an environment suitable for conflict resolution”) to interventions 
in support of democracy (including “military operations intended to overthrow existing 
leaders and to support freely elected government officials”), humanitarian assistance 
during conflict, and sanctions enforcement. Such definitions suffer from over-
specification lacking flexibility across a spectrum of mandates and contexts, and 
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assumption of norms and theoretical framing that is not universally accepted (such as 
liberal peace).  
As different taxonomies for peace operations have flourished in the past twenty 
years, so too have the types of peace operations deployed to conflict settings.   In 
response to this trend, Bellamy and Williams (2011) define peace operations as those 
which  
“involve the expeditionary use of uniformed personnel (police and/or 
military) with or without UN authorization, with a mandate or program to:  
1)  assist in the prevention of armed conflict by supporting a peace 
process; 
2)  serve as an instrument to observe or assist in the implementation 
of ceasefires or peace agreements; or 
3) enforce ceasefires, peace agreements or the will of the UN Security 
Council in order to build stable peace” (Bellamy & Williams, 
2011). 
 
Types of peace operations include preventive deployments, traditional peacekeeping, 
wider peacekeeping, peace enforcement, assisting transitions and peace support 
operations.  Actors may be unilateral, coalitions of the willing (e.g., regional 
organizations (e.g., African Union or Economic Community of West African States, and 
international organizations including the UN.  
The US Joint Publication 3-07.3 (Peace Operations, 2012) defines peace 
operations similarly to Bellamy (2011) as   
“Crisis response and limited contingency operations (that) normally 
include international efforts and military missions to contain conflict, 
redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and 
rebuilding and to facilitate the transition to legitimate governance (and) 
may be conducted under the sponsorship of the United Nations (UN), 
another intergovernmental organization (IGO), within a coalition of 
agreeing nations, or unilaterally.”  
 
 Aligning terms of reference with the UN conceptualization of peace operations, 
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the US doctrine employs the following categorical definitions of peacekeeping, peace 
enforcement, peace building, peace making, and conflict prevention:  
1)  Peace keeping: military operations undertaken with the consent of all major 
parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an 
agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic 
efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. 
2) Peace enforcement: application of military force, or the threat of its use, 
normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with 
resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.  
3) Peace building: stability actions that strengthen and rebuild governmental 
infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. 
4) Peacemaking: process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of 
peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute and resolves issues that 
led to it.  
5) Conflict prevention: a peace operation employing complementary diplomatic, 
civil, and, when necessary, military means to monitor and identify the causes of 
conflict, and take timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or 
resumption of hostilities. 
The US joint doctrine places primary responsibility for tasks (1) and (2) with military 
forces and with diplomatic and civilian organizations for tasks (3) to (5).    
The following definition of peace operations adopted from literature for this 
dissertation research is most closely aligned with the US joint doctrine:  
"Peace operations involve the expeditionary use of uniformed personnel 
(police and/or military) with or without UN authorization, with a mandate 
Chapter 1 
 39 
or program to:  1) Assist in the prevention of armed conflict by supporting 
a peace process; 2) Serve as an instrument to observe or assist in the 
implementation ceasefires or peace agreements; or 3) Enforce ceasefires, 
peace agreements or the will of the UN Security Council on order to build 
stable peace” (Bellamy & Williams, 2011).  
 
Peacekeepers 
Actors other than the UN blue helmets are increasingly involved in partnership 
peacekeeping, where different types of actors cooperate to achieve their objectives 
(Bellamy & Williams, 2011).  Usually, but not necessarily acting under authorization by 
the UN or the auspices of a regional organization, these actors include  
• International and regional organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU);  
• Coalitions of the willing, such as UNITAF in Somalia in 1992, INTERFET in 
East Timor in 1999, and ISAF in Afghanistan;  




Foreign aid is defined to be those goods, services, and financial benefits 
transferred to government or population groups for the purpose of supporting economic 
development or providing humanitarian relief.  Foreign aid for development purposes 
refers only to those parts of capital inflow which normal market incentives do not provide 
and consists of long term loans repayable in foreign currency, grants (including debt 
relief) and soft loans repayable in local currency, sale of surplus products for local 
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currency payments, and technical assistance (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1961; Tierney et al., 
2011).    
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) has traditionally been one of the primary 
sources of foreign aid through “official development assistance” (ODA), defined as  
“Those flows to countries and territories on the DAC list of ODA 
recipients and to multilateral institutions which are: i) provided by official 
agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive 
agencies; and ii) each transaction of which is administered with the 
promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing 
countries as its main objective; and is concessional in character and 
conveys a grant element of at least 25 percent.”22 
 
In recent years, the international aid community has widened beyond the OECD 
countries to include China and other Arab countries as significant donors to 
Africa in particular.  
Humanitarian aid is a subcategory of foreign aid, defined by the OECD as 
“Assistance designed to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain and 
protect human dignity during and in the aftermath of emergencies.  To be 
classified as humanitarian, aid should be consistent with the humanitarian 
principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence.”23 
 
Other subcategories of ODA are social services and conflict prevention; 
transportation and communications; energy and banking; natural resources; industry and 
construction; trade; commodity assistance (e.g., food security); environmental protection 
and development; and refugees in donor countries.  These categories are widely used as a 
typology for foreign aid, even among donors outside the OECD, and are considered 
                                                
22 “OECD Official development and assistance – definition and coverage” 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm retrieved February 
29, 2016 




collectively as development aid other than humanitarian in this research.  Security and 
military assistance are not considered part of foreign aid.    
 
State capacity and reach 
State capacity is a key concept for explaining conflict persistence, yet there is no 
precise definition or consistent operationalization of the concept for measurement.   The 
literature refers to two primary dimensions of state capacity—military and governance 
(Hendrix, 2010).  
Military capacity concerns the state’s ability to deter or repel challenges to its 
authority through force and is most often operationalized as military personnel per 
capita.24  Military spending per capita has been used as an alternate measure to account 
for patronage (Henderson & Singer, 2000).  Hendrix (2010) argues that military capacity 
is not significant to explaining conflict onset, but is important to understanding conflict 
duration.  Both measures of military capacity—military personnel per capita and military 
expenditures—are used in this research as indicators of state capacity to represent 
different mechanisms through which state capacity operates. Where large paramilitaries 
are available, I assume that they support the government and include them in the military 
measure of state capacity.25  The literature points to dilution of military capacity through 
government involvement in multiple conflicts (Merz, 2012; Wood, 2010).  I control for 
this using variables to capture wars on the border near the conflict, and the intensity of 
other ongoing internal conflicts.  
                                                
24 This operationalization is used, for example, in studies by Singer (1988), de Rouen & Sobek (2004), 
Walter (2006), Balch-Lindsay (2008), and Buhaug et al (2009). (See also Balch-Lindsay et al., 2008; 
Buhaug et al., 2009; Henderson & Singer, 2000; and Singer, 1987, 1988).  
25 Wood (2010) provides a precedent for including paramilitaries in assessing state military capacity.   
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Governance capacity concerns the state ability to accommodate grievances 
through institutionalized channels.  Hendrix (2010) analyzes 15 different indicators used 
in the literature and finds that they essentially capture one of three different aspects of 
governance: bureaucratic efficiency (with ideal democracies at the high end and 
inefficient authoritarian states at the low end); rentier-autocraticness (with high-revenue 
rentier autocracies at the high end and resource-poor democracies at the low end); and 
neopatrimoniality (with monarchies at the high end).   Of these, bureaucratic efficiency 
and rentier-autocraticness have the highest explanatory power for conflict risk (Hendrix, 
2010).  Hendrix (2010) recommends a multivariate approach to modeling the governance 
dimension of state capacity using (log) GDP per capita as a robust positive indicator of 
bureaucratic competence and dependence on oil as a robust negative indicator of tax 
capacity and governance quality. Polity-derived measures of democratic quality and 
institutional coherence are conditionally correlated with state capacity, and should be 
used as interactive variables.26   
In this study, I use (log) GDP per capita, dependence on oil, polity and polity 
squared as measures of governance quality. While Hendrix (2010) did not find the CPIA 
index to be a robust indicator of governance, I include it as a control variable for 
consistency with World Bank approaches to measuring absorptive capacity for aid.  
State reach can be an important determinant of the effectiveness of state capacity, 
where state reach refers to the penetration power of state authority and government 
institutions throughout the polity, with a special emphasis on rural areas from where 
                                                
26 These recommendations are consistent with standard approaches used in the literature (see Hegre & 




many belligerents draw their resources (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Holtermann, 2012).  Low 
state reach creates political opportunity for belligerents to mobilize resources against the 
government and survive government repression (Fearon & Laitin, 2003).   Material 
proxies used in the literature for state reach include road density, percent urban 
population, and access to electricity, mountainous or forested terrain, and per capita 
income. Additionally, social fragmentation creates cleavages within the polity that can be 
exploited by belligerents to dilute state reach (Reynal-Querol, 2001). Lacking road 
density data, I use urban population, access to electricity and forest terrain as proxies for 
state reach, controlling for (log) population size, density, and social fragmentation.  
 
Belligerent Capacity  
 
Although relative capacity of state and challengers is a key explanatory variable 
in the literature, belligerent capacity is even less coherently defined than state capacity 
Belligerent capacity is acknowledged in the literature as dependent on access to material 
capabilities and sanctuary, ability to maintain support from (or prevent denouncement by) 
the local populace, generate new recruits, and maintain control over them. Some of these 
factors (e.g., sanctuary, influence and control over local population) are clearly related to 
state reach as defined above. 
Wood (2010) measures material capacity of belligerents through scaled troop 
strength, accounting for asymmetric advantages enjoyed by rebels.   Problems with this 
measure include lack of reliable data for rebel troop strength, and a consistent basis for 
constructing a scaling formula that is appropriate for comparative analysis. Szekely 
(2012) approaches the issue by asking the question, Why are there differences between 
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strategies for how militias evolve and survive when they initially have similar material 
capabilities? In this formulation, survival has two practical components; the ability to 
resist a major military attack as it unfolds, and the ability to recover afterwards.   
The literature describes different strategies for acquiring resources with which to 
resist major attacks – coercion, illicit activities, service provision (to states and 
noncombatants) and marketing (to sponsoring states or to civilians through ethnic or 
ideology), and capabilities for recovery that include distance from the capital, access to 
sanctuary, leadership, cohesion within the group, and local community support (coerced 
or voluntary).  Ethnic polarization, (log) population, and illicit trade are frequently used 
as proxies for cohesion and material resources (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Montalvo & 
Reynal-Querol, 2007; Sambanis, 2002).  GDP per capita is sometimes used as a proxy for 
ability to maintain support from local populace, with the argument that lower GDP per 
capita presents lower opportunity costs for rebellion, thereby increasing the marketing 
power of rebels.   An alternate measure, which I use, is depth of poverty, defined as the 
GDP share of the lowest 10th percentile. This allows the differentiation between the two 
income measures of state and belligerent capacity.  
 
Trends in Civil Conflict, Peace and Stability Operations, and Aid  
Walter (2010) notes three disturbing trends regarding civil conflict persistence.  
As has already been noted, they have a high recidivism rate (57% of all countries that 
suffered civil war between 1945-2009 experienced at least one recurrence), with 
recurring conflicts being the dominant form of armed conflict in the world today. Using 
the UCDP/PRIO database on armed civil conflict from 1946-2004, the Human Security 
Project shows that between 1990 and 2004, there was a downward trend in onsets of 
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conflicts with continuous fighting lasting more than five years.  However, there is an 
upward trend in onsets of conflicts with recurring bouts of violence following an apparent 
termination, which are decreasingly likely to end in outright victory.  More than 60% of 
terminations between 2000-2004 resulting in renewed fighting within five years (Mack, 
2012).  In addition, Walter (2010) notes that today’s conflicts are increasingly 
concentrated in fewer geographic regions characterized as the world’s poorest and 
weakest states.   Since 1990, Africa’s share of civil conflict recurrences has risen from 
21% to 38%.  
The international community tends to deploy peacekeeping operations most 
frequently to these persistent conflicts (Fortna, 2004). Difficult questions of when 
interventions by third parties are justified and how to best achieve the objectives of those 
interventions—considering normative, material, economic, and political factors—
continue to challenge policy makers at national, regional, and global levels.  As the case 
of Somalia illustrates, failing to address these challenges when they are first presented 
can have dire consequences that persist and grow for many years into the future.  
In recent years, scholarly research has claimed progress in understanding the 
macro-level conditions under which political instability is likely to result in armed 
intrastate civil conflict, the dynamics of conflict escalation, factors that impact conflict 
duration, outcome and recurrence, and the impact of external interventions.  The 
literature generally agrees that dominant risk factors for armed civil conflict are (i) high 
ratio of primary commodity exports to GDP, (ii) weak governing institutions and low 
state reach, (iii) economic contraction, (iv) geographic dispersion, (v) ethnic dominance 
(vi) a history of previous conflict, and (vii) population size (Dixon, 2009; Goldstone et 
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al., 2010; Holtermann, 2012).  However, even these factors are disputed, as scholars 
continue to seek to understand underlying causal mechanisms.  
Shorter conflict durations are generally associated with strong government 
bureaucracies, military coups, revolutions with strong rebels, and military interventions 
on the side of the rebels, although these correlations have also been shown to depend on 
geographic factors, such as distances that combatants must travel to project power 
(Buhaug et al., 2009; Fearon, 2004), and the decade in which the conflicts occurred. 
Longer conflict durations are associated with a combination of low per capita income and 
high inequality, land conflicts between ethnic groups, conflicts in which belligerents 
derive major funding from contraband, and the presence of external actors—including 
UN peacekeepers (Beardsley, 2012; Collier et al., 2004; Cunningham et al., 2009; de 
Rouen & Sobek, 2004; Fearon, 2004).   
Until very recently (e.g., prior to 2010), studies of conflict duration have been 
conducted using country-level, event-based datasets in which episodes during which 
conflict events are counted are defined on the basis of numbers of battle deaths per year 
(usually 25 per calendar year), and conflict actors are presumed to be opposing dyads. 
Studies of conflict terminations in the literature use different criteria for differentiating 
between recurring episodes of violence within a persistent conflict and a new conflict. As 
a result, the derived understanding is inconsistent in explaining causal mechanisms and 
insufficient for explaining variations in conflict dynamics at the micro-level.   
The most common explanations for why some countries experience renewed civil 
war while others do not are severe economic hardship after the war, and lack of inclusion 
in post-war political systems (Call, 2012).  The literature agrees that African civil wars in 
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particular tend to last longer and are harder for governments to win.  New questions 
continue to emerge from the last two decades as the presence external actors has 
increased in civil conflicts across the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.  Current crises in 
Syria, Nigeria, Iraq, and South Sudan, to name a few, underscore that many gaps remain 
in understanding intrastate conflict dynamics at the subnational, micro-level, and 
converting theoretical understanding into effective policies to impact security and 
stability at both micro and macro levels.   
The lack of understanding contributes to suboptimal policies and outcomes, as 
evidenced by a number of current trends.27 First, the post-Cold War decline in numbers of 
active armed intrastate civil conflicts has reversed; and seems to have equilibrated around 
thirty-three in any given year. The number of distinct armed intrastate conflicts, and the 
number of countries involved in those conflicts, grew steadily during the Cold War, 
peaking in 1991 with 51 active armed intrastate conflicts worldwide (Figure 4).  This 
contrasts starkly with the trend in interstate conflicts, which average approximately one 
per year over the last sixty years, and account for less than 5% of all active conflicts since 
1975.  Between 1991- 2004 the rising trend in armed intrastate conflicts reversed, 
declining significantly and steadily to a low of 30 active conflicts in 2003—the lowest 
number since 1975 (Figure 5).  However, the trend reversed in 2004, with the number of 
active conflicts seeming to level off at around 33 active armed intrastate conflicts since 
                                                
27 Conflict trends are calculated from UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, version 4-2014, which defines 
an active conflict as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of 
armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 
battle-related deaths”; a conflict is coded as a new onset in the year that 1,000 fatalities have been recorded 
for the same incompatibility for the first time; a conflict is coded as a recurrence if the same 
incompatibility returns to active status after having been inactive for one or more years (i.e., having 
resulted in less than 25 battle-related deaths in the previous year); a conflict episode is coded as terminated 
if there are fewer than 25 battle-related fatalities in a given year.  
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2010.  The primary geographic regions experiencing armed civil conflict have shifted 
from Latin America and Asia during the 70s and 80s, to Europe and Africa in the 90s, 
and more recently to the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa with growing involvement 
of transnational Islamic extremists.  
Second, the way conflicts end changed after the end of the Cold War.  The 
proportion of conflicts that end in victory by one side or the other has declined since the 
end of the Cold War, while the number that end in peace agreements, ceasefires, or 
continue with low level activity has increased. Of 368 intrastate conflicts counted by 
UCDP between 1946-2008, 104 ended with a victory28.  That proportion shifted, 
however, from 47% victories during the Cold War to 17% victories after Cold War 
(Figure 6).  During the Cold War, 70% of the victories were to governments, whereas 
after the Cold War, the trend shifted in favor of rebels, accounting for 66% of the 
victories. The proportion of conflicts ending in peace agreements or ceasefires shifted 
from 12% during the Cold War to 36% after the Cold War.  Continued low-level activity 
after the end of major conflict episodes shifted from 40% during the Cold War to 45% 
after the Cold War.   
Third, The rate of conflict recurrence has risen over the past twenty years while 
the rate of conflict terminations has decreased. Over the last two decades, civil conflicts 
have been increasingly likely to re-occur after wars stop (Figure 8).  Since 2000, half of 
the civil wars active in any one year are due to post-conflict relapses (Collier, 2003).   Of 
94 different conflicts that became active between 2000 and 2013, 65 were recurrences of 
past episodes.  Some of these conflicts have involved as many as six episodes of 
                                                
28 Data from UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset v.2010-1, 1946-2009(Kreutz, 2010a).  
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recurrence (Figure 7).   More than half of the conflict episodes since 2005 involve 
recurrences of conflicts in India, Myanmar, Ethiopia, the Philippines, Pakistan, Israel, 
and the DRC (Figure 9). The countries with the highest number of recurring episodes 
within a single conflict are Iran, Iraq, Angola, the DRC, Chad, and Myanmar.  
 
Figure 4 Number of Distinct Armed Intrastate Conflicts, Countries Experiencing Conflict, and 
Overall Country Years 1946-2013 
 
 





Figure 6 Outcome Distributions of Intrastate Conflict 
 
 
Figure 7 Frequency Distribution of Episodes Within Distinct Armed Intrastate Conflicts 1946-2013 
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Figure 9 Countries Accounting for Majority of Conflict Years 2006-2013 
 
Fourth, foreign military interventions have become the most common types of 
interstate military force used since the end of World War II. Between 47-66% of 
intrastate conflicts since the end of World War II have attracted outside interventions 
(Patrick M. Regan, 2002).29 Major powers accounted for almost half of these; the US had 
the most—more than twice as many as the former USSR/Russia, followed by France, 
UK, China, and Cuba (Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2000).  The proportions of conflicts in 
which foreign militaries have intervened were highest during the Cold War. 
Fifth, the number of uniformed personnel involved in peace and stability 
operations has surged since 2000.  Peace operations are more likely to be deployed to 
conflicts with high risk of recurrence and where the resulting refugee flows threaten 
regional peace (Fortna, 2008). Many of these personnel are from TCCs that were 
experiencing civil themselves during the time period of the peace operation or within the 
previous decade.  The maximum number of UN troops deployed in peace operations in 
any one year rose from approximately 10,000 in 1999 to over 100, 000 in 2014.30   The 
                                                
29 The count of number of conflicts with foreign interventions varies depending on the dataset used, as 
discussed in the literature review in Chapter 1.  




average cumulative number of UN troops per mission during that period in Africa was 
8900, compared to a cumulative average of 1000 troops per mission in Africa for UN-
Authorized and UN-recognized missions (Figure 10-12).  The African countries to which 
these peace operations were deployed in 2014 are:  Burundi, CAR, Chad, Comoros, Cote 
D’Ivoire, DRC, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
Sudan, and South Sudan (Figure 13).   The conflicts in eleven of these sixteen countries 
involve recurrences of past conflicts.  
 









Figure 11 Distribution of UN, UN-Recognized, UN-Authorized, and  

















Figure 12 Cumulative Numbers of Uniformed Personnel to UN, UN-Authorized,  
and UN-Recognized Peace Operations in Africa Since 2000.   
































The number of private militias supporting political and ethnic groups in civil 
conflict has been rising. These groups become gatekeepers for allowing access to external 
peace and stabilization operations and humanitarian aid organizations.  These groups are 
often engaged in criminal activities that fuel the conflict (Boe et al., 2014; El-Katiri & 
Army War College (U.S.) Strategic Studies Institute, 2012; Guichaoua, 2010; Lyons & 
Samatar, 1995; Miklaucic, 2010; The Military Balance 1999, 1999; The Military Balance 
Report 2011: The Annual assessment of global military capabilities and defence 
economics, 2011).    
Sixth, development aid to countries experiencing recurring conflict has increased 
steadily since 1996, accounting for approximately 20% of all aid worldwide in 2011 
(Figure 14 below)31.  In the UK, the proportion is even higher, with a new target set in 
2015 for 50% of all foreign aid (about .7% of GNI) to be directed to “fragile and failing 
states and regions”.32 Countries with recurring conflicts repeatedly top the list of 
humanitarian aid recipients, e.g., the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Myanmar, 
Uganda, Lebanon, Ethiopia, Iraq, the Philippines, and Sudan.    
 
                                                
31 Source:  http://aiddata.org/aiddata-research-releases, Accessed April 2014.  
 
32 The new UK policy also expands funding and creates a cross-government scope for the Conflict, 
Stability and Security Fund in partnership with the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. This approach 
mirrors the US efforts for a whole-of-government approach through the CSO office at DOS.  Source: 
https://www.devex.com/news/uk-aid-shifts-more-to-fragile-states-through-cross-government-approach-




Figure 14 Aid from the International Community to Conflict Affected Countries Has Been  
Rising over Past Twenty Years, Including Those with Recurring Conflicts.   
Data retrieved from www.aiddata.org on April 20, 2015. 
 
Review of the Literature 
Exploring conflict persistence through the framework of system dynamics and 
resiliency draws on key theoretical concepts from the literature on civil conflict dynamics 
(onset and duration), impacts of external interventions in civil conflict (aid and 
peacekeeping), the nexus between security and development in conflicts, system 
dynamics and socio-ecological resiliency.   The following sections review this literature 
and discuss the connections across the different domains.  
 
Conflict Dynamics  
The relevant literature on conflict dynamics generally falls into one of three broad 
categories – that of predicting risk factors for conflict onset; that of explaining the 
evolutionary characteristics and trajectories of conflict (e.g., intensity and types of 
violence, durations, and ways in which conflicts end); and that of explaining recurrence 
of conflict versus sustainability of peace.  While this dissertation is not concerned with 
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predicting conflict onset, the literature is germane to risk of conflict recurrence, so is 
included here.   
 
Risk Factors for Onset of Civil Conflict 
The literature variously associates risk of political instability and the onset of 
armed civil conflict with historical, economic, structural, social, and regional factors. 
More than 200 independent variables have been quantitatively explored in the literature 
using cross-country comparative analyses to improve understanding of the conditions that 
pose the highest risk of political instability and armed civil conflict.  There is some 
degree of consensus on the significance of fewer than thirty of these variables, and a high 
degree of consensus on no more than seven (Dixon, 2009; Sambanis, 2002).   Theses 
include low-income large populations, mountainous or forested terrain, politically 
excluded ethnic minorities, and possibility dependence on oil production.  However, even 
for these variables, interpretations of causal mechanisms are contested.  
Discrepancies around contested variables and mechanisms for conflict risk are 
most commonly attributed to different theoretical frameworks, data limitations, lack of 
methods for exploring complex interaction effects between variables, different methods 
used to operationalize measurements, and scaling effects (Dixon, 2009; Hegre & 
Sambanis, 2006; Sambanis, 2002). Primary divergences in theoretical frameworks are 
between greed and grievance as the driver of conflict initiation (Collier & Hoeffler, 
1999), and the feasibility thesis (Fearon & Laitin, 2003).   Greed-based frameworks argue 
that conflict is more likely to be caused by economic opportunity than by grievance.  
Employing a rational actor model, this theory attributes violent conflict onset to expected 
utility of rebellion as a function of the economic benefit to be gained and the probability 
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of victory—which depends on the belligerents’ perceptions of their military advantage, 
access to resources to support conflict, and costs of sustaining conflict. Grievance-based 
frameworks, in contrast, do not make assumptions about rational actors or economic 
calculus; violent conflict onset results from both objective and subjective grievances 
(e.g., intergroup rivalries including those based on ethnic or religious identity, inequality 
and oppression, or retribution for past injustices) for which other means of contestation 
have proved ineffective.   The feasibility thesis argues that where capacity is available to 
make insurrection feasible for would-be challengers, it will occur.   
In recent years, researchers have acknowledged the existence of interaction and 
feedback mechanisms between the factors that constitute these frameworks. The Collier-
Hoeffler integrated greed-grievance model of conflict onset posits economic viability of 
predatory rebel organizations—in which the organization has to generate its own 
resources and sanctuary—as a necessary condition for conflict initiation (Collier et al., 
2005), yet acknowledges that grievances play a role in contributing to resource 
generation for the rebels.  Moreover, the model recognizes that conflict in fragmented 
societies is more costly due to coordination and cohesion problems.  The nested model 
hypothesizes that belligerents’ consider economic viability of rebellion as a function of 
expected government response (e.g., degree of escalation and size of balancing force 
required), ongoing rebel access to financial resources (enabled through extortion of 
natural resource commodity exports,33 diaspora funding, and local recruitment) and 
                                                
33 Primary commodity exports are assumed to provide a target of opportunity for rebel predation during 
transportation to ports; however the net value of potential revenues generated have diminishing returns due 
to increased levels of state protection on higher value export shipments.  The model calculates the revenue-
maximizing value of primary commodities available to rebels using a military contest function developed 
by Konrad and Skaperdas (1998) in the context of extortion by gangs and organized crime. The model 
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sanctuary necessary for survival (approximated by geographic dispersion of population 
and land cover). The pre-conflict level and structure of income affects the cost of rebel 
recruitment—increasing economic growth, smaller population growth rates, and 
increased levels of male secondary schooling reduce risk of conflict onset because 
opportunity costs for recruits are higher, and the labor pool for recruits is more 
competitive.   
Collier-Hoeffler (1999) tested the power of greed, grievance, and integrated 
theoretical models using data from the Correlates of War (COW) project (Singer & 
Small, 1994), and a methodology combining case control with regression analysis to 
predict onset of civil war between 1960 and 1999 in 161 countries.  The integrated model 
was the most robust, and showed that ethnic dominance increases risk (by contributing to 
rebel cohesion) while social fractionalization reduces risk.  Primary commodity exports 
and diaspora funding dominate all other risk factors in the model—suggesting that 
resource availability is a key factor; however, the mechanisms for acquiring those 
resources may involve both greed (in the case of extortion of primary commodities) and 
grievance (in the case of diaspora) at different times.  Recommended preventive policy 
measures emphasize diverse and equitably distributed economic development that is 
difficult for rebels to co-opt and that is used to build the capacity of the state.   
In their attempt to explain the upward trend in onset of civil war that accompanied 
economic development in third world countries after the end of WWII through the end of 
the Cold War, Fearon and Laitin (2003) do not find evidence of the strong relationship 
between primary commodity exports and conflict advanced by Collier and Hoeffler.  
                                                                                                                                            
balances the cost of increasing the size of the rebel organization in response to government force escalation, 
which may in some cases bankrupt the rebellion.   
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Instead, they found that conditions favoring insurgency—such as state weakness, 
poverty, prior war, political instability (measured by changes in Polity IV scores), rough 
terrain, superior local knowledge by rebels, oil exports, and a large population from 
which to draw recruits—are positively correlated with onset of conflict (Fearon, 2003).  
While some of these factors also appear in the economic model of civil war onset, Fearon 
and Laitin explain the relationship through an alternative Hobbesian framework more 
predicated on feasibility rather than greed or grievance. Heavy reliance on oil exports is a 
proxy for state weakness, and where states are weak and capricious, fear and opportunism 
give rise to would-be rulers who supply local “rough justice” while taxing the populace 
for themselves, and sometimes contributing to a larger, grievance-driven cause to 
maintain a base of support.  Recent literature provides reasonable empirical support for 
this thesis, and emphasizes preventive policy measures of governance competency, 
strength and transparency within the military and police.   
Neither the Collier-Hoeffler nor the Fearon-Laitin model finds democracy or 
ethnic fractionalization to be a significant factor.  However, other scholars argue that if 
correctly specified, ethnically driven political grievances and degree of democracy 
interact with each other and are correlated with civil war onset (Elbadawi & Sambanis, 
2002; Gurr, 2000; Hegre et al., 2001; Østby, 2008; Reynal-Querol, 2002). For example, 
Reynal-Querol (2002) distinguished between proportional versus presidential 
representation in democracies when testing for the effect of political system type and 
religious polarization on economic development and the incidence of ethnic wars, while 
Hegre et al. (2001) tested for the effect of different levels of democracy in combination 
with regime persistence on civil war onset between 1816-1992.  Reynal-Querol (2002) 
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found that religious polarization increased the incidence of ethnic civil wars between 
1960 and 1995, and that consociational democracies34 reduced this risk.  Hegre et al. 
found that the effect of political change depends on the point of departure, and that the 
“conflict-generating effect of democratization when moving from autocracy to 
intermediacy produces violence in the short run only” (Hegre et al., 2001).  Using a 
different probit estimator than Collier and Hoeffler (1999) to more accurately explore 
cross-sectional differences and include random effects, and correcting for autocorrelation 
in the data, Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002) also found a significant, negative relationship 
between civil war onset and Polity scores. They additionally found a nonlinear 
relationship between ethno-linguistic fragmentation and civil war prevalence35 at low-
income levels, and that the correlation with primary commodity exports obtained by 
Collier and Hoeffler (1999) was fragile to model specification.  
Restricting his analysis to only ethno-political conflict, Gurr (2000) shows a 
consistently rising trend of both protest and rebellion during the Cold War that fell 
sharply after 1994. Drawing on collective action and social movement theory (Tilly, 
2004), Gurr attributes ethnic conflict onsets to four factors: salience of the ethnic identity 
group for leaders; the extent to which the group has collective incentives;36 the group’s 
capacity for collective action; and opportunities in the political environment that increase 
chances of attaining group objectives through political action.  Statistical analysis shows 
that the new ethno-rebellions between 1986 and1998 were preceded by years of protests, 
                                                
34 Reynal-Querol (2002) defines consociational democracies as coalition systems based on proportional 
representation. 
35 Civil war prevalence is defined to be the probability at any point in time of the existence of a civil war, 
and integrates both onset and duration.  However, the factors and mechanisms for onset and duration are 
assumed to be different.  
36 Examples of collective incentives are repression, socially derived inequalities in material wellbeing, 
political access, or cultural status by comparison with other social groups, and loss of political autonomy.  
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revealing both missed opportunities for conflict management as well as potentially 
intractable differences.  In contrast, the shift in ethno-political rebellion since 1994 may 
be due to states abandoning strategies of assimilation and control of ethnic minorities in 
favor of policies of pluralism and accommodation under both democratic and 
authoritarian regimes. 
Responding to this proliferation of possible causal mechanisms for conflict, Hegre 
and Sambanis (2006) conducted a sensitivity study of empirical results across the 
literature on civil war onset to differences in model specification, data sources and 
operationalization of variables.  They found that of 88 variables tested, only seven 
explanatory variables were robustly correlated with civil war onset across the different 
methodologies and data sources: large population combined with low income levels; low 
rates of economic growth; recent political instability combined with inconsistent 
democratic institutions; small military establishments and rough terrain; and war-prone 
and undemocratic neighbors.  Variables representing ethnic difference in the population 
were robust only in low intensity conflict (Hegre & Sambanis, 2006).  
In the empirical analysis of civil war onset, the aforementioned researchers used 
the threshold of 1000 battle deaths to count a conflict as a civil war event.37 Goldstone et 
al. (2010) relaxed this threshold in developing a model to predict risk of political 
instability38 from 1955 to 2003 using conditional logistic regression analysis of 351 
control cases and 141 instability cases.  Beginning with the assumption that most states 
                                                
37 This threshold was first established by (Singer & Small, 1994) in creating the Correlates of War project 
and has become a standard reference point for most civil war research.  
38 Goldstone et al. (2010) include both violent civil conflict and nonviolent adverse regime change in their 
definition of political instability, which includes nonviolent failures of democracy, genocide, state collapse, 
revolutions and ethnic wars. 
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have potential insurgents with grievances and resources, matched by military power 
exceeding that of potential insurgents, they argue that key factors determining political 
stability are not economic or military but political.  They predict 80% of the occurrences 
of political instability using a model based on whether or not the regime is united and 
competent versus paralyzed or undermined by elite divisions.   While they found some 
statistical significance to many of the same economic, geographic, and cultural factors 
identified by Collier and Hoeffler (1999) and by Fearon and Laitin (2003), the 
explanatory power of these factors was much weaker than political factors.  In particular, 
they found that weak anocracies are particularly vulnerable to onset of conflict, consistent 
with the analysis of Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002), Hegre et al. (2001), and Reynal-
Querol (2002).  
These theories are supported by evidence that welfare spending contributes to 
sustaining peace when this spending results in the provision of social services that offset 
the effects of poverty and inequality. Using time-series, cross-national data from 1975 to 
2005, Taydas and Peksen (2012) find that as government spending on welfare (i.e., 
education, health, and social security) reduces the risk of armed civil conflict onset 
significantly.  In contrast, general public spending and military expenditures have no 
effect on the probability of civil conflict (Taydas & Peksen, 2012).  They argue that 
welfare spending serves as an indication of the commitment of the government to social 
services and reflects its priorities and dedication to citizens. By enacting welfare policies 
that improve the living standards of citizens, governments can co-opt the political 
opposition and decrease the incentives for organizing a rebellion. 
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Other scholars find evidence to support the feasibility thesis, arguing that low 
GDP per capita in high population countries, is a proxy for the strength and effectiveness 
of government institutions.  Examining 133 countries and the incidence of civil war onset 
between 1989 and 2006, Holtermann shows that, when controlling for low state reach 
(measured as road density, telephone density, and % urban population), the negative 
association between GDP per capita and civil war onset disappears (Holtermann, 2012). 
He concludes that military opportunity for rebel capacity building through control over 
remote areas, enabling more effective recruitment campaigns, rewards for local 
cooperation, and generation of resources, has more explanatory power for civil war risk 
than poverty and lack of economic opportunity.  
With the exception of the work by Goldstone et al. (2010), the explanatory power 
of these econometric models of civil conflict onset, measured by the coefficient of 
determination, R2, is generally no greater .3, implying that 70% of the variation in civil 
war onset may be explained by other factors.  Even the most agreed-upon factors are not 
uncontested.  For example, the correlation between oil and diamond resources and civil 
war has been shown to suffer from problems of robustness and endogeneity (Lujala, 
Gleditsch, & Gilmore, 2005; Ross, 2006; Snyder & Bhavnani, 2005). There is general 
agreement, however, that while grievances may not be strong explanans for conflict 
initiation, the emergence of grievances during conflict are important and must be 
considered in studying conflict dynamics and the duration of post-conflict peace.   
In summary, in spite of the consistency and data issues across research methods, 
country-level risk of conflict and instability is generally agreed to be strongly and 
positively correlated to conditions of poverty coupled with a large population, economic 
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contraction, weak government institutions and infrastructures (especially in anocracies or 
partial democracies),39 political transitions, and a recent history of armed conflict.  These 
results favor a rational choice explanation, suggesting that risk of conflict onset is highest 
when regime challengers’ expected opportunity costs and costs of sustaining conflict are 
low, conditions favor insurgency,40 and perceptions of military advantage are high. Most 
notably, heavy reliance of the export sector on primary commodities is not a consensus 
predictor of civil conflict onset, although it is consistently reported as significant in 
explaining conflict duration, as discussed below.    
 
Conflict Persistence: Duration and Recurrence  
Estimating Trends in Conflict Duration  
Once initiated, a conflict may persist either as continuous, uninterrupted fighting 
among belligerents, or as episodic outbreaks of fighting over the same issue interspersed 
by periods of apparent “peace”.  Cross-country studies of civil war duration 
between1960-2000 show that if a conflict has not ended in the first year, the probability 
that it becomes a protracted war increases (Collier et al., 2004).41   The average duration 
trends reported in the literature vary somewhat depending on how duration is 
calculated.42  In general, however, there is agreement that duration increased throughout 
                                                
39 The strength of government institutions is generally measured on the Polity IV scale, with strong 
institutions being at extremes (e.g., between -6 to -10 or between 6-10) and weak governments and 
institutions being in the middle (-5 – 5).  
40 Fearon (2003) defines insurgency as “military conflict characterized by small, lightly armed bands 
practicing guerilla warfare from rural base areas.”  
41 This empirical observation is most often explained in terms of the relative vulnerability of rebel 
organizations in early stages, when armed opposition movements are typically more fragile and susceptible 
to military defeat or early accommodation.  In order to survive, they must secure resources, consolidate 
forces, and build cohesion (Regan, 2002). 
42 Analysis of duration requires that a researcher define a start and end date to a conflict.  In most cases in 
the literature, this assumed to be when killing begins and ends. This is problematic, however, when killing 
escalates gradually, as data is often lacking on numbers killed in the initial stages of conflict; and when 
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the Cold War.  Using an original dataset, Fearon (2004) calculated that the overall 
average duration of civil wars steadily increased from approximately 5 years in 1950 to 
16 years in 2000.  The average duration of armed intrastate conflict recorded in the 
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4_2010 peaked at more than twenty years at the 
height of the Cold War, and has declined to less than ten years since 1981(Hironaka, 
2005; Kreutz, 2010b) and are less deadly (Bethany, Gleditsch, & Russett, 2006).  
While the average duration has declined, the distribution of conflict duration is 
highly skewed, ranging from episodes of one day (e.g., Paraguay in 1989; Philippines in 
1997) to conflicts that have lasted 50 years or more (e.g., the communist insurgency in 
the Mindanao Islands of the Philippines, rebel insurgency in North Yemen, the Karen 
rebellion in Myanmar, the Israel-Palestine conflict, military and sectarian insurgencies in 
Iraq).   For this reason, average duration can be a misleading measure of conflict 
persistence.  Distinguishing between duration of persistent conflict and conflict episodes, 
Mack (2012) found that since 1950 civil war episodes have averaged approximately four 
years and three months, and that the percent of intrastate conflict episodes lasting five 
years or more have become less common since 1990 (around 20 percent).43  
 
Risk factors for conflict duration 
Most of the research on conflict duration has been done through individual cases 
studies or comparative statistical studies involving civil wars since the end of WWII.   
These studies have shown that there are additional risk factors for conflict duration than 
                                                                                                                                            
killing stops for a period then restarts.  Fearon recommends that in the absence of any non-debatable coding 
scheme for start and end dates upon which to assess durations, the best course is conduct parametric tests of 
robustness of results to coding assumptions (Fearon, 2004).  
43 In conducting this analysis, Mack (2012) used a threshold of 25 battle deaths per year to define a conflict 
as active.  
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just those associated with conflict onset, driven by emergent and self-reinforcing 
processes that sustain conflict (Collier et al., 2004; Fearon, 2004; Hegre, 2004; Merz, 
2012).  In some cases, these differ significantly from the onset risk factors.  The more 
consistent findings in the literature are that low levels of state and belligerent capacity, 
belligerent access to sanctuary, landmass, and ethnic fragmentation are associated with 
longer durations.  
Expanding their hazard model of civil war onset, Collier et al. (2004) found that 
none of their significant variables for explaining war onset were significant in explaining 
duration of civil conflicts between 1960-2000.  They found long durations to be 
correlated with low per capita income, high inequality, and ethnic division, and short 
durations to be correlated with decline in the prices of exported commodities and external 
military intervention on the part of the rebels.   
Fearon found that shorter durations are associated with the type of conflict in civil 
wars between 1944-1999 (Fearon, 2004).  Coups, popular revolutions, and de-
colonization wars resulted in shorter durations whereas wars involving ethnic minorities 
in peripheral regions of the state (“sons-of-soil” wars) resulted in much longer durations.  
Coups and popular revolutions have median and mean duration of 2.1 and 3 years, 
respectively and an average of 4,000 killed compared to an average of 29,000 in other 
types of wars.  De-colonization wars have median and mean durations of 4.7 and 7.3 
years, respectively.  In contrast, sons-of-soil wars have estimated median and mean 
durations of 23.2 and 33.7 years, respectively, but relatively low fatality levels.  Access 
to contraband such as illegal drugs and precious minerals lead to longer durations. The 
effect of ethnic fractionalization is only statistically significant in association with sons-
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of-soil wars in the absence of coups.  GDP per capita, population, and polity have no 
statistically significant correlation with duration when controlling for the type of war.     
Fearon (2004) explains these results in terms of strategic violence on the part of 
belligerents challenging the state. In coups and revolutions, the strategy is to initiate an 
all-or-nothing tipping process to gain complete control of power.  In contrast, peripheral 
insurgencies are wars of attrition, based on strategies of violence that ultimately aim to 
either gain a military advantage or exact costs sufficient to force an imposition of terms 
or negotiated settlement.  
The literature also indicates a strong correlation between conflict characteristics 
and duration, i.e., increased number of belligerents, land conflicts among ethnic rivals, 
and relatively even capabilities of belligerents all lead to longer durations (Cunningham 
et al., 2009; Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2002; Fearon, 2004). Multiple belligerents are 
postulated to increase duration by making settlement more difficult as a result of 
increased information asymmetries and shifting alliances among an expanded set of “veto 
players” (Cunningham, 2006).  In contrast, longer durations associated with ethnic rivals 
and relative capabilities of belligerents are related to the difficulty in prevailing militarily, 
which can be influenced by biased foreign military intervention (Licklider, 1993). Land 
conflicts have been shown to last longer when a dominant migrant group is supported by 
the state (or foreign power) at the expense of a periphery minority group (Fearon, 2004; 
Gurr, 2000).  
Environmental factors postulated to contribute to conflict persistence (but which 
lack consensus) are associated with political geography, e.g., mountainous or forested 
terrain, distance to government stronghold, and ease of access to natural resources that 
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can be used to generate resources for maintaining conflict.  Mountain cover may help 
rebels sustain conflict while forest cover may hinder their abilities; African wars seem to 
be longer and harder for governments to win (Buhaug et al., 2009; de Rouen & Sobek, 
2004).  Using the UCDP/PRIO data set for conflicts between 1946-2003 that did not 
involve coups, (Buhaug et al., 2009) found that when locations are along remote 
international borders or are considerable distances from government strongholds, 
duration is longer. 
Foreign military interventions in civil conflict have been common since the end of 
World War II, with 101 of 150 conflicts between 1945-1999 involving external actors 
(Regan, 2002), with an increasing number of peace operations since the end of the Cold 
War.  Literature on the impact of external interventions (diplomatic, economic, and 
military) on conflict duration is discussed in the next section. 
The difference between risk factors for conflict onset and duration suggests that 
the processes that sustain conflict can be distinct from those that initiate it.   Explanations 
in the literature include divergence between structural conditions prevailing prior to 
conflict onset and those that evolve during conflict; triggering of latent grievances during 
conflict; reinforcing cycles of violence and arms proliferation that create new security 
dilemmas; and the emergence of new dynamics and actors.  
Three common economic models in the literature that attempt to capture these 
processes are: rebellion-as-investment, rebellion-as-business, and rebellion-as-mistake 
(Collier et al., 2004). The model of rebellion-as-investment was first put forth by 
Grossman (1991).  According to this model, longer durations should be correlated with 
the pre-existence of primary commodity exports and/or severe political repression, both 
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of which lead to higher expected payoffs.  The rebellion-as-business model makes some 
of the same assumptions as the Collier (2004) model of civil war onset based on greed, 
with two key differences: (1) while profit may not be a motive to start a civil war, it is 
necessary to continue a rebellion; and (2) the potential for profit during rebellion attracts 
actors who may not be engaged in civil war onset.  In this model, payoffs during conflict 
extend duration. In the rebellion-as-mistake model, military optimism prevents the 
recognition of mutually advantageous settlement that would lead to cooperation 
(Hirshleifer, 2001).44  
Both the rebellion-as-business and rebellion-as-mistake models are consistent 
with the literature that associates higher durations of continuous, uninterrupted fighting 
with economic, institutional and environmental factors that include low per capita 
income, high inequality, lootable resources (Collier et al., 2003; Collier et al., 2004), and 
low state reach and corruption (Holtermann, 2012; Le Billon, 2003; Pyman et al., 
2014).45  In contrast, there is little support for the conceptualization of rebellion-as-
investment, in which payoff to rebellion (political or material) is contingent upon rebel 
victory.  
While the literature has made substantial advances in identifying the risk factors 
for long durations of civil conflict, the theoretical understanding of causal mechanisms 
remain weak and often contradictory.  This ambiguity may be explained in part by 
                                                
44 In the rebellion-as-mistake model, potential combatants face the choice posed by Vilfredo Pareto, 
between directing their efforts to the production or transformation of economic goods, or else to the 
appropriation of goods produced by others. Opposite theories inform these choices – the Machiavellian 
view that people will never pass up an opportunity to gain a one-sided advantage by exploiting another 
party, and Coase’s hypothesis that people will never pass up an opportunity to cooperate by means of 
mutually advantageous exchange (assuming perfect information).  
45 State reach is distinct from government institutional strength, and is generally measured in the literature 
as a function of services provided, such as access to electricity or roads for transportation.  
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limitations in research methodology dependent upon econometric analysis, which is 
highly sensitive to sample selection, coding and measurement procedures, suffers from 
endogeneity and multiple equivalent pathways (Collier & Hoeffler, 2001, Walter, 2010) 
and lacks micro foundations (Collier & Hoeffler, 2001; Kalyvas, 2008; Merz, 2012; 
Walter, 2010).  A particularly difficult problem is in the measurement of the dependent 
variable, conflict duration, in many of the statistical studies.  Conflict episodes may be 
counted as “ended” if the annual battle death threshold has been met, when in fact the 
conflict has not yet been settled, leading to an underestimate of conflict duration.46  On 
the other hand, analysis of conflict duration based solely on active conflicts leads to an 
inflated estimation of average duration.   
In addition, the count of events that determine conflict duration is most often 
conducted at a macro level with deaths counted on a countrywide basis, whereas civil 
conflict events (and processes) tend to be highly localized driven by micro-level 
dynamics.47 For example, one study found that between 1993-2009, poor households on 
the margins of cities in Somalia appear to have been mostly at peace and enjoyed some 
degree of economic development.  In contrast, high levels of violence concentrated in 
Mogadishu have severely depressed the economy in the city where humanitarian aid 
agencies have been located (Shortland et al., 2013).   Limited research into the micro-
level foundations for conflict duration suggests that a self-reinforcing, symbiotic 
association emerges between poor household economics and belligerents in which 
noncombatants draw on belligerents to protect their economic status during conflict, 
while armed groups derive support (which may be involuntary) from local populations.  
                                                
46 For example, Somalia in 2002 and the Central African Republic in 2002 and 2006. 
47 Visual evidence can be seen in the geolocated patterns of conflict events illustrated in Figure 1.  
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The level of household support is a function of vulnerability to poverty and violence 
(Justino, 2009).   
These findings at the micro-level support the macro-level explanation of 
prolonged civil war as “development in reverse”, in which war retards development, and 
development retards war.  The resulting double causation gives rise to “virtuous and 
vicious  circles”.  Low incomes and economic contraction reduce government capacity, 
purchasing power of civilians, and contribute to tensions that sustain the civil war. Civil 
war, in turn, destroys infrastructure and increases risk to foreign investors, reducing 
economic growth opportunities (and hence the opportunity cost of war) even more.  In 
contrast, elite privilege and financial gains by rent-seeking leaders of combatant 
organizations—often associated with civil war—increase and thereby exacerbate pre-
existing grievances resulting in more support for belligerents (Hirshleifer, 2001; Collier, 
2003).  
Fearon (2004) offers alternative explanations for long durations in ethnic conflicts 
involving peripheral minorities and state-supported dominant groups over control of land, 
and those in which rebels have access to funding through contraband.  Using game 
theory, Fearon argues that in these instances, credible commitment problems in 
negotiated settlements drive long durations.   The commitment problems are due to 
fluctuations in state strength48 and the ability of government and rebels to earn income 
during conflict despite the costs of fighting (Fearon, 2004).    
                                                
48 African militaries, which have only existed since independence in the 1960s, are relatively weak 
compared to those in developed countries, with approximately 69% of the number of soldiers per 1000 
citizens, and inexperienced in combat.  Moreover, according to data from the US Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, many experienced an unstable decline in manpower and capabilities in the decade 
after the end of the Cold War.  The limited data that exists also suggests these militaries often have 
difficulty mobilizing troops to respond to rebel threats (Herbst, 2004).  
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The relative capacity of belligerents, in turn, has been correlated to levels of 
violence, which has a nonlinear association with duration, depending on where and under 
what conditions security (for civilians) is reestablished in the midst of civil conflict and 
how it is sustained in areas of limited statehood (Chojnacki et al, 2012).  Geo-referenced 
statistical studies of violence in African conflicts 1989-2009 show that violence against 
citizens by both government and rebels is highest in areas of the enemy’s territory (Fjelde 
& Hultman, 2014); both case studies and quantitative statistical analyses have shown that 
rebel use of strategic violence against civilians is inversely proportional to relative 
capacity (strength) of rebels (Kalyvas, 2006; Wood, 2010). Akcinaroglu and 
Radziszewski (2013) provide evidence that high competition among private military 
companies (e.g., militia) supporting the state in African conflicts increases the likelihood 
of ending violence; conversely, lack of competition is associated with longer durations as 
private military companies underperform in order to maximize profits (Akcinaroglu & 
Radziszewski, 2013).    
In summary, some of the literature argues that conflicts are most likely to be of 
longer duration when they occur in countries with low per capita income coupled with 
high levels of inequality, two to three dominant ethnic groups, easily lootable resources, 
and terrain that favors rebels; and when they involve multiple belligerents with relatively 
equal resources (usually implying low state reach) so that neither side can exact a victory; 
when they are involve territorial disputes; and/or when they attract foreign military 
intervention in support of rebels. These results are consistent with (1) economic models 
that emphasize net gains to be realized by conflict—where long durations are associated 
with low opportunity costs (which decline even further as a result of conflict), relatively 
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low costs of sustaining conflict, and high payoffs during conflict compared to expected 
payoffs of peace, and (2) security models—in which the ability to achieve military 
victory or commit credibly to a negotiated settlement shorten the duration of conflict.  A 
number of factors may contribute to the cost of sustaining conflict (e.g. ethnic 
polarization, mountain cover, natural resources reduce costs while ethnic fractionalization 
and military parity increases cost), expected payoff, and commitment problems.    
However, there is lack of consensus on these models, which may be due in part to 
interdependency between economic and security mechanisms for sustaining conflict, 
which require analysis of the interactions between factors driving them.  For example, the 
literature also suggests that relative weakness of belligerents will lead to longer durations, 
due to lack of state incentives to provide meaningful concessions to them, and the 
potential high costs for doing so.   The literature calls for further theoretical development 
and empirical analysis on the relationship between these mechanisms, as well as those 
between conflict duration and demographics, and the strategy for prosecuting a conflict.  
 
Risk Factors for Conflict Recurrence 
Post-conflict peace is typically fragile: nearly half of all civil wars are due to 
episodic outbreaks of the same conflict or post-conflict relapses (Collier et al., 2008).  
The risk for conflict re-start is highest in the years immediately following settlement and 
decreases over time (Call, 2012).  The literature offers multiple credible pathways to 
explain episodic outbreaks of the same conflict based on theoretical foundations that 
share causal mechanisms with both the conflict onset and conflict duration literature.   
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However, the risk factors associated with conflict recurrence are less clear and more 
contested than those proposed to explain long durations of continuous conflict.  
Using survival analysis, researchers variously argue that recurrence is highly 
dependent on the way in which conflicts end (Licklider, 1995; Merz, 2012); the ability of 
parties to commit to peace agreements (Kirschner, 2010; Walter, 2010); the 
organizational type, comprehensiveness, and effectiveness of third party peacekeeping 
operations (Fortna, 2008; Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl, 2008); inclusiveness of post-
conflict institutions (Call, 2012; Gates & Strom, 2007; Walter, 2004); and development 
of local capacities that increase the economic opportunity costs of returning to war 
(Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Walter, 2010; Walter, 2004).  
There are flaws in each of these arguments. Licklider (1995) first argued that 
recurrence is more likely when civil conflict ends with negotiated settlements rather than 
a victory by one side or the other.  However, higher levels of violence or genocide often 
follow coups or civil wars that end in military victories, temporarily suppressing conflict 
but increasing risk of recurrence at a later time.  In addition, most research in support of 
the argument that recurrence depends on the way in which conflicts end omits cases of 
civil war that have ended without peace agreements (e.g., Afghanistan in 2001). In 
assessing the role of commitment of parties to peace agreements, it is difficult to 
distinguish cases of tactical cease-fires from those where parties are genuinely interested 
in peace (e. g. Rwanda in 1993).  
Associating a risk factor for conflict recurrence with characteristics of peace 
operations is similarly difficult in cases where the operation is considered successful but 
civil war still recurs (e.g., Liberia after 1997).  Citing a correlation between the severity 
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of post-conflict risk, UN peacekeeping expenditures, and level of income at the end of a 
conflict, Collier et al. (2008) argue that the equitable and inclusive economic 
development necessary to reduce risk of conflict recurrence takes a long time, requiring 
an external military presence to sustain gradual economic recovery rather than a massive 
infusion of aid.  
Other researchers argue that conflict recurrence results from security dilemmas49 
triggered by post-conflict factors that include power transitions, political exclusion and 
manipulation, redistribution of resources, and lack of state capacity or reach.  They argue 
that the resulting fear and uncertainty among former combatants and the general populace 
underlie the prevalence of conflict recurrence, especially in cases where rational behavior 
would dictate cooperation over armed conflict as an optimal choice (Walter & Snyder, 
1999). Frequently cited examples are Rwanda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Somalia.  
This theoretical framework implicitly acknowledges that conflict persistence and at least 
some of its drivers may change over time, calling for dynamic trend analysis beyond the 
scope of statistical econometric studies.  For example, research suggests that the 
relationship between relative state capacity and the security dilemma fluctuates over 
time; at some times in a conflict state strength may reinforce the security dilemma, 
whereas at other times in the conflict it may be a moderating force, depending on the 
rebel capacity at the time and their control of territory (Merz, 2012).  
As in the case of conflict onset and sustained conflict duration, the divergence 
between outcomes of empirical studies on conflict recurrence can be traced in part to 
                                                
49 A security dilemma is a situation in which the effort of one party to increase its own security reduces the 




methodological issues that include the use of macro-level indicators and data coding 
protocols that can obscure conflict dynamics (Kalyvas, 2012) 50, as well as different 
methods for operationalizing the dependent variable of conflict termination and restart 
(Mack, 2012).  Geolocated conflict event datasets that have become available in recent 
years demonstrate that most civil conflict events are clustered geographically in relatively 
small areas, the majority of statistical analyses assessing conflict risk have used country-
level data. Case study research has shown that that micro-level conditions within conflict 
zones are often poorly approximated by these country-level statistics (Buhaug & Lujala, 
2005; Kalyvas, 2012; Collier & Hoeffler, 2001; Gulden, 2002; Kalyvas, 2012).  
Relative capacity between belligerents and the state is a key factor across all of 
the literature on conflict persistence.   However, measuring the distribution of capabilities 
on both sides, and estimating how those capabilities translate into power in the context of 
civil conflict is difficult and rarely addressed.  In studying the relationship between rebel 
capacity and violence against citizens, (Wood, 2010) estimates relative capacity based on 
troop sizes, accounting for whether or not the state is engaged in other conflicts that 
                                                
50 Examples include Angola from 1988- 1998, and Burundi from 2000-2008.  Competing nationalist groups 
in Angola (MPLA and UNITA) signed a ceasefire agreement in 1988, but hostilities between UNITA and 
the government continued through 1995 when the Lusaka Protocol came into effect.  Although the 
UCDP/GED database records 55 conflict events involving UNITA, the government, and citizens in the 
ensuing period from 1996-1997 that resulted in an estimated 126 deaths, the conflict is coded as “inactive” 
until the number of deaths exceeded the threshold of 1000 per year in 1998.  Likewise, in 2000, although 
the Burundi government and three Tutsi groups signed the Arusha accords, Hutu rebel groups continued 
fighting.  A second peace agreement was signed at the end of November 2003 between Hutu and Tutsi 
leaders but a small Hutu rebel group has remained active even amidst the presence of AU and UN 
peacekeepers and a strong disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) program. Following the 
peace agreement, there were 225 conflict events involving the government, former combatants, and 
civilians that resulted in an estimated 1240 deaths between 2004 and 2006.  A third cease-fire agreement 
was signed in September 2006.  The conflict is coded as “inactive” in the following year, in spite of 24 
recorded conflict events resulting in an estimated 76 deaths; the conflict is coded as “active” in 2008, 
during which time 21 recorded conflict events resulted in an estimated 202 deaths.  
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dilute its capacity.  This approach does not account for the asymmetric power that 
belligerents often have with respect to the state.   
Cunningham et al address this deficiency, arguing that the asymmetry in 
vulnerability to attacks between belligerents and state is a key factor in the decision to 
resort to violence (Cunningham et al., 2009).   Whereas government is clearly defeated if 
not in power, when challengers to the state fail to win control of territory in battle, they 
may withdraw into sanctuary51 from where they can regroup to continue fighting.    
(Cunningham, Gleditsch, et al., 2009) argue that the capacity of belligerents relative to 
state must therefore be understood along two distinct dimensions – that of offensive 
strength by which they can inflict costs on the state, and that of resistive ability.    Using 
the UCDP/PRIO Nonstate Actor Database52, they approximate offensive strength of 
belligerents using indicators of organization structure that favors strong leadership for 
organizational control and decision-making, mobilization capacity relative to the 
government, arms procurement relative to the government, and skill in fighting relative to 
the government.  Resistive ability is approximated using indicators of territorial control 
and degree of control.  Bureaucratic strength of the government has also been shown to 
be an important aspect of state capacity by undermining opposition strength, although it 
does not necessarily enhance the state cause (DeRouen & Sobek, 2004). 
Other researchers use approximations of state reach as an alternative to belligerent 
control of territory when estimating relative capacity (Fearon, 2004; Gent, 2011).   
Indicators of state reach prevalent in the literature are population density, percent of 
                                                
51 Sanctuary can be territory under control of the belligerent, at the periphery of the state outside of the 
research of the government; or underground blending among the local, noncombatant population.  
52 This database has subsequently been incorporated into the UCDP Actor Dataset, 2.2-2015, Uppsala 
Conflict data Program, www.ucdp.uu.se, Uppsala University 
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population that live in urban centers, percent of population with access to electricity, 
density of transportation networks and distance from capital to conflict location.  
In summary, the systematic examination of civil conflict persistence is relatively 
new in the literature.   Conflict duration is variously linked to development factors, access 
to natural resources and contraband, and ethnic fragmentation as causal mechanisms 
underlying relative belligerent capacity, resilience, and choices to engage in violence or 
settle.  A key factor in all of the literature on conflict duration is relative capacity, yet this 
is an understudied mechanism, with no clear consensus on how to operationalize 
belligerent capacity relative to the state.  Likewise, data to support estimates of relative 
belligerent capacity is minimal.  
Conflict recurrence is linked to conflict outcomes and various termination and 
post-conflict processes.  The diversity of theories and lack of consensus for civil war 
onset, duration, and recurrence underscores one pertinent fact:  that the dynamics of civil 
war are complex and its persistence is unlikely to be attributable to one or two factors or 
variables.  As one scholar has put it, “internal armed conflicts have a nasty habit of 
repeating themselves and we don’t really know why” (Walter, 2004).  More recently, 
Marine Lt. General Vincent Stewart, head of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 
commented, “You see nation states collapsing in the region (Middle East) and maybe 
going to ethnic lines, and none of us understand where that will lead five minutes from 
now, or five years from now”.53  
 
                                                
53  As quoted in Naylor (2015).  
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Interventions in Conflict  
External interventions in ongoing civil conflict may be diplomatic and/or military 
efforts to bring about an end to fighting and support peace processes, economic sanctions 
and/or development aid to support resiliency and reduce conflict drivers, and 
humanitarian relief.  These interventions may be biased or neutral. They may be 
primarily one dimensional, or multi-dimensional, and may involve overlapping 
sequencing from one type of operation to another by different actors.  This thesis is 
concerned with the combined impact of interventions through peace operations involving 
a military component and foreign aid (which may include both economic and 
humanitarian dimensions).  The following sections review relevant literature on the 
impact of foreign military interventions, peace operations, and foreign aid on conflict 
duration and outcomes.  
 
Foreign Military Interventions 
Foreign military interventions, as distinct from peace operations, are those in 
which armed forces enter a conflict in support of one side or the other, either as single 
actors or part of an ad hoc coalition.  Driven by a variety of national interests and 
humanitarian concerns, foreign military intervention has become one of the most 
common types of interstate military force used over recent decades, and are present in 
twenty of the thirty-six conflicts included in this research.54  These interventions affect 
not only the material capacity of belligerents and the state, but also expectations, 
                                                
54 Conflicts involving single actor foreign intervention by a single actor occurred in Angola, Burundi, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, DRC, Ethiopia, Gabon, Liberia, Mali, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Senegal, Sudan, and Algeria.  Foreign interventions by ad hoc 
coalitions occurred in Angola, Central African Republic, Lesotho, and Somalia.  
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information, and the cost of coordination among belligerents, and human security of 
noncombatants.  
Scholarly literature on the impacts of military interventions on conflict outcomes, 
and the resulting governing institutions, economic growth rates, and human security is 
nascent. Statistical studies reveal some general trends for the correlations between foreign 
military interventions and conflict durations and outcomes.  These quantitative studies 
draw primarily on five different databases: the Correlates of War Project (Sarkees & 
Wayman, 2010), the UCDP Conflict Termination dataset (Kreutz, 2010a), the UCDP 
Georeferenced Event Dataset (Sundberg & Melander, 2013), the International Military 
Intervention (IMI) dataset (Pickering & Kisangani, 2009) and a dataset of 150 civil 
conflict interventions between 1945 and 1999 constructed by Regan (2002). In addition, 
the RAND corporation has compiled a set of twenty-two case studies of small-scale 
military interventions between 1970 and 2010 (Watts et al., 2012).55  
As expected, the literature shows that military interventions influence the 
intensity, duration, and outcome of conflict by changing the relative capabilities and 
motivations of the belligerents, and the information that belligerents have about each 
other (Aydin & Regan, 2012; Balch-Lindsay et al., 2008).  The literature has explored 
whether the direction of influence depends on the strength of the intervention and 
whether it supports the incumbent regime or challengers to the regime.  The results 
discussed below are suggestive, but inconclusive, due in part to lack of robust datasets to 
track trends in the pre-and post Cold-War eras.  
 
                                                
55 These case studies focused strictly on stabilization missions.  
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Impact of Foreign Military Interventions on Conflict Intensity 
Statistical analysis of armed intrastate conflicts between 1989-2005 where at least 
one party is the government of a state has shown that when military intervention shifts 
the balance of power, the level of violence employed by the supported faction against 
civilians decreases while violence employed by the opposed force increases in order to 
extract resources and deter denouncement (Wood, 2010; Wood et al., 2012).56   Case 
study research in Vietnam supports these conclusions (Wood, 2010). However, case 
study research drawing on interviews with combatants in Uganda, Mozambique, and Peru 
has revealed an opposite tendency, where insurgents supported by foreign military are 
found to be flooded with opportunistic, profit-seeking joiners and less discriminate in 
using violence against citizens (Weinstein, 2007).  
In reality, both mechanisms could be operational, resulting in escalating violence 
against citizens on both sides.  However, in the first case, one should expect the violence 
to be strategically targeted whereas in the second it should be indiscriminant and 
opportunistic.  Further research should also examine whether this depends on the country 
from which the intervening military force derives.  
 
Impact of Foreign Military Interventions on Conflict Duration 
Several empirical studies have shown that the foreign military interventions are 
generally associated with longer conflict duration.  Using hazard analysis of 150 conflicts 
from 1945 to 1999, Regan (2002) finds longer durations to be more likely for all military 
interventions in intrastate conflict whether neutral or biased, regardless of the number of 
                                                
56 This used quantitative data from the UCDP-Georeferenced Event dataset. 
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intervening parties, which side(s) they support, or how they are operationalized.57  
However, the relative effect of interventions varies, with interventions in support of the 
opposition reducing the probably that a conflict would end in the next month by 1000%, 
while the effect of neutral interventions on duration is weak. Subsequent studies 
controlling for additional variables have shown that, on average, foreign military 
interventions in civil wars increase time until a negotiated settlement, regardless of which 
side the intervention supports. In contrast, considering all civil wars between 1816 and 
1997, the literature shows that if the supported side achieves a victory, interventions are 
likely to decrease the time until victory (Balch-Lindsay et al., 2008).   Others have shown 
that civil conflicts since 1989 attracting competing interventions on both sides experience 
longer durations (Cunningham et al., 2009; Gent, 2008).  
The causal relationship between foreign military intervention and duration is not 
known, as other factors associated with interventions could be driving the longer 
durations, such as conflict intensity and human rights abuses (Aydin & Regan, 2012; 
Cunningham, 2010; Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2000; Gurr, 2000; Regan, 2002). For 
example, Elbadawi (2002) shows a correlation between wars with higher fatalities and 
more interventions, consistent with other statistical findings on interventions and 
intensity.  In a study of 160 intervention episodes between 1981 and 2001, both neutral 
                                                
57 Regan’s analysis used a constructed data set that defined conflicts on the basis of a threshold of 200 
fatalities over the course of the conflict, and restricted foreign military interventions to be those that were 
“convention breaking”.  The data is drawn from the Correlates of War project, SIPIR, the Minorities at 
Riks project, and Sixty-six of the conflicts in the dataset experienced interventions that occurred during the 
Cold War (e.g., between 1944-1989), of which only three were neutral.  Thirty of the Cold War foreign 
military interventions occurred in support of opposition forces, and fifty-four in support of government 
forces.  Forty-five of the sixty-six conflicts experienced biased interventions on both sides.  Thirty-eight of 
the conflicts in the dataset experienced interventions that occurred after the Cold War (e.g., 1990-1999), of 
which six were neutral, six were in support of opposition forces, and twenty-four were in support of 




and supportive foreign military interventions contribute significantly to state repression 
and human rights abuses in the form of extrajudicial killing, disappearance, political 
imprisonment and torture.  Hostile interventions contribute to political imprisonment 
(Peksen, 2012).    These negative consequences of foreign military intervention may 
contribute to duration through a variety of mechanisms.  
The most common explanation in the literature is that foreign military 
interventions change the expected utility of conflict through both real and expected 
capability expansion that affects each actor’s estimate of the chances for victory.  For 
example, Regan (2002) employs bargaining theory to argue that the goal of foreign 
military intervention is the manipulation of costs of continued fighting for one or both 
sides so that belligerents perceive settling maximizes expected utility compared to 
continued fighting. Assuming that interventions on behalf of the opposition 
disproportionately shift the balance of capabilities towards parity,58 rebel’s expectations 
of concessions or even victory as a result of the interventions are disproportionately 
raised, explaining the stronger effect on likelihood of longer duration when interventions 
are biased.    
Using the same dataset as Regan (2002), Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) employ 
microeconomic theory in a model of rebellion-as-mistake to argue that external military 
support for combatants reduces costs of coordination, and extends conflict duration 
through its impact on growth in rebel forces and rebel mobilization along ethnic lines that 
leads to stalemate.  In doing so, they distinguish between multilateral peace operations 
                                                
58 Due to the typical small size of opposition forces compared to government forces, small interventions 
supporting opposition movements can be assumed to provide a much higher marginal increase in capability 
than the same support to government.  
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whose mission is to bring end to war, and biased third-party interventions (Elbadawi & 
Sambanis, 2000). 
Both of the above arguments employ relative rebel capacity as the causal 
mechanism though which foreign interventions affect conflict duration, consistent with 
other literature on conflict duration.  Aydin (2012) alternatively considers the numbers 
and intentions of the intervening parties, and whether multiple interveners engage 
competitively or cooperatively in balancing or bandwagoning behavior (Aydin & Regan, 
2012).  Their analysis of civil wars since 1945 show that interveners who engage in 
balancing behavior by supporting opposing sides increase war duration, while 
bandwagoning on the same side are effective in shortening duration only if they share 
similar preferences. In addition to effecting material capabilities, both types of foreign 
interveners are hypothesized to reduce incentives to negotiate or capitulate while 
increasing resolve and willingness to continue fighting.  
 
Impact of Foreign Military Interventions on Civil Conflict Outcomes 
Bargaining models common in the literature suggest that biased foreign military 
interventions should increase the probability of victory for the supported side.  However, 
statistical analysis of the Regan (2002) dataset shows that biased military interventions 
only increase the probability of a victory when they support rebel groups (Gent, 2008).  
Gent (2008) explains this result by considering the conditions under which third parties 
intervene militarily.  Both rebel-biased and government biased foreign military 
interventions are more likely when the government is facing a stronger rebel group.  
However, government-biased interventions are more likely to be the tougher cases, so 
that these interventions appear empirically to be less effective.  
Chapter 1 
 85 
Case study analysis of twenty-two minimalist stabilization missions59 since 1970 
show that these interventions do not usually contribute significantly to regime success.  
While they may improve the odds of avoiding a regime defeat, they are most likely to 
lead to military stalemate accompanied by longer durations, and may worsen regime 
outcomes in negotiated settlements with political and security concessions to the 
insurgents (Gent 2010).   In contrast, when insurgents lose the support of foreign 
militaries, the conflict tends to end quickly and result in stable peace (Watts et al., 2012).   
Statistical hazard analysis of the duration of 137 post-conflict regimes between 
1946 and 1996 show that foreign military interventions by themselves do not have a 
statistically significant effect on post-conflict political stability.  However, when those 
military interventions entail defeating a state and imposing a regime change, they are 
politically destabilizing in the long term, regardless of whether or not the new regime is 
democratic (Gates & Strand, 2004).   These results are contested in a study controlling for 
the degree of development in the country experiencing conflict and the size of the 
intervention. Analysis of large-scale foreign interventions60 in 106 developing countries 
from 1960 to 2002 showed that interventions in developing democracies did not 
significantly affect post-conflict stability, whereas hostile interventions in non-
democratic developing countries has some positive effect on subsequent likelihood of 
democratization and long-term economic growth (Pickering & Kisangani, 2006). 
 
                                                
59 Small scale foreign military interventions that are either neutral or in support of a regime, launched both 
during the period of active conflict and in the immediate post-conflict period. 




Peace Operations, Conflict Duration, and Outcomes 
Most of the literature on peace operations in conflict generated prior to 2000 
concerns UN presence in international disputes, with a focus on short-term goals, such as 
the prevention of escalation and the cessation of hostilities. This literature presents 
inconclusive results, which question the effectiveness of UN operations for achieving 
sustainable peace.  Much of the quantitative literature since 2000 on the effect of peace 
operations on civil conflict duration and outcomes builds on a dataset for 44 instances of 
UN interventions (mediations, observer missions, traditional and multidimensional 
peacekeeping, and enforcement mission in 124 civil from 1944-1999 compiled by Doyle 
and Sambanis to test effectiveness of interventions based on three dimensions of what 
they term the “ecological space for peace”—the depth of war-related hostility, a 
country’s capacities for peace, and the available international assistance. In their original 
study, Doyle and Sambanis found that multilateral UN enforcement operations are 
usually successful in ending violence (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000). De Rouen’s analysis of 
this dataset using multinomial regression and competing risk survival analysis finds that 
UN intervention decreases the probability of both government and rebel victory, while 
increasing the likelihood of a treaty or truce (DeRouen & Sobek, 2004).   
 
Peace Operations, Conflict Recurrence and State Building  
Doyle and Sambanis conceptualize peacebuilding as international capacities that 
compensate for lack of local capacity to mute the hostilities of civil war.  The risk of 
peacebuilding failure is high in countries with low levels of local capacities, slow 
economic growth, high poverty, significant resource dependence, and high 
Chapter 1 
 87 
fractionalization (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006).  Using game theory, they formulate 
sustainable peace as the outcome of a dynamic process shaped by peacekeeper’s 
performance, the structure of peace operations, and the parties’ reactions to those efforts.   
Whether or not the conflict has become internationalized, the perceived neutrality and 
resources of peace operations, and the successful reconstruction of legitimate state 
authority may, substantially shape pay-off structures for potential spoilers. 
Doyle and Sambanis (2006) capture these effects in simple model where the 
probability of peacebuilding success is the product of international capacities and net 
local capacities, where net local capacities is the difference between local capacity or 
development potential61 minus war-generated hostilities,62 and metrics for international 
capacities are the presence and mandate of UN peace operations, 63 and foreign economic 
assistance.64  They find that peacebuilding success is lower after ethnic and religious 
wars; is negatively and significantly correlated with level of hostilities65 and with share of 
primary commodity exports in GDP and reliance on oil exports.  Local capacities are 
only weakly correlated with peacebuilding success; the effect of economic assistance 
cannot be ascertained with the available data used for the proxy.  Traditional 
peacekeeping missions are perfectly correlated with failure.   However, strong UN 
peacekeeping operations that combine multidimensional and enforcement missions are 
                                                
61 Proxies for local capacity are electricity consumption per capita and the annual rate of change in real 
GDP per capita, dependence on natural resources, and infant mortality.  
62 Proxies for hostilities are number of deaths and displacements, factions, war type, and war outcome. 
63 UN Mandate is a proxy for mission’s strength, technical and military capabilities and level of 
international commitment.  
64 Lacking comprehensive data for international aid from all sources for all the cases in their dataset, Doyle 
and Sambanis used the ratio of net current transfers per capita to balance of payments of the country as a 
proxy for international assistance.  
65 This correlation loses its significance if refugees and internally displaced is not included; it is also 
sensitive to extreme outliers.  
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positively correlated with peacebuilding success and reduced violence, although the 
effect is not as strong as positive economic development and opportunity.   They 
conclude that the policy gap between peacekeeping and economic assistance through 
humanitarian aid and development assistance is a key factor in the success or failure 
of peacebuilding strategies.   
Using the Doyle and Sambanis (2006) data of 34 UN peace operations and 44 
non-UN peace operations, and building on their ecological model of peacebuilding, 
(Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl, 2008) examine effects of UN and non-UN peace 
operations through a framework of cooperation and coordination, positing explanatory 
variables of, local capabilities, and international capabilities,66 while controlling for 
hostility levels (measured as log of number of deaths and displacements).  Logistic 
regression analyses show that non-UN peace operations alone have no significant effect 
on peacebuilding success,67 while UN operations have a large positive effect.  However, 
effectiveness of UN is highly dependent on where the troop contributing countries to the 
UN operations are from. The presence of a non-UN peace operation in the same conflict 
may complement the effectiveness of a multidimensional UN operation.    
Most studies on the effectiveness of peace operations uses mission mandate as 
proxy for capacity, on the assumption that troop strengths and budgets are correlated with 
mandate. Research by Hultman et al. (2015) using monthly numbers for troops strength 
shows that the number and type of military personnel deployed to peace operations is 
                                                
66 Mandate of the international operation is again used as an assumed proxy for international capacity, 
based on the assumption that mandates are correlated with numbers of troops and budget.    
67 Peacebuilding is coded as a success if conflict has not recurred 2 years or more after the UN has left, 
there is no residual violence (e.g., 200 deaths or more per year) or mass violations of human rights, no 
divided sovereignty, and participatory peace holds with polity scores of 2 or greater.   Note that this would 
exclude Rwanda as a peacebuilding success, due to low polity scores. .  
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strongly correlated with the risk of conflict recurrence.   Using georeferenced, monthly 
data of African civil wars between 1989-2010, their analysis indicates that the duration of 
peace is extended as more armed troops are deployed to post-conflict zones (Hultman et 
al., 2015).   These results are consistent with Collier et al. (2008), who found that 
doubling the expenditures on peacekeeping troops in post-conflict settings reduces the 
risk of conflict recurrence from 40% to 31% (Collier et al., 2008).  
 
Causal Mechanisms Associated with Peace Operations 
Building on the work of Doyle and Sambanis, and adding additional control 
variables for availability of illicit financing, external alliances, and internationalization of 
the conflict, Fortna finds that the risk of civil conflict recurrence within the first five 
years after cease-fire in 60 civil wars from 1989 to 1999 is less when UN peacekeepers 
are present than when belligerents are “left to their own devices” (Fortna, 2008).  
Fortna’s research not only asks the question of whether UN peace operations work, but 
also how they work, finding that the causal mechanisms are consistent for both consent-
based and enforcement missions. These mechanisms are predicated on assumptions about 
pathways by which belligerents return to war: aggression facilitated by contraband 
financing, fear and mistrust, accident or the actions of rogue groups, and political 
exclusion. Successful peace operations accordingly are those that change incentives for 
aggression relative to maintaining peace, alleviate fear and mistrust, prevent or control 
disruption or accidents by spoilers, and dissuade political abuse and exclusive politics.   
Fortna’s case study research with the peace kept in Mozambique, Bangladesh, and 
Sierra Leone supports these four primary mechanisms. Incentives may be changed 
economically through peace dividends, politically through improved perceptions of 
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legitimacy, and/or militarily through deterrence, monitoring, and enforcement.   
Monitoring missions facilitate communication that allows the peace-kept to signal 
intentions for peace, thereby alleviating security dilemmas that give rise to fear and 
mistrust. Peacekeeping troops may additionally deter rogue groups and shift power 
towards moderates, provide on-the-spot mediation, law and order, and alternatives to 
escalation in response to alleged violations.  Drawing on conflict-bargaining literature, 
Hultman et al. (2015) support Fortna’s hypothesis, arguing that the effect is a result of 
peacekeeping troops ability to mitigate commitment and information problems (Hultman 
et al., 2015).68  
Most of these studies on the effectiveness of peace operations concern 
deployment of troops after some type of cease-fire or settlement has occurred, and 
measure success by the duration of peace.  Hultman et al. (2014) examine cases of UN 
peacekeepers deployed to active conflicts, where the measure of success concerns 
reducing the level of hostilities during conflict to create space in which to negotiate peace 
and addressing humanitarian concerns.  In a sample of civil wars in Africa from 1992-
2011, they show that in this context, increasing numbers of armed military troops are 
associated with reduced battlefield deaths, while police and observer missions are not 
(Hultman et al., 2014).  As a result, the effectiveness of peace operations involving armed 
troops may be due in part to reduction in hostilities, according to the ecological model of 
Doyle and Sambanis.   
                                                
68 This literature builds on the argument that civil wars endure because of information asymmetries and 
commitment problems (Fearon, 2005; Fearon & Laitin, 2003) and portrays conflict as a way to gain 
information about another’s resolve and strength in a bargaining contest over the division of disputed 
resources (Filson and Werner, 2002; Ramsay 2008; Slantchev, 2004).  
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Examining cases of civil conflict from 1946-2005 recorded in the UCPD/Prio 
Armed Conflict dataset, Beardsley (2011) finds that the presence of international 
peacekeepers also reduces the risk of conflict contagion by securing borders to reduce 
transnational movement of and support for insurgencies in neighboring rival states 
(Beardsley, 2011).  
In summary, multidimensional, armed peace operations by the UN in countries 
experiencing civil conflict are strongly correlated with less risk of conflict recurrence and 
lower conflict intensity, while the effectiveness of peacekeeping and observer missions is 
ambiguous. UN presence is more likely to result in a treaty or settlement, rather than a 
victory, and as a result is correlated with longer conflict durations prior to peace.69  
Causal mechanisms for successful peacebuilding are likely to include reducing the 
security dilemma by solving information and commitment problems, reducing spoiler 
opportunities, and mitigating conflict diffusion to neighboring regions. However, these 
results are dependent on contextual factors that include the number of belligerent 
factions, presence of other international actors, local capacities, availability of foreign 
economic assistance, and capabilities of the troop contributing countries and their 
perceived neutrality.  Non-UN peace operations alone to date have not been effective at 
sustaining peace, but may be complementary to UN missions. An important gap in the 
literature addressed by this thesis is the combined effects of actual foreign aid received 
(rather than using economic indicators as proxies) and the presence of other international 
actors as either complementary peace operations, and/or or foreign military interventions.  
 
                                                
69 This conclusion may be due to the fact that UN peace operations are most often deployed to the most 
difficult cases, as shown by Fortna (2004).  
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Foreign Aid  
Three dimensions of foreign aid considered in this research are development, 
humanitarian, and military assistance. All three are tools of foreign policy used by 
advanced countries to advance national security interests, address humanitarian concerns, 
and prevent conflict.  At the end of the Cold War, foreign aid to Africa shifted away from 
security assistance to strengthening democratic institutions and the rule of law, and 
inclusive economic development that would break the conflict trap (Orr, 1992).  At the 
same time, as was noted earlier, the percentage of that aid going to countries experiencing 
recurring conflict has been steadily increasing.  In order to save lives in these active 
conflict settings, humanitarian relief efforts must risk fueling conflict through a variety of 
mechanisms that include emergent entrepreneurial activities around aid delivery and the 
misappropriation and theft of aid assets (Anderson, 1999; Weiss & Collins, 2000).   
The literature reports mixed results on the effectiveness of foreign aid in reducing 
the risk of conflict onset, duration, and recurrence.  For the most part, development aid 
has so far failed to live up to expectations or potential for reducing poverty and 
promoting good governance and economic growth in recipient countries that are in most 
need and at highest risk of conflict (Busse & Gröning, 2009; Collier & Dollar, 2002, 
2004; Lensink & White, 2000).  The literature is accordingly concerned with mechanisms 
and necessary conditions for improving overall net effectiveness of aid to improve human 
security in conflict settings, and the consequences of not doing so.  
The underperformance of aid as a conflict prevention tool may be attributed in 
part to policies that preference aid delivery to countries with “good” policies that support 
economic growth (Burnside & Dollar, 2004), competing needs among donors for 
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disbursing foreign aid, such as international crises involving terrorism, political conflicts 
and strategic alliances, spread of infectious disease, and major domestic economic 
problems (Lancaster, 2008), and competing, non-aid policies of donor countries that may 
negatively affect the economic and political systems of recipient countries (Booth, 2012).  
Other factors that impede aid effectiveness for conflict prevention include lack of 
absorptive capacity70 on the part of donors and recipients, corruption, lack of ownership 
or salience within recipient countries, and radical changes in the aid architecture over the 
past 25 years that have made coordination and transparency among donors more complex 
(Collier & Dollar, 2004; Boone, 1996; Booth, 2012; Kharas, 2009; Lamb & Mixon, 
2013).   
Theoretical foundations underlying the relationship between absorptive capacity 
and economic development are grounded in terms of inputs and prerequisites required for 
growth, and the limitations and constraints the impede it (Adler, 1966; Chenery & Strout, 
1966).  Since the end of WWII, when the international community first embraced the 
concept of using foreign aid from wealthy countries to poor countries as a tool for 
peacebuilding through economic growth, prerequisites have consistently focused on 
human factors such as health, education, and technical competence; governance factors, 
                                                
70 Within the international development community, absorptive capacity is most often defined as the ability 
of recipient countries to use foreign assistance to grow their economies, improve the quality of life, reduce 
violence, and recover from disasters. Absorptive capacity is one of the measures commonly used by donors 
to assess appropriate and efficient levels of aid, yet no single standard assessment tool exists. While the 
World Bank uses the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) index as a first approximation 
for rating absorptive capacity, many other measurement frameworks exist, such the State Fragility Index 
published annually by the Center for Systemic Peace at George Mason University, the Fragile States index 
published annually by Foreign Policy magazine, the US AID indicators and methods strategy for ranking 
for fragile states, the Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger published annual by the Center for International 
Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland, and the Ibrahim Index of African 
Governance, recently launched by the Ibrahim Foundation. Thanks to Dr. Bob Lamb of CSIS for insights 




such as political stability, leadership, equality, and inclusiveness; and economic factors 
such as domestic capital and macroeconomic policy.  However, the theories linking these 
factors to growth and poverty reduction have fluctuated over the years and remain 
contested today.  As official development assistance (ODA)71 rises worldwide, research 
and donor programming in recent years has placed special emphasis on understanding the 
relationship between absorptive capacity of recipients, conflict, and resilience (Buston & 
Smith, 2013; Cliffe & Roberts, 2011).  
Theoretical foundations underpinning the concept of resiliency that is popular in 
today’s aid programming community derive from socio-ecological research from the 
1960s and 1970s that examined ecosystem dynamics in the presence of expanding human 
social systems, and resulted in innovative policy and management approaches based on 
the concepts of resilience and sustainability (Folke, 2006; Holling, 1973). The resilience 
perspective shifts policies from those that aspire to control change, to managing the 
capacity of social–ecological systems to cope with, adapt to, and shape change where the 
future is unpredictable and surprise is likely (Gunderson et al., 2002). Socio-ecological 
research conceptualizes resilience as a system (or subsystem) property that is a function 
of structure and capacity, as measured through attributes of latitude, resistance, 
precariousness, and panarchy (Walker et al., 2004).72   These attributes in turn explain the 
vulnerability, adaptability or transformative capacity of the system in response to chronic 
                                                
71 ODA includes all types of aid that is provided by official agencies, including state and local 
governments, or by their executive agencies, but not aid directly provide by NGOs or private foundations.  
Military aid is excluded.  
72 Latitude is the maximum amount a system (or its subsystems) can be changed before crossing a threshold 
which, if breached, makes recovery difficult or impossible; resistance is the ease or difficulty of changing 
the system; precariousness is how close the current state of the system is to a threshold (Walker et al., 
2004); panarchy is the degree to which cross-scale interactions among elements affect adaptive cycles of 
growth, accumulation, restructuring, and renewal(Gunderson & Holling, 2001). 
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stressors, exogenous disruptions and surprise (Brooks et al., 2005; Dalziell & McManus, 
2004; Gallopín, 2006; Gunderson et al., 2002; Olsson et al., 2004; Walker et al., 2004).  
US AID defines resilience as the ability of people, households, communities, 
countries and systems to mitigate, adapt to and recover from shocks and stresses in a 
manner that reduces chronic vulnerability and facilitates inclusive growth (USAID, 
2013). US AID and others in the donor community are currently engaged in research to 
understand the operational relationship between resiliency and local drivers of change, 
risk and sustainability, and to develop and measure more robust indicators of resiliency of 
local actors and the systems within which they are embedded in response to capacity-
building strategies. For example, survey research by Mercy Corps has found that greater 
resilience to food shocks in Somalia is associated with women’s participation in 
household decisions, households with greater social capital across clan lines, livelihood 
diversification across independent income sources, access to basic services including 
water and cell phone service, and higher performing local institutions (Mohamud & 
Kurtz, 2013b). Other research sponsored by Mercy Corps explores how the use of mobile 
technologies to deliver humanitarian assistance might increase resilience of aid recipients 
in conflict settings (Murray & Hove, 2014). At the macro level, the World Bank is 
engaged in research to explore how policies can increase resilience of fragile states to 
trade shocks so as to avoid conflict (Cali, 2015).  
There are diverging views in the theoretical literature on whether and how these 
local absorptive capacities interact with aid flows to affect the risk of conflict onset and 
resilience during and after conflict. Some researchers assert that although aid may be 
inefficient as a conflict prevention tool, it does not increase the risk of conflict onset and 
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may actually shorten conflict duration. De Ree and Nillesen (2009) find that when 
controlling for country specific factors (e.g., primary commodity dependence, GDP per 
capita, and polity), foreign aid flows have a statistically significant and economically 
important effect of on shortening the duration of ongoing civil conflicts in sub-Sahara 
Africa, but not on conflict onset (de Ree & Nillesen, 2009).  
Challengers to this view argue that when absorptive capacity of the state is low, 
foreign aid can further weaken institutional capacity through increased dependence, and 
cause reallocation of resources away from production while inducing a struggle between 
rent-seeking elites over distributive shares (Grossman, 1992; Knack, 2001; Svensson, 
2000).  As in the case of governments with low tax revenues and high dependence on 
natural resource extraction, those in power avert armed conflict with potential challengers 
through either co-optation through resource sharing with a parasitic clientele, or 
deterrence through a strong military (Collier & Hoeffler, 2007; Fjelde, 2009; Smith, 
2008). Both strategies tend to deplete the resilience of the general population, while 
increasing risk of violent conflict when they fall short or become difficult to uphold. 
Empirical evidence supports these arguments under certain conditions. Using data 
from 1960 – 2004 from the UCDP/PRIO dataset on armed conflict and from the OECD 
on disbursed ODA as a percentage of gross national income (GNI), Sollenberg (2012) 
finds that high levels of aid increase the probability of armed conflict between elites 
inside and outside the government in states with fewer checks and balances, but finds no 
corresponding effect in states with higher institutionalized constraints on leaders, or when 
levels of aid are low relative to GNI.  On the other hand, analysis of bilateral and 
multilateral data from AidData.org between 1981 and 2005 show that negative aid shocks 
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can significantly increase the probability of armed conflict onset.73 Nielsen et al. (2011) 
attribute this to the government’s inability to credibly commit to future resource transfers 
to potential rebels (Nielsen et al., 2011).  Alternative explanations are that aid shortfalls 
accelerate and intensify competitive rent-seeking behavior to the point of sustained 
violence between elites inside and outside government, that may include “shadow states” 
comprised of military, organized criminal networks, or other actors free-riding on the 
economy of violence (Bates et al., 2002; Reno, 2000; Sollenberg, 2012).  
During armed conflict, absorptive capacities of the state for aid are degraded to 
the extent that state attention, resources and infrastructures are diverted to the conflict.  
The International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank accordingly 
assesses absorptive capacity for development assistance in three different stages of 
engagement relative to conflict environments: a watching period during active conflict or 
its immediate aftermath, a transitional period during which time countries are moving out 
of immediate post-conflict environments, and stable post-conflict development 
environments (Aid Delivery in Conflict-Affected IDA Countries: the Role of the World 
Bank, 2004).  
In the midst of active conflict, aid programs transfer resources representing wealth 
and power into a resource-scarce environment, with the potential to cause even greater 
harm than good (Anderson, 1999).  In the “watching phase” of active conflict, when 
absorptive capacities are lowest, the need for humanitarian aid is greatest and induces a 
                                                
73 AidData.org was formed in 2009 as a partnership between the College of William & Mary, Development 
Gateway, and Brigham Young University to fill a critical gap for scholars and policy makers to address 
development investments and results.  As of 2016, AidData.org maintains a searchable portal in 
collaboration with additional partners to track over $40 trillion in global funding for development and make 
the results available to the public. See AidData (2016).  
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surge in demand for these capacities. Case studies in Liberia, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, 
Bosnia, Yemen, Afghanistan, Cambodia, to name a few, provide ample evidence that the 
aid delivery networks that emerge to supply the demand are frequently reliant, directly or 
indirectly, upon belligerents, mercenaries, corrupt officials, and other shadow state actors 
that once formed, become endogenous to social, political, and economic system 
(Grünewald, 2012; Moore, 1998; Shawcross, 2000; Shearer, 2000). These delivery 
structures can involve many layers of gatekeepers and warlords that extract delivery taxes 
and siphon away the majority of the aid assets. In many cases, donors know this and 
expect only a fraction of their shipments to be delivered to those in need. For example, 
estimates are that as much as 50-80% of aid in Somalia is regularly diverted; in Liberia, 
an estimated 15% of aid was diverted to Charles Taylor alone as a tax (Attree, 2016; 
Groenewald, 2016; Lindberg & Orjuela, 2011).  
Aid diversion and conflict can become a mutually self-reinforcing process, with 
the well being of aid recipients becoming symbiotically dependent on structures that 
reinforce the adaptive capacity and resilience of belligerents and other violence 
entrepreneurs who have a vested interest in maintain conflict (Andreas, 2009; Reno, 
2000).  These structures and actors, once established, create their own reinforcing 
feedback loops that can contribute to conflict persistence. The degree to which they 
contribute to conflict persistence across different conflicts and conditions is contested 
however, and remains an open question of research. This is due in part to the difficulty in 
isolating and measuring the effects of aid on conflict mechanisms74 across different types 
                                                
74 Various mechanisms explored in the literature include material effect on capacity; uncertainty effect on 
bargaining; and structural effect on control of resources.  
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of conflicts with complex operations that include military and peacekeeping troops and 
other actors with competing interests (Borton, 2009; Narang, 2015; Prendergast, 1996).   
The international aid community is not blind to these dilemmas.  In addition to 
“do no harm”, they generally operate under the principle that humanitarian relief should 
be judged against international humanitarian law, which gives civilians certain basic 
rights, including protection in armed conflicts.  For example, in addition to advocating 
that programming consider the side effects of interventions, assessing the net impact in 
deciding whether to work in any given situation, Oxfam asserts no responsibility to 
provide aid where the net impact is negative, or to those who violate international law. 
They argue that if governments fail in their responsibilities to protect civilians, this does 
not give aid agencies the responsibility of filling the vacuum; but it does mean that they 
should campaign for governments to act (Bryer & Cairns, 1997).    
These principles for aid programming and delivery have been challenged in recent 
years by the increasing use of humanitarian aid as a conflict management tool (Borton, 
1998). In some cases, major Western donors (e.g., US, UK, and the EU) have hijacked 
foreign aid to pursue their own security objectives in the battle for “hearts and minds” 
rather than development and the alleviation of poverty or misery.  At the same time, they 
impose competing and sometimes clashing priorities on aid recipients, eroding the 
capacity of some of the world's neediest governments (Woods, 2005).  Since 2001, the 
war on terror has exacerbated these challenges.  To date, such hearts and mind strategies 
through aid have not been proven effective.  
For example, surveys among more than 10,000 households in Uganda, Nepal, the 
DRC, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka sponsored by the 
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Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC)75 show that aid recipients often feel 
that their priorities are not taken into account, and that transparency in aid distribution 
matters more in fostering feelings of security and well being than who provides the aid 
(Bennett & D'Onofrio, 2015; Mazurana et al., 2014).  In longitudinal studies of 80 
communities in Afghanistan, Bohenke and Zurcher (2013) similarly find that aid does not 
increase perceived security or foster positive attitudes towards international actors.  
While they do find that aid may be positively correlated with perceptions of state 
legitimacy, it is also associated with increased threat perception (Böhnke & Zürcher, 
2013).  
Increased threat perception may be due to the relationship between aid and 
increased violence in conflict. Several recent studies provide insights on the causal 
mechanisms and circumstances under which aid can lead to increased violence. Aid 
creates incentives for armed actors to intentionally target civilians for violence not only 
when it provides opportunities for looting, but also when it creates challenges to the 
power or authority of belligerents. Disaggregated data on aid and conflict violence in 
post–Cold War conflicts provide strong support for the argument that humanitarian aid is 
associated with increased rebel violence against citizens but less support for the 
relationship between aid and state violence (Wood & Sullivan, 2015).  In a cross-
national, time-series data analysis of 154 countries for the years 1970 to 2007, Choi and 
Salehyan (2013) demonstrate that the infusion of aid resources for refugees is associated 
with increased looting and attacks by militant groups on foreign aid workers and those 
                                                
75 The SLRC was established in 2011 as part of the Overseas Development Institute with the aim of 
strengthening the evidence base and informing policy and practice around livelihoods and services in 
conflict. http://www.securelivelihoods.org/content/2191/About-Us Retrieved February 20, 2016.  
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who support them (Choi & Salehyan, 2013).  Strandow (2014) finds that violence 
induced by aid in conflict depends on the funding concentration and susceptibility to 
diversion. High barrier aid and greater funding concentrations is correlated with increased 
fatalities among combatants.  However, he finds that funding concentration has no impact 
on fatalities among noncombatants (Strandow, 2014).  
There is widespread acknowledgement among the aid community that civil 
society76 is an underutilized resource for increasing aid effectiveness and reducing its 
negative impact, with a trend to push for increasing participation of local partners 
(Gizelis & Kosek, 2005; Walker et al., 2014). However, research on efficient allocation 
of resources to civil society to increase absorptive capacity in conflict settings without 
introducing unintended consequences is nascent and lacks a consistent theoretic 
framework (Lamb & Mixon, 2013). In a comparative study of 13 cases,77 Paffenholz 
(2010) finds that civil society can play a particularly important support role during armed 
conflict for the protection of citizens from violence, monitoring of human rights 
violations, and advocacy for and facilitation of these services. However, civil society is 
most often only turned to for socialization and cohesion functions of peacebuilding in 
post-conflict phases, and rarely called upon for protection and service delivery during 
armed conflict (Paffenholz, 2010). She advocates for more initiatives that include civil 
society in these functional capacities, and that aid projects systematically integrate these 
goals for maximum effectiveness, contrary to current practices.   
                                                
76 Civil society includes a wide range of actors from professional associations, clubs, unions, faith based 
organizations, NGOs, as well as traditional and clan groups. Excluded groups are the media, businesses, 
and political parties.  
77Case study research was conducted in Cyprus, Guatemala, Turkey, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Nigeria, 
Somalia, Israel/Palestine, Northern Ireland, Bosnia-Herzegovina, DRC, Tadzhikistan and Nepal. 
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In summary, theory and evidence support a variety of mechanisms for aid as a 
conflict prevention tool, as a source of conflict, and as a conflict enabler.  While the 
principles for counteracting mechanisms through which aid increases conflict are 
generally understood (security, transparency, accountability, absorptive capacity), 
pressures generated by conflict settings and among the donor community often constrain 
strict adherence to these principles, with policy choices often conforming to the “least 
bad” principle rather than the “do no harm” principle.  Research to advance 
understanding of the interactions between causal mechanisms in conflict that determine 
how aid, on balance, may increase human security and resilience without contributing to 
the resilience of belligerents and exacerbating conflict has been hampered to date by lack 
of longitudinal data of sufficient granularity and quality for comparative analysis.  The 
AidData.org, as discussed in Chapter 2 and Appendix B, is currently addressing this 
need.  
What is the effect of foreign aid—both development and humanitarian—in the 
immediate, fragile post-conflict environment, when belligerents have, at least 
temporarily, given up violence in favor of negotiation, accommodation, or compromise? 
Chavet and Collier (2006) hypothesize that for aid to be effective as an instrument of 
reform that reduces the risk of conflict recurrence, it must overcome constraints that 
emerge from four dimensions—elite interests relative to society, elite cognizance of 
optimal economic choices, elite power, and technical capacity of civil sector (Chavet & 
Collier, 2006).  They differentiate aid as technical assistance, which augments the 
capacity of the public sector, from aid as finance, which affects interests. Using indicators 
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of income and the World Bank CPIA index to define a sample size of 233 failing state78 
years, they test the relative effect of technical assistance and financial aid on institutional 
reform considered necessary for stabilization,79 where reform is measured by moving 
from a score of the CPIA index from below 2.5 to at least 3.0 or above on the CPIA index 
and has a total movement of 1.5. Hazard analysis indicates that reform only occurs if the 
aid relaxes binding constraints.  They find that improving societal capacities through 
technical assistance is the most reliable for doing so in early post-conflict stages; whereas 
financial aid to shape elite and social interests is only effective if delivered at least 4 
years post conflict.  However, they also find that in too many cases donor enthusiasm 
seems to lead to inappropriate financial intervention too early, when absorptive capacity 
of recipients is still low, resulting in higher risks of conflict recurrence.80   
Collier, Hoeffler and Soderman (2008) also conclude that aid can reduce conflict 
persistence by facilitating reforms in post-conflict settings.  In a statistical hazard analysis 
of 74 post-conflict settings between 1960-2002, they find military expenditures on 
external peacekeeping forces to be the most effective mechanism by which to relax 
reform constraints.  They find that economic development is correlated with reduced risk 
of conflict recurrence but that it takes a long time and must be accompanied by an 
external military presence sustaining a gradual economic recovery, whereas progress in 
                                                
78 Failing states are defined to be those low-income states in which policy and governance is persistently 
low, as measured by the CPIA index.  
79 Aid considered was from five largest donors. This approach is common in the literature to avoid spurious 
variations due to donor budget fluctuations.  Aid from World Bank is not included, as it is tied to CPIA 
index.   
80 In general, the absorptive capacity of aid as a percentage of GDP measured by purchasing power parity is 
estimated to be roughly proportional to twice the CPIA index (Paul Collier & Hoeffler, 2004).   However, 
conflict settings are exceptions to this rule.  During active conflict absorptive capacity may be less; in post 




political openness increases risk of conflict recurrence relative to autocratic systems 
(Collier et al., 2008).81   They attribute these results to an underlying model of conflict 
that preferences the feasibility thesis over a grievance based model, and recommend aid 
allocations be inversely proportional to the level of income in the post-conflict country to 
reduce risk of recurrence.  
In contrast to Collier’s studies, using data from the UCDP conflict termination 
and recurrence dataset, econometric analysis by Walter (2010) finds no significant 
correlation between increased aid and either reduction in conflict duration or risk of 
renewed conflict (Walter, 2010).  These results are robust to specification of type of aid 
(e.g., humanitarian, debt relief, development assistance or remittances), sector (e.g., 
health, education, or food security), mode (e.g., technical assistance versus direct aid), 
and time horizon (e.g., short versus long term). Walter cautions against drawing firm 
conclusions from econometric analyses, however, due to the likelihood that aid is 
endogenous to conflict, being offered to poor countries that are particularly susceptible to 
renewed civil wars.  While it is true that aid may become endogenous to conflict, other 
studies and policy documents challenge the assertion that preference is given to countries 
most at risk of war (Cogneau & Naudet, 2007; Collier & Dollar, 2002;Randel, 2000).  
Taking a different approach and looking at the political constraints on reform in 
the immediate post conflict environment, Savun and Tirone (2011) find that 
democratizing states receiving high levels of democracy aid are less likely to experience 
a recurrence of civil conflict than countries that receive little or no such external 
                                                
81 This study did not test the effectiveness of foreign aid in reducing risk directly; rather used economic 
growth as an indicator.  
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democracy assistance.  They explain these results as reduction in commitment and 
uncertainty problems among actors (Savun & Tirone, 2011).   
Most studies in the cited literature on the effect of aid in conflict settings fail to 
control explicitly for the impact of foreign aid on corruption, which can slow growth and 
investment, divert tax receipts, and bias the provision of public goods—all of which can 
contribute to increased risk of conflict persistence. The relationship between aid and 
corruption is contested in the literature, with some finding empirical evidence to support 
the hypothesis that foreign aid is on average associated with higher corruption (e.g., 
Svensson, 2000), while others find the opposite trend (e.g., Tavares, 2003).  
 
Nexus Between Conflict, Peacekeeping and Aid Literature 
As the summaries above indicate, the interaction between conflict dynamics, 
military and peacekeeping interventions and foreign aid in conflict settings is an ongoing 
area of research with contested results.   While some general, common themes have been 
developed, consensus around causal mechanisms and policy solutions are lacking 
(Tschirgi et al., 2010).  Three types of connections between security and development 
interventions dominate the literature: security as an objective of development, security as 
an instrument in achieving development goals, and development as an instrument for 
achieving security goals (Stewart, 2004). Broad conclusions linking thematic and case 
studies suggest that these connections cannot be considered independently of one another 
(Collier, 2003; Tschirgi et al., 2010):  
1. Structural development factors invariably introduce risks of intrastate 
conflict—although the patterns are different depending on context.  
2. At country level, political uncertainty and instability emerge as causes rather 
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than consequences of development failures and insecurity (and therefore provide a 
key to their remedy). There is a security-politics-development nexus that is highly 
context specific.   
3. External factors, both regional and international, have such influence that 
country level factors alone cannot explain conflict and development nor provide 
solutions. 
The diversity of theories and lack of consensus on mechanisms for civil war 
onset, and the effect of interventions on duration and recurrence underscores one 
pertinent fact:  that the dynamics of civil war are complex and its persistence is unlikely 
to be attributable to one or two factors or variables.  As one scholar has put it, “internal 
armed conflicts have a nasty habit of repeating themselves and we don’t really know 
why” (Walter, 2004).  More recently, Marine Lt. General Vincent Stewart, head of the 
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) commented “You see nation states collapsing in the 
region (Middle East) and maybe going to ethnic lines, and none of us understand where 
that will lead five minutes from now, or five years from now”.82  
 
Principles of System Dynamics and Relationship to the Literature 
A commonly cited weakness of the literature is the inadequacy of econometric 
analyses alone to determine causal relationships in dynamic systems in which 
interventions (e.g., peace operations, military interventions, foreign aid) become 
endogenous to the system itself.  My research addresses this weakness through a system 
                                                
82  See e.g., Naylor (2015).  
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dynamics framework, using reference behaviors as outcomes of actions taken within 
particular system structures.  
 As introduced previously, reference behaviors reflect underlying system 
structures that in turn determine resiliency of conflict actors and sustainability of 
violence.  Understanding these structures and which mechanisms cause desired changes 
to behaviors is a key purpose of system dynamics and is essential for effective 
intervention policy formulation. Most often policy analysis makes implicit assumptions, 
consciously or not, about these structures and their constraints in particular contexts, 
measures state variables within them (e.g., GDP, polity, inequality, etc.) and then predicts 
future behavior with or without interventions.  This is a reasonable approach when 
structure is easily observed and casual mechanisms are well understood.  However, a 
different approach is taken here, in which observed reference behaviors are analyzed and 
correlated to measures of state variables to infer hidden system structure and causal 
mechanisms that in turn can inform policy analysis.   
 
Previous Applications of System Dynamics to Conflict Analysis 
System dynamics has previously contributed insights to both theory testing and 
policy analysis for defense studies.  System dynamics is frequently used by defense 
organizations in conjunction with other methods to conduct simulated experiments and 
sensitivity studies for strategic and operational military problems.  While most of these 
applications are unpublished, Coyle et al. (1999) describe some of the applications to 
assessment of command and control processes, search and rescue processes, and life 
cycle cost analysis (Coyle et al., 1999).  
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Coyle (1985) developed the earliest system dynamic model of insurgency and 
subsequently expanded the model to analyze the complex dynamics between combatants 
and international actors in the Angolan conflict (Coyle, 1985; Coyle, 1998).   The 
dominant structural features are five interdependent feedback loops – persuasion, 
logistics, protection, and supply control. The interaction between these loops determines 
capacity of belligerents, moderated by counterinsurgency strategies that include military 
response, anti-subversion efforts and supply control efforts (Figure 15).83   The sign of 
the loops (e.g., balancing or reinforcing) depends on the level of these efforts in relation 
to parameters in additional underlying causal linkages.  
                                                
83 The full model contains additional structures accounting for local versus macro needs of the population; 
threat perception of the state, state strength and associated allocation of resources for protecting the 




Figure 15 Coyle (1985) Causal Loop Model of Insurgency Dynamics 
 
In the past decade, applications of system dynamics to conflict analysis build on 
this basic model, incorporating new research findings to test evolving theories of conflict 
dynamics and their policy implications. Diaz (2008) tests the power of greed and 
grievance theories for explaining conflict resistance to policy interventions in the 50-year 
old conflict in Columbia (i.e., state control over illicit activities, increased military 
investments, and political inclusion), and finds the greed model most relevant.   Choucri 
et al. (2007) incorporate theories of radicalization in agent based modeling and system 
dynamics to analyze the conditions under which various policy options enhance state 
stability and resilience to insurgency activities in the short and long term (i.e., removing 










































reduce insurgent recruitment).  They demonstrate why the removal of insurgents alone is 
unlikely to result in long-term stabilization.  Additional conflict applications in the 
system dynamics literature concern problems of intelligence in counterinsurgency, 
counterterrorism, contagion of serial insurgencies (Anderson, 2013; Anderson, 2011; 
Armenia, 2014), and an extensive case study of the tensions between conflict and 
development in Sri Lanka (Richardson, 2005).   
In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, Gallo (2013) presents a simplified model of 
how internal economic and political pressures lead to domestic conflict (Figure 16) that 
may or may not escalate to violence, depending on how much pressure can be 
nonviolently relieved through domestic adaptation (Gallo, 2012).  This structure 
illustrates how the behavior depends on the relative strength of the balancing loops.  If 
the two balancing loops are relatively equal, they can create a reinforcing loop when 
combined.  If the variables creating internal pressure are not reduced, then exponential 
behavior will initially be observed, ultimately reaching s-shaped behavior, where some 
low-level of conflict is sustained.  In reality, this structure is likely to produce oscillatory 
behavior due to various delay mechanisms. On the other hand, if either reinforcing loop is 
significantly stronger than the other, and there are saturation limits on the variables that 
increase internal pressure (e.g., inequalities, unemployment), then overshoot and collapse 





Figure 16 Gallo Causal Loop Model of Domestic Conflict Pressures 
 
This model builds on literature relating conflict to adaptive capacity, resource 
scarcity, and stresses within society, where stresses are related to high youth 
unemployment, economic inequalities, and social injustice; adaptive capacities are related 
to GDP per capita and governance factors; and interactions between balancing loops are 
moderated by technology.  Gallo (2013) draws on this model to conceptually explain the 
overshoot and collapse of governments in the early uprisings of the Arab Spring (e.g., 
Tunisia and Egypt) compared those that subsequently became protracted armed conflicts 
(e.g., Libya).   
Elsewhere, I have presented the theoretically grounded models shown in Figures 
17 and 18 that introduce perceived legitimacy of government and belligerents, strength of 
civil society, and internal displacement as an additional mechanisms affecting violence 
and resiliency of actors (Hayden, 2014). One of the key differences between these models 
and others in the literature is the displacement of the population that would otherwise 































displaced persons and refugees can be as high as 50% of the average population, and 
even higher locally.  In contrast to existing models, I treat interventions by regional and 
international actors as endogenous variables that may change or disrupt internal 
structures that may affect resiliency of actors in negative and positive ways, that may lead 
to the emergence of new structures that become self-sustaining (e.g., war economies).   
 





































































Figure 18 Causal Loop Model of Civil Conflict Dynamics Contains Endogenous Variables  
Linking Individual Agency with Loops for Increased Grievances,  
Belligerent Capacity, Violence and Human Security 
 
The causal loop models  shown in Figure 19 accounts for economic and political 
causal mechanims theorized in the Collier-Hoeffler conflict trap and the political 
instability model by Goldstone et al. (2010).  Key stocks are societal resources (which 
can be used for either productive or destructive endeavors), economic develoment, 
human security, and violence.  If productivity payoffs exceed war pay offs, there will be 
no civil war.  Factors that decrease productivity payoff include inequalities that lower 
human security and opportunity costs of war for marginalized groups, reduced spending 
of GDP on for social services, and increased rates of elite capture and government 
corruption. War pay off increases for belligerents who are able to capitalize on the 
reduced opportunity costs of war (and thereby attract supporters), while increasing their 
capture of societal resources and conduct of illegal activities to build and sustain 
capabilities.   Once civil war has started, the ensuing violence drives large population 
displacements (due to death, disease, and loss of property), thereby further degrading 
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productivity payoff and human security. If the war pay-off loop is weakened through 
interventions, and more societal resources are returned to supporting production rather 
than conflict capabilities, recurring civil war is more likely than the original risk of 
conflict, due to the long delays (e.g., often ten years or more) in reconsituting production 
capabilities, economic development, and human security (measured as infant mortality 
rates and disease).  
 
 
Figure 19 Causal Loop Model of Conflict Trap 
 
The models discussed above have contributed theoretical understanding of policy 
resistance to intervention strategies in civil conflict, and have provided insights into 
individual case studies (e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon). However they have not been 
systematically and rigorously applied in comparative analysis to explain differences 
between conflict outcomes across multiple cases, or for developing and testing 
interventions.  One of the difficulties in doing so is the amount of data required to 
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populate these complex models for comparative predictive analysis and theory testing.   
A second difficulty lies in formulating a methodology to compare the explanatory power 
of different model structures across a sample of different conflict settings.  A third is that 
the model complexity often makes it difficult for policy makers to understand their 
implications.  The methodology developed in this research is a step towards overcoming 
these difficulties by integrating econometric methods with the system dynamics approach 











The complex and dynamic nature of civil conflict challenges any single research 
method for providing robust explanations of observed behaviors and insights into causal 
mechanisms to inform policy, as noted by (Kalyvas, 2008), who writes: 
“However, despite these advances much remains to be understood. On 
the one hand, the conceptual foundations of our understanding of civil 
wars are still weak; on the other hand, econometric studies have produced very 
little in terms of robust results – the main one being that, like autocratic regimes, 
civil wars are more likely to occur in poor countries. The problems of 
econometric studies are well known: their main findings are incredibly sensitive 
to coding and measurement procedures; they entail a considerable distance 
between theoretical constructs and proxies as well as multiple observationally 
equivalent pathways; they suffer from endogeneity; and they lack clear micro-
foundations or are based on erroneous ones.”  
 
To address concerns of endogeneity, the distance between theoretical constructs 
and proxies that makes determination of causal mechanisms difficult, and the problem of 
multiple equivalent pathways, I combine quantitative econometric analysis with the 
framework of system dynamics to test hypothesized dominant causal mechanisms that 
explain correlations between conflict persistence and risk factors at different scales of 
analysis.  Quantitative regression analysis provides macro level comparative analysis 
between conflict outcomes over a twenty-five year period. Preliminary conclusions from 
quantitative analysis are further explored in a case study of the Somalia conflict that 
allows within-case comparative analysis of causal mechanisms at a mesa-level, that are 
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further explored through field research regarding causal mechanisms in the Somalia 
conflict at an individual, micro-level.  
The construct of the econometric analysis implicitly assumes independence 
among hypotheses.  In reality, the risk factors and causal mechanisms associated with 
each hypothesis co-evolve as noted by Kalyvas (2008).  Risk factors and inferred causal 
mechanisms from the hypothesis testing through regression analysis are incorporated into 
the system dynamics model for exploring how these mechanisms co-evolve.  
Combining quantitative and qualitative analysis at different scales provides 
insights for understanding path dependencies over time and differentiating among causal 
mechanisms to guide more effective and efficient policy interventions. The methods 
employed at each of these scales are discussed below.  Data sources, which included 
extensive archival investigation, practitioner interviews, fieldwork, and the construction 
of original quantitative data sets, are then summarized.	   
 
Comparative Macro-Level Analysis Using Quantitative Regression  
Refinement of Hypotheses 
A striking feature of trends in event data for violent armed conflict in Africa over 
the past 25 years is the manifestation of archetypal reference behaviors associated with 
structural system dynamics that suggest different influences of underlying causal 
mechanisms for conflict persistence.  These reference behaviors differentiate between 
long durations characterized by exponential growth and those characterized by sustained, 
but bounded, oscillations; and between shorter durations characterized by overshoot and 
collapse from within, and those characterized by strong conflict dampening by force 
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(Figure 2, Chapter 1, and Table 1, Chapter 1). The hypotheses proposed in Chapter 1 
predict risk factors most likely to be associated with overshoot and collapse, damped 
impulse, exponential and oscillatory. The purpose of the quantitative regression analysis 
is to test these hypotheses by determining the correlation of risk factors for conflict 
persistence with the likelihood of the reference behaviors, and in so doing infer insights 
into relative strengths of associated causal mechanisms.  The theoretical assumptions for 
inferring causal mechanisms from structural dynamics associated with risk factors were 
summarized in Table 2 below.   
The reference behaviors of conflicts are treated as the dependent outcomes in 
multinomial logistic regression analysis to test correlations between risk factors posited 
in H-A, H-B, H-C, H-D (Chapter 1, p 21-25) for those outcomes. The risk factors are 
associated with three categories of causal mechanisms in the literature for conflict onset 
and durations – those related to endogenous country level characteristics, those related to 
conflict characteristics, and those introduced by external intervention factors.  To isolate 
the relative influences of the causal mechanisms each of these categories, correlations 
with risk factors associated with country level characteristics are tested in isolation from 
the other categories; risk factors associated with both country level characteristics and 
conflict characteristics are then tested; risk factors associated with country level 
characteristics and intervention characteristics are tested in isolation from conflict 
characteristics; and then combinations of significant risk factors from among all 
categories are tested.  This requires refinement of hypotheses proposed in Chapter 1 for 
likelihood of each behavior group as follows: 
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H1: All else being equal, observed behavior patterns of conflict persistence (e.g., 
overshoot and collapse, or outcome behavior A; damped impulse, or outcome 
behavior B; exponential growth, or outcome behavior C; oscillatory behavior, or 
outcome behavior D) can be explained by country characteristics associated with 
conflict risk and duration: size and rate of growth of economy, state reliance on 
commodity exports, state reach and capacity, depth of poverty, social cohesion, 
ethnic polarization, geographic sanctuary available to belligerents, strength and 















































































A + + -- + -- - + -- -- - - 
B - - - - - ++ - -- -- - - 
C -- -- ++ -- + - - + + -- + 
D - - + - - +/- - + + + + 
 
Overshoot and collapse (Behavior A) should be associated with lower state and 
rebel capacity, and higher opportunity costs and state reach. Damped impulse (Behavior 
B) should be associated with moderate to high relative rebel capacity and opportunity 
costs; low rebel cohesion; low state capacity and reach (which results in higher likelihood 
of foreign military intervention).  Exponential growth (Behavior C) should be associated 
with low opportunity costs, high rebel capacity and cohesion, and higher state capacity 
but low state reach.   Oscillatory (Behavior D) should be associated with moderately 
balanced rebel capacity, social cohesion, state capacity and reach, and lower opportunity 




H2: All else being equal, observed behavior patterns of conflict persistence (e.g., 
overshoot and collapse, or outcome behavior A; damped impulse, or outcome 
behavior B; exponential growth, or outcome behavior C; oscillatory behavior, or 
outcome behavior D) can be explained by endogenous conflict characteristics: 
type of conflict (territorial or political), rebel capacity (fungible resources, 
number and types of belligerents) relative to state security capacity (forces, 
military expenditure, state reach), security environment (e.g., other internal 
















































































A P - - ++ - - -- 
B P + ++ - + - - 
C T + - - + - ++ 
D T -- +/- - + ++ - 
 
Overshoot and collapse and damped impulse (Behaviors A and B) are 
hypothesized to be more likely to be associated with political conflicts; neither is likely to 
be associated with religious extremism or prior conflict.84  The difference between A and 
B is expected to be in relatively capacity of state and rebels and in the security 
environment (e.g., wars on borders).  Exponential growth and oscillatory behavior (C and 
D) are hypothesized to be more likely to be associated with territorial conflicts and poor 
security environment (that exacerbates and fuels conflict capacities on both sides). The 
difference between them is likely to be the association with religious extremism (more 
                                                
84 Religious extremism is assumed to provide a deep source of continued support for rebel causes and 
opportunity to connect with other groups, making it less likely that conflicts involving religious extremism 
will collapse quickly (behavior A), or be integrated into existing political structures (behavior B).   
Previous research has shown that prior conflict is less likely when episode durations are shorter.  
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likely in case of exponential growth).  In both cases, relative levels of state capacity 
relative and other belligerents may be approximately equal (after compensating for 
asymmetric advantage to rebels); but, in the case of C, they are both likely to be higher 
relative to the opportunity costs of conflict (leading to continued escalation) while in the 
case of D they are both likely to be lower relative to opportunity costs of conflict 
(resulting in continued but incomplete damping).  
The infusion of aid (development, humanitarian, military) in conflict settings 
potentially affects absolute and relative capacity of all belligerents and has been shown to 
have various positive and negative effects on duration, intensity, and outcomes.  I 
hypothesize that those interventions involving aid that seeks short -term human security 
goals over longer term goals associated with improving aid effectiveness may increase 
risk of conflict escalation or recurrence and generate more insecurity in the long term.  
H3 tests this hypothesis:  
 
H3: All else being equal, the observed patterns of conflict persistence (overshoot 
and collapse, or outcome behavior A; damped impulse, or outcome behavior B; 
exponential growth, or outcome behavior C; oscillatory behavior, or outcome 
behavior D) are correlated with different levels of aid assistance, controlling for 
state reach, state security capacity, institutional capacity, and aid effectiveness. 
Reference 
Behavior 











Governance Aid  Effectiveness 
A - - - ++ - -- + 
B - - + - ++ - - 
C + + - - - - - 




Higher levels of aid coupled with low state reach are predicted to be correlated 
with exponential growth and oscillatory behavior (C and D).  The distinction between the 
two is that low aid effectiveness is expected to be associated with exponential growth, 
while higher aid effectiveness is expected to be associated with oscillatory behavior.  
Low aid is expected to be correlated with overshoot and collapse and damped impulse (A 
and B).  A key difference between A and B is predicted to be comparatively low 
indicators of aid effectiveness for B, correlated with a lower CPIA index, and higher level 
of external military assistance.  
 
H4:  The pattern of conflict persistence associated with the observed behavior 
groupings (overshoot and collapse, or outcome behavior A; damped impulse, or 
outcome behavior B; exponential growth, or outcome behavior C; oscillatory 
behavior, or outcome behavior D) is correlated with the presence of external 
military interventions with the stated purpose of peace operations and/or 

















A ++ - - - - ++ 
B - - - + + - 
C - + + ++ ++ + 
D - - - - - - 
 
Previous research has shown that both peace operations and military interventions 
by single actors are likely to be correlated with longer conflict durations.   I hypothesize 
that this correlation is associated with exponential of cases of exponential growth (C), 
and not with oscillatory behavior (D), and that exponential growth is correlated with non-
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UN peace operations, whereas overshoot and collapse (A) is expected to be correlated 
with instances of peace making interventions followed by UN peacekeeping 
interventions.   
 
H5:   The pattern of conflict persistence associated with the observed behavior 
groupings (overshoot and collapse, or outcome behavior A; damped impulse, or 
outcome behavior B; exponential growth, or outcome behavior C; oscillatory 
behavior, or outcome behavior D) is correlated with interactions between aid 
assistance, the presence of peacekeeping missions and state security capacity, 




Peacekeeping Missions x 
State Security Capacity 
State 
Reach 
Conflict Type Economic Opportunity 
Costs 
A + ++ + + 
B - + + + 
C + - - -- 
D - - - - 
 
Conflicts with exponential growth are predicted to be associated with both 
interventions involving high levels of aid and peace making operations in countries with 
poor governance and economic indicators resulting in low economic opportunity costs, so 
that interventions become endogenous to the system and generate amplification rather 
than balancing effects on the capacity to sustain conflict (Shortland, Christopoulou, & 
Makatsoris, 2013).   Recent reports by Saferworld85 reviewing the effect of the past 15 
years of interventions in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Yemen have termed this the 
                                                
85 Saferworld is an international nongovernmental organization headquartered in the UK that has been 
working for 25 years to prevent violent conflict and build safer lives in conflict affected areas. See 
http://www.saferworld.org.uk/ .  
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“stabilization trap” (Attree, 2016; Groenewald, 2016; Suri, 2016).  I hypothesize that 
those intervention policies employing balancing principles from system dynamics that 
preference long human security goals (e.g., development) over short term (e.g., 
humanitarian) are most likely to reduce risk of conflict recurrence for overshoot and 
collapse and damped impulse (A and B).  
Risk factors posited in H1 derive from social, political, economic, and physical 
conditions within which the conflict occurs. Risk factors posited in H2 derive from the 
nature of the conflict and characteristics of the belligerents and state.  Risk factors posited 
in H3 and H4 derive from foreign aid and external peace operations, respectively.  Risk 
factors posited in H5 derive from interactive effects between aid, peace operations, and 
conflict characteristics.   
Case Selection 
 The cases for this research consist of 34 persistent violent armed conflicts in 
Africa from 1989 – 2014, resulting in 810 conflict years.  The criteria for selecting these 
34 conflicts is that the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2015 (Pettersson 
& Wallensteen, 2015) or UCDP/GED version1.5-2011 (Sundberg & Melander, 2013) 
records at least two reported episodes of the same conflict interspersed with periods of 
apparent peace, or an extended period of uninterrupted fighting in the same conflict 
lasting ten years or more.  These cases are listed in Table 2, Chapter 1, and summarized 
in Appendix A.86  
                                                
86 Appendix A provides detailed discussion and analysis of data from ACLED, UCDP, and SCAD for 
conflict events, event types, actors, and interaction between actors used to choose cases and make the 
categorization into different reference behavior types.    
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Africa is chosen for two reasons: to take advantage of robust, subnational 
georeferenced data on conflicts in Africa (described in the next section and in Appendix 
B) and because of the high number of cases of conflict persistence. The post Cold-War 
timeframe avoids conflating intervention affects with those of covert military actors 
acting as Superpower proxies.  Most quantitative, cross-country, comparative studies on 
conflict duration typically examine time periods of at most 5 to 10 years post-conflict for 
evaluating “success” or “failure” of peace.   A timeframe of 25 years is chosen so that 
conflict dynamics leading to recurrence after 10 years or more are not overlooked. This 
also provides sufficiently large data set to conduct statistically meaningful quantitative 
analysis.  
Multinomial logistic regression predicts categorical placement in the outcome, 
reference behavior, based on multiple independent variables.  Like binary logistic 
regression, it uses maximum likelihood estimation to evaluate the probability of 
categorical membership.   It is particularly suitable for this study because it does not 
assume normality, linearity, or homoscedasticity of the explanatory variables.  However, 
thorough initial data analysis is required to confirm the assumptions of independence 
among the dependent variable categories and to evaluate correlations among the 
independent variables that could introduce problems of multicollinearity (Berry & 
Feldman, 1985; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).   
Outcome Characterization 
The first step in the multinomial regression analysis is to characterize the 
dependent variable according to the categorical outcome, reference behavior. Each of the 
idealized reference behaviors (Figure 1) can be described by different mathematical 
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equations.  The determination of outcome for each conflict case is obtained by calculating 
the best-fit equation to violent conflict event data over the 25-year time period and 
matching to the corresponding reference behavior as described in Appendix A.  Conflict 
event data that is best fit with an exponential equation clearly reflects exponential growth 
(or decay); a polynomial or sinusoidal best-fit equation is associated with oscillatory 
behavior; truncated logistic growth is associated with damped impulse, and a Weibull 
hazard function is associated with overshoot and collapse.   
 
Figure 1 Reference Behaviors Associated with Different System Structures Revealed Over Time87 
 
As with any real world data trends over time, a clear and unambiguous fit to idealized 
behavior is rare and is only seen here in a few cases (e.g., exponential growth in Somalia; 
stable oscillations in Kenya, overshoot and collapse in Burundi, damped impulse in 
Mali).  For this reason, conflict narratives are taken into account, along with statistical 
analysis to avoid classification on the basis of hidden effects—such as time since 
initiating event or types of interactions.  These considerations are discussed in Appendix 
                                                
87 Figure adapted from Worcester Polytechnic Institute course lecture material, “System Dynamics 




A and did not reveal any obviously problematic fixed effects to be present in classifying 
outcomes that are not captured by the independent explanatory variables used for 
hypothesis testing.  
Independent Variable Selection 
The second step in the regression analysis is to choose variables to test for 
outcomes correlations with theoretically hypothesized conflict drivers, capacity to engage 
in conflict, opportunity costs for engaging in conflict, reconciliation drivers, capacity for 
managing or resolving conflict, and interventions. Annual data from 1989-2014 were 
collected for the proxy variables in Table 1.  The potential for introducing 
multicollinearity problems in the regression analysis was reduced by filtering out some 
variables based on pairwise correlation analysis in STATA and by conducting standard 
statistical tests for variance inflation in the STATA regression models.88  
Variables listed in Table 1 are indicators and proxies for hypothesized causal 
mechanisms of conflict drivers, capacity and opportunity costs commonly used in the 
literature based on the size, rate of growth, and structure of the economy, and social, 
political, institutional and physical conditions within the country of the conflict. Risk 
factors based on characteristics of the country and society within which the conflict 
occurs are proxies for state capacity (log GDP, oil exports as a percentage of GDP), 
opportunity cost (GDP per capita, GDP growth, economic inequality, remittances), 
poverty (GDP share and GDP per capita of lowest 10th percentile), governance (Country 
Policy and Institutional Assessment [CPIA] Index and Polity IV scores), state reach 
                                                
88 The variance inflation factor (VIF) is calculated for each regression to test for co-linearity.  The standard 
statistical protocol of rejecting any model in which the VIF exceeds a value of 10 is followed.  When any 
two variables have a statistically significant pairwise correlation coefficient that exceeds .5, they are not 
used in the same model.  
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(percent urbanization, access to electricity, landmass, population density) and 
social/political exclusions (social fragmentation, ethnic polarization, religious 
polarization).  
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Proxies used in the literature for state capacity include GDP, GDP per capita, oil 
exports as a percentage of GDP, polity scores, size of security forces, and military 
expenditures.  There is some degree of statistically significant correlation among all of 
these, although they operate through different mechanisms.  GDP and polity scores are 
proxies for institutional capacity, while military expenditures and size of force represent 
security capacity.  There is a negative correlation between oil as percentage of GDP and 
polity scores as reported in other literature, but this correlation is weak and does not 
appear to introduce co-linearity problems.  Correlation analysis between the country level 
risk variables (described in Appendix B) showed that proxies for government reach are 
correlated with coefficients between .3 and .6. Percent urban population is used as the 
more reliable and stable proxy for state reach over the time period.    
Measures of economic inequality based on GINI coefficient and GDP share of 
lowest 10th percentile are strongly correlated with each other, but not with GDP per capita 
of lowest 10th percentile.  However, GDP per capita of lowest 10th percentile is strongly 
correlated with GDP per capita.  GDP per capita share of lowest 10th percentile is used as 
a measure of inequality; and GDP of lowest 10th percentile is used as a measure of 
poverty and opportunity cost, but with caution to avoid overinflating the affect of GDP 
when also using GDP per capita as a measure of state capacity.   
The CPIA index, developed by the World Bank to measure absorptive capacity 
for aid, is a composite of sixteen indicators in four clusters – economic management, 
structural policies, policies for social inclusion and equity and public sector management.  
The composite score is used here a proxy for state capacity to balance conflict drivers 
through peaceful, rather than forceful means.  Values for the indicators based on gender 
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equality and corruption, which are included in the composite CPIA score, are considered 
individually to test the premise that higher levels of gender equality are associated with 
decreased likelihood of conflict persistence, and higher levels of corruption are associated 
with increased likelihood of conflict persistence.89 As one would expect, CPIA, gender 
equality and corruption are somewhat correlated, but not so much as to introduce co-
linearity problems in the regression analysis.  This is because of the influence of other 
factors in the CPIA index and corruption index, having to do with structural economic 
policies.  Male youth unemployment and population are proxies for belligerent 
expectations of sustainable resources for conflict.90   
Based on the considerations above, 4 of the 20 potential explanatory and control 
variables for testing H1 in Table 1 were dropped in favor of those remaining in Table 2, 
with cautions as noted for additional judgment when interpreting results containing 
correlated variables.91  Potential problems are flagged by unrealistically small size of 
coefficients or incongruous statistical significance of those coefficients, relative to the 
calculated statistical power of the model based on log pseudo likelihoods and Wald chi2 
tests.  
                                                
89 These effects derive from two different causal mechanisms.  The first is based on the association between 
gender equality and reconciliation mechanisms present in society.  The second is based on associations 
between corruption and ease of access to resources for engaging in conflict.   
90 Population size is sometimes used as a proxy for rebel capacity in the literature, in absence of reliable 
data on force size of rebel troops.   There are limited data on rebel forces in the set of cases considered 
here.  For the data that does exist, there is a significant positive correlation of .2 between rebel forces and 
population.  
91 Variables dropped are ratio of girls to boys in secondary school, religious polarization, infant mortality, 
and income from oil (as compared to percent GDP from oil).  Infant mortality is highly and negatively 
correlated with ln GDP per capita, poverty, male youth unemployment, polity scores, and gender equality.  
It is strongly and positively correlated with social fragmentation and religious polarization.  While this 
makes it an attractive measure of overall aid effectiveness and human capital development, the high degree 
of correlation with different causal mechanisms reduces its utility as a control variable.    
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 Variables for testing H2 are proxies to for relative capacity during conflict (e.g., 
number of belligerents groups and forest cover); and type of conflict (e.g., territorial, 
governance ethnic, religious, and coups). Ideally, availability of income from illicit 
sources should be included as well, but is not included due to lack of reliable annual data. 
As can be seen, there is no way to completely eliminate correlated variables due to the 
co-evolution and interdependence of conflict risk factors with causal mechanisms and 
underlying structures associated with those country level risk factors.  
 
Table 2 Variables for Testing H1 and H2 
 
 
Some of the variables listed in Table 2 for state reach and capacity are commonly 
used in the literature and associated with longer conflict durations (e. g., GDP per capita, 
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oil). However, some variables for state security capacity  (military expenditures, 
percentage of government spending on military expenses, size of state armed forces and 
the presence of militias) have not been systematically included as controls for impact on 
conflict persistence in conjunction with the presence of peace operations.  Military 
expenditure, size of national armed forces, and GDP are strongly correlated with each 
other, whereas the correlation between these variables and military expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP is weaker. GDP and military expenditures as percent of GDP are 
therefore used as differentiating measures of state capacity.  The density of security 
forces (troops per km2) is only weakly correlated with expenditures and GDP, and is used 
as an additional measure of the reach of military capacity.  
  Intervention variables for testing H3-H4 are the amount and type of foreign aid; 
the monthly numbers of forces involved in peace operations and foreign military 
interventions (differentiated as UN, regional, or ad hoc coalitions); annual mission 
months of peace operation missions and foreign military interventions; and peace 
agreements or negotiated settlements.  As discussed in Chapter 1, previous research has 
failed to systematically control for variations of the size of troop presence within 
missions over time when assessing the impact of different types of peace operations and 
foreign military interventions over the history of the conflict.  Original data was compiled 
from primary and secondary sources to construct measures of the individual and 
combined annual mission months and troop levels of five different types of military 
interventions: (1) UN peacekeeping forces; (2) African Union peacekeeping forces; (3) 
peacekeeping and/or stabilization missions of other regional organizations (e.g., 
Economic Community of West African States, or ECOWAS); (4) UN sanctioned, ad-hoc 
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coalitions of the willing (e.g., Unified Task Force, UNITAF, in Somalia); and (5) single 
actors (e.g., Ethiopia troops in Somalia, French troops in Mali).   These external actors 
are present in 17 of the 34 conflicts, involving 26 UN missions, and 37 non-UN missions 
with a total presence of actors other than UN forces accounting for slightly over 50% of 
the external presence measured as troop-mission months per year (Figure 2).   The only 
statistically significant correlations are between UN and African Union missions (.13) 
and between coalition and single actor missions (.5).  For this reasons, coalition and 
single actor missions are combined into a single variable, accounting for approximately 
25% of the interventions.   
 
Figure 2 UN, AU, Regional, Coalition, and Single Actor Presence in Conflicts 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the literature ascribes different causal mechanisms to 
development versus humanitarian relief aid.  Foreign aid interventions are measured as 
total development aid committed, aid as a percentage of GDP, and percentage of aid that 
is humanitarian relief.  Total development aid is assumed to increase state capacity, when 
controlling for aid effectiveness.  A key assumption in the literature (and illustrated in 
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many case studies) is that humanitarian aid can increase belligerent capacity in conflict 
settings due to lack of institutional control, principles of neutrality, and opportunities for 
theft and high levels of corruption.  Attempted peace agreements or negotiated 
settlements are included as a control variable.    
As expected, correlation analysis shows that aid variables used for testing H3 are 
not independent from other predictors of conflict and duration (Table 3).  Of these, the 
strongest correlation is the positive association between high levels of corruption and 
percentage of aid that is humanitarian, and negative association with CPIA index.  The 
presence of UN and regional troops is also associated with low levels of CPIA index but 
lower levels of gender inequality.  Since a goal of the regression analysis is to examine 
whether aid and peace operations have a moderating or interactive effects that could be 
differentially associated with reference behavior outcomes, use of correlated variables is 
unavoidable.  None of the correlations between variables used are higher than .4 to avoid 
overinflating the effects.   
Chapter 2 
 135 
Table 3 Variables for Testing H3 and H4 
 
 
Other researchers have noted the methodological difficulties of using econometric 
analysis in studying conflict dynamics due to interdependencies between interventions 
and characteristics of the conflict itself, and caveat their results accordingly.  Two notable 
problems are endogeneity effects and the possibility of sampling on the dependent 
variable. This research addresses interdependencies and co-evolution explicitly using 
systems dynamic modeling, discussed in a later section.   
Other potential concerns with the regression analysis are fixed effects, omitted 
variables, and sample size.  Possible sources of fixed effects include natural disasters 
(e.g., drought), exogenous economic or political shocks (e.g., Arab Spring), and/or 
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affect civil conflict dynamics through endogenous economic performance indicators, 
which are included in the analysis (Bergholt & Lujala, 2010).  Data from the International 
Displacement Monitoring Center on natural disaster impacts within conflict settings 
confirm the correlation with economic indicators in the sample set, so that there is no 
need to introduce additional instrumental control variables.92  Major economic and 
political shocks that occurred in the time frame of analysis are post-Cold War political 
adjustments, the global recession in 2008, and the Arab Spring.  In addition, the global 
war on terror since 2001 in the Middle East and Afghanistan, and the collapse of Libya in 
2011 have led to a flood of arms and an increase in Islamic extremism that may be 
driving some of the conflict dynamics. The potential for bias introduced by these factors 
is discussed in Chapter 3.  The potential for introducing omitted variable bias by 
excluding data on conflict characteristics such as types of interactions between actors or 
time since the initiating trigger for conflict, is examined statistically and found to be 
unlikely as discussed in Appendix A.  
 Although there are no standard rules of thumb for sample size in multinomial 
regression, it does require a larger sample size than ordinal or binary logistic regression, 
due to the use of multiple equations and the requirement that no category should have 
very few cases compared to other categories.  Standard rules of thumb for ordinal or 
binary logistic regression suggest minimum sample sizes for outcome-to-predictor ratio 
that range from 5 to 1 to 15 to 1 (Green, 1991).  The regression models are constructed to 
maintain a minimum sample size of four times this recommended minimum, to account 
for the four categorical outcomes. With 810 observations, this criterion is easily met in 
                                                
92 The one exception is the case of the 2011 drought in Somalia, which induced an abnormally large influx 
of humanitarian aid.  
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most cases.  However, when using a variable with missing data for a significant number 
of years (e.g., US military assistance from 1989 - 2000), fewer predictors must be used.  
Four series of regression analyses are run with the variables listed in Tables 2 and 
3 for hypothesis testing.  The first of these produces the most efficient model for testing 
H1, in that the log likelihood of the null hypothesis is minimized, the explanatory power 
is maximized with the fewest significant variables with coefficients substantially different 
than zero, and the model is robust to different specification of control variables.  This 
model is then used as a base model for sequentially testing additional explanatory power 
of H2, H3 and H4.   
Evaluation of Regression Results 
Results from the quantitative regression analysis are evaluated on the basis of (1) 
explanatory power of each model, (2) significance, strength of influence and polarity of 
correlation coefficients within each model, and (3) robustness of correlation coefficients 
across models. The most efficient models are those with the most explanatory power for 
the fewest number of coefficients.  Only coefficients with significance to the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level are recorded. In order to compare strength of correlation coefficients, the 
regression analyses are conducted with and without constants.  The results for correlation 
coefficients in regression models without constants are scaled by the order of magnitude 
of the median values for the variables to obtain relative strengths of influence for 
variables within models. Robustness of correlation coefficients across models is tested by 
using a large number of different controls, and seeing whether the significance. Results 




Mesa- and Micro-Level Case Study Analysis of Somalia Conflict 
As a within-case single study, Somalia has both unique and typical features of 
conflict persistence, and provides an opportunity for longitudinal study.  The Somalia 
conflict provides rich data over a 25-year time period to compare manifestations of 
different reference behavior patterns at a mesa-level level within a single case to those at 
the macro level across conflict cases. Somalia is an extreme case of state failure and 
persistent conflict, but is also representative of and salient to current crises in the Middle 
East and Africa, and contains many characteristics common to ongoing persistent 
conflicts in Africa and Asia – high levels of corruption, low state security capacity, 
history of conflict, high rates of poverty and fragility, multiplicity of Nonstate actors, 
growing presence of Islamic extremists.  Even so, some nonviolent parts of Somali 
society have shown resilience during discreet periods of the conflict and the country has 
shown recent progress in peacebuilding efforts.   
There are five distinct phases of different types of intervention strategies and 
levels of external presence in the Somalia conflict, during which time there was 
remarkably little change in governance structure (due to its absence).  These distinctive 
phases offer a type of natural experiment for isolating the effects of external 
interventions. Specifically, they allow process tracing to explore how third-party peace 
operations; humanitarian aid and development interventions affect the resiliency of 
different actors and conflict behaviors at the mesa-level within a single case.   
Two analysis methods are used in the case study.  The first uses system dynamics 
to represent and evaluate hypothesized relationships between intervention policies, causal 
mechanisms, and outcomes of conflict dynamics at the country scale in each of five 
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phases of the Somali conflict.93  The relationships between intervention variables, the 
feedback loops that they generate, and risk factors from the previous regression analysis 
are assessed for each phase of conflict to evaluate the congruency between the previous 
macro-level, comparative regression analysis of outcome predictors across conflicts over 
time, and the mesa-level analysis based on comparing causal relationships within a single 
conflict. This comparison provides a test for internal validity and scalability of the 
hypothesized relationship between outcomes and conflict intervention factors.  
The second employs semi-structured field interviews at the individual level to 
explore the same hypothesized relationships between policies, causal mechanisms, and 
conflict outcomes at the micro-level.  
 
Causal Modeling Using System Dynamics  
Causal models of five distinct phases of the Somalia conflict are built using 
systems dynamics for testing the relationship between interventions and likely outcome 
behaviors. The five phases are (1) UN humanitarian relief interventions and US 
support1992-1994 (associated with Overshoot and Collapse); (2) Emergence of regional 
self-governance structures and the Union of Islamic Courts1995-2006 (associated with 
oscillatory behavior); (3) US-backed Ethiopian intervention on behalf of the Transitional 
Federal Government and rise of Al Shabaab 2007-2009 (associated with exponential 
growth); (4) growth of Al-Shabaab insurgency and expansion of AMISOM intervention 
2010-2013 (associated with exponential growth); and (5) continued insurgency 
accompanied by increased international support to political and development activities of 
                                                




the new Federal Government of Somalia, implemented through the Somalia New Deal 
Compact and UN stabilization mission 2014 to present (associated with potential 
transition to oscillatory or overshoot and collapse).  
As with the regression analysis, the unit of analysis in the causal modeling of the 
Somalia conflict is the reference behavior of conflict (outcome).  However, in the case 
study the outcome is considered within distinct sub-intervals of time for each phase, and 
associated with causal model structures in which the balance between feedback loops in 
the causal model, rather than risk factors, are the predictors of outcome behavior.  These 
structures are based on archetypes of overshoot and collapse, exponential growth, and 
oscillatory behavior.  
Table 4 summarizes the feedback structures assumed to represent conflict risk 
factors based on theoretical mechanisms and the reference behaviors that should be 
expected, all else being equal (AEBE).  A discussion of these underlying archetypal 
structures and the rationale for mapping these to causal mechanisms in Table 4 that 
follows.  
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Table 4 Mapping Between Conflict Risk Factors, System Structure and Reference Behaviors 
Conflict Risk 
Factor 




Higher rentier income 
increases greed, differentially 
affects capacities 
Positive reinforcing loops with 
delayed resource constraints  
Exponential (weak 
constraints) or Oscillatory 
(strong constraints) 
Low GDP per 
capita  
Equally affects capacities, 
low opportunity costs 
Delayed balancing loops 
create strong reinforcing loop 
Exponential with eventual 
saturation 
Low GDP per 
capita and high 
inequality 
Grievance and low 
opportunity cost 
Goal-driven with delayed 
resource constraints  
Exponential (weak balancing 
loops) or Oscillatory (strong 
balancing loops) 
Availability of 
illicit income  





Type of conflict: 
coups 
All or nothing Goal-oriented with resource 
constraint, no delays 
Overshoot & Collapse 
Type of conflict: 
ethnic “sons of 
soil” 
Hold out for accommodation 
& negotiation 
Goal-oriented with delayed 













Low state reach, competing 
goals of inter-ethnic rivalries 






Diluted state capacity, 
competing goals and 
resources 
Capacity constraints, 
competitive goal-seeking  




Increase relative capacities 
and expectations 
Change strength of balancing 
loops and delays 
Episodic Damped Impulse 
(on side of government) or 
Exponential (against 
government) 
Military victory Increased post-conflict 
violence, corruption, 
uncertainty 
Goal seeking with asymmetric 
capabilities, no delay 
(competitive pay-off) 




Capacity limited commitment 
problems; security dilemma 
Delayed capacity limited goal-






capacity and transparency, 
human security, reduce 
corruption 
Reduce delays and goal-
seeking gap 
Damped Impulse, 
Oscillatory with lower 
amplitudes and mean 
Peace operations 
during conflict 
Reduce expectations of, cost 
of coordination, security 
dilemma 
Reduce delays and goal-
seeking gap 
Damped Impulse, 
Oscillatory with lower 
amplitudes and mean 
Foreign Aid during 
conflict 
Aid as benefit: Increase state 
capacity; reduce grievances 
Goal-seeking with reduced 
delays and increased capacity 
Overshoot & Collapse, 
Oscillatory with lower 
amplitudes and mean 
Foreign Aid during 
conflict 
Aid as harm: Corruption, 
rent-seeking, capture  
Increase strength of 
asymmetric capacity, goal-gap 
within balancing loops 
Exponential 
Foreign Aid post 
conflict 
Improve social capacity 
through technical assistance 
Increase governance balancing 
loop 
Overshoot and collapse 
Foreign Aid post 
conflict 
Increase elite power through 
financial assistance 
Create competitive goal-





Archetypal System Structures and Causal Mechanisms 
The reference behaviors that appear in Table 2 (and that were introduced in 
Chapter 1, Figure 2) are overshoot and collapse (A), damped impulse (B), exponential 
growth (C), sustained oscillations (D).   First order exponential growth is the simplest of 
these, involving only one dominant stock (e.g., first order) with a positive (reinforcing) 
feedback loop in a system with unconstrained capacity to generate growth.  The structure 
is shown in Figure 3 below. The accumulation of the state variable describing the system 
is given by the equation, 
𝑠(𝑡)   =   𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑔𝑡)        
where s is a variable describing the state of the system, and g is the fractional growth rate.  
 
Figure 3 Exponential Growth Feedback Structure 
 
In pure exponential behavior, the growth rate is relatively constant over time, and results 
in a fixed doubling time period, where the doubling time, Td, is given by the equation,  
 
𝑇𝑑   =   𝑙𝑛(2)/𝑔  
In most systems, exponential growth is eventually limited due to resource constraints, but 
may dominate for many years before balancing forces are felt.  Examples in social 








prison population from 1925-2010.   The key insight for application to conflict is that for 
exponential growth to occur, other balancing structures that are present do not dominate 
the behavior of the system (Astrom & Murray, 2012). Exponential growth dominates as 
long as belligerent capacity is not resource limited, and there are no strong balancing 
loops created by other actors. Exponential growth should therefore be most likely when 
there is approximate parity between capacity of the state and belligerents, belligerents’ 
resources are unconstrained by the state and they are able to maintain cohesion.  The 
feasibility thesis is most consistent with this outcome, while motivation mechanisms for 
sustaining conflict are less likely and more consistent with outcomes that exhibit goal-
seeking behavior.   Peace operations should be most effective in preventing exponential 
growth if they are able to constrain access to resources; aid can exacerbate exponential 
growth if easily diverted to support belligerent capacity.     
Theoretical and empirical research has shown that if the state is too weak and 
belligerents gain control, violence decreases as belligerents achieve their goals.  Goal 
seeking and capacity limited behavior outcomes result from first-order systems with 
strong negative (balancing) feedback with the structure shown in Figure 4.  The 
accumulation of the state variable describing the system is given by the equation, 
𝑠 𝑡 =   𝑆  −    𝑆 − 𝑠 0 ∗   𝑒𝑥𝑝 −
𝑡
𝐴𝑇 = 𝑠 0 ∗ exp(−𝑑𝑡)   
where s is a variable describing the current state of the system, s(0) is the initial state of 
the system, S is the desired state of the system (or capacity limit), the expression exp (-




Figure 4 Feedback Structure of First Order Goal Seeking and Capacity Limited Systems 
 
With no delays in a closed system, this is an inherently stable structure in which 
the current state is continuously compared with desired goal (or limit) and corrective 
action is taken to counteract disturbances that would move the system away from goal (or 
approach a capacity limit too quickly). The rate at which the state of the system 
approaches goal (or limit) usually diminishes as discrepancy falls.  When the relationship 
between the corrective action and the size of the gap is linear, exponential decay results.  
Both motivational and feasibility theories of conflict are consistent with this 
structure.  However, the feasibility thesis predicts that the primary mechanism creating 
the balancing loop is capacity limitation; while motivational theories (greed and/or 
grievance) predict that the primary mechanism creating the balancing loop is the 
achievement of a goal.  
S-Shaped growth results from second order structure (e.g., one that involves at 
least two interacting feedback loops) with nonlinear interaction of positive (exponential) 
and negative (goal seeking or capacity limited) feedback loops as the capacity (or goal) is 














must be met for stable S-Shaped growth: there must be no significant time or information 
delays in balancing the loop, and the carrying capacity does not change with time.   
 
 
Figure 5 Second-Order, Nonlinear System Structure with  
Two Feedback Loops Resulting in S-Shaped Growth 
 
Primary models for the accumulation of the state variable describing the system, 
s(t) are logistic population growth and the Bass diffusion model.  Logistic growth is 
given by the equation, 
𝑠(𝑡)   =   𝐶/  {1  +   𝑒𝑥𝑝[−𝐺(𝑡 − ℎ)]}  
 
where C  is the carrying capacity, G is the maximum growth rate, and h is the time at 
which the state reaches 1/2C.   The stability of this structure depends on the fractional 
growth rate relative to the carrying capacity.    Examples are the adoption of new 
technology, physical growth of humans, spread of infectious diseases, and the spread of 
information.   
















Overshoot and collapse is a result of exponential or logistic growth constrained by 
carrying capacity that erodes as the capacity is approached, thus violating one of the 
conditions for S-Shape growth.  The structure is shown in Figure 6 below.  This structure 
erodes the resources available per capita in the system as well as the total resources (see 
Chapter 1, Figure 2, amplifying and balancing loops with nonlinear decay in carrying 
capacity).   A key feature is the presence of the delay in recognizing when limits on 
resource adequacy are being approached, and in acting on that recognition.  These delays 
are indicated by hash marks on the links between state of system and resource adequacy 
and between resource adequacy and fractional net increase rate.  Real world examples 
are over-fishing, the US housing market bubble in 2008, and unmitigated global warming 
effects on the environment.  Mathematical models include capacity limited logistic and 
exponential growth models with non-monotonic, variable growth rates, and diffusion 
models with threshold tipping points.  
 
Figure 6 Second-order, Non-linear System Structure Resulting in Overshoot and Collapse 
 





















The behavior of systems most frequently observed in the “real world” involves 
oscillatory behavior that emerges when delays in balancing feedback allow an overshoot 
of production goals or over consumption of resources, reversal in consumption or 
production rates that results in undershoot, and so on. These oscillations are primarily the 
result of delays. The two most common delays are material and information arising from 
the time it takes for communications, changes in material input, flow rates, system 
properties, or goals to move through feedback loops.  Misperceptions, imperfect and 
contradictory information are treated as delays in getting information about the real state 
of the system. Both material and information delays affect the quality of decisions made 
on the basis of the perceived state of the system and the effectiveness of those decisions 
in achieving the intended goals (Figure 7 below).  
 
Figure 7 Second-order, Nonlinear System Structure Resulting in Oscillatory Behavior 
 
Oscillating systems can be locally stable, locally unstable but globally stable, or 
chaotic (path dependent instability), depending on the relative loop strengths in the 




















determines how much the system oscillates as the response decays to a steady state.   
Locally stable, damped oscillations develop when perturbations are small relative to 
nonlinearities that might cause other dynamics to emerge. Examples are balancing loops 
that seek to adjust to a step function change in resource constraints that is exogenously 
imposed, oscillations due to lag of adjustment time to random exogenous shocks.  
Expanding oscillations with limits are locally unstable but nonlinear constraints on 
oscillations ensure global stability.  Costly oscillations in supply chain management and 
commodity market prices provide examples that illustrate the impact of information 
feedback delays.   Chaos results when shocks are endogenous and path dependency arises 
from sensitivity to initial conditions.   In different cycles, chaotic system responses will 
always vary but patterns of cycles may group around strange attractors.  
 
Causal model building and evaluation 
Causal model building requires selection of key stocks94 that drive system 
behavior; determining the rate of input into and out of those key stocks; identifying the 
variables that influence those rates; the relationships between stocks, rates, and 
influencing variables that create feedback loops and the polarity of those relationships;95 
and model boundaries.  The regression analysis identifies the most important and robust 
conflict risk factors to include as stocks and variables influencing those stocks.  Factors 
                                                
94 A stock is a quantifiable resource that accumulates over time, often used to represent the state of the 
system. Influencing variables may be constant or dynamic, and have values that that change key driver in 
determining the system state 
95 As with regression analysis, polarity between two variables in a system dynamic model is determined by 
whether the variable that is being influenced increases or decreases as a result of a unit increase in the 
influencing variable.  In order for a model to have internal consistency and congruency, variables are 




found not to be significant differentiators in the regression analysis are treated as 
exogenous factors that do not interact dynamically with stocks and are outside the model 
boundaries. The case study then uses data from historical records, published databases 
and scholarly literature to determine the linkages between influencing variables, stocks, 
and the rates into and out of stocks.  
The models are evaluated according to the following questions: Do the dynamic 
system structures identified through case study research result in conflict outcomes 
consistent with the correlations between risk factors and observed reference behaviors 
that obtain from regression analysis, and the inferred causal mechanisms for those 
correlations? Do alternative structures emerge in the dynamic system that contradict or 
compete with causal mechanisms suggested by the reference behavior?   If the 
association between observed reference behaviors, underlying structures, and process 
tracing are consistent, then what are the implications for resiliency of belligerents and 
conflict persistence? Are they consistent with theoretical explanations? What are the 
policy implications?  
 
Field Interviews 
Semi-structured field interviews were conducted with over 75 persons in Ethiopia, 
Burundi, Uganda, Kenya, Washington DC, Geneva, and Amsterdam between June 1 and 
September 30, 2014, according to a peer-reviewed and university-approved field research 
plan (Appendix C).  The interviews engaged persons who have been involved in 
managing, implementing, or participating in military and civilian-led peace operations, 
foreign aid interventions, and/or relief efforts in different phases of the Somali conflict.  
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Interview participants were chosen based on their roles as government representatives, 
peacekeeping troops and trainers, aid workers, development specialists. All interviews 
were conducted according to an IRB-approved plan, included in Appendix C. The plan 
included presenting the participants with an overview of the research goals, questions 
prior to the interview, and obtaining signed documentation of informed consent. 
Interview questions were developed to gathering data through narrative stories to 
test theoretical explanations for causal mechanisms for the impact of aid and 
peacekeeping interventions on conflict dynamics and the hypothesized impact on risk 
factors for conflict persistence represented in the structures underlying the reference 
behaviors.    
Questions fall into three broad categories:   
• Understanding local and regional perspectives of conflict drivers and impact;  
• Understanding the intended scope and outcomes of interventions, and factors 
that affect success in achieving those outcomes; and  
• Relationships between peace operations and humanitarian aid interventions.   
The goals for interviews in each location are summarized below; specific subjects and 
interview questions are provided in Appendix C.    
Interview questions are designed to test assumptions and theories in the literature 
regarding causal mechanisms by which interventions operate, and assumptions in policy 
assessment frameworks for decision making on interventions in conflict settings.  
Questions asked of subjects involved in peace operations draw heavily on causal 
mechanisms proposed by Doyle and Sambanis (2000) and Fortna (2004), assumptions in 
the US Counterinsurgency Field Manual, and their potential relationship to resiliency of 
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conflict actors (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000; Fortna, 2004; The US Army Counterinsurgency 
Field Manual No. 3-24, 2006).  Questions asked of subjects involved in foreign aid draw 
on theories discussed that assume peacebuilding success depends on degree of harm 
sustained during conflict, resources available for humanitarian relief and development, 
international assistance to overcome gaps, and perceived legitimacy of different factors.  
The questions were reviewed by subject matter experts,96 vetted with local 
representatives in each locale, and approved by the University of Maryland Internal 
Review Board for human subjects research.  
Subjects in Ethiopia provide perspectives of regional organizations – e.g., the 
African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) – 
with leadership roles in peace operations in Somalia. Subjects in Uganda and Burundi 
provided first-hand perspectives of AMISOM peacekeeping soldiers and officers.   
Subjects in Burundi provide additional perspectives on how participation in AMISOM 
impacted peacebuilding efforts at home.  Subjects within the US embassies in Ethiopia, 
Kenya, and Burundi provide US government perspectives for the impact of interventions 
in Somalia.  Subjects in Kenya provide perspectives from field offices in Nairobi for 
international and local humanitarian aid and development organizations active in 
Somalia. Subjects in the Netherlands provided perspectives of the Somalia diaspora 
community.  Subjects in Washington DC and in Switzerland provide headquarter 
perspectives of UN entities and International Nongovernmental Organizations (INGOs). 
Ethiopia and Kenya are key regional players in the Horn of Africa with long-
standing strategic interests in the Somali conflict.  These interests involve complex 
                                                




security and economic concerns that include the presence of Ethiopian Somalis in the 
Somali regional state of Ethiopia and their claims upon the Ethiopian government 
(supported by extremists in the conflict in Somalia), a large influx of Somali refugees 
into Kenya from the conflict in South Central Somalia, and violent cross-border spillover 
from Somalia in both countries. Historic governance, cultural, and natural factors in the 
region (e.g., climate change) create stresses that exacerbate the conflict and complicate 
the pursuit of both Ethiopia and Kenya’s interests. As a result, Ethiopia and Kenya have 
participated in various interventions in Somalia over the past two decades, and are 
currently participating in peace operations to address national and human security 
concerns, are providing humanitarian aid and sanctuary for refugees, and are regional 
leaders in development initiatives to reduce the risk of conflict by fostering a stable and 
productive environment in the Horn of Africa.  These initiatives involve many different 
sectors – government, civil society, private enterprises, international and regional non-
governmental organizations, and academia.  Interviews in Ethiopia took place in Addis 
Ababa and were arranged with the help of Eyob Tekalign Tolina, a staff member of the 
Ethiopian Embassy to the USA and a fellow PhD candidate at the University of 
Maryland.  Interviews with NGO community in Nairobi were facilitated by staff at 
InterAction97 and at the Alliance for Peacebuilding98 offices in Washington DC.  
Since its inception in 2007, Uganda and Burundi have provided the largest 
contingent of troops and leadership to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), 
                                                
97 InterAction is an alliance of NGOs in Washington DC with 180 members around the world working 
among the poor and vulnerable for peace.  https://www.interaction.org/. Retrieved March 8, 2016. 
98 Alliance for Peacebuilding is a network of over 100 organizations working to resolve conflict and create 
sustainable peace in 153 countries.  http://www.allianceforpeacebuilding.org/.  Retrieved March 8, 2016.  
Chapter 2 
 153 
established to support national unity efforts from Islamic extremists.99  The original 
AMISOM mandate of six months was to support a national reconciliation congress and 
report on a possible UN peacekeeping mission.  The lack of security on the ground in 
Somalia since that time—evidenced by exponential growth in conflict—has to date 
precluded the establishment of such a mission. Instead, the AMISOM mandate has been 
extended and enlarged several times to “create the necessary conditions for the conduct 
of humanitarian activities and an eventual handover of the Mission to a UN peacekeeping 
operation.”  Currently, AMISOM is a multidimensional peace support operation with the 
following mandate:  
1. Take all necessary measures, as appropriate, and in coordination with the 
Somalia National Defense and Public Safety Institutions, to reduce the threat 
posed by Al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups; 
2. Assist in consolidating and expanding the control of the Federal Government 
of Somalia (FSG) over its national territory; 
3. Assist the FGS in establishing conditions for effective and legitimate 
governance across Somalia, through support, as appropriate, in the areas of 
security, including the protection of Somali institutions and key infrastructure, 
governance, rule of law and delivery of basic services; 
4. Provide, within its capabilities and as appropriate, technical and other support 
for the enhancement of the capacity of the Somalia State institutions, 
particularly the National Defense, Public Safety and Public Service 
Institutions; 
5. Support the FGS in establishing the required institutions and conducive 
conditions for the conduct of free, fair and transparent elections by 2016, in 
accordance with the Provisional Constitution; 
6. Liaise with humanitarian actors and facilitate, as may be required and within 
its capabilities, humanitarian assistance in Somalia, as well as the resettlement 
of internally displaced persons and the return of refugees; 
7. Facilitate coordinated support by relevant AU institutions and structures 
towards the stabilization and reconstruction of Somalia; and 
                                                
99 The African Union Mission in Somalia is an active, regional peacekeeping mission operated by the 
African Union (AU) with the approval of the UN and funded in large part by the EU.  The AU Peace and 
Security Council created AMISOM in January 2007, replacing and subsuming the Inter-Governmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD) Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM) approved by the AU and 




8. Provide protection to AU and UN personnel, installations and equipment, 
including the right of self-defense. 100 
 
Interviews with AMISOM soldiers and officers from Burundi were facilitated by 
Dr. Nicole Ball and arranged through the Assistance Minister of Defense by Alwin van 
den Boogaard, Director of the joint Netherlands-Burundi Security Sector Reform (SSD) 
program.  Interview subjects from Burundi represented all periods of major AMISOM 
operations since 2008, including the most recent advances into rural areas, and included 
all levels of military personnel. The interviews were conducted at the SSD offices in 
Bujumbura with an interpreter fluent in French and Kirundi.  Interviews with officers in 
Uganda took place in Kampala, and were arranged with the help of Dr. Joe Siegel, 
director of the Africa Strategic Studies Center at the National Defense University in 
Washington DC.  Interview subjects in Uganda represented elite commanders of 
AMISOM form 2011-2012, during which time Al Shabaab was expelled from 
Mogadishu.    
Since 2012, troop-contributing countries to the military component of AMISOM have 
expanded beyond Uganda and Burundi to include Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti.  These 
troops are currently deployed in six sectors covering south and central Somalia.  The US 
has provided key military training to these troops through Africa Contingency Operations 
Training & Assistance (ACOTA) facilities in Uganda and Burundi since the first 
contingents were deployed to Mogadishu in 2008, and has recently opened a leadership 
and police training facility in Nairobi.101   Lt. Colonel Daniel Ebert at the US Embassy in 
                                                
100 AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia, http://amisom-au.org/amisom-mandate/. Retrieved March 
2016.  
101 Personal communication, Lt. Col Eric Roitsch, May 2014.  The mission of the ACOTA program is to 
enhance capacities and capabilities of African peacekeeping resources for deploying professionally 
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Bujumbura facilitated interviews with ACOTA training officers and a visit to the training 
camp outside of Bujumbura, Burundi. Requests to visit the training facility in Nairobi 
were denied by AMISOM. 
 
Data Summary and Sources  
Summary of Metadata 
Metadata for explanatory variables are summarized in Tables 5 and 6.  Table 5 
summarizes metadata for select country level risk factors of state capacity and reach, 
poverty and inequality. Table 6 summarizes metadata for intervention factors.  Data 
trends and summary statistics for all variables are presented in Appendix B.   
 
                                                                                                                                            
competent peacekeepers to “meet conflict transformation requirements with minimal non-African 
assistance”.   US Department of State, Diplomacy in Action, “Africa Contingency Operations Training & 
Assistance,” http://www.state.gov/p/af/rt/acota/. Retrieved March 1, 2016; and Combined Joint Task Force 
Horn of Africa, “ACOTA Force HQ course prepares personnel for AMIOSM operations,” 
http://www.hoa.africom.mil/story/17034/acota-force-hq-course-prepares-personnel-for-amisom-operations.  
Retrieved March 1, 2016.   
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Burundi A 170 7.3 1.3 -5.6 8.6 3.1 501[18.5] 53 36
Chad A 475 8.9 6 33 22 1.97 2161[14.1] 108 44
Liberia A 200 2.9 5.1 -0.8 48 1.59 7.71[3.6] 79 36
Namibia A 3087 1.9 4.2 -4.4 34 35.5 1911[9.7] 336 61.3
Rwanda A 332 8.5 5.2 1.3 16 6.43 671[13.3] 64 50
South1Africa A 4590 44.4 2.5 0.07 58 71.3 33801[4.8] 467 62
Average'A 1475.7 12.3 4.1 3.9 31.1 20.0 650[10.7] 184.5 48.2
Angola B 1922 15.1 5.8 46 34 31.3 16701[10] 361 49
Congo-Brazzaville B 1581 3.3 3 54 50 27.5 1561[8.3] 308 51
Guinea B 417 9.1 3.4 -2.6 32 16.8 78.21[10.7] 93 42
Guinea-Bissau B 350 1.3 2.5 -3.3 38 53.7 8.41[9.7] 78 43
Lesotho B 617 1.9 4.2 8.8 20 9.46 331[6.8] 55 56
Mali B 382 12 4.6 -5 30 15.1 78.2[16.7] 105 42
Sierra1Leone B 308 4.7 2.6 -15.5 41 8.79 28.41[8.2] 84 37
Average'B 796.7 6.8 3.7 11.8 35.0 23.2 293.2[8.6] 154.9 45.7
Bukina1Faso C 379 12.5 5.5 -4.4 19.8 8.7 75.21[8.2] 87.7 45
Cameroon C 900 16.8 2.2 7.2 46.5 41.4 2141[7.9] 225 43
DRC C 249 52.2 0.8 2.6 36 . 2471[8.7] 55 43
Gabon C 6302 1.3 2.9 39 77 39.8 1361[6.1] 1701 42
Mauritania C 670 2.9 3.6 -5.7 50 14.9 59.21[.] 173 40
Mozambique C 295 19.1 6.5 -7.2 29 9.51 79.31[9.7] 57 45.7
Nigeria1(BH) C 850 129 5.8 33 37 44.9 8171[3] 161 46
Somalia C 195 7.8 0.4 -1 34 25.8 307[3]* . .
Sudan C 903 29.4 3.8 10.2 32 25.7 10701[21] 234 35
Average'C 1193.7 30.1 3.5 8.2 40.1 26.3 333[8.5] 336.7 42.5
Algeria D 2713 24 2.8 19.7 50 97.1 38971[10] 505 35.3
CAR1 D 279 37 1.1 -7.1 38 6.15 20.31[9] 49 53
Ethiopia1 D 273 68.9 6 -5 15 15.2 4781[15] 95 33.6
Ivory1Coast D 952 16.1 2.1 2.5 45 48.9 2441[12.2] 218 41
Kenya1(Kik) D 576 32.7 3.5 -8.9 21 16.1 3751[6.8] 110 47
Niger D 258 12.4 3.3 0.9 16.5 7.4 35.61[5.7] 80 38
Nigeria1(P) D 850 129 5.8 33 37 44.9 8171[3] 161 46
Senegal D 736 10.5 3.5 0.001 36 16.1 1261[6.1] 167 43
Uganda D 332 25.9 6.8 -4.9 12.7 10 2241[12.5] 78 43
Zimbabwe D 608 12.6 5.9 -3.4 33 33 2201[10.2] . 42














Data sources are from desk research (e.g., news media, government reports, NGO 
reports, and academic literature), field interviews, and published conflict and intervention 
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databases. The datasets, major news media sources, and field research methods are 
summarized below and described more fully in Appendix B.  
 
Conflicts, Conflict Events, and Conflict Actor Datasets 
Until recently, research into conflict dynamics was hampered by the lack of 
disaggregated, subnational level data for armed conflict and violence to differentiate 
between activities of different, but simultaneously occurring conflicts within a country 
(Chojnacki et al., 2012; Collier & Hoeffler, 2001).  As a result, cross-country 
comparisons often conflated data from multiple different conflicts, contributing to the 
difficulty of inferring causal mechanisms from data analysis. This deficiency has been 
addressed in recent years by collection of georeferenced event data at the subnational 
level (Gleditsch et al., 2014).  
Data on frequency, type, intensity, and location of conflict events are derived 
from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2015 (1946-2014), UCDP-GED 
version1.5-2011 (1989-2010), and the ACLED version 5(1997-2015).  These datasets 
differentiate and bound conflicts by issues, actors involved, and level of violence 
(Pettersson & Wallensteen, 2015; Raleigh & Hegre, 2005).  Triangulating data and 
conflicts trends among these three sources provides a robustness check on the 
differentiation among conflicts within countries, and their categorization into reference 
behaviors based on the pattern of frequency of events.  
These datasets use different units of analysis, event counting criteria, and 
timescales. ACLED counts conflict events from 1997-2015, based on the broadest criteria 
for counting conflict events, including violent events that do not result in direct battle 
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deaths (e.g. protests and riots) as well as nonviolent events by combatants, such as the 
establishment of battle headquarters. UCDP/PRIO counts dyadic interactions from 1946-
2014 for events that result in twenty-five or more direct battle deaths. The UCDP/GED is 
an event-based, georeferenced dataset that counts those events from 1989-2010 resulting 
in one or more direct battle deaths. The reference patterns are across the three datasets. 
Databases for civil conflict events rely on reports from actors involved in the conflict 
(e.g., military or police), third-party observers (such as nongovernmental organizations), 
and news reports.  Relying on actors or observers has the disadvantage that many events 
are covered differently by different actors or not at all (Weidmann, 2014).  For this 
reason, most databases, including those used in this research, rely on reports from news 
media, which suffer from inaccuracies, missing data, and biases (Salehyan, 2015).  These 
issues are primarily a concern for classifying the conflicts into reference behavior. 
Missing data and inaccuracies are addressed to some degree by triangulating patterns 
across databases, although the possibility that missing data results in misclassification of 
reference behavior cannot be dismissed.  
To partially address missing data concerns, three additional datasets were consulted.  
The UCDP Actor Dataset v.2.2-2014, with information on all actors in UCDP’s datasets 
on organized violence102, and UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset v.2-2015 (1946-
2013)103 provide internal consistency checks.  Data on coup d’état events published by 
the Center for Systemic Peace104 provides a check on conflict data from an alternate 
                                                
102 UCDP Actor Dataset 2.2-2014, Uppsala Conflict Data Program, www.ucdp.uu.se, Uppsala University 
103 UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset, Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research 
http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_conflict_termination_dataset/, Retrieved January 2014.  
104 http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/CSPCoupsCodebook2013.pdf,  accessed August 31, 2015.  
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source.   Systematic reporting biases are assumed to be consistent across space and time 
for each conflict event, so that affects on dynamic patterns should be small. 
 
Human Security 
Human security is not explicitly modeled in econometric studies but is important 
to the co-evolutionary system dynamic model and the case study.   Human security is 
proxied with data on internally displaced persons, refugees, aid worker security, food 
insecurity, and violence against citizens. Primary data sources are the United Nations and 
the Norwegian Refugee Council.  UN statistics are collected and published by the UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)105 and country data from the portal, Relief 
Web.106  Data from the Norwegian Refugee Council is collected and published by the 
Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC).107 The Aid Worker Security Database 
provides data for aid worker security.108 ACLD provides data for violence against 
citizens. 
 
                                                
105 UNHCR, The UN Refugee Agency, Statistics and Operational Data, 
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c4d6.html Retrieved January 2014- February 2016.  
106 Reliefweb, Countries, http://reliefweb.int/countries Retrieved October 2013 – November 2015.  
107 Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, Global Figures, Conflict and violence-induced displacement, 
http://www.internal-displacement.org/global-figures/#natural. Retrieved January 2014-September 2015.  
IDMC data was also accessed through a secondary source, via the web portal for the Armed Conflict 
Database of the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS).  https://acd.iiss.org/en. Retrieved January 
2014- September 2015.  
108 The Aid Worker Security Database (AWSD) is a project of Humanitarian Outcomes, funded by 
contributions from Canada, Ireland, and the US (the Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance 
(OFDA/USAID).  AWSD reports on major incidents (killings, kidnappings and attacks that result in serious 
injury) involving deliberate acts of violence affecting aid workers. https://aidworkersecurity.org/about. 




Impacts from three foreign aid types are evaluated: development (e.g., 
governance, health, education, and economic assistance [including debt relief]), 
humanitarian (e.g., food and emergency relief), and military assistance (e.g., training and 
direct subsidies for purchases).  With the exception of South Africa, all of the countries in 
this study are less developed countries (LDCs) that qualify as recipients of development 
and humanitarian aid from the official development assistance (ODA) program of the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).   The primary 
source of data for development and humanitarian aid is AidData.org, which compiles 
georeferenced development and aid data from the OECD, Relief Web, as well as other 
sources globally.109  
Many of the countries receive significant external aid in the form of military 
assistance. No single source of data on foreign military assistance to conflict countries 
from all potential sources exists.   Data on US military assistance from 2000-2015 derives 
from a database compiled from open source government reports and maintained by the 
Security Assistance Monitor.110 While this data provides a sampling of external military 
support, it is unclear how representative it is without comparative data from other 
sources, and accounting for US military assistance prior to 2000. With the increase in US 
                                                
109 AidData is a collaborative project between US AID, University of Texas at Austin, ESRI, and the 
African Development Bank Group and others.  The purpose is to provide open source data for international 
development and research.   Data last accessed from http://aiddata.org/aiddata-research-releases, October 
2015.  
110 The Security Assistance Monitor is a joint program of The Center for International Policy in partnership 
with the Friends Committee on National Legislation, the Latin America Working Group Education Fund, 
the Project on Middle East Democracy, and the Washington Office on Latin America.   Their mission is to 
document all publicly accessible information on U.S. security and defense assistance programs throughout 
the world, including arms sales, military and police aid, training programs, exercises, exchanges, bases and 
deployments. Data retrieved from http://www.securityassistance.org/about, August-September 2015.    
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counter-terrorism efforts post 2001, this is a potential source of a hidden fixed effect.  
Future research efforts should attempt to include data on military assistance other than 
US and include data from 1989-2000.  
 
Peace Operations involving Military Forces 
External peace operations using military forces are involved in 50% of the 
conflicts, and 32% of the observations. There is wide variation in the troop strength and 
deployment period within and among these operations.  Some missions are as short as 
one month and involve only a few tens of troops, while other last many years and involve 
thousands.  To account for this variation, monthly data on troop strength is required, and 
is measured as the annual sum of the product troops x months. This monthly troop data 
from different operations is compiled from multiple sources, as there is no single source 
of data on all peace operations that includes non-UN as well as UN troop statistics, nor is 
there consistency of reporting between different troop providing organizations such as the 
United Nations, African Union, and European Commission.111  Data on monthly UN 
troop deployments is from the International Peace Institute Peacekeeping database 
developed and maintained at George Washington University (Perry & Smith, 2013),112 
UN Security Council reports, the annual Military Balance Reports of the International 
Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), and academic publications, e.g., (Doyle & Sambanis, 
2006; Fortna, 2004; Hultman, Kathman, & Shannon, 2014; Hultman, Kathman, & 
                                                
111 The data compilation effort for this research occurred in partnership with a UMD research team 
supported by the DOD Minerva project and led by Dr. David Backer.  Deniz Cil was particularly helpful in 
compiling and verifying the dataset for UN and non-UN operations used in this research.  
112 International Peace Institute, IPI Peacekeeping Database, Retrieved from 
http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/contributions/, October 2013 to August 2015.  
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Shannon, 2015; Kathman, 2013; Perry & Smith, 2013).  Data on monthly troop 
deployments of non-UN peacekeeping forces and other foreign military interventions is 
triangulated from academic research publications (Bellamy & Williams, 2015; Howe, 
1997; Mullenbach, 2013; Pickering & Kisangani, 2009; Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl, 
2008), the African Union Peace and Security website,113 the Geneva Academy Rule of 
Law in Armed Conflicts Project (RULAC);114 news media reports (searched and accessed 
through the news source FACTIVA), mission websites (e.g., AMISOM115, 
ARTEMIS116), the SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database,117 annual IISS Military 
Balance Reports, and the European Union External Action website.118  
 
Governance Data 
The primary governance indicator is the Polity IV Index.  Data is from the Polity IV 
project of the Center for Systemic Peace.119  
                                                
113 African Union Peace and Security, Peace operations conducted by the AU and Partners, 
http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/72-peace-ops. Retrieved October 2013 – August 2015. 
114 The Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts Project is an initiative of the Geneva Academy of International 
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights to support the application and implementation of international law in 
armed conflict. The Project reports on the extent to which norms and rule of law are respected by the 
relevant actors in active armed conflicts and maintains a global database. Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts 
Project, http://www.geneva-academy.ch/RULAC/index.php.  Retrieved October 2013 – August 2015.  
115 AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia http://amisom-au.org/. Retrieved August 2014-February 
2016.  
116 National Defense and the Canadian Armed Forces, Operation ARTEMIS, 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-current/op-artemis.page.  Retrieved June 2015 – August 
2015.  
117 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 
http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database.  Retrieved October 2013 – August 2015. 
118 European Union External Action, http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-current/op-
artemis.page. Retrieved August 2015. 
119 Systemic Peace, Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2013, 




Socio-Economic Country Data 
Socio-economic data (e.g., GDP, % GDP commodity exports, GDP growth rates, 
population, access to electricity, poverty as GDP per capita of lowest decile,120 GINI 
index, CPIA index including corruption and gender equality, male youth unemployment, 
ratio of female to male schooling) is from the World Bank. Dependency on commodity 
exports and value of commodity exports is supplemented by analysis from The 
Economist.121  Data for the human development index (HDI), remittances, forest cover, 
and impacts from natural disasters are from the UN Development Programme (UNDP) 
Human Development Reports.122  Gender equality data is primarily taken from the World 
Bank. In cases of missing gender equality data, estimates are made using UNDP data.  
Missing corruption data is estimated from the Transparency International Corruption 
Perception index.123  Missing economic data for Somalia is estimated from the trade 
publication, Trading Economics124.  Ethnic and religious polarization, along with social 
fragmentation, are triangulated from datasets published by the International Conflict 
Research Center at the Swiss Federal institute of Technology Zurich125, the Minorities at 
Risk project126, and the published Reynal-Querol research dataset (Reynal-Querol, 2001).  
 
                                                
120 In future studies, comparison of results using the UNDP multidimensional poverty index would be 
desirable.  However, data has not been collected using this index over a sufficiently long period for this 
research.  
121 The Economist: Commodity Dependency, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2015/08/commodity-dependency. Retrieved April 2014-
August 2015.  
122 UNDP Human Development Reports, http://hdr.undp.org/en/data. Retrieved October 2013-August 2015.  
123 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi. 
Retrieved January 2016-February 2016.  
124 http://www.tradingeconomics.com/, Accessed July 2015.  
125 http://www.icr.ethz.ch/data/epr, Accessed September 1, 2015.  
126 http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/, Accessed November 2014.  
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Military Expenditure and Troop Data 
Data on military expenditures is derived from the Military Expenditures database 
maintained by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)127.   Data on 
national armed forces, rebel forces, and foreign forces are from the annual Military 
Balance Reports of the International Institute for Strategic Studies.128  In the case study 
for Somalia, military expenditures are proxied by financial support from the UN and EU 
to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and US military assistance to 
Ethiopia and Kenya for unilateral military interventions into Somalia. 
 
Peace Agreements and Negotiated Settlements 
Data on peace agreements and negotiated settlements are triangulated from the 
UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset v 2.0, 1975-2011129, UN Security Council Reports, and 
news sources accessed through FACTIVA.  
 
Supplemental Data from News Sources  
Secondary sources included media reports of BBC Worldwide and others 
accessed through Factiva at the University of Maryland libraries, the International Crisis 
                                                
127 http://www.sipri.org/, Accessed August 2015.  
128 IISS: The Military Balance https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/military-s-balance. Retrieved June 
2015-October 2015.  
129 Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset 




Group reports and briefings,130 the Uppsala University UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia,131 
and from UN Security Council Reports.132  
 
                                                
130 International Crisis Group, Reports and briefings, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-
type/reports.aspx. Retrieved October 2013-November 2015. 
131 Uppsala Conflict Data Program, UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, 
http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/search.php. Retrieved October 2013 - November 2015.  
132United Nations Security Council, Reports of the Security Council Missions, 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/missions/.  Retrieved October 2014 – November 2015; Reports 
submitted by/transmitted by the Secretary-General to the Security Council, 




Chapter 3: Research Findings 
 
Research findings are presented in the following four sections.  The first section 
discusses findings from the macro-level quantitative regression analysis of the correlation 
between conflict dynamics (measured as reference behavior outcomes) and risk factors 
associated with each hypothesis posited to explain those dynamics.   The second and third 
sections discuss findings from the case study of causal mechanisms between external 
interventions and conflict dynamics in Somalia.  The second section discusses results of 
causal modeling of these mechanisms using system dynamics, and the third section 
discusses qualitative insights of mechanisms provided through field studies.  The fourth 
section integrates findings from the three approaches. Policy implications of these 
findings are discussed in Chapter 4.  
 
Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis  
To explain the observed groups of persistent conflict behaviors in the pool of 34 
conflict cases, I first test the hypothesis drawing on existing explanations in the literature 
for conflict onset and durations based on country characteristics and conflict dynamics, 
H1 and H2, described in Chapter 2. I then test alternative explanations involving aid and 
peace and stability operations, H3 and H4, and their interactions, H5. Causal mechanisms 
are inferred from the different underlying structures associated with the outcomes, to test 
different explanatory theories.    
The results of multinomial logistic regression analyses using STATA for testing 
H1-H4 are shown in Tables 2, 4, 6, and 8.   The variables used as proxies for risk factors 
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are either the same as, or strongly correlated with, those proposed in the original 
hypotheses (Chapter 1), and were selected through correlation analysis as described in 
Chapter 2.  The coefficients for each conflict risk factor in each category are interpreted 
as the relative likelihood of an observation being in that category compared to the base 
category, due to that factor.  The default base category is the most frequent category, 
oscillatory behavior (reference behavior D), associated with maximum resiliency of 
belligerents.   For a unit change in a risk factor in other categorical outcomes overshoot 
and collapse (reference behavior A), damped impulse (reference behavior B), or 
exponential growth (reference behavior C), the logit of the outcome relative to D is 
expected to change by the respective estimate of the coefficient, given that all other 
factors in the model are held constant. Coefficients for factors tested but not shown to be 
statistically significant in explaining deviations form the reference behavior are marked 
with an “x”.   
The parameters for estimating each model are the pseudo R2 value,133 log 
likelihood,134 prob> chi2, and Wald (chi2).  The more reliable and straightforward 
measures of model explanatory power in multinomial logistic regressions are the log 
likelihood, Prob>chi2, and chi2 test (Berry & Feldman, 1985; "Stata Annotated Output 
Multinomial Logistic Regression,").   
 
                                                
133 Pseudo R2 is the McFadden’s pseudo-R2, based on log likelihood values, rather than standard errors as in 
an ordinary least-squares regression. 
134 The log likelihood is used in the chi-square test of whether all predictors’ regression coefficients in the 
model are simultaneously zero in tests of nested models (the null hypothesis). The log likelihood is 





Hypotheses 1: Endogenous Country Effects on Outcomes 
H1 tests the hypothesis that endogenous country characteristics can explain 
outcomes for conflict persistence through theorized mechanisms of relative capacity 
(Model B), political and economic opportunity costs (Model C and D), and grievances 
(Models E-F). Hypothesized results for influence of risk factors on outcomes (reference 
behaviors) posited in Chapter 2 are reproduced in Table 1. 
 
































































































A + + -- + -- - + -- -- - - 
B - - - - - ++ - -- -- - - 
C -- -- ++ -- + - - + + -- + 
D - - + - - +/- - + + + + 
 
The regression analysis (Table 2) fails to reject the null hypothesis for H1. State capacity 
measured by ln GDP per capita and oil rents is significantly and negatively associated 
with overshoot and collapse (A) and exponential (C) compared to oscillatory (D), with 
overshoot and collapse (A) being the least likely outcome.  Contrary to expectations, 
damped impulse (B) is consistently, significantly and positively correlated with oil rents, 
compared to oscillatory (D).  State reach measured by state security forces per km2 is 
significantly, consistently and positively associated with overshoot and collapse (A) 
compared to oscillatory (D), whereas state reach is negatively associated with exponential 
(C) compared to oscillatory (D).   State reach measured by urban population is 
consistently and positively associated with overshoot and collapse (A), damped impulse 
(B), and exponential (C) compared to oscillatory (D).   State capacity measured by 
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military expenditures as a percent of GDP is strongly correlated with damped impulse 
(B), but is not a significant predictor of overshoot and collapse (A) or exponential (C). 
  The literature associates male youth unemployment, ethnic polarization, and 
population size with increased recruiting capacity and cohesion for challengers to the 
state, leading to belligerent resiliency that enables longer durations. Ethnic polarization 
and male youth unemployment are consistently, significantly, and positively correlated 
with exponential (C) compared to oscillatory (D), but are not significantly correlated with 
overshoot and collapse (A) or damped impulse (B).   Population is consistently, 
significantly, and negatively correlated with overshoot and collapse (A) and damped 
impulse (B) oscillatory (D). 
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Table 2. Multinomial Logistic Regression Results for H1 
 

























ln&GDP&percapita A x x x (11.3)*** (7)*** (5.2)*** x
.01,&.5 B .56** 1.9*** x (.95)*** (.9)*** (1.6)*** .76**
C (1.)*** (2.)*** (2)*** (2.2)*** (1.7)*** (1.6)*** (.91)***
Oilrents&(%&GDP) A (.9)*** (1.3)*** (.6)*** (3.7)*** x x &(.95)***
.02,0 B x x .05*** .07*** .04*** .04*** .06***
C (1.5)*** (.04)*** x x (1.6)*** .02*
State&Security&
Forces/km2 A .009*** .01*** .01*** .05*** .02*** .02*** .01*** &.01***
.16,&0 B x .004** .004*** .004** .004** x .004*** .004***
C (.01)*** (.008)** (.02)** (.01)*** (.015)*** (.02)*** (.01)*** (.02)***
Mil&exp&%&GDP A 49** 51** x x x x
.02,0 B 53*** 54*** 49*** 55*** 64*** 58***
C x x x x 46**
male&youth&
unemployment A .15*** .11** .1** (1.5)*** (1.1)*** .07**
.03,0 B .05*** .05** x x x
C .15*** .2*** .13*** .32*** .35**** .17***
Percent&urban&
population& A .16*** x .1** 1.8** 1.1*** .37*** .18***
.02,0 B .06*** .08*** .06*** .22*** .23*** .14*** .08***
C .15*** .15*** .21*** .23*** .23*** .14*** .1***
Ethnic&polarization A x x x (64)*** (33)*** (11)** (5.8)*** &2.86**
.03,0 B x x 4.3*** (2)* x x 3.4*** 4.35***
C 3.5*** 5.4*** x 3.8*** 2.9*** 2.2** 2.1** 3.8***
ln&population A (.4)** x (.7)** (12)*** (8)*** (2)*** (1.7)***
.09,0 B (.5)*** (1)*** (1)*** (1.4)*** (1.3)*** (.8)*** (1.03)***



















gender&equality A 68*** 46*** 6.4*** 6.5*** 5.7***
.06,0 B 5.8*** 5.7*** .17*** 2.3*** 2.7***
C 1.1** 1.3*** x .9*** 1.05**
Social&fragmentation A 18*** x 13*** 7.5***
0.01 B x (3.9)*** x x
C 8*** 3.8*** 2.3*** 3.4***
PROB%>%CHI2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
WALD%CHI2 534 571 935 499 531 385 775 954
DF 24 30 33 30 33 27 18 24
Log%LIKELIHOOD Z386 Z289 Z322 Z219 Z218 Z331 Z492 Z399
NO.%OBS 474 474 459 466 469 469 623 566
pseudo%R2 0.55 0.63 0.61 0.81 0.82 0.58 0.49 0.56





The correlation of overshoot and collapse (A) with relatively lower state resource 
availability and belligerent capacities (e.g., ln GDP per capita and negative correlation 
with oil rents), coupled with higher levels of state reach (security forces per km2 and 
percent urban population) is consistent with assumptions of resource constraints on 
belligerent capacities leading to overshoot and collapse (Figure 1).135 The correlation of 
exponential (C) with low state reach coupled with higher belligerent capacities is 
consistent with the assumption of underlying structures that result in exponential growth 
(e.g., absence of strong balancing loops through resource constraints or dampening 
response functions on belligerents).  These results are also consistent with research 
showing the dependence of conflict duration on state capacity to achieve a victory e.g., 
(de Rouen & Sobek, 2004; Holtermann, 2012).  
 
Figure 1 Relationship Between State Capacity, State Reach, and Outcome 
                                                
135 The distribution of state capacity for overshoot and collapse (A) measured as ln GDP per capita has 
larger average variance than other outcomes, as it included South Africa and Namibia. However, the 
economies of these outlier states do not depend on oil rents, in contrast to the outliers in other outcomes, 
which derive their income from oil (e.g., Angola in damped impulse (B), Gabon in outcome C, and Algeria 
in outcome D).  The most extreme value of the outliers for South Africa and Namibia are less than the most 




Damped impulse (B) is positively correlated with state capacity measured as 
percentage of GDP from oil rents and military expenditures as a percentage of GDP, and 
negatively correlated with belligerent recruiting capacity as proxied by population size.  
A significant difference between overshoot and collapse (A) and damped impulse (B) 
appears to be correlation with oil.  While dependence on oil is associated with lower 
institutional state capacity, it also provides an economic resource to support patronage 
and military responses to challengers. These results are consistent with the assumption of 
an underlying structure characterized by a strong damping function in damped impulse 
(B), relative to a causal mechanism of capacity depletion assumed in overshoot and 
collapse (A), but challenge assumptions in the literature that higher dependence on oil 
results in longer durations.  The impact of oil can be both balancing (B), leading to 
shorter durations, or reinforcing (default D), leading to longer durations, depending on 
how the resource is used to manipulate relative capacities between state and belligerents.    
In Model C, economic opportunity cost measured by GDP growth is insignificant.  
Economic opportunity cost measured by depth of poverty (GDP per capita of lowest 
decile) is significantly and positively associated with overshoot and collapse (A) and 
exponential (C), and negatively associated with damped impulse (B). The size of the 
coefficient for B and C is very small, however.   In Model D, political opportunity costs 
(measured by polity and corruption indices) are positively and significantly correlated 
with damped impulse (B) compared to oscillatory (D), and significantly and negatively 
correlated with exponential (C) compared to oscillatory (D).  The size of the effect 
through corruption is stronger than through the polity scores.  Neither is significantly 
correlated with exponential (A).    
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For the most part, the regression results for proxies of opportunity costs in 
combination with state capacity appear to be consistent with assumed underlying 
structures for the outcome behaviors. Higher opportunity costs correlated with overshoot 
and collapse (A) should contribute to overshoot and collapse in the presence of lower 
belligerent recruiting capacities; higher political opportunity costs correlated with 
damped impulse (B) contribute to the damping function; lower political opportunity costs 
correlated with exponential (C) indicate the lack of a balancing loop on exponential 
growth of conflict.    
Examination of the distribution of observations suggests an alternative 
interpretation, however, of the causal mechanism for overshoot and collapse when the 
skewed distribution with extreme outliers is taken into account.  The bifurcated 
distribution of observations for poverty depth and polity scores suggest that two 
mechanisms can lead to overshoot and collapse. Extremely high depth of poverty (very 
low levels of GDP per capita of lowest decile) result in lack of economic resources for 
belligerents to engage in conflict, where as low poverty depth (higher GDP per capita of 
lowest decile) increases opportunity costs, resulting in lack of motivation for popular 
support for belligerents to engage in conflict and more likelihood of negotiations (Figure 
2).   
In Model E, all outcomes are positively correlated with percent share of GDP 
held by lowest decile and gender equality, compared to oscillatory (D).  However, higher 
levels of gender and economic equality are much stronger predictors of overshoot and 
collapse (A), all else being equal.  Higher value of GDP share for lowest decile is 
interpreted as a proxy for relative deprivation, while gender equality additionally is a 
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proxy for social and institutional cooperative conflict management capacities and respect 
for human rights.136 
 
    
Figure 2 Relationship Between Poverty and Polity and Outcomes137 
 
 
The results in Model E are consistent with those expected for overshoot and 
collapse behavior.  Higher share of GDP per capita of the lowest decile reflects less 
relative economic deprivation, balancing conflict by reducing conflict drivers and 
increasing opportunity costs (relative to oscillatory (D)). Acting together, the measures of 
economic and gender inequality are proxies for deeper capacities with the society for 
cooperatively managing grievances and reconciling past aggression. Where these 
capacities are higher, civilian resiliency is higher, making belligerent recruitment harder, 
                                                
136 Gender equality is significantly and positively correlated with the CPIA index (.54) and negatively 
correlated with corruption (.58). It is more robust across all models than either of these two indicators.  
137 In Figure 2, SDTYPE 1= Outcome A (overshoot and collapse), SDTYPE 2= Outcome B (damped 
impulse), SDTYPE 3= Outcome C (exponential), and SDTYPE 4 = Outcome D (oscillatory behavior). 
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resulting in a collapse of aggression.138  The distribution of observations for gender 
equality for each of the outcome is consistent with this interpretation. The mean value of 
gender equality is significantly higher for overshoot and collapse (A), and is lowest for 
outcomes C and D (Figure 3).  Interpreting gender equality as a proxy for cooperative 
conflict management capacity may amplify balancing feedback in overshoot and collapse 
(A) due to economic factors discussed for Model D.   
 
Figure 3 Gender Equality by Outcomes139 
 
Models F.1, F.2, F.3 control for social fragmentation (Model F.1) and the 
potential effects of correlations between risk factors (Model F.2 and F.3).   Social 
fragmentation is positively correlated with outcomes A and C, although it does not add to 
explanatory power of the model.  The larger coefficient for overshoot and collapse (A) is 
consistent with lower state reach.  There is possibility of variable inflation due in Models 
                                                
138 These assumptions are based on behavioral psychology of aggression, supported by studies of 
aggression and conflict resolution in primate societies (Flack, Karkauer, & Waal, 2005; Waal, 2000).   
139In Figure 3, SDTYPE 1= Outcome A (overshoot and collapse), SDTYPE 2= Outcome B (damped 
impulse), SDTYPE 3= Outcome C (exponential), and SDTYPE 4 = Outcome D (oscillatory behavior). 
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B-F.1 due to multicollinearity introduced by correlation between GDP share of lowest 
decile and gender inequality (.38), male youth unemployment and ln gdp per capita (.58), 
ln gdp per capita and oil rents (.45), and ln GDP per capita and percent urban 
population (.67).   The correlations between relative state capacity, state reach, poverty, 
and inequality remain robust in Model F.3 and G.   
In summary, the regression analysis rejects the null hypothesis for H1, and 
coefficients for the likelihood of categorical outcomes are generally consistent with the 
assumed causal mechanisms for the underlying structures of those outcomes.  Outcome 
D, oscillatory behavior, is the most frequently observed. The relative likelihood of 
outcomes A and B compared to D are correlated with proxies indicating lower state and 
belligerent capacity, higher opportunity costs, lower gender and economic inequality, and 
higher state reach.  Percentage of GDP from oil (oil rents) is a differentiating factor 
between outcomes A and B, reinforcing the hypothesis that shorter durations in overshoot 
and collapse (A) are most likely to be attributable to a mutual collapse of resources 
whereas in damped impulse (B) they are attributable to strong state response and 
sustained dampening response to conflict. The relative likelihood of exponential (C) 
compared to D is correlated with proxies indicating lower state capacity and higher 
belligerent capacity, lower state reach, and lower governance, and lower capacities for 
cooperative conflict management (proxied through gender inequality).  
Hypothesis 2: Conflict Effects on Outcomes 
H2 tests the hypothesis that conflict persistence patterns are explained by 
characteristics of the conflict environment, with expected results for coefficients of 
conflict risk factors from regression models shown in Table 3. 
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A + - - - - 
B + + + - - 
C - + + + ++ 
D - + + ++ - 
 
 Conflicts across the border are hypothesized to increase relative capacities of 
challengers to the state by diluting state resources and increasing opportunities for illicit 
trade, arms, and recruitment.  Longer durations are most frequently associated in the 
literature with territorial conflicts, so that higher values for the risk factor, type, should be 
correlated with shorter durations (e.g., outcomes A or B).140  Higher number of 
belligerent groups (which are positively correlated with ethnic factions), conflict on the 
borders, and forest cover are assumed to preference relative belligerent capacity, lower 
state reach, and contribute to the difficulty of reaching negotiated settlements e.g., 
(Fearon, 2004; Hegre, 2004). Religious extremism is expected to be correlated with 
exponential (C).  
Models H-M in Table 2 predict the likelihood of outcomes based on correlations 
between conflict characteristics alone and in combination with country level 
characteristics, and the explanatory power of these correlations. Model H tests the  
                                                
140 The type of conflict is derived from UCDP/PRIO conflict data project typology of incompatibilities as 
either territorial or government.  Territorial conflicts concern “the status of a territory, e.g., the change of 
the state in control of a certain territory (interstate conflict), secession or autonomy (internal conflict)”.  
Government conflicts concern “the type of political system, the replacement of the central government or 
the change of its composition” (Themnér, 2013), p 5. Territorial conflicts are coded as 1 and government 




Table 4 Multinomial Regression Tests for H2 
 
 




Oilrents#(%#GDP) A (.84)*** (.77)*** (.92)*** (.8)*** (.7)***
.02,0 B .06*** .08*** .06*** .07*** .09***
C x x x x x
State#Security#
Forces/km2 A .01*** .01*** .01*** .01*** .01***
.16,0 B .004*** .003** x .003** x
C (.01)*** (.02)*** (.02)*** (.02)*** (.02)***
ln#population A (1.6)*** (1.8)*** (3.7)*** (3.8)*** (3.8)***
.09,0 B (.69)*** (.74)*** (.8)*** (.75)*** (.78)***
C (.18)*** (.21)*** (.02)*** (.33)*** (.48)***
gdplowtenpc A .008*** .009** .02*** .02*** .01**
.016,0 B .002* .002* .003** .003** .004**
C .005*** .005*** .005*** .006*** .006***
Polity#IVQ2 A x .13* x .27** .14**
.025,0 B .11*** .13*** .12*** .19*** .15***
C (.09)*** (.08)*** (.09)*** (.1)*** (.16)***
gender#equality A 6*** 6.3*** 7.4*** 7.4*** 9.3***
.06,0 B 3.1*** 3.3*** 3.3*** 3*** 3***
C .9*** 1.*** 1.2*** 1.5*** 1.8***
Social#fragmentation A 7.1*** 7.1*** 12*** 14.5*** 15.6***
.01,0 B x x (1.6)* x x
C x x x x x
border#wars A 1.4*** 1.7** 2** 3*** 2.7***
.001,.0002 B x .83*** .8*** 1.1*** .99***
C x .6** .62* .5* x
type#wars A x 12*** 12.2*** 8.2**
.002,.2 B (.24)** 1.2*** 1.*** .5**
C (.7)*** x x (.5)*
number#belligerents A (.1)*** (.12)* x
.04,0 B (.14)*** (.2)*** (.16)***
C .03*** .05** .1***
forest A (.02)*** .08***
.07,0 B .02*** .04***
C .03*** .08***
PROB%>%CHI2 0 0 0 0 0
WALD%CHI2 227 786 823 704 558
DF 12 21 24 27 33
Log%LIKELIHOOD Q949 Q451 Q443 Q426 Q338
NO.%OBS 789 589 588 588 571 571
pseudo%R2 0.13 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.69




explanatory power of conflict characteristics alone. Model I is the most efficient model141 
for explaining the likelihood of outcomes on basis of endogenous country characteristics  
alone (e.g., relative state capacity, state reach, opportunity costs, governance, grievances, 
and social fragmentation), with coefficients consistent with those in Models B-G.  
Models J-N present the marginal increase in influence of each conflict characteristic 
when combined with Model I, and the effects on significance, size, and/or sign of the 
coefficient for the risk factors associated with each outcome.   
Results of multinomial regression analysis reject the null hypothesis for H2 
(Table 2). Belligerent groups associated with religious extremists is strongly and 
negatively correlated with overshoot and collapse (A), and weakly and negatively 
correlated with outcomes B and C, relative to oscillatory (D).  These results, however, are 
not robust to subsequent model specifications for testing H2-H5 and are dropped from the 
models discussed below. 
The explanatory power of conflict characteristics alone (Model H) is very low 
compared to country level characteristics alone (Model I), with log likelihood of -949 
(compared to -451) and pseudo R2 of .13 (compared to .56).  Models that include both 
country and conflict risk factors see a marginal increase in explanatory power compared 
to H1.  Correlation coefficients of the risk factors for country level characteristics are 
robust to controlling for conflict characteristics.  
The likelihood of exponential (C) relative to the base oscillatory (D) in Model H 
is expected to be positively correlated with numbers of belligerents, forest cover, border 
                                                
141 The most efficient model is that which optimizes explanatory power using the least number of variables, 
controlling for multicollinearity.     
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conflict and type of conflict (as indicated in Table 3).142  Outcomes A and B should have 
opposite correlations. Results in Table 4 are only somewhat consistent with expectations, 
do not have strong differentiating or explanatory power, and contain some discrepancies 
with assumptions of causal mechanisms associated with each outcome.   
All else being equal, the likelihood of overshoot and collapse (A) relative to D is 
positively correlated with conflict on the border, and negatively correlated to number of 
belligerent groups and lower forest cover. The likelihood of damped impulse (B) relative 
to D is negatively correlated to type of conflict and number of belligerent groups, and 
positively correlated to forest cover. The likelihood of exponential (C) relative to D is 
negatively correlated with type of conflict and positively correlated with number of 
belligerent groups and forest cover.  
 With the exception of the effect of forest cover on likelihood of overshoot and 
collapse (A), the coefficients for conflict risk factors in Models J-M are robust.  The 
strong positive correlation of forest cover and border conflict with likelihood of outcomes 
A and B are both surprising and challenge the assumption of weaker belligerent capacity 
relative to state in these models.  The negative correlation between likelihood of 
outcomes A and B and number of belligerents is consistent with the assumed mechanisms 
in both the overshoot and collapse and the damped impulse structures, and with literature 
that associates more belligerent groups with longer durations.  The positive correlation 
between likelihood of outcomes A and B and type of conflict is also consistent with 
assumed mechanisms in the underlying structures, and with the literature that associates 
longer durations with territorial conflicts over land.   
                                                
142 Positive correlation with conflict type implies that the incompatibility is primarily political regarding 
control of government.  
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 In summary, the regression analysis rejects the null hypothesis for H2, although 
border conflict, type of conflict, and number of belligerent groups provides only marginal 
increase in explanatory power of the outcomes.  Oscillatory behavior (D) is robustly 
correlated with low forest cover and fewer border conflict compared to overshoot and 
collapse (A), damped impulse (B), and exponential (C), which suggests a stronger 
balancing loop created by increased state reach. Oscillatory behavior (D) results from the 
corresponding stronger reinforcing loop created by the correlation of D with territorial 
conflict compared to overshoot and collapse (A) or damped impulse (B). There is weak 
evidence that exponential growth (C) and D are differentiated by the higher number of 
belligerent groups correlated with C, which is consistent with exponential growth.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Aid Effects on Outcomes 
 
H3 tests the hypothesis that, all else being equal, different types and levels of aid 
assistance can explain the likelihood of conflict persistence outcomes, controlling for 
country characteristics and aid effectiveness.  Foreign aid is hypothesized to act through 
multiple mechanisms via balancing and reinforcing feedback loops to affect conflict 
persistence, as discussed in Chapter 1 and 2. Expected results shown in Table 5 assume 
that, all else being equal, aid in conflict settings affects conflict persistence through 
reinforcing feedback loops as both a driver (competition over aid as a resource) and an 
enabler (increased capacities of belligerents). Balancing affects of aid theoretically 
should act through mechanisms that increase state capacity, governance, and opportunity 
costs.  However, correlation analysis shows a strong, negative correlation only between 
higher levels of aid as percentage of GDP and opportunity costs (measured as GDP per 
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capita of lowest decile).  Correlation between aid measures and governance measures is 
insignificant, and aid is negatively associated with oil rents.  This suggests that the 
contribution of aid to balancing loops for conflict persistence may be weaker than aid 
contributions to reinforcing loops.   
 













































































A - - - ++ - - + 
B - - + - ++ - - 
C + ++ - - - - - 
D + + - - +/- + + 
 
The regression analysis tests the hypothesis for the explanatory power of aid 
alone, and in combination with country characteristics, for the likelihood of outcomes.  
Four aid variables are (ln) total aid (development and humanitarian) as a percentage of 
GDP, percent of total aid that is humanitarian; infant mortality (as a proxy for aid 
effectiveness), and US military assistance.143 Non-military aid variables alone have very 
low explanatory power (Model N in Table 6).  Controlling for aid (Models O-S in Table 
6) has no significant impact on the coefficients for country level risk factors in Model I.   
 
                                                




Table 6 Results of Multinomial Regression Analysis for H3 
 
 
Contrary to expectations, the likelihoods of overshoot and collapse (A), damped 
impulse (B), and exponential (C) relative to oscillatory behavior (D) are all positively 
correlated with aid, regardless of type.  The strongest positive correlation is between the 
Conflict)Risk)Factors Model)N Model)I Model)O Model)P Model)Q Model)R Model)S
Oilrents)(%)GDP) A (.84)*** (1.9)*** (.84)*** (.74)*** (.78)** (1.1)***
.02,0 B .06*** .08*** .08*** .09*** .1*** .08***
C x x x x x x
State)Security)
Forces/km2 A
.01*** .01*** .008*** .01*** .009*** .04***
.16,0 B .004*** .004*** .002* .005*** .004*** .005**
C (.01)*** (.02)*** (.02)*** (.02)*** (02)*** (.02)***
ln)population A (1.6)*** (2.2)*** (1.6)*** (1.9)*** (1.9)*** (8.1)***
.09,0 B (.69)*** (.62)*** (.7)*** (1.3)*** (1.2)*** (.76)***
C (.18)*** (.12)*** (.2)*** (.2)*** (.25)*** (.18)***
gdplowtenpc A .008*** .03*** .009** .01** .01** x
.016,0 B .002* .003*** .002* .005*** .006*** x
C .005*** .006*** .004*** .007*** .007*** .003***
Polity)IVQ2 A x x x .15** x 1.5**
.025,0 B .11*** .11*** .23*** .2*** .22*** .1**
C (.09)*** (.09)*** (.12)*** (.1)*** (.13)*** (.2)***
gender)equality A 6*** 8.5*** 6.4*** 6.6*** 7.2*** 20***
.06,0 B 3.1*** 3*** 3.3*** 4.4*** 4.5*** 3.4***
C .9*** .77*** 1.3*** 1*** 1.6*** 1.1***
Social)fragmentation A 7.1*** 10*** 6.8*** 7.6*** 7.2*** 86***
.01,0 B x x x .6*** x x
C x x x x x x
ln)aid)%)GDP A x 2.5***
.006,.0006 B .3*** .44***
C .14** .3***
%)humanitarian)aid A x .32* .57***
0.02,0 B .11*** .18** .3***
C x .26*** .3***
infant)mortality A x x .01*
.02,0 B .005*** .03*** .03***




PROB%>%CHI2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
WALD%CHI2 69 786 397 582 645 492 287
DF 9 21 24 24 24 27 24
Log%LIKELIHOOD Q983 Q451 Q439 Q415 Q400 Q363 Q229
NO.%OBS 732 589 589 546 589 546 352
pseudo%R2 0.03 0.56 0.58 0.57 0.6 0.61 0.66




likelihood of overshoot and collapse (A) and increased levels of aid as percentage of 
GDP.  One interpretation is that aid increases opportunity costs, contributing to collapse 
of conflict.  Alternatively, the result could be due to increased development aid following 
collapse of conflict.   The path dependency cannot be determined from the multinomial 
regression model specified and requires further examination in process tracing through 
case studies or time lagged regression analyses on micro-level conflict events as the 
dependent variable.  However, some insights are provided by examining the variance in 
aid within categories and individual countries of conflict (Figures 1-3).   
The variable, ln aid as percentage of GDP, is normally distributed (Figure 4), 
which indicates exponentially decreasing frequency of observations with higher aid 
values.  Figures 5-6 reveal outlier observations with high values that could be biasing the 
results of the regression analysis.144  
 
Figure 4 Density Plot of ln Aid as Percentage of GDP 
 
                                                
144 In Figures 4-5 , SDType1 = Reference Behavior A, SDType2 = Reference Behavior B, SDType3 = 




Figure 5 Comparative Density Plots of Aid as Percentage of GDP by Outcome Category145 
 
 
Figure 6 Comparative Density Plots for Aid as Percentage of GDP by Country 
                                                
145 In Figures 5-6, SDTYPE 1= Outcome A (overshoot and collapse), SDTYPE 2= Outcome B (damped 




The mean value for aid as a percentage of GDP for overshoot and collapse (A) is 
20%; for damped impulse (B) is 19%; for exponential growth (C) is 18%; and for 
oscillatory behavior (D) is 11%.   However, overshoot and A, B, and C all contain 
outliers with observations that are significantly higher than the categorical average. 
Categorical overshoot and collapse (A) contains the highest variance among observations 
and oscillatory (D) has the lowest.   
In overshoot and collapse (A), the most significant outlier is Liberia, which 
received a huge infusion of aid beginning in 2007 - 2008 (160-200% of GDP), 4 years 
after the end of the second civil war, and continued to remained high (~90%) until 2011. 
In damped impulse (B), the outliers are Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone, and Lesotho.  
Guinea Bissau and Lesotho received abnormally high values of aid relative to GDP in 
1989 (160% and 50%, respectively) that have no apparent relationship to conflict activity, 
and again in 1991 for Lesotho (60%) and 1994 for Guinea Bissau (140%).   Sierra Leone 
received abnormally high levels of aid relative to GDP (50-60%) from 2000-2004, prior 
to and just after the end of the civil war in 2002. The initial infusion immediately 
followed the Lome peace agreement in 1999 and arrived with the UN peacekeeping 
mission.  The largest anomaly the observations is in exponential (C), with a massive 
infusion of humanitarian relief aid into Somalia in 1992 during the early stages of the 
civil war, when aid levels were increased from prewar levels of 36% in 1990 to 260% in 
1992.   The goal of the failed UNITAF mission led by the US was to safeguard these 
supplies in advance of a UN peacekeeping mission.  Other outliers in exponential (C) are 
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observations from Mozambique, where aid soared from 44% of GDP in 1991 to 130% in 
1992 at the end of the civil war.  
These cases show that high levels of aid introduced into active conflict settings or 
immediately following cessation of violence are more likely to be associated with 
exponential growth; whereas high levels of aid introduced only after a period of reform 
are more effective at reducing conflict risk, especially when sustained at a significant 
level for a number of years post-conflict to avoid foreign aid “shocks” that could trigger 
conflict recurrence (Nielsen, Findley, Davis, Candland, & Nielson, 2011).  The 
observations reinforce policy recommendations in the literature that advocate a period of 
at least 4 years of reconciliation, stabilization, and reform to relax binding constraints on 
absorptive capacity prior to infusing large amounts of aid into post-conflict settings 
(Chavet & Collier, 2006).   
This argument is supported by the results for humanitarian aid as a percentage of 
total aid, which has differentiating power among overshoot and collapse  (A), damped 
impulse (B), and exponential (C) only when controlling for aid effectiveness (Model R).  
In this case, higher levels of humanitarian aid as a percentage of total aid are more 
strongly correlated with the likelihood of overshoot and collapse (A).  
US military assistance alone contributes more explanatory power for the 
likelihood of outcomes, and is positively correlated with overshoot and collapse (A) 
(Model S).   However, this result may be affected by missing data and fixed effects, in 
that no observations prior to 2000 are included in the analysis due to lack of data.  The 
strategic concerns of the US in the global war on terror since 2001 may introduce a bias 
in the data.  The largest single recipients of US military assistance in the observations are 
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Somalia and Sudan, both countries with exponential growth and of concern in the global 
war on terror.  As a group, countries with overshoot and collapse (A) receive the largest 
amount.  While these countries (Chad, Burundi, Liberia, Namibia, Rwanda, and South 
Africa) do not hold particularly strategic positions viz-a-viz the war on terror or pose 
terrorist threats, the violent civil wars that they experienced destabilized entire regions 
with repercussions that are still of concern today.   
In summary, the regression results reject the null hypothesis for H3.  They show 
that aid provides marginal explanatory power to differentiate likelihood of outcomes 
when considered in combination with country risk factors that impact aid effectiveness 
and absorptive capacity.  However, the similarity of positive correlation of aid variables 
with different outcomes precludes direct interpretation of results on the basis of the 
multinomial regression analysis alone. A temporal dimension is required to account for 
different mechanisms that reinforce or balance conflict, depending on when the aid is 
introduced relative to the conflict trajectory.  This path dependency introduces the 
possibility of Type I errors (failure to reject the null hypothesis).   
Hypothesis 4: Peace Operation Effects on Outcomes 
H4 tests the hypothesis that the extent of interventions through peace operations 
can explain outcomes for conflict persistence, where expected results are as shown in 
Table 4.  The independent variables are troop-mission months of different types of peace 
operations (defined in Chapter 1 and discussed in Chapter 2) and peace agreements or 
negotiated settlements.146  The likelihood of oscillatory behavior (D) is expected to be 
                                                
146 Other potential independent variables to measure the presence of peace operations are troop size alone, 
mission months, and a binary 0/1.  All of these variables were tested; the variable, troop-mission months, 
was found to be the most robust and significant indicator.  
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negatively correlated with the extent of peace operations compared to overshoot and 
collapse (A) or damped impulse (B); exponential (C) is expected to be to be correlated 
with higher extent of coalition or single actor operations; overshoot and collapse (A) is 
expected to be correlated with a higher extent of UN operations following negotiated 
settlements or peace agreements, and damped impulse (B) is expected to be correlated 
with a higher extent of regional operations. Metadata on these interventions were 
previously summarized in Table 5, Chapter 2 and are discussed in more detail below.   
 


















A ++ - - - - ++ 
B - - + + + - 
C - + + ++ ++ + 
D -- - - - - - 
 
Group A, overshoot and collapse, consists of Liberia, South Africa, Namibia, 
Burundi, Rwanda, and Chad. Five of the six conflicts in Group A - Liberia, Chad, 
Namibia, Rwanda and Burundi - experienced military interventions by ad hoc coalitions 
or single actors. 147  Group B, damped impulse, consists of Sierra Leone, Angola, Mali, 
Lesotho, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, and the Republic of Congo.  Four of these seven 
experienced military interventions by a single actor -- Mali, Lesotho, the Central African 
                                                
147 Approximately 4000 US troops were present in Liberia in 2003 (1200 of which were advisors) 
compared to regional EOCMOG peacekeepers from 1990-1998 that peaked with 12000 troops from 1993-
1997; and UN peacekeeping troops from 2003 – present, peaking at 14,500 in 2006.  The South African 
Protection Support Detachment had 700 troops in Burundi from 2000-2003(Boshoff, Vrey, & Rautenbach, 
2010).   The African Union Mission (AMIB) and the UN Mission (ONUB) replaced the SAPSD at the end 
of 2003.  France has had a continuous presence of approximately 1000 troops in Chad since 1990, while the 
EU deployed a mission of 3700 troops for 12 months to Chad in 2008.  
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Republic, and the Republic of Congo.148  Coalition and single actors were present in 
Sierra Leone, Mali, and Congo, and Lesotho for a total of 349 mission months.  Group C, 
exponential growth, consists of Somalia, Nigeria (Boko Haram), Mozambique, Sudan, 
Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Gabon, and the DRC. Five of these – Somalia, 
Sudan, the DRC, Gabon, and Mozambique  – experienced military interventions by 
single actors or coalitions.149  Group D, oscillatory behavior, consists of Senegal, 
Ethiopia (ONLF, OLF and political), Ivory Coast, Uganda, Kenya (Kikuyu and Turkana), 
Nigeria-political, Algeria, Zimbabwe, Niger, and CAR (political and Seleka coalition).  
Five of these - Ivory Coast, Algeria, Ethiopia, Senegal, and the CAR experienced military 
interventions by external single actors or coalitions.150 
                                                
148 France intervened on the side of the government in Mali with 4000 troops from January 2013-July 2014 
(Operation Serval); the South African Development Community (led by South Africa and Botswana) 
intervened on behalf of the government in Lesotho with 700 troops from September 1998-May 
1999(Likoti, 2007); in 1997 Angola intervened in the Republic of Congo to support rebels with 1000 troops 
to gain control of Brazzaville after a coup that reinstated former Marxist dictator Sassou-Nguesso. The EU 
provided 2275 troops from June 2006 – November 2006 to support historic elections in the Congo (EUFOR 
RD Congo). 
149 The US-led coalition, UNITAF, intervened in Somalia from December 19292-May 1993 with 37000 
troops to restore order ahead of a UN Peacekeeping force, and to safeguard relief supplies; Ethiopia 
intervened with 10000 troops ostensibly to support the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia in 
fighting against the ICU from July 2006 – January 2009; Kenya intervened from October 2011  - June 2012 
with 2400 troops to counter Al Shabaab in southern Somalia.  Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, and Zimbabwe 
intervened in support of the DRC government with up to 3100 troops in 1998-1999.   Rwanda and Uganda 
switched their support to the opposition with 9000 troops in 1999-2000; while Zimbabwe, Angola, 
Namibia, and Sudan supported the government with up to 13,500 troops. The EU has intervened twice in 
the DRC with more than 2000 troops: France successfully led the EU Interim Emergency Multinational 
Force (IEMF) from June 2003- September 2003 in Operation Artemis to restore order, improve 
humanitarian conditions, disarm militias, and protect government infrastructures, IDPs, civilian population, 
UN personnel (MONUC), and humanitarian aid workers. Since October 2002 France has maintained an 
intervention force of 450 troops to support local armed forces of the government and the regional African 
force FOMUC in the Central African Republic (Operation Boali).  
150 France intervened to support the UN Operation in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI) with a rapid reaction force 
from September 2002 – January 2015 with a peak of 5000 troops in a mission that evolved from 
intervention and peace enforcement to stabilization and reorganization (Operation Licorne).  At the request 
of the Central African Republic, France deployed 1700 troops from December 2013-September 2014 to 
support the African-led International Support Mission (MISCA) restore order in areas targeted by the 




Four of the six conflicts in Group A experienced UN peacekeeping operations for 
a total of six missions with a combined 369 UN mission months:  Liberia, Burundi, Chad, 
and Rwanda.  Three of these – Liberia, Burundi, and Chad – also experienced regional 
peacekeeping operations for a total of six missions and 156 mission months.151  Three of 
the seven conflicts in Group B experienced UN peacekeeping operations for a total of 
seven missions with a combined 245 mission months: Sierra Leone, Angola, and Mali.  
Two of these – Sierra Leone and Mali, also experienced regional peacekeeping 
operations, along with Guinea-Bissau, for a total of nine regional peacekeeping 
operations and 120 mission months.152 Four of the nine conflicts in Group C experienced 
UN peacekeeping operations for a total of seven missions with 224 mission months: 
Somalia, Sudan, Mozambique, and the DRC.153   Of the twelve conflicts in Group D, only 
the Ivory Coast and CAR experienced UN peacekeeping operations for a total of five 
missions with combined 182 mission months.154   
                                                
151The UN peacekeeping operations in Group A are: UNOMIL (September 1993- September 1997) and 
UNMIL (September 2003 through present) in Liberia; ONUB (May 2004-December 2006) and BINUB 
(February 2007-December 2012) in Burundi; MINURCAT (September 2007-December 2010) in Chad and 
UNAMIR (October 1993-March 1996) in Rwanda.  Regional peacekeeping operations in Group A are: 
ECOMOG-Lib (August 1990 – December 1998) and ECOMIL (September 2003- October 2003) in Liberia; 
and AMIB (April 2003- May 2004) and AUSTF (January 2007 – April 2009) in Burundi.  
152 The UN peacekeeping operations in Group B are: UNAMSIL (October 1999 – December 2005), 
UNOMSIL (June 1998-October 1999) in Sierra Leone; UNAVEM I, II, III (November 1990 – June 1997), 
and MONUA (June 1997-February 1999) in Angola; and MINUSMA (July 2013 – present) in Mali.   The 
regional peacekeeping operations in Group B are: ECOMOG-SL (October 1997-December 1999) in Sierra 
Leone; AFISMA (January 2013 – July 2013) and EUTM (February 2013 to present) in Mali; FOMUC 
(January 2003- July 2008), CEN-SAD (December 2001 - January 2003), MICOPAX (July 2008 – March 
2013), and ECOMOG-GB (February 1999 – May 199), MISSANG-GB (March 2011 – June 2012), 
ECOMIB (May 2012 – present) and EU SSR (June 2008 – September 2010) in Guinea-Bissau.  
153 The UN peacekeeping operations in Group C are: UNOSOM I, II (April 1992-March 1995) in Somalia; 
UNMIS (March 2005 – July 2011) and UNIFSA (August 2011 to present) in Sudan; MONUMOZ 
(December 1992-December 1994) in Mozambique;; and MONUC (March 1999 – June 2010) and 
MONUSCO (March 2013 to present) in the DRC.  
154 The UN peacekeeping operations in Group D are: MINUCI (May 2003- April 2004) and UNOCI 
(February 2004 – present) in the Ivory Coast; MISCA (December 2013 – September 2014) in CAR-Seleka;  
and MINURCA (April 1998-February 2000) and BONUCA (February 2000-August 2000) in the CAR.  
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The frequency distribution of UN peacekeeping mission months and personnel for 
the different reference behavior outcomes is shown in Figure 7, the frequency distribution 
of regional peacekeeping mission months and personnel for different reference behaviors 
is shown in Figure 8, and that of coalition and single actor mission months is shown in 
Figure 9.  The wide variation in the number of mission months per year for each outcome 
category means that annual troop data alone is not sufficient to indicate presence of peace 
operations.  The measure of actual annual presence for each type of mission is calculated 
as the annual sum of the product of troops per month x mission months for each year.  
The frequency of observations for troop-mission months for each category is shown in 
Figures 10-11.155   
 
 
Figure 7 Frequency Distribution of UN Mission Months and Personnel by Outcome 
 
                                                
155 In Figures 7-11, SDTYPE 1= Outcome A (overshoot and collapse), SDTYPE 2= Outcome B (damped 




Figure 8 Frequency Distribution of Regional Mission Months and Personnel by Outcome 
 
 










Figure 11 Frequency Distribution of Coalition and Single Actor Troop-Mission Months 
 
Regression results Models U-Z in Table 8 reject the null hypothesis for H4, 
although the explanatory power of the models, indicated by pseudo R2 and log likelihood, 
is only marginally increased compared to Model I (the most efficient model for country 
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risk factors alone).156  The direction and significance of coefficients for UN and regional 
peace operations are correlated with outcomes as expected, and with one exception, there 
is no affect on coefficients for country risk factors when compared to Model I.  The one 
exception is that poverty becomes insignificant as an indicator for damped impulse (B) 
when controlling for UN and regional peace operations.  
UN missions alone (Model U) have more explanatory power for the likelihood of 
outcomes than regional missions alone (Model V). The coefficients for coalition and 
single actor missions (Model X) and for peace agreements and settlements (Model Z) are 
as predicted in Table 7, but are not statistically significant, although the explanatory 
power is highest when controlling for these mission types (Model Z).   
The likelihood of A, B, and C relative to D are positively correlated with UN 
troop mission months.  However, the correlation coefficient is 3 times higher for 
overshoot and collapse (A) than for damped impulse (B) or exponential growth (C).  
With only one outlier observation for overshoot and collapse (A) (Rwanda, 1994, as 
shown in Figure 10), this result is robust.  Recalling from H1 testing that overshoot and 
collapse (A) is associated with lower state and belligerent capacity, higher state reach and 
gender equality, a theoretical interpretation of these results could be that the presence of 
UN troops in the cases included in overshoot and collapse (A) reduce fear and uncertainty 
following cessation of violence, helping to take advantage of conditions that support 
peacebuilding and community resiliency through stronger reconciliation mechanisms 
(Fortna, 2008; Walter, 2010).  
 
                                                
156 Model I has pseudo R2 of .56 and log likelihood of -451.   
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Model)U Model)V Model)W Model)X Model)Y Model)Z
(1.9)** (.82)*** (1.9)** (.84)*** x (2.4)**
.07*** .07*** .07*** .07*** .07*** .07***
x x x x x x
.01*** .01*** .01*** .01*** .01*** .01***
.005*** .004*** .005*** .004*** .005*** .005***
(.02)*** (.02)*** (.02)*** (.01)*** (.02)*** (.02)***
(2)*** (1.7)*** (2)*** (1.6)*** (2)*** (2.1)***
(.78)*** (.71)*** (.8)*** (.7)*** (.8)*** (.8)***
(.26)*** (.25)*** (.3)*** (.2)*** (.3)*** (.3)***
.02*** .008** .02*** .008*** .02*** .02***
x x x .002* x x
.004*** .004*** .004*** .005*** .004*** .004***
x x x x x x
.09*** .12*** .1*** .11*** .11*** .1***
(.12)*** (.08)*** (.12)*** (.09)*** (.11)*** (.12)***
7*** 6.1*** 7.1*** 5.9*** 7.1*** 7.4***
3.6*** 3.2*** 3.6*** 3.1*** 3.6*** 3.7***
1.4*** 1.3*** 1.6*** .9*** 1.5*** 1.6***
3.9*** (.12)*** 4.1*** 7*** 4.8*** 3.5***
x .01* x x x x
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UN peace operations are more likely to reduce the security dilemma that result 
from relatively low, but equal state and belligerent capacities, reinforcing endogenous 
conflict management represented by gender equality, and supporting state reach, where 
state reach is proportional to population and security force density, and inversely 
proportional to size of population.  This is less likely where oil is present (strongly 
correlated with damped impulse (B)), ability to enforce commitments is asymmetric, and 
endogenous cooperative conflict management capabilities (indicated by polity and gender 
equality scores) are low (e.g., exponential growth, C, and oscillatory behavior, D).  On 
the average, both state reach and gender equality are higher for cases in overshoot and 
collapse (A) (Figures 3, 12-13), supporting this interpretation.157   However, the wide 
variance within the group for gender equality and state security forces weakens the 




Figure 12 Comparative Density Plots for State Security Forces by Outcome 
                                                
157 In Figures 12-13, SDTYPE 1= Outcome A (overshoot and collapse), SDTYPE 2= Outcome B (damped 






Figure 13 Comparative Density of ln Population and ln Population Density by Outcome 
 
The marginal increase in explanatory power of Models W, Y, and Z, which 
include UN and regional peace operations, is comparable to Models Q and R, which 
include humanitarian aid as a percent of total aid and infant mortality as a proxy for aid 
effectiveness, raising some concern as to whether these models are responding to a 
similar hidden effect.  However, correlation between infant mortality and peace operation 
variables is low (maximum of .1), and there is only moderate correlation between 
humanitarian aid as a percent of total aid and combined UN and regional troop-mission 
months (.25).  
In summary, regression analysis rejects the null hypothesis for H4, although 
explanatory power of peace operations alone is at best incremental, and does not change 
the coefficients for likelihood of outcomes obtained by considering country level 
characteristics alone. The results for coefficients on peace operations are as expected, and 
are consistent with assumptions for causal mechanisms in the literature for peace 
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operations, and with the assumptions for how those mechanisms act as balancing and 
reinforcing loops in underlying structures associated with each outcome to affect conflict 
duration and belligerent resiliency.  In particular, they help to differentiate between 
outcomes A and B, with the likelihood of overshoot and collapse (A) being positively 
correlated with UN peace operations and damped impulse (B) correlated with coalition 
and single actor missions.  
On the average, cases in overshoot and collapse (A) generally have lower state 
and belligerent capacities that are roughly equal, accounting for asymmetric advantages 
of belligerents, but higher state reach and gender equality that favor cooperative conflict 
management. In contrast, relative capacities of observations in damped impulse (B) tend 
to strongly favor the state, which may increase the security dilemma for belligerents. 
Large variances in the observations for these risk factors within outcome categories 
indicate a need for deeper analysis through individual case studies. UN, regional, and 
coalition/single actor missions are all associated with exponential growth in exponential 
(C).  Removing the outlier observations for Angola, coalition and single actor missions 
are more likely in conflicts of longer durations (Groups C or D).  
 
Hypothesis 5: Interactive Effects between Conflict, Peacekeeping, and Aid on 
Outcomes 
H5 tests the hypothesis that interactions between aid, peace operations, and state 
capacity explain the outcomes, controlling for state reach, the security environment, and 
opportunity costs.   Expected outcomes are summarized in Table 9.  
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Peacekeeping Missions x 
State Security Capacity 
State 
Reach 
Conflict Type Economic Opportunity 
Costs 
A + ++ + + 
B - + - + 
C + - + -- 
D - - - - 
 
The original assumption underlying this hypothesis is that the factors tested by 
previous hypotheses in isolation would not provide strong explanatory power.  However, 
as the previous sections make evident, the ensemble of country level characteristics 
accounting for relative capacities, state reach, opportunity costs, governance, and equality 
are strong explanans for the outcomes (H1).  Factors accounting for conflict 
characteristics (H2), aid (H3), or peace operations (4) provide only marginal increases in 
explanatory power over country factors, but do provide insights into causal mechanisms 
for how those interventions interact with country characteristics. The models created for 
testing H5 provide robustness checks on these results, and insights into additional causal 
mechanisms from interactive affects. 
The regression results for testing H5 are in Models IA-3, IA-4, IA-6, IA-10, and 
IA-11 in Table 10.158 The most efficient models for testing each of the previous 
hypotheses also appear in Table 10 for comparison (Models I, M, R and Z).  Model IA-3 
includes aid, state capacity and peacekeeping forces, but does not control for conflict 
type.   Model IA-4 controls for type of conflict; Model IA-6 controls for state reach; 
Model IA-10 controls for both state reach and type of conflict.  Model IA-11 tests for the 
                                                
158 These models also control for coalition and single actor troop missions months, but the coefficients are 
statistically insignificant so are not included in Table 10.  
Chapter 3 
 202 
ratio between state military capacity and aid by introducing the variable, ln of the ratio of 
military expenditures to total development and humanitarian aid received.   
 Models IA-10 and IA-11 have the greatest explanatory power, measured by both 
R2 and log likelihood.  Log likelihood values are significantly less in Models IA-10 and 
IA-11.  The R2 values of .8 and .77 for Models IA-10 and IA-11, respectively, are a 
marginal increase over the maximum R2 value of .69 for Model M.   These high R2 
values raise concerns of variable inflation due to multicollinearity.  However, statistical 
tests on each regression and correlation analysis between variables (discussed in Chapter 
2) confirm that this is not the case.   
Several results stand out in Table 10. First, the negative correlations between oil, 
population and overshoot and collapse (A), and the positive correlations between infant 
mortality, poverty, social fragmentation and overshoot and collapse (A) lose statistical 
significance when controlling for peace operations, humanitarian aid, and conflict 
characteristics.   Second, the sign and order of magnitude of the coefficient for type of 
conflict changes for exponential growth (C), while the coefficients for type of conflict 
become insignificant for overshoot and collapse (A) and damped impulse (B). Third, 
coefficients for UN and regional troop mission months, percent humanitarian aid, gender 
equality, polity, forest cover, and state security forces/km2 are robust for the likelihood of 
all outcomes across all models. Additional coefficients for the likelihood of damped 
impulse (B) and exponential (C) that are robust across models are ln population and 
poverty.  Coefficients for oil rents and ethic polarization are significant and robust only 
for the likelihood of damped impulse (B); coefficients for type are not robust, but type is 
important as a control.    
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These results reject the null hypothesis for H5, with several significant effects on 
coefficients of influential factors when including aid, conflict, and peace operations 
together. The results are insensitive to control for coalition and single actor interventions 
and number of belligerents.   The influences of aid and peace operations by themselves 
on likelihood of outcomes are not as strong as country characteristics. This suggests that 
these interventions do not operate as independent, exogenous mechanisms on conflict 





Table 10 Multinomial Regression Analysis Results for Testing H5 
 
  
Conflict)Risk)Factors Model)I Model)M Model)R Model)Z
Oilrents)(%)GDP) A (.84)*** (.7)*** (.78)** (2.4)**
.02,0 B .06*** .09*** .1*** .07***
C x x x x
State)Security)
Forces/km2 A .01*** .01*** .009*** .01***
.16,0 B .004*** x .004*** .005***
C (.01)*** (.02)*** (02)*** (.02)***
ln)population A (1.6)*** (3.8)*** (1.9)*** (2.1)***
.09,0 B (.69)*** (.78)*** (1.2)*** (.8)***
C (.18)*** (.48)*** (.25)*** (.3)***
gdplowtenpc A .008*** .01** .01** .02***
.016,0 B .002* .004** .006*** x
C .005*** .006*** .007*** .004***
Polity)IVU2 A x .14** x x
.025,0 B .11*** .15*** .22*** .1***
C (.09)*** (.16)*** (.13)*** (.12)***
gender)equality A 6*** 9.3*** 7.2*** 7.4***
.06,0 B 3.1*** 3*** 4.5*** 3.7***
C .9*** 1.8*** 1.6*** 1.6***
social)frag A 7.1*** 15.6*** 7.2*** 3.5***
.01,)0 B x x x x














































































































































PROB%>%CHI2 0 0 0 0
WALD%CHI2 786 558 492 487
DF 21 33 27 30
Log%LIKELIHOOD U451 U338 U363 U408
NO.%OBS 589 571 546 588
pseudo%R2 0.56 0.69 0.61 0.62
























Summary of Regression Analysis  
The regression analysis rejects the null hypothesis for H1-H5.  The four reference 
patterns of conflict persistence are strongly correlated with risk factors postulated in the 
five hypotheses. Conflict risk factors associated with state characteristics posited by H1 
have the highest explanatory power for differentiating among reference behaviors.  
However, robust results for correlation coefficients of the state characteristics require 
control for the influence of the additional risk factors tested in H 2-H5 associated with 
conflict characteristics, peace operations, aid, and interactive variables.  Summary 
statistics (Table 11) aid to interpret relative influence of the risk factors based on the 
regression coefficients. The robust, strongly differentiating correlation of gender equality 
for likelihood of outcomes in all of the regression models is unexpected.  
 
Table 11 Summary Statistics for Explanatory Variables 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
  
  
Oil rents (%) 751.00 7.66 15.81 0.00 73.00 
ssf/km2  (scaled by 1000km2) 704.00 184.90 410.01 2.54 3208.33 
Ln population 795.00 16.14 1.17 13.74 18.97 
GDP per capita lowest decile 710.00 227.43 376.50 22.15 3217.51 
Polity IV-2 781.00 0.14 4.99 -9.00 9.00 
      
  
  
Gender equality 801.00 3.19 0.65 2.20 5.00 
Ethnic polarization 758.00 0.55 0.18 0.00 0.89 
Social fragmentation 757.00 0.30 0.22 0.00 0.67 
Conflict type 810.00 1.76 0.61 0.00 3.00 
Forest cover (%) 810.00 29.21 23.72 0.30 85.00 
      
  
  
UN-Regional troop - mission 
months (1000) 809.00 17.10 61.01 0.00 946.96 
Coalition-single actor troop-
mission months (1000) 810.00 5.75 37.05 0.00 652.80 
Ln % humanitarian aid of total 733.00 -3.81 2.25 -10.97 0.03 
Annual infant mortality rate 
(deaths per 1000) 807.00 136.97 57.65 25.60 332.90 




Taking into account scale differences of the variables in Table 11 and order of 
magnitude of correlation coefficients in Table 10, the influence of the two variables, 
population size and gender equality, appear to be the strongest predictors of the 
likelihood of overshoot and collapse, although only gender equality is robust to all model 
specifications.  Four variables -- density of state security forces, gender equality, poverty, 
and infant mortality -- have roughly equal influence on the likelihood of damped impulse 
and exponential behaviors relative to oscillatory behavior. The influence of polity scores, 
social fragmentation and ethnic polarization, forest cover, percent humanitarian aid, and 
UN-regional troop mission months are an order of magnitude less, where they are 
significant predictors.   
  Correlations between the most significant, differentiating predictors and 
reference behaviors may be explained through relative mechanisms of coercive power 
(state military strength and reach), cooperation capacity (proxied by gender equality), 
economic deprivation and opportunity cost (poverty), and institutional capacity (proxied 
by infant mortality as an indicator of aid effectiveness) operating through conflict 
balancing and reinforcing feedback structures associated with the different reference 
behaviors. The relative strength of cooperative and coercive mechanisms as proxied by 
relative values of the variable gender equality (which creates balancing feedback) and 
state military strength (that may be balancing or reinforcing, depending on relationship to 
other factors) are shown for the four different reference behaviors in Figure 14.  
Figure 14 shows that higher values of both state security forces/km2 and gender 
equality characterize overshoot and collapse behavior. These are consistent with 
assumptions of strong, but delayed balancing loops in the overshoot and collapse 
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structure in which asymmetric capabilities of belligerents (proxied through higher 
association with forest and ethnic polarization) enable rapid conflict escalation that 
cannot be sustained (due to lower population, higher social fragmentation, higher 
opportunity costs). Damped impulse is differentiated from other behaviors by strong and 
positive correlation with oil and i, but characterized by only moderate values for state 
security forces/km2 and gender equality. Lower values of state security forces/km2 and 
gender equality characterize exponential behavior.  Moderate values of state security 
forces/km2 and low to moderate values of gender equality characterize oscillatory 
behavior, with greater variances in state security forces/km2 for oscillatory behavior than 
for damped impulse, as one would expect.    
 
 
Figure 14 Relationships Between State Strength and Gender Equality by Outcome159 
 
                                                
159 In Figure 14, SDTYPE 1= overshoot and collapse, SDTYPE 2= damped impulse, SDTYPE 3= 
exponential, and SDTYPE 4 = oscillatory behavior. The values for ssf/km2 in Figure 14 are scaled by a 




The relative strength of grievance, opportunity costs and institutional 
mechanisms, proxied through values of poverty (which is in both balancing and 
reinforcing feedback structures) and infant mortality rates (the inverse of which is 
balancing) are shown for each reference behavior in Figure 15.  In Figure 15, lower infant 
mortality rates combined with moderate poverty levels characterize overshoot and 
collapse. Relatively high infant mortality rates and poverty characterize damped impulse, 
indicating lower institutional capacity and opportunity costs, reducing the balancing 
potential of these mechanisms.  Relatively moderate infant mortality rates and lower 
poverty (higher GDP of lowest decile) are characteristic of exponential behavior. This 
result demonstrates that resources of the lowest decile operate through multiple pathways, 
and can amplify conflict risk as a resource, as well as balance conflict risk as an 
opportunity cost. Higher social fragmentation, also correlated with exponential behavior, 
may be a tipping factor in this case.  
Oscillatory behavior is characterized by the lowest infant mortality rate coupled 
with moderate poverty, with values similar to overshoot and collapse.  This shows that 
institutional capacity and opportunity cost are balancing, as in the case of overshoot and 
collapse, but are accompanied by weaker security presence and governance, higher 
populations and are more likely to involve contestation over territory than in the case of 
overshoot and collapse.  These second-tier influencers operate through mechanisms of 
governance (proxied by polity), grievance (proxied by ethnic polarization), and 
asymmetric belligerent capacities (proxied through forest cover, population, and social 
fragmentation).   UN peace operations reinforce cooperative mechanisms and reduce the 
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security dilemma of asymmetric capabilities; regional peace operations reinforce state 




Figure 15 Relationships Between Infant Mortality and Poverty by Outcome160 
 
 
Somalia Case Study 
The regression analysis of the previous section provided insight for what factors 
have the most influence in affecting likely outcomes of conflict behaviors. This section 
discusses how factors specifically associated with aid and peace operations affect conflict 
behaviors through a case study of the Somalia civil conflict.  Somalia provides a salient 
case study over several decades with distinct phases of different types of intervention 
strategies and level of external presence in a persistent conflict, during which time there 
                                                
160 In Figure 15, SDTYPE 1= overshoot and collapse, SDTYPE 2= damped impulse, SDTYPE 3= 
exponential, and SDTYPE 4 = oscillatory behavior. 
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was little change in governance structure (due to its absence).  These distinctive phases 
offer a type of controlled experiment for isolating the effects of external interventions for 
a within case comparison of the effect of different intervention strategies by the external 
actors.   
As before, the unit of analysis is the reference behavior of conflict.  However, in 
the case study it is considered within distinct time sub-intervals of time, and associated 
with causal models in which the balance between feedback loops, rather than risk factors, 
are the predictors of outcome behavior.  The relationships between intervention variables, 
the feedback loops that they generate, and risk factors from the previous analysis are 
discussed for each phase of conflict to assess the congruency between the previous 
macro-level, comparative regression analysis of outcome predictors across conflicts over 
time, and this mesa-level analysis based on causal relationships between those predictor 
and structural conditions across time within a single conflict. 
First, dynamics effects of peace operations and aid interventions during different 
phases of the Somalia conflict are discussed and evaluated through the framework of 
system dynamics and reference behaviors, based on archival research. In so doing, 
patterns of conflict dynamics in Somalia from 1989-2014 at the micro-level are also 
considered to compare findings of risk factors and causal mechanisms derived from the 
macro-level, cross-conflict comparative analysis and the micro-level.161 This is followed 
by a discussion of findings from field interviews conducted from June 2014-September 
2014 regarding these causal mechanisms and conflict dynamics.      
                                                
161 Data for the micro-level analysis is from the Armed Conflict Event and Location Dataset (ACLED) 
version 5.  
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Somalia Case Study: External Interventions and Conflict Dynamics   
 
The United Republic of Somalia was created on July 1, 1960, following a period 
of UN trusteeship of territory inhabited by Somalis in the Horn of Africa that had 
previously been occupied by the French, Italians, Great Britain, and Ethiopia.  After 
leading a bloodless coup in 1969, General Siad Barre established a socialist political 
system under military rule with close ties to the Soviet Union.  Clan-based armed 
resistance to Barre’s rule, led in large part by General Aidid and the United Somali 
Congress (USC), waged guerilla warfare against the regime throughout the 1980s. The 
resistance movement was encouraged by events in neighboring Ethiopia, where Emperor 
Haile Selassie I had been overthrown by the Derg in 1974, which was in turn ousted by 
Mengistu in 1987 to form the People’s Republic of Ethiopia. Both Mengistu and Barre 
were overthrown in 1991.  Aidid’s USC and other clan-based militias pushed aside 
traditional elders as they clashed violently for power in Somalia subsequent to Barre’s 
fall, leading to collapse of the central government, and the secession of the northwest 
region into the self-declared Republic of Somaliland in 1991 162.  
                                                
162 Administrative districts Adwal, Woqooyi Galbeed, Togdheer, Sool and Sanaag in Figure 16, with Sool 




Figure 16 Political Administrative Regions of Somalia 
 
Five phases of international involvement in the Somalia conflict followed. The 
first phase from 1992- 1995 involved the UN Operations in Somalia I (UNOSOM I), UN 
Operations in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), and the US-led, UN-authorized multilateral 
United Task Force (UNITAF).  The second phase, after the withdrawal of the US and UN 
from Somalia, and the death of General Aidid in 1995, saw the emergence of 
decentralized, autonomous regional governments with little involvement from the 
international community.  The third phase, 2006-2008, was initiated by the unilateral 
intervention of Ethiopia to counter the growing power and influence of the Islamic Courts 
Union (ICU) as a primary governance mechanism in Somalia.  The fourth phase began 
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after the withdrawal of ENDF and increasing presence of the UN authorized African 
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), originally deployed in 2008, with episodic 
unilateral troop excursions from Kenya and Ethiopia along the borders. A fifth phase of 
international involvement was introduced in 2013 with the expansion of AMISOM to 
include troops from Ethiopia and Kenya, and the adoption of peace and state building 
initiatives through the Somali Compact Partnership between the Federal Government of 
Somalia (FSG) and the international community, based on the Busan New Deal 
Principles (Booth, 2012), and the 4-year strategy contained in Vision 2016 for transition 
to democracy.163  During this time, the UN established the Assistance Mission in Somalia 
(UNSOM) in to support the FSG with peace building, state building and governance, and 
coordination of international assistance.  Different patterns of conflict events during these 
phases are overshoot and collapse in phase 1 (Figure 17), oscillatory behavior during 
phase 2, and exponential growth throughout phases 3-5, beginning with a surge in 
conflict events with Ethiopia’s intervention in 2006 (Figure 18). 
 
Figure 17 Somalia Conflict Events 1989-1998 
 
                                                
163 Vision 2016 is the strategy of the FSG launched in 2014 to reach agreement on a final constitution. 
Center on International Cooperation, “Somalia’s New Deal: The compact and its implementation so far”, 
August 8, 2014, http://cic.nyu.edu/blog/global-­‐development/somalia%E2%80%99s-­‐new-­‐deal-­‐
compact-­‐and-­‐its-­‐implementation-­‐so-­‐far.	  Retrieved	  March	  26,	  2016.	  	  The	  strategy	  was	  led	  by	  Somalis,	  
with	  mediation	  by	  the	  regional	  Intergovernmental	  Authority	  for	  Development	  (IGAD). 



















Figure 18 Somalia Conflict Events, Aid, and Peacekeeping Troops 1989-2015 
 
Phase I of Somalia Conflict 1992-1994: Overshoot and Collapse 
 
In the turmoil immediately following the collapse of the Barre regime, warlord-
led militias used military power for extortion and pillaging the extensive international 
humanitarian aid operations providing relief from the 1991-1992 famine as their main 
source of income (Natsios, 1996).  UNISOM I was authorized with 50 observers and 
3500 security personnel in April 1992 to monitor a UN-negotiated cease-fire in 
Mogadishu and to provide protection and security for the distribution of humanitarian 
supplies within Mogadishu and its environs, and ultimately throughout Somalia. In 
December 1992, as the security situation deteriorated with attacks by clan militias on the 
UNOSOM I forces and complete absence of government control, UN authorized Member 
States to form the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) as a Chapter VII mission with an 
eventual deployment of 37,000 troops, led by the US in Operation Restore Hope, to 
establish a safe environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. These troops 
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were deployed across approximately 40% of Somalia primarily in the south and central 
districts. 164   
The success of the UNITAF mission depended on developing trust, 
understanding, and maximum coordination between the military and humanitarian relief 
community. The Civilian-Military Operations Center (CMOC), led jointly by US 
Marines, CARE, and US AID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), achieved 
this objective through daily planning and information sharing between the UN, 
international NGOs (INGOs), UNITAF and representatives of military commands for 
logistic support, protection of humanitarian relief supplies, medical assistance, and 
rebuilding of educational and transportation infrastructures.  The most serious, and 
unresolved challenge for the mission was what to do with the heavily armed private 
guards retained by most of the relief organizations before UNITAF’s arrival, for fear of 
reprisals if they were let go, and banditry if they stayed.  The guards, who usually 
belonged to whatever militia was dominant in the area, had been earning up to $2000 
each per month plus food from the INGOs, who provided the only stable jobs in the 
country.  According to Hirsch and Oakley, political advisor and US special envoy to 
Somalia 1992-1993, respectively, “the closest UNITAF came to a solution was in 
banning all armed guards from Kismayo, providing radio contact for emergencies and 
some direct military protection for humanitarian agencies, and starting local Somali 
police forces that helped protect relief installations” (Hirsch & Oakley, 1995, p. 69).  
                                                
164 United Nations Operations in Somalia I – (UNOSOM I), prepared by the Department of Public 
Information, United Nations, March 21, 1997. 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom1backgr2.html, Retrieved July 2015.  
Chapter 3 
 216 
In early 1993, 15 Somali political movements agreed to a ceasefire at the National 
Reconciliation Conference convened in Addis Ababa, and endorsed an accord on 
disarmament, reconstruction, restitution, and the formation of a transitional government. 
In March 1993, UN authorized the transition of tasks from UNITAF to an expanded 
UNSOM II mission with 15,000 troops to take over the provision of security and the 
disarmament and political reconciliation processes. At the same time, aid donors pledged 
over $130 million to support a comprehensive Relief and Rehabilitation Programme for 
Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia, developed in consultation with 190 Somali 
representatives.165 
The accord did not hold, however, due to infighting among clan leaders for the 
presidency of the transitional government, Aidid’s distrust of the UN’s role in the Somali 
political process (which he propagated throughout Somalia via radio broadcast), 
noncooperation in the disarmament process and continued banditry.  Somali militia 
belonging to General Aidid brutally attacked UN soldiers in June 1993, to which UN 
responded with a call for Aidid’s arrest and military action, forced disarmament, and 
repositioning UN civilian staff to Kenya. US Rangers and Quick Reaction Force 
launched an operation to capture key aides of General Aidid in support of the UN’s call, 
loosing two helicopters and the lives of eighteen soldiers in the process, and leading to 
the withdrawal of US forces from Somalia in1994.  By October 1994, Aidid declared a 
unilateral cessation of hostilities against UNOSOM II, but fighting continued between the 
two major clan leaders.  With attrition in troops from Member Countries for UNSOM II 
                                                
165 This agreement was endorsed as well by representatives of women’s and community organizations, 
elders, and scholars.  United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom2backgr2.html,	  Retrieved	  July	  2015.	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following the US withdrawal from Somalia, and “in view of the limited possibilities for 
UN political efforts related to Somalia”, the UN declared UNSOM II over in March 1995 
(Rutherford, 2008).    
While the humanitarian goal of the UNOSOM and UNITAF missions are 
generally agreed to have been successful in providing much needed relief and saving 
lives, Lyons and Samatar (1995) argue that preventable mistakes led to violence 
escalation and set the stage for the collapse of support for these missions.  First, lack of 
engagement by the international community throughout 1991 left Somalia to 
nongovernmental organizations providing humanitarian assistance that was exploited as a 
resource commodity by belligerents with impunity.  Second, when the UN and US did 
intervene, the pursuit of tactical goals above all else - the safe passage of aid  - resulted in 
accommodation of militia leaders that gave them credibility they would not have 
otherwise had, ignored mass atrocities, and discouraged more peaceful elders from 
stepping forward. Third, the emphasis on disarmament was counterproductive without a 
political strategy, leaving individuals without alternative means to achieve security, and 
strengthening the hand of the militias (Lyons & Samatar, 1995).  Lyons and Samatar cite 
an assessment by the African Rights Organization166 that concluded,  “UNITAF had more 
success disarming merchants and the guard forces of private relief groups than it did 
reducing the threat from armed bandits or more organized militia groups who hid their 
weapons or moved them out of town (p. 42)”.  
                                                
166 The African Rights Organization is an international human rights organization that documents human 
rights violations and conflict and promotes dialogue.  The lead author of the assessment, Rakiya Omaa, was 
reportedly fired by Human Rights Watch from her position as executive director of the human rights group, 
Africa Watch, for publishing the assessment criticizing the US deployment. 
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The UN Secretary General had presented 3 options in a report November 1993 for 
the extension of the UNOSOM II mandate to provide security for humanitarian relief and 
space for the political reconciliation process: (1) increase troop levels to retain coercive 
mandate for disarmament and create a professional Somali police force; (2) maintain 
reduced troop levels and discharge the disarmament mandate through voluntary measures 
of cooperative Somali partners but maintain some defensive capacity; (3) maintain 
minimal troops and limit use of force to self-defense and security of the Mogadishu 
airport and ports and supply routes. The Security Council adopted Option (2) in May 
1994, due to lack of required material support from the international community for 
option 1. Recurrence of inter-clan fighting, banditry, and attacks against UN personnel 
ultimately brought humanitarian activities to a standstill. 
The dynamics of the interactions between actors in the Somalia conflict from 
1991-1995 are consistent with feedback structures in the overshoot and collapse model 
(Figure 18, Chapter 1), if aid and peacekeeping resources are treated as measures of state 
capacity in lieu of GDP or oil rents.  There are four major conflict reinforcing feedback 
loops in the causal loop model of these dynamics, compared to three major balancing 
loops, which contain delays (Figure 19).167 In the causal loop model of these interactions 
shown below belligerents (i.e., the Somali clan-based militia) obtain resources through 
aid diversion, which increases with decreased human security, creating a strong 
reinforcing loop (“Feeding the Beast”) that accelerates conflict growth rate more than 
exponentially, due to the amplifying reinforcing loops created by increased aid in as a 
response to decreased human security (“Security Entrepreneurs”), increase in number of 
                                                
167 In Figure 19, major conflict balancing feedback loops are labeled with a “B”, and major conflict 
reinforcing (amplifying) feedback loops are labeled with an “R”.  
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belligerents, and failed negotiation attempts. Exponential growth of conflict is balanced 
only by the consumption of resources (“Consuming the beast ” loop), and peacekeeping 
capacity through the delayed action of state reach on aid diversion (“Balancing 
belligerents” loop). The presence of strong reinforcing loops with no delays, balanced by 
resource-constrained loops containing delays, is characteristic of overshoot-and-collapse 
behavior.   
 
Figure 19 Overshoot and Collapse Structure of Somalia Conflict  
with Balancing and Reinforcing Loops by Peacekeeping 













































































































Not shown are exogenous factors168 that influence rate of troop deployment and 
withdrawal. The initial deployment of 3700 for humanitarian purposes was too low for 
UN peace keeping capacity to create a strong balancing loop until reinforced by the 
additional 37,000 UNITAF troops. The UN peacekeeping capacity was itself balanced 
(e.g., reduced) through troop withdrawals in a delayed recognition of the low likelihood 
of success of negotiation attempts to achieve political solutions. As noted by Lyons and 
Samatar (1995), appeasement strategies over-inflated militia leaders’ positions relative to 
the influence of traditional clan elders in these negotiation attempts, significantly 
reducing the likelihood of success for political solutions to conflict.  This influence was a 
key nonmaterial resource that could have led to higher likelihood of success of 
negotiation attempts, which in turn would have reinforced support for continued troop 
deployment for peacekeeping capacity.  The disillusionment with the missions was 
amplified by international concerns about direct involvement of peacekeeping forces in 
conflict and loss of troop lives.   
Causal pathways embedded in the model for the variables resources available, 
conflict events, conflict drivers, peacekeeping capacity, aid diversion, aid in, likelihood of 
success, and number of belligerents are illustrated in Figures 20-27.169 Reinforcing 
feedback on aid diversion, which results from negative human security, positive number 
of belligerents, resources needs, and conflict events, increases resources available 
(Figure 20-21). Feedback from state reach (which increases with peacekeeping capacity 
                                                
168 Examples include domestic politics in the US, where the first Bush administration was transitioning to 
the new Clinton administration. These politics and administrative shifts are attributed to playing a large 
factor in decisions regarding the initial US support to the mission in Somalia, and subsequent hasty 
withdrawal.   




to reduce aid diversion) and consumption of resources balance resources available. 
However, competing feedback loops on aid in, between human security needs and aid 
diversion create a tipping point that ultimately collapses resources available (Figure 21-
22).  
Figure 20 Causal Pathway for Belligerent Resources, Somalia 1992-1995 
 
 
Figure 21 Causal Pathways for Aid Diversion, Somalia 1992-1995 
 
 
Figure 22 Causal Pathways for Aid in Somalia 1992-1995 
 
 
Figure 23 Causal Pathway for Likelihood of Success in Somalia 1992-1995 
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Figure 24 Causal Pathways for Peacekeeping Capacity, Somalia 1992-1995 
 
 
Figure 25 Causal Pathways for Conflict Events, Somalia 1992-1995 
 
 
Figure 26 Causal Pathway for Conflict Drivers, Somalia 1992-1995 
 
 
Figure 27 Causal Pathways for Number of Belligerents, Somalia 1992-1995 
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priorities and strategies of the missions (Figure 23).170  Peacekeeping capacity is driven 
strongly by human security, conflict and aid diversion, with a delayed response to 
feedback from political solutions, which is influenced by both the number of belligerents 
and moderating groups (Figure 24). The delayed response of peacekeeping capacity to 
the low likelihood of success compared to the relatively rapid response to human security 
needs, creates disequilibrium conditions for leading to overshoot and collapse. An 
alternative outcome could be produced by strengthening the influence of moderating 
groups to increase likelihood of success of political solutions, which reduces number of 
belligerents as an amplifier for conflict drivers and aid diversion (Figure 27).  
These dynamics in the first phase of the Somalia conflict are consistent with the 
predicted risk factors determined from the regression analysis in the previous section for 
overshoot and collapse. Relatively high values are predicted for state capacity and state 
reach for the likelihood of overshoot and collapse, compared to oscillatory behavior 
(Table 10). Higher percentages of humanitarian aid to total aid, UN and regional troop 
mission months, and social fragmentation (correlated with number of belligerent groups) 
increase the likelihood of both overshoot and collapse and exponential behavior, with the 
stronger affect being on the likelihood of overshoot and collapse relative to oscillatory 
behavior.    
The proliferation of new fault lines within clans during this period clearly 
increased social fragmentation, as predicted.  Aid surged to 256% of GDP during the 
drought in 1992 (from 14% in 1991), 42% of GDP in 1993, and 12% of GDP in 1994.  
                                                
170 Six competitive factions populated the Somalia political landscape in early 1991, compared to over two 
dozen that had emerged by 1995 as a result of UN sponsorship for representation in Somalia peace talks 
based on factional leadership as criteria for participation(Menkhaus, 2004), p. 19. 
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Eighty percent of this was humanitarian aid in 1992; seventy percent in 1993; and 21% 
was humanitarian aid in 1994.171 Different bilateral donors (EU, Italy, Netherlands, 
Canada, US, Norway and Sweden) provided ninety-five percent of the aid, making 
coordinated oversight difficult. The combined number of UNOSOM and UNITAF forces 
at their maximum was 52,000, deployed across an estimated 250,000 km2 to yield 
approximately 210 troops/1000-km2. This is in the mid-range of the levels of state reach 
and capacity that are correlated with increased likelihood of overshoot and collapse in the 
regression analysis. The ratio of military expenditures to aid during this phase falls in the 
high range of the regression analysis (9.7),172 which is consistent with the predicted range 
for overshoot and collapse compared to oscillatory behavior, although this factor is not 
statistically significant for overshoot and collapse. There one inconsistency with the 
regression results  -- the predicted association of higher levels of gender equality, 
assumed to be a proxy for increased presence of moderating conflict management 
capabilities.  
Phase 2 of Somalia Conflict 1995-2006: Quasi-Equilibrium Oscillations 
 
In the next phase of the conflict, from 1995-2006, there were 12 failed 
reconciliation conferences leading up to the establishment of the clan-based, Ethiopian-
                                                
171 Source: AidData.org, http://aiddata.org/; UNHCR Reliefweb, http://reliefweb.int/, Retrieved March 
2015. 
172 The ratio of military expenditures to aid uses expenditures of UN authorized missions in lieu of state 
military expenditures. AidData.org reports that aid disbursed in Somalia between 1992-1994 to be $16 
million USD (compared to committed of $328).  There is a wide variance in reported expenditures for 
UNOSOM missions, ranging from $959million USD - $1650 million USD (The Military Balance 1996-
1997, 1996), (Somalia – UNOSOM II, Mission Backgrounder, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosom2b.htm. Retrieved March 16, 2016): reported 
expenditures for UNITAF range from $883 million USD to 2.2 billion USD (Peace Operations: Cost of 
DOD Operations in Somalia, GAO/NSIAD-94-88, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GAOREPORTS-
NSIAD-94-88/html/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-94-88.htm. Retrieved March 16, 2016), (The Military 
Balance 1996-1997, 1996) 
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backed Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004-2005, with financial support 
from the international community (e.g., UNDP, World Bank, and the European 
Commission). Members of the internally disputed TFG continued previous patterns of 
factional in fighting, and failed to engage on key issues. The Union of Islamic Courts 
(UIC), an umbrella group of Sharia courts in Mogadishu, formed as a rival power to the 
TFG for leadership in south and central Somalia, and to the US-backed Alliance for 
Restoration of Peace and Counter-terrorism for local control in Mogadishu (Barnes & 
Hassan, 2007; Dagne, 2007; Eriksson, 2013; Menkhaus, 2007).   
While the dominant Hawiye clans supported the UIC, the Council transcended 
sub-clan factions and the UIC militia formed in 2000 represented the first significant non-
warlord-controlled and pan-Hawiye military force with wide appeal that initially brought 
together moderate and extreme wings of political Islam, and provided a voice for the 
weaker clans.  The influence of the UIC grew to extend outside Mogadishu and included 
most of the lower Shabelle region of Somalia by 2004-2005 (Barnes & Hassan, 2007).  In 
June 2006, forces of the UIC took control of the capital, which became relatively 
peaceful during their six-month rule (Dagne, 2011).  
During this period, a number of regional and trans-regional authorities came into 
existence as well, forming a montage of decentralized local polities and informal social 
pacts, primarily along clan lines, that provided a minimal level of popularly supported 
governance, public order, and stability that was inversely related to status of efforts to 
rebuild a national government (Menkhaus, 2004).  Some of these adopted principles of 
co-existence and power sharing, as in Somaliland, while others engaged in hegemonic, 
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clan-based favoritism and oppression.173 Outside of Mogadishu, armed conflict was 
episodic and comparatively low, with many regions enjoying relative peace (Figure26).  
The primary violent conflicts that did exist were within clans at the local level (Dagne, 
2007).  Exceptions to this trend were outbreaks in 2002 and 2004 in the Bay and Hiiraan 
districts, triggered in part by political maneuvering in advance of the IGAD-sponsored 
peace negotiations in Djibouti. These conflicts were between relatively weak clans who 
favored federalism, and larger, predatory clans who preferred a strong central state 
(Menkhaus, 2004). Another surge in conflict occurred in 2005, as the TFG moved into 
Somalia.  
 
Figure 28 Somalia Conflict Event Frequencies by Administrative Districts 1997-2006 
 
The regional authorities that emerged served two different purposes for 
participants that determined the likelihood of conflict versus cooperative conflict 
management through power sharing and co-existence.  Some authorities were viewed by 
                                                
173 The strongest and most resilient of these regional polities have been Somaliland and Puntland. The 
northeast region of Somalia, comprised of Mudug, Nugal, and Bari, in the Northeast, was declared the 
semi-autonomous state of Puntland in 1998 (Figure 16).   The Sool and Sanaag regions remain contested 
with Somaliland to this day.  
Chapter 3 
 227 
participants as building blocks to seats of power in a central state, attracting political 
figures that engaged in power struggles with no real interest in the provision of local 
services.  In contrast, some political administrative units were formed at the local 
municipal level to provide day-to-day governance through Sharia courts made up of 
coalitions of clan elders, intellectuals, businessmen and Muslim clergy.  While these 
coalitions were fragile with powers that waxed and waned, many were successful in 
providing local rule-of-law and services through traditional, moderate elements viewed as 
legitimate by their communities.  The successful municipalities were supported by 
moderating civil society groups and local NGOs in partnership with the UN and INGOs 
committed to local capacity building (in contrast to state building), but were limited to 
local areas where power of warlords and their militia was weak (Bradbury, 2009; 
Menkhaus, Sheikh, Quinn, & Farah, 2010). Estimates of militia sizes in this period range 
from 20,000 to 32,000 (Military Balance Report 2007, 2007), spread across 




Figure 29 Geographical Distribution of Major Somali Clan Families174 
 
 
Total aid and relief aid during this time was comparatively low, with the majority 
being provided though bilateral donors, for a total of $1772 million USD over the 10-year 
period (Figures 27 - 30), in contrast to an estimated annual average of at least $500 
million USD in remittances during the same period.175 Reported security incidents against 
aid workers was also relatively low (59 attacks) compared to later periods, occurring 
most frequently on roads, and across all regions but slightly more in south central 
Somalia (Figure 30)176.  With the aid being less of a target than in the previous phase, and 
more local level accountability at the municipal levels, it is assumed that a higher 
                                                
174 Source: 
175 UNDP provides no official data for remittances to Somalia during this period.  Estimates are 
extrapolated from reports in news sources (allAfrica.com), NGOs (Rift valley Institute), and the Economist 
Intelligence Unit.  
176 Source: The Aid Worker Security Database, 1997-present, https://aidworkersecurity.org/about Retrieved 
June 2015.  
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percentage of aid reached intended recipients during this phase with less being captured 
or diverted to support conflict.  
 
 
Figure 30 UN Relief Aid in Somalia and IDPs 1999-2013177 
 
 
Figure 31 Total Aid to Somalia 1989-2010 
 
                                                
177 Sources: UNHCR ReliefWeb, http://reliefweb.int/; International Displacement Monitoring Center 





























Figure 32 Top Donors Accounting for 90% of Foreign Aid to Somalia, 1995-2005 178 
 
 
Figure 33 Reported Aid Security Incidents in Somalia, 1997-2015 
 
 
There were no national armed forces during this time period. Estimated combined 
size of the main militia forces (outside of Somaliland) are 20,000, distributed amongst six 
clan and sub-clan groups and coalitions (The Military Balance Report 2006, 2006).179  
The militias exerted local control over resources and projected local power as basis for 
participation in political negotiations as discussed above.  
 
                                                
178 Source: AidData.org. The top donors accounted for 90% of the $1772 million USD of total aid. 
179 The main six militias of this period are the Somalia Salvation Democratic Front, led by Abdullah Yusuf 
Ahmed of the Darod clan; the United Somali Congress, formerly led by Aidid of the Hawiye clan; the Ali 
Mahdi Faction, of the Abgal clan; the Somali National Front, led by General Hersi of the Darod clan; the 
Somali Democratic Movement led by the Hawiye clan; and the Somali Patriotic Movement, led by Ahmed 









































































The relative likelihood of oscillatory behavior predicted by the comparative 
regression analysis is correlated with lower levels of humanitarian aid to total 
development aid, military expenditures to aid, absence of peacekeeping troops or other 
foreign interventions, and lower state reach relative to overshoot and collapse. These 
conditions are consistent with those in Somalia from 1995-2006, relative to those from 
1992-1994 (and to subsequent phases after 2006). In the causal loop model of the 
dynamics for the period 1995-2006 (Figure 34), the “Balancing Belligerents” loop 
previously associated with peacekeeping capacity is removed, replaced by one that links 
human security needs and local level moderating groups to increased likelihood of 
success of negotiated attempts for political solutions.  
The structure in Figure 34 compares to the goal-gap structure of Figure 19, 
Chapter 1 for oscillatory behavior, where a strong balancing loop for conflict events is 
created by corrective actions to achieve the goal of human security, with the corrective 
action being that undertaken by moderating groups to increase likelihood of success of 
providing local level political solutions to local conflict drivers to reduce the perceived 
discrepancy between actual and desired human security. At the same time international 
negotiation attempts for national level political solutions continue to reinforce conflict 
through the variable, number of belligerents. The effects of the variable, aid in, operate 
through local level moderating groups, rather than carrying capacity,180 and are less 
susceptible to aid diversion towards resources for conflict.  This is reflected in the causal 
pathways for conflict drivers, number of belligerents and likelihood of success (Figures 
33-35).  
                                                
180 Carrying capacity refers to the maximum resources that the local environment is capable of producing 
for supporting conflict. 
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Causal pathway structures for conflict drivers and number of belligerents are 
similar in the overshoot and collapse, and the oscillatory causal loop models (Figures 26, 
27, 35, and 36).  However, the causal pathways for likelihood of success (Figures 23 and 
37) differ significantly as a result of the connection of aid and human security with 
moderating groups at the local level in the “Balancing Belligerents” loop in Figure 34. A 
state of oscillatory behavior in quasi-equilibrium is maintained through endogenous 
conflict regulating mechanisms as long as moderating groups at the local level, 
responding to reduced human security, are effective in damping conflict drivers through 
local level political solutions whenever the rate of conflict events causes unacceptably 





Figure 34 Oscillatory Structure of Somalia Conflict with Balancing Loops Created by Moderating 




























































































































Figure 36 Causal Pathway for Number of Belligerents in Somalia 1995-2006 
 
 
Figure 37 Causal Pathways for Likelihood of Success, Somalia 1995-2006 
 
Phase 3 in Somalia Conflict 2006-2009: Exponential Growth 
 
A third phase of the Somalia conflict began when the Ethiopia National Defense 
Forces (ENDF), with the support of the US, invaded Baidoa in July 2006 to prop up the 
TFG. The UIC responded with a military advance across southern and central Somalia, 
demanding ENDF withdrawal. Rather than withdraw, an estimated 10,000 ENDF troops, 
backed by the US, ousted the UIC from Mogadishu with little resistance and installed the 
TFG in its place in early 2007 (Dagne, 2011; The Military Balance Report 2008, 2008). 
In February 2007, the UN Security Council authorized the African Union Mission in 
Somali (AMISOM) to support a national reconciliation congress, and prepare the way for 
a possible UN peacekeeping mission. A coalition of former UIC loyalists, Al Shabaab, 
and various Somali militia, allegedly supported by Eritrea, immediately launched an 
insurgency campaign against the TFG and the ENDF.  Conflict surged across most of the 
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country, with the heaviest concentration in Mogadishu and surrounding districts (Figures 
18, 34). 
 
Figure 38 Violent Armed Conflicts in Somalia by District 2006-2009 
 
Over the next two years South Central Somalia was a proxy battlefield for 
multiple combatants with different agendas and diverse goals: (1) the Islamist insurgents 
Al Shabaab fought against the US-backed ENDF to regain regional control of South-
Central Somalia, (2) Eritrean-backed Somali militias took the opportunity to inflict losses 
on their chief rival, Ethiopia; (3) Somali warlords fought to regain regional power and 
control; and (4) US engaged in targeted attacks against suspected Al Qaeda members or 
affiliates(Dagne, 2011).  A majority of the conflicts took place within and around 
Mogadishu, frequently at the level of neighborhoods controlled by different factions.  By 
December 2008, insurgent forces controlled most of central and southern Somalia, with 




























the ENDF and TFG area of influence limited to Baidoa and a handful of districts in 
Mogadishu. AMISOM troops were relegated to the protection of a few strategic 
facilities.181  The ENDF withdrew in January 2009, after a power-sharing deal was 
brokered between the TFG and an alliance of Islamist splinter groups of the UIC, the 
Alliance for Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS).  The deal was not recognized by al 
Shabaab, who continued the insurgency against the TFG from strongholds Mogadishu, 
while controlling large swaths of land and allegedly receiving material support from 
Eritrea (Dagne, 2011; Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia pursuant to Security 
Council resolution 1872(2009), 2009).  
During this time, Somalia was described as the worst humanitarian crisis the 
world, as well as the most dangerous place in the world for providing humanitarian relief 
(Gettleman, 2009). Attacks against aid workers increased significantly, with systematic 
looting of aid workers’ compounds making it risky and difficult for humanitarian 
operators to fulfill their mandate (Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia pursuant 
to Security Council resolution 1872(2009), 2009). The lack of security and complex 
political economy focused on state-building constricted humanitarian space, as reduced 
international emphasis on protection of and access to civilians created mistrust and 
frustration among aid workers and between aid workers and recipients, exacerbated the 
co-option and diversion of aid into the wartime economy, and encouraged the use of aid 
for political purposes (Hammond & Vaugh-Lee, 2012).  In spite of these constraints, over 
                                                




$800 million USD in aid was disbursed between 2007-2008 (Dagne, 2011), with the US 
being the largest donor (Figure 35).182   
 
 
Figure 39 Top Aid Donors to Somalia 2006-2009 
 
In this environment, aid was not only an exploitable resource for belligerents, but 
perceived as a partial, biased weapon of external actors with political agendas. The UN 
Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea reported in 2010 that as much as half of aid 
was routinely diverted, some directly to support the military, and recommended the 
dismantlement of the corrupt aid delivery system (Bryden, Laloum, & Roofthoot, 2010; 
Gettleman & MacFarquhar, 2010). At the same time, the conflict triggered upsurge in 
illegal arms trafficking183 and other illicit activities. Conflict and chaos, desperate 
                                                
182 Approximately half of this aid was food, a particularly fungible resource susceptible to exploitation 
during conflict. A total of $2300 million USD was committed for the entire period 2006-2009.  
183 The demand for the illegal arms trade was created in part by the UN embargo on arms into Somalia. 
The original embargo was established in January 1992 with Security Council Resolution 733; amended in 
June 2001 Security Council Resolution 1356 to allow supply of nonlethal military equipment for use in 
humanitarian operations; clarified in July 2002 Security Council Resolution 1425 prohibiting financing of 
arms acquisitions or military training; partially lifted in December 2006 by Security Council Resolution 
1725 to train and supply a regional intervention force to protect the TFG; amended in February 2007 
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humanitarian need, poor donor administrations, corruption, lack of viable security forces 
or governance institutions, and illegal trade networks converged to create a war economy 
that continues to plague Somalia today (Webersik, 2006(Suri, 2016; "UN Security 
Council Resolution 2125," 2013; Victor, 2010)). In the midst of the chaos, and in spite of 
some internal friction, Al Shabaab forged the only semblance of coherent, cross-clan 
administrative functions able to provide services and some degree of stability for the 
populace, empowering clan elders in doing so (Barnes & Hassan, 2007; Somalia: Al-
Shabaab - It will be a long war, 2014).  
The causal loop model of these dynamics (Figure 40) reintroduces a stock of 
peacekeeping capacity contributing to state reach, present in the overshoot and collapse 
model (Figure 19), but absent from the oscillatory model (Figure 34), and contains six 
major reinforcing loops, each of which is comparable to the simple exponential growth 
model (Figure 15, Chapter 1), and two balancing loops.  There are 4 key structural 
differences between the causal loop model in Figure 40 and that of the overshoot and 
collapse model.  First, the carrying capacity constraint (which creates a balancing loop 
leading to overshoot and collapse) is replaced by three positive reinforcing loops 
(“Feeding the Beast) for conflict resources created by resources from illegal activities, 
remittances, and by direct diversion of aid, all of which increase as human security 
decreases.  Second, the self-reinforcing variables, belligerent legitimacy and control of 
territory, are added.  These amplify the reinforcing loops for conflict resources.  Third, 
                                                                                                                                            
Security Council Resolution 1844 to target entities that had violated the arms embargo or obstructed 
delivery of humanitarian assistance; amended in March 2013 Security Council Resolution 2093 to loosen 
restrictions related to supplies to the Somalia government while maintaining the embargo on arms supplies 
to non state actors. In December 2009 the UN imposed an arms embargo on Eritrea in response to reports 
that Eritrea had violated the arms embargo on Somalia. “UN arms embargo on Somalia,” Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute, 
http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/un_arms_embargoes/somalia. Retrieved March 1, 2016. 
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the polarity of the influence of moderate groups on likelihood of success of negotiation 
attempts for political solutions is reversed, caused by the intervening variable, belligerent 
legitimacy.  The causal mechanism for positive association between belligerent 
legitimacy and likelihood of success is assumed to be transference of the relationship that 
evolved between the UIC and local groups to Al Shabaab (by either coercion or co-
optation or both).184  Fourth, the balancing loop between peacekeeping capacity, state 
reach and aid diversion that appeared in the overshoot and collapse model is removed, 
and replaced by a causal linkage between ENDF and allies of TFG, state reach, and the 
number of belligerents.  This represents the significant shift in intervention policy 
priorities that moved away from creating space for external aid to increase human 
security, in favor of reducing the number of belligerents by force, ostensibly to create 
space for national level political solutions.  
The shift in policy priorities giving preference to use of external military 
interventions for support of political solutions could be argued as a necessary precursor 
to creating the space for human security – a lesson learned from the 1992-1994 
interventions.  The Ethiopian intervention, however, had the opposite affect, due to 
widespread mistrust of the “foreign invaders”. The direction of the loop created by the 
causal linkage between political solutions and number of belligerents depends on the 
intervening variable for intervention legitimacy.  Theoretically, as intervention legitimacy 
increases, number of belligerents should decrease. Increase or decrease in the number of 
belligerents is determined by the relationship between the balancing loop, “Balancing 
                                                
184 This assumption is based on the International Crisis Group report on the resiliency and legitimacy of Al 
Shabaab based on trans-clan relationships, provision of some social services and rule of law compared to 
profiteering warlords, and promoting a narrative against foreign invaders and political corruption of the 
elite(Somalia: Al-Shabaab - It will be a long war, 2014).  
Chapter 3 
 240 
Belligerents”, which operations through coercion (ENDF and allies, state reach), 
compared to the reinforcing loops, “Feeding the Beast”.  The loop, “Adding Fuel to the 
Fire” may be reinforcing or balancing, depending on the relative strength of mechanisms 
for cooperation or dissension, depending on the relationship between intervention 
legitimacy and belligerent legitimacy.  It is assumed that throughout this phase, however, 
intervention legitimacy remained consistently low, independent of evolving conditions, 





Figures 40 Exponential Growth Structure of Somalia Conflict with Reinforcing Loops by Aid 
Capture, Remittances, Illegal Activities and Increased Belligerent Legitimacy, 2006-2009 
 
Causal pathways for the key variables, number of belligerents, belligerent 
legitimacy, likelihood of success, and conflict drivers illustrate the complex and co-
evolutionary relationships (Figures 41 - 44). Number of belligerents depends directly on 
intervention legitimacy and indirectly on belligerent legitimacy through likelihood of 
success (Figures 41, 43). Exponential growth occurs when belligerent legitimacy is high 
relative to intervention legitimacy.  Alternatively, exponential decay or a quasi-







































































































































relative to belligerent legitimacy, depending on the delays in improving human security 
as conflict is reduced, and whether rates of input to resources available become lower 
than rate of resource consumption.   The relationship is particularly complex, as 
belligerent legitimacy, in turn co-evolves with the influence of intervention legitimacy on 
control of territory and co-opting moderating groups (Figure 42).  The moderating 
groups comprised of civil society entities that were successful at peacebuilding, 
providing public goods, and managing security risks prior to the Ethiopian intervention, 
found it difficult to operate independently after the intervention due to high levels of 
displacement, social polarization, and targeted assassinations (Menkhaus et al., 2010). 
 
Figure 41 Causal Pathways for Number of Belligerents in Exponential Growth Model  
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Figure 43 Causal Pathway for Likelihood of Success, Somalia 2006-2009 
 
 
Figure 44 Causal Pathway Conflict Drivers, Somalia 2006-2009 
 
The dynamics around legitimacy of all parties can be construed as representing 
the “hearts and minds” battle adopted for counterinsurgency strategies, but could just as 
well represent rational cost/benefit behaviors within various types of local economies that 
have come to depend on conflict and responses to conflict (e.g., “Security 
Entrepreneurs”), or cultural preferences for local level empowerment versus association 
with a national identity. The interests, values, and capabilities of moderating groups in 
local level contexts influence the balance between belligerent and intervention legitimacy 
in this model, which eventually determines the power of the “Balancing Belligerents” 
loop.  
The regression analysis results (Table 10) predict that underlying structures and 
causal mechanisms such as those in the model shown in Figure 40 leading to exponential 
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growth are more likely (compared to oscillatory behavior) with lower state reach and 
capacity, higher social fragmentation, higher percentage of humanitarian aid to total, and 
lower levels of military expenditures relative to aid and polity scores.  The conditions of 
higher social fragmentation and levels of humanitarian aid triggered by the Ethiopian 
intervention are consistent with the predicted likelihood of exponential growth in 2006-
2009, compared to oscillatory conflict behavior from 1995-2006.   
Predictions for lower state reach and capacity, and for lower military capacity 
(proxied by expenditures) relative to aid associated with exponential growth are harder to 
reconcile with conditions at the national level during this time.  However, the predictions 
are consistent if interpreted relative to belligerent capacity at the subnational level.  The 
backlash of support for the UIC and consolidation of Islamic extremist militias with clan 
militias triggered by the Ethiopian interventions was a widespread phenomenon across all 
of the lower and central Somalia that remained under their control, whereas the Ethiopian 
troops backing the TFG were concentrated primarily in Baidoa in the eastern regions and 
in particular neighborhoods of Mogadishu (Figure 45). From this micro-level perspective, 
the security capacity and reach was low within many regions experiencing high levels of 
conflict (e.g., Shabeellaha Hoose, Hiiraan, and Mogadishu in Figure 38).  
Military expenditures (for state security capacity) during from 2006-2009 are 
proxied by the EU contributions to AMISOM that provided resources for troop 
allowances, UN logistical support packages to AMISOM, and the annual average level of 
US military assistance to Ethiopia and Somalia.185  These combined to an annual average 
                                                
185 The UN logistical support package to AMISOM totaled $81 million USD 2007-2009 (United Nations 
Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, “Subject: AMISOM African Union 
Mission in Somalia”, http://www.un.org/ga/acabq/documents/all/666?order=title&sort=asc&language=en. 
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of $ 115 million USD - creating a surge compared to the previous decade, when there 
was essentially no security assistance provided by the West in Somalia.  Annual average 
aid from 2006-2009 surged as well – doubling from averages of the preceding ten years.   
The rate of increase in military expenditures in support of state is much greater than the 
rate of increase for aid.  However, it is not clear how much of the military expenditures 
were actually spent on the ground in Somalia, as opposed to Nairobi (where the UN 
logistical support offices were headquartered) or in troop contributing countries. The 
increase in military expenditures in support of state reach was also offset by two external 
sources of support - the alleged military support of Eritrea, and increased remittances 
from abroad, which are estimated to have be in the range of $1 billion USD or more 
(Somalia Human Development Report 2012: Empowering youth for peace and 
development, 2012).   These factors are assumed to reduce the effective ratio of annual 
state military expenditures to aid, consistent with predictions for the likelihood of 
exponential conflict growth.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
Retrieved March 16, 2016). The EU contributions during this period totaled $220 million USD (European 
Union Delegation to the United Nations – New York, “EU allocates 65.9 million euros to support 
peacekeeping in Somalia”, 28 March 2011 http://eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_10876_en.htm. 
Retrieved March 16, 2016). US military assistance to Ethiopia rose from $3.4 million USD in 2006 to  $13 
million USD in 2007, $17.5 million USD in 2008, $12.6 million USD in 2009, and dropped back $2.9 
million USD in 2010. US military assistance to Somalia was $7.5 million USD in 2007, $5.6 million USD 
in 2008, and $24 million USD in 2009. Together, these averaged $26 million USD annually.  Source: 





Figure 45 Territorial Control and Contested Areas Prior to Ethiopian Withdrawal from Somalia in 
2009. Ethiopian Troops Support TFG Contestation for Control.186 
 
Phase 4 in Somalia Conflict 2009-2013: Continued Exponential Growth 
 
With the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops at the end of 2009, a fourth phase of the 
Somali conflict began. The TFG, supported by the AMISOM, struggled to consolidate 
power and build capacity with a stabilization strategy focused on reconciliation and 
outreach, improving security, and engaging the international community on recovery and 
reconstruction efforts (Report of the Secretary General on the situation in Somalia, 
2010). Insecurity remained widespread with Al-Shabaab controlling most of south central 
Somalia and, until August 2011, parts of Mogadishu (Figures 46- 47).  Drought in 2011 
                                                
186 D.K. Thompson (2014) Map East Africa, “Maps of Territorial Control in Somalia 2007-2010”, 
http://mapeastafrica.com/2014/03/maps-territorial-control-somalia-2007-2010/ Retrieved March 21, 2016. 
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caused famine felt most severely in areas under Al Shabaab control,187 while piracy 
soared off the Puntland coast ("Bargain like a Somali - Pirate economics," 2012; Hesse, 
2010(Lehr, 2013)). 
 
Figure 46 Areas of Control in Mogadishu, March 2011188 
 
                                                
187 Oxfam International, “Famine in Somalia: Causes and Solutions”, July 2011 
https://www.oxfam.org/en/somalia/famine-somalia-causes-and-solutions. Retrieved March 21, 2016.  
188 Credit: Katherine Zimmerman, American Enterprise Institute, Critical Threats Project,  “Mogadishu 
Map: Areas of Control” http://www.criticalthreats.org/somalia/mogadishu-map-areas-control.  Retrieved 
March 16, 2016.  Used with permission.  
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Figure 47 Areas of Control, Somalia, 2012189 
 
The international community’s security presence in Somalia increased 
incrementally with expanded capacities190 and mandate for AMISOM from a primarily 
peacekeeping mission to a peace enforcement mission (Williams, 2013), with continued 
financial and material support from the UN, EU and the US,191 alongside efforts to train 
and equip an integrated Somalia National Army (SNA). AMISOM efforts were initially 
focused on securing Mogadishu, which succeeded in August 2011 when Al Shabaab 
withdrew from the capital. The TFG had limited success in local outreach, when its 
military capabilities were temporarily augmented by an agreement executed with the 
                                                
189 Source: BBC News, “Somalia’s al-Shabaab attack Ethiopian base in Beledweyne,” January 24, 2012, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-16697879. Retrieved January 2014.  
190 AMISOM troops increased to 7,000 in 2010, 9,000 in 2011,12,000 in 2012, and 17,730 in 2013.  Kenya, 
who also carried out a unilateral intervention from October 2011-June 2012 with 2400 troops on the border, 
formally joined its troops with AMISOM in 2011, with operational jurisdiction along the Kenyan border 
and southern Somalia, including the port of Kismayo. 
191 The US has provided material support to AMISOM since its inception through more than 16 training 
courses through the ACOTA training program at the International Peace Support Training Center in 
Nairobi, and additional training courses in Burundi and Uganda; as well as conducting counter-terrorism 
efforts. Sgt. Nathan Maysonet, Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa, “ACOTA Force HQ course 
prepares personnel for AMISOM operations”, August 29, 2015, 
http://www.hoa.africom.mil/story/17034/acota-force-hq-course-prepares-personnel-for-amisom-operations, 
Retrieved March 16, 2016; and Angela Dickey, USIP, “Training Peacekeepers in Burundi”, November 15, 
2013, http://www.usip.org/publications/training-peacekeepers-in-burundi. Retrieved March 2014.  
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moderate Islamic paramilitary group, Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a, in early 2010 to bring 
capabilities under a single command and to form an advisory council of religions leaders 
to counter Al-Shabaab’s radical doctrine. However, this agreement collapsed in less than 
a year (Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia, 2010).   
By mid-2013, AMISOM and the SNA had cleared an area connecting Mogadishu 
to Baidoa in a second phase of operations (Figure 49). While considered a strategic 
success, the expanded operations into the rural areas were criticized for not providing 
sufficient policing and governance capacities for meeting needs for civilian security, 
humanitarian relief delivery, or other stabilization requirements, leaving citizens more 
vulnerable in a highly volatile and dangerous situation (Buston & Smith, 2013; 
Hammond & Vaugh-Lee, 2012; Suri, 2016).  Civilian resiliency and human security 
suffered as humanitarian space was reduced.  Recognizing these needs, the AMISOM 
civilian component moved from Nairobi to Mogadishu in 2011, but remained under 
resourced.192 In some cases, AMISOM troops would voluntarily share resources to 
provide humanitarian assistance to needy civilian populations within its area of 
operations by, including those of the Mission’s field hospitals designed to cater to troops 
to local communities (Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in 
Somalia, 2010).  Foreign fighters and weapons continued flowing in from external 
sources, while Al-Shabaab expanded its attacks into troop contributing countries, with 
terrorist bombings in Kampala in 2010 and the Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi in 
                                                
192 The Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union oversees efforts of political, 
humanitarian, gender, civil affairs, security and safety, and public information and administration units of 
the AMISOM civilian component, responsible for coordinating military and police, disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration in the security sector reform process, and coordinating with donors and 
other international actors to deliver humanitarian aid.  AMISOM, “Civilian Component”, http://amisom-
au.org/mission-profile/amisom-civilian-component/. Retrieved March 21, 2016.  
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2013(Malet, Priest, & Staggs, 2013; Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and 
Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2111(2013), 2014).  
 
Figure 48 Area of AMISOM Control, Somalia, 2013193 
 
 
The UN Assistance Mission to Somalia (UNSOM) was established June 2013 to 
meet stabilization needs, with a mandate that included 
“(a) To provide United Nations “good offices” functions, supporting the 
Federal Government of Somalia’s peace and reconciliation process; 
(b) To support the Federal Government of Somalia, and AMISOM as appropriate, 
by providing strategic policy advice on peacebuilding and state building,  
 (c) To assist the Federal Government of Somalia in coordinating international 
donor support, in particular on security sector assistance and maritime security… 
(d) To help build the capacity of the Federal Government of Somalia to: 
(i) promote respect for human rights and women’s empowerment…”194    
 
However, the capacity for military-civilian coordination within UNSOM, AMISOM, the 
SNA, and the TFG remained low for most of this time with no effective police capacity 
outside of Mogadishu to follow in the wake of the expeditionary AMISOM forces 
(Pelton, Nuxurkey, & Osman, 2012; Roitsch, 2014(Suri, 2016)). 
                                                
193 Political Geography updates on the changing world map, War in Somalia: Map of Al Shabaab Control 
(June 2013), May 2013. http://www.polgeonow.com/2013/05/somalia-war-map-al-shabaab-2013.html 
Retrieved January 2014.  
194 ("UNSC Resolution 2102 (2013)," 2013) 
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The causal loop model of this fourth phase differs from that of the previous phase 
(i.e., during the Ethiopian intervention) by five structural changes and three exogenous 
input variables that reflect the policy shifts and evolving conditions described above.  
Three of the structural changes introduce causal mechanisms between human security 
and existing variables.   While the changes introduce more balancing loops, the structure 
continues to support - and potentially accelerate - exponential growth due to delays in 
causal mechanisms through which they act (e.g., of human security on intervention 
legitimacy and moderating groups, state reach on aid diversion, political solutions on 
conflict drivers, and security capacity on belligerent control of territory) and the 
incremental rate of supplying security capacity stock (Figure 49).  
The first change in exogenous factors is the replacement of ENDF troops with 
AMISOM and TFG security capacity as the feedstock for state reach in the balancing 
loop, “Balancing Belligerents”.  A second change influencing the stock of resources for 
conflict is the introduction of foreign fighters, whose presence increased with intensified 
US counterterrorism efforts in the region and the affiliation between Al-Shabaab and Al 
Qaeda (Bryden, 2015; Marchal, 2009; Menkhaus, 2009a; Roland, 2007; U.S. Military 
Operations in Libya and Somalia, 2013).  The third exogenous factor is the shock to 
human security created by natural disaster (i.e., the drought in 2011) that stimulated a 
huge increase in external aid.  
The first structural change directly influences resources available for conflict with 
the introduction of a causal link between AMISOM and TFG security capacity as a 
balance on belligerent control of territory, creating the balancing loop “Turning the Tide” 
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in place of the previous reinforcing loop.  The causal pathways for resources available 
for conflict and belligerent control of territory are shown in Figures 50-51.  
The link between security capacity and belligerent control of territory reflects the 
expanded AMISOM mandate from a peacekeeping force to a peace enforcement mission 
in the wake of the Uganda attacks, to “take all necessary measures, as appropriate, … to 
reduce the threat posed by Al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups,” and “assist in 
consolidating and expanding the control of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) 
over its national territory.”195  The strength of this balancing loop relative to the two 
reinforcing loops, “Feeding the Beast” depends on the rate and amount of increased 
security capacity, and intervention legitimacy.   
 
 
                                                
195 (Security Council Extends Mandate of African Union Mission in Somalia until 31 October 2012, 
Adopting Resolution 2010(2011), 2011).  The original mandate of AMISOM was limited to the protection 
of the TFG institutions and infrastructures to enable them to carry out their functions, and to disarmament 




Figure 49 Exponential Growth Structure of Somalia Conflict with Reinforcing Loops by Aid 
Capture, Remittances, Illegal Activities; and Weak Balancing Loops by Peacekeeping Forces, 
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Figure 51 Causal Pathway for Belligerent Control of Territory 
 
 
A second structural change, also influencing resources available for conflict, is the 
restoration of the causal link between state reach and aid diversion factor through the 
variable AMISOM and TFG security capacity (Figures 49, 50). This link is present in the 
overshoot and collapse model in Figure 19, but absent in the oscillatory and Ethiopian 
exponential growth models (Figures 34 and 40) and reflects the inclusion of support for 
humanitarian assistance in the AMISOM mandate.196   
A third structural change is the introduction of humanitarian access, dependent on 
belligerent control of territory, as an intervening causal mechanism for the stock of 
human security in the “Feeding the Beast” loops (Figures 49, 52).   
 
Figure 52 Causal Pathway for Human Security, Somalia 2009-2013 
 
Two final structural changes introduce a causal mechanism between human security and 
intervention legitimacy (Figures 49, 53), and between human security and moderating 
                                                
196 AMISOM, “Mandate 2006-2007”, http://amisom-au.org/mandate-2006-2007/. Retrieved March 21, 
2016. 
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groups. The former reflects the co-evolutionary dependency between security capacity, 
intervention legitimacy and resources available for conflict that create a potential tipping 
point between “Balancing Belligerents” and “Feeding the Beast” loops; the latter creates 
a tipping point between “Taming the Beast” and “Feeding the Beast” loops via the chain 
of causal mechanisms relating human security to moderating groups, belligerent 
legitimacy and likelihood of success for political solution, and to number of belligerents 
(Figures 49, 54, 55).  
     The co-evolution of human security and intervention legitimacy create a 
security dilemma for local level moderating groups, who are suspicious of the AMISOM 
troops197 and any disarmament process led by the international community, and who face 
difficult choices between alliances most likely to ensure present and future security for 
their communities(Bryden & Brickhill, 2010). Both causal mechanisms involving human 




Figure 53 Causal Pathway for Intervention Legitimacy, Somalia 2009-2013 
 
                                                
197 The suspicions of AMISOM troops are in part to the substantial numbers of military personnel from 
neighboring nations which Somalis have historical grievances, and are exacerbated by large disparities in 
monthly salaries between AMISOM troops and members of the SNA and allegations of human rights 









Figure 54 Causal Pathways Likelihood of Success, Somalia 2009-2013 
 
 
Figure 55 Causal Pathway for Number of Belligerents, Somalia 2009-2103 
 
The influence of human security in these dynamics is greater than in the two 
previous conflict phases, co-evolving with conflict drivers through four different 
mechanisms involving resources available: aid in, aid diversion, remittances, and illegal 
activities (Figures 56 – 57). This complexity creates tension in policies to increase human 
security and resiliency: increasing aid makes bigger targets for aid diversion whereas 
decreasing aid encourages remittances and illegal activities that may fund further 
conflict; increased reliance on peacekeepers for humanitarian access in conflict zones 
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violates some humanitarian organizations’ principles of neutrality whereas strict 
neutrality may increase resources for conflict and expose aid workers and recipients.  
Indeed, reported violent, life-threatening attacks on aid workers remained high during 
this period, averaging 20 per year.198   However, human security as a result of violent 
conflict improved significantly from previous periods, with the percent of conflict 
fatalities that were civilian being 17% from 2010-2013, compared to 90% from 2006-
2009, and 33% from 1997 - 2005.199 
 
Figure 56 Causal Pathway for Conflict Drivers, Somalia 2009-2013 
 
 




                                                
198 The Aid Worker Security Database, USAID, https://aidworkersecurity.org/. Retrieved March 16, 2016.  
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On the other hand, human security condition due to natural disasters in Somalia 
worsened for most of 2009-2013, although it began to show signs of improvement in late 
2012. Food insecurity across much of Somalia was assessed as highly or extremely 
insecure, emergency, or in catastrophic famine situations for most of that period, as a 
result of the previous high rates of conflict targeting civilians.200 After the departure of 
the ENDF in 2009, aid to Somalia fell to $350 million USD in 2010, 2/3 of which was 
humanitarian aid. This soared to $1200 million USD in response to the drought in 2011 
and 2012.  Emergency humanitarian relief accounted for 2/3 of aid in 2011, but only 1/3 
in 2012.  Foreign aid to Somalia in 2013 was $900 million USD, of which 1/3 was 
humanitarian aid. The situation began to improve in late 2012 and 2013, as the 
percentage of population in acute crisis fell from 53% of the population in 2011 to 28% at 
the end of 2012 and less than 10% in 2013. The improved situation was attributed to 
sustained humanitarian interventions following good harvest years.201   
As in the previous period during the Ethiopian intervention, human insecurity and 
low state reach are consistent the likelihood of exponential growth predicted by the 
regression analysis at the macro level (Table 10).  Prior to 2012, AMISOM troop 
numbers were low with 7,000 in 2010 and 9,000 in 2011, and were confined to 
peacekeeping activities in Mogadishu. With an expanded peace enforcement mandate, 
these increased to 12,000 in 2012, and 17,730 in 2013, but remained stationed primarily 
                                                
200 Famine Early Warning Systems Network, “Somalia food security outlook through September 2010” 
http://www.fews.net/sites/default/files/documents/reports/Somalia%20Outlook%2004%202010%20Final.p
df; “Somalia Food Security Outlook October 2011-March 2012” http://www.fews.net/east-
africa/somalia/food-security-outlook/october-2011. Retrieved February 2016.  
201 Famine Early Warning Systems Network, “Somalia: 28 percent of the population is food insecure”, 
http://www.fews.net/east-africa/somalia/special-report/october-2012; “Somalia: Despite improvements, 
870,000 likely in Crisis and Emergency”, http://www.fews.net/east-africa/somalia/food-security-outlook-
update/august-2013.  Retrieved February 2016.  
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in areas surrounding the major urban centers of Mogadishu or Baidoa202.  With security 
assistance from Turkey other Western partners,203 the TFG began the job of 
reconstituting an integrated Somali National Army (SNA) composed of officers from 
various Hawiye and Darod sub-clans in 2011, with and estimated 12,000 trained forces 
deployed in and around Mogadishu in 2012.204 However, the SNA forces are ill equipped, 
remain dependent on clan militias for armament and equipment, and lack any centralized 
barracks for communal living as a professional organization.205  Loyalty within these 
forces was fragile and vulnerable to political negotiating between the TFG and the militia 
leaders(Menkhaus, 2009b). These combined SNA and AMISOM troop sizes compare to 
an estimated 20,000 militia forces remaining distributed across south and central 
Somalia, and an estimated 7000-9000 Al Shabaab forces (Somalia: Al-Shabaab - It will 
be a long war, 2014).206   
Military expenditures to support these forces, proxied as before through UN, EU, 
and US security assistance, rose to  $543 million USD in 2009, $359 million USD in 
2010, $332 million USD in 2011, $558 million USD in 2012, and $766 million USD in 
                                                
202 AMISOM, “First AMISOM troops deployed outside Mogadishu”, http://amisom-au.org/2012/04/first-
amisom-troops-deployed-outside-mogadishu/; “AMISOM beefs up Baidoa town Security with foot patrols” 
http://amisom-au.org/2013/10/amisom-beefs-up-baidoa-town-security-with-foot-patrols/; Retrieved March 
21, 2016 
203 As of 2015, UNSOM coordinates international security sector assistance for the SNA. “Report S 
/2015/331of the Secretary - General on Somalia”. United Nations Security Council. 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=s/2015/331. Retrieved 18 May2015. 
204  “Report S/2013/440 of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council 
resolution 2060 (2012): Eritrea” UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea. 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2013_440.pdf. Retrieved 26 June 2014. 
205 IRIN News, “Shortages, clan rivalries weaken Somalia’s new army”, 28 May 2014, Baidoa, 
http://www.irinnews.org/report/100141/shortages-clan-rivalries-weaken-somalias-new-army. Retrieved 
March 21, 2016.  
206 The United Nations estimates are lower at 5000 in 2013. (United Nations Security Council. “Letter 
dated 12 July 2013 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) 




2013.207  The ratios of military expenditures to aid during this period were 1.03 in 2010, 
0.3 in 2011, 0.47 in 2012, and 0.85 in 2013.   These values fall within the median range 
of observations for the macro level regression analysis, suggesting that overshoot and 
collapse or damped impulse (both of which are correlated to higher expenditures) are less 
likely, whereas oscillatory or exponential growth are about equally likely.  However, as 
previously argued, it is likely that a significant portion of these expenditures occurred 
outside of Somalia, going to the troop contributing countries or to support operational 
headquarters in Nairobi, making the actual ratios lower, and exponential growth a more 
statistically likely outcome.  
Governance improved with the establishment of the Federal Government of 
Somalia (FSG) in August 2012, following the end of the interim mandate of the TFG, 
was followed by a pledge of additional $300 million in donor support.  However, like the 
TFG, the FSG was relegated to Mogadishu, and challenged by exclusionary politics, the 
inheritance of the political economy based on war profiteering, the highest ranking for 
corruption in the world, and over-reliance on military rather than political solutions to 
defeat Al Shabaab (Bryden, 2013).  The low level of governance is consistent with the 
predictors for exponential conflict in Table 10.  
                                                
207 UN logistical support in was $224 million USD in 2009-2010, $182 million USD in 2010-2011, $287 
million USD in 2011-2012, and $440 million USD in 2013-2014 (United Nations Advisory Committee on 
Administrative and Budgetary Questions, “Subject: AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia”, 
http://www.un.org/ga/acabq/documents/all/666?order=title&sort=asc&language=en. Retrieved March 16, 
2016). EU support averaged 65 million euros per year 2009-2012, and increased to 124 million euros in 
2013 (European Commission Press Release Database, “The European Union announces more than 124 
million euros to increase security in Somalia” 9September 2013, Brussels, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-13-816_en.htm. Retrieved March 16, 2016). US military assistance was $246 million USD in 
2009, $104 million USD in 2010, $77 million USD in 2011, $198 million USD in 2012, and $192 million 
USD in 2013.  
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Phase V of Somalia Conflict 2014-: Transformation or More of the Same? 
 
The most recent phase of the Somalia conflict began in 2014, as the AMISOM 
expanded mission made headway in regaining control of territory outside of Mogadishu, 
and increased diplomatic efforts and international development aid structures introduced 
through the Somalia Compact between the FSG for international assistance in peace and 
state building created new space for civil society actors in political dialogue, and 
increased support for domestic security mechanisms.  While Al Shabaab still controls 
large areas in south and central Somalia, the government or pro-government entities 
control considerably more territory than in previous years (Figure 58).  AMISOM troop 
forces have reached a maximum authorized deployment of 22,000 stationed across five 
sectors: Lower and Middle Jubba along the Kenya border, which includes the port of 
Kismayo (Kenya command), Baidoa in Bay and Bakool along the Ethiopian border 
(Ethiopian command), Banaadir and Middle Shabelle along the Indian Ocean, including 
Mogadishu (Uganda command), the Hiiraan and Galguduud regions in central regions 
north of Mogadishu (Djibouti command) and Lower Shabelle along the Indian Ocean 




Figure 58 Territorial Control in Somalia September 2015208 
 
 
The AMISOM campaigns to regain these territories have been successful in 
reclaiming control of important port access and other business infrastructures.  However, 
they have also been criticized for lack of operational capacity to provide stabilization for 
human security in their wake, leaving populations vulnerable to raids and reprisals by Al 
Shabaab, who still controls most of the rural areas and wields considerable influence 
across clans (Ahmad, 2014; Bryden, 2015; Suri, 2016).  These criticisms have been met 
with increased emphasis on the civilian component of the AMISOM mandate for 
assisting the FSG with the protection of civilians and provision of humanitarian access.  
However, the AMISOM’s civilian protection capacities are extremely limited; provide 
only marginal opportunities for community engagement; rely on police, perceived as the 
most corrupt institution in Africa (Pring, 2015);209 and are met with suspicion as 
                                                
208 BBC News, “Who are Somalia’s al-Shabaab?” www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15336689. April 
2015, updated September 2015. Retrieved March 21, 2016.  
209 To make the situation worse for trust in the civilian protection capacity of AMISOM, the Global 
Corruption 2015 survey reports that citizens in three of the five countries contributing police to AMISOM 
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representatives of the FSG.  These suspicions are exacerbated when the troops are from a 
country perceived to have a biased agenda or clan alliances (e.g., Kenya),210 and/or poor 
record on human rights.  
The political process has become an attractor and amplifier for new divisions and 
power struggles between the interests of local, regional, and national actors as stakes are 
raised in anticipation of elections in late 2016 to form a new government.  The current 
political process is supported by significant investments from the international 
community through the Somalia New Deal Compact, 211 and has come under criticism for 
paying inadequate attention to conflict and fragility assessments or to addressing root 
causes of conflict.212  These concerns were echoed through field interviews, as discussed 
in the next section.  Many of the unaddressed root causes of conflict derive from multiple 
clan divisions at the local and regional level in areas where Al Shabaab still has a strong 
presence (Figure 58).    
                                                                                                                                            
(Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria), are the most negative about the scale of corruption in their country 
(Print, 2015).  
210 The civilian component of AMISOM currently draws on troops from Sierra Leone 47 police officers), 
Uganda (340 police officers), Ghana (56 officers), Kenya (21 officers), and Nigeria (140 officers).  Their 
rotation typically lasts no more than 12 months.  (AMISOM Civilian Component, http://amisom-
au.org/mission-profile/amisom-civilian-component/. Retrieved March 21, 2016. ) The majority of the 
police are stationed near infrastructures assets.  
211 The elections scheduled for August 2016 are the culmination of a process adopted by the FSG in 2012 to 
reach an agreement on a final constitution and transition to democracy by the end of its term of office in 
2016. The strategy, outlined in “Vision 2016: Framework for Action”, has three pillars – review and 
implementation of the provisional constitution, establishing a voluntary federal system of member states, 
and the establishment of a functional democracy. (Abdirashid Hashi, “Somalia’s Vision 2016: Reality 
Check and the Road Ahead”, The Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, May 2015, 
http://www.heritageinstitute.org/somalias-vision-2016-reality-check-and-the-road-ahead/. Retrieved March 
21, 2016.)  The international community developed the new deal framework as a mechanism to provide 
$1.8 billion in international assistance to support the four-year state-building process, recognizing that 
Somalia did not meet the IDA criteria for development aid.  A New Deal for Somalia, Brussels Conference 
16 September 2013, “The Somali Compact” http://somalia-newdeal-
conference.eu/files/sites/default/files/The%20Somali%20Compact.pdf. Retrieved March 21, 2015.  
212 Saferworld, “Getting the New Deal right in Somalia,”18 November 2014 
http://www.saferworld.org.uk/news-and-views/comment/152-getting-the-new-deal-right-in-somalia. 
Retrieved March 21, 2016.  These concerns echoed during  
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The structure of the causal loop model for conflict in this phase closely resembles 
the previous, but contains four major balancing loops compared to three in the previous.  
The addition of the Somalia New Deal Compact (representing both the Vision 2016 
political process and development initiatives of the Somali New Deal Compact, which go 
hand-in-hand), has multiple effects that amplify the previously existing balancing and 
reinforcing loops with the potential to significantly change the system behavior, while the 
addition of UNSOM and Stabilization efforts creates an new balancing loop, “Securing 
the Land” (Figure 59).  The addition of the Somalia NEW DEAL Compact strengthens the 
balancing loop, “Taming the Beast” through negotiation attempts, and creates a delayed 
balancing influence on aid diversion. At the same time, the additional aid committed as a 
result of the Somalia NEW DEAL compact potentially strengthens the reinforcing loop, 
“Adding Fuel to the Fire” as is the reinforcing loop,  “Feeding the Beast” loop (Figure 
60).    Additionally, the causal mechanism introduced between aid committed and conflict 
drivers, and between aid committed and likelihood of success, potentially amplifies the 
self-reinforcing loops for conflict through political solutions and negotiation attempts in 
the causal pathway for conflict drivers (Figures 61 and 62). The introduction of 
stabilization efforts to improve human security through policing and local level 
engagement with moderating groups (Figure 63), introducing the additional balancing 
loop, “Securing the Land”, influences key variables in other balancing loops (Figure 64). 
With no natural disasters in this period, humanitarian aid has remained at 30% of 
overall aid, which has been close to $1000 million USD annually.  This amount of non-
humanitarian aid relative to GDP (approximately 60%) is atypical for an active conflict 
setting, creating additional incentives for conflict over positions of power to control these 
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resources, and is a large target for diversion.  It is not clear how much of this aid is 
directed through the Somali Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF) 
established as a vehicle for international funds from the World Bank, UN Multi-Partner 
Trust Fund, African Development Bank and IMF to support the New Deal Compact, and 
whether this vehicle is likely to increase or decrease long term conflict potential.213   
 
Figure 59 Exponential Growth with Potential Overshoot Structure of Somalia Conflict with 
Reinforcing and Balancing Influence of Somalia New Deal Compact 
 
 
                                                
213 United Nations in Somalia, “A New Deal for Somalia”, 
http://www.undp.org/content/unct/somalia/en/home/what-we-do/new-deal-for-somalia.html. Retrieved 





























































































































































Figure 60 Forward influences of Somalia NEW DEAL Compact as a Causal Mechanism 
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Figure 63 Causal Pathway for Human Security, Somalia 2014 
 
 
Figure 64 Forward Influence of Human Security, Somalia 2014 
 
 
Estimated military expenditures rose in 2014, with the EU contribution to 
AMSIOM almost doubling to $250 million USD; the UN contributing $440 million; and 
the US military assistance to Somalia rising slightly to $202 million USD,214 for a 
combined total of $892 million USD.   The ratio of these proxies for military 
expenditures to aid in 2014 was 0.89, compared to 0.85 in 2013.   Effective military 
expenditures are likely higher, however being supplemented by increased partnership 
efforts between AMISOM, the SNA, and the US Combined Joint Task Force in the Horn 
of Africa (CJTF-HOA) on counter-terrorism, intelligence, and leadership training in 
                                                
214 US military assistance to Somalia subsequently increased to $320 million USD in 2015 and $745 
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civil–military affairs to counter the rising threat of the Islamic State in the Levant 
(ISIL).215  The additional security assistance was caveated by US Congressional concerns 
that  
“The open-ended AMISOM mission without a clearly articulated transition 
strategy could crystallize the current status quo that while presenting progress 
from past conditions, is not an acceptable end-state.  Accepting the status quo as 
an end state would mean a long-term dependence by the Somali Federal 
Government (SFG) on AMISOM to fulfill its security needs; a SFG that is unable 
or unmotivated to extend its reach beyond Mogadishu; an overwhelming 
dependence by the SFG on foreign assistance; the strengthening or 
institutionalization of clan-based militias outside of Mogadishu; and lack of 
progress toward necessary constitutional and government reform…”(Carl Levin 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, 2014b) p. 201 
 
The combined affects of increased security capacity, delayed responses from 
previous improvements to human security, and international resources and pressure for 
increased negotiation attempts strengthen balancing loops that explain reduced conflict 
and apparent change in system behavior away from exponential growth in 2014 and 2015 
(Figure 18).   The increased state reach and security capacity since 2014 relative to the 
previous periods, greater inclusiveness through moderating groups, improved human 
security, and involvement of UN are correlated with higher likelihood of overshoot and 
collapse behavior from the regression analysis in Table 10.216  However, as evidenced by 
the US Congressional concerns, many of the causal mechanisms are embedded within 
balancing loops with delays (e.g., “Turning the Tide”) that could produce tipping points 
in the future to reverse the downward trend or steer the system towards oscillatory 
                                                
215 “Security and Governance in Somalia: Consolidating gains, confronting challenges, and charting the 
path forward,” Hearing before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations 
United States Senate, 113th Congress, October 8, 2013. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-
113shrg86352/pdf/CHRG-113shrg86352.pdf, Retrieved May 2015; CJTF-HOA Combined Joint Task 
Force Horn of Africa, “Stories of 2014”, http://www.hoa.africom.mil/stories/2014, Retrieved March 16, 
2016. 
216 Recall that human security related to aid effectiveness is proxied by the inverse of infant mortality in the 
regression analysis; inclusiveness is proxied by higher gender equality.  
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behavior, which would sustain persistent conflict.   The elections in late 2016 may 
reinforce the current path towards reconciliation and collapse of violent armed conflict if 
the process is broadly perceived as legitimate and there are sufficient security and 
stabilization mechanisms in place to deter spoilers, but are otherwise likely to induce a 
transition to sustained oscillations or renewal of exponential growth. 
Insights from Conflict Dynamic Models  
 
The case study of Somalia conflict dynamics since 1989 provides three important 
insights.  First, while Somalia manifests an overall pattern of exponential growth over its 
25-year history, the four different types of reference behaviors that distinguish conflicts 
from each other at the macro level are also present at the mesa-level during distinct 
phases within this single conflict.  These outcomes correspond to different levels of aid, 
security capacity, conflict-supporting and peacebuilding resources that emerge as a result 
of interactions and feed back between exogenous and endogenous factors at different 
levels to affect human security.  Second, with one exception, the relative values for aid, 
state reach and capacity (proxied through peacekeeping operations and external military 
interventions), military expenditures (proxied through external military assistance), and 
governance factors (proxied as the influence of moderating groups on likelihood of 
success of political solutions) during each of these phases are consistent with predicted 
macro-level values of these variables for the different outcomes.  Third, each of these 
variables operate through causal mechanisms involved in both reinforcing and balancing 
loops for conflict that co-evolve with endogenous micro-level factors through complex 
causal pathways that can determine whether a structural condition becomes reinforcing or 
balancing. Examples include the complex relationships between likelihood of success of 
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negotiated attempts for political solutions, and belligerent legitimacy, numbers of 
belligerents, peacekeeping capacity, intervention legitimacy, aid, resources for conflict, 
and human security.  
One apparent exception to consistency between the macro-level regression results 
and the mesa-level Somalia case study is regarding the predicted correlation between 
increased likelihood of overshoot and collapse behavior with higher levels of endogenous 
conflict management mechanisms proxied through gender equality in the regression 
analysis. The period during which cooperative conflict management mechanisms appear 
highest in Somalia (1995-2006) is associated with oscillatory conflict behavior, rather 
than overshoot and collapse.  However, the mechanisms for cooperative behavior during 
this period involved Islamic institutions that excluded women’s participation, and 
involved use of force, co-optation, and intimidation rather than conflict resolution.  
Evidence from situations in which women are allocated roles in alternative approaches 
for responding to conflict in Somalia supports the conclusions of the regression analysis. 
For example, in case studies of negotiations among community-based peace processes 
during this period, women’s pressure groups are credited as a contributing factor 
whenever there was success (Bradbury, 2009; I. A. A. Oker & Habibullah, 2008).217 This 
evidence, together with the regression analysis, suggests the counterfactual that 
                                                
217 The assumption that gender equality is positively correlated with cooperative conflict management in 
Somalia is reinforced by additional evidence from studies of the impact of the Somali conflict on women 
and their response.  These have found that while women have taken on increased roles of responsibility at 
the household level as a result of conflict and are the most likely to affect sustainable change as recipients 
of micro-level aid.  They have also mobilized successfully to affect peace-making in Somaliland and their 
political empowerment is regarded as essential to the political reconciliation efforts associated with the 
New Deal compact(Barakat et al., 2014; Bradbury, Menkhaus, & Marchal, 2001; Gardner & Bushra, 2004; 
Menkhaus, Sheikh, Quinn, & Farah, 2010; Security and Goverance in Somalia: Lindborg Testimony, 2013; 
Shortland, Christopoulou, & Makatsoris, 2013; Simmon, 2013; Somalia Human Development Report 2012: 
Empowering youth for peace and development, 2012; Somalia:  Current Conflicts and New Chances for 
State Building, 2008; UNOCHA, 2013).  
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participation of women in the moderating structures present during the oscillatory phase 
(e.g., 1995-2006) might have reduced conflict levels further.  
The complexity of mechanisms through which variables interact to reinforce or 
balance conflict result in a multitude of causal pathways that require additional methods 
of analysis for causal understanding of interaction mechanisms at the micro-level.  For 
example, the relatively simple causal loop model of relationships between the four 
“stock” variables (e.g., security capacity, aid, human security and conflict resources) in 
Figure 59 generates a total of 327 different causal pathways between endogenous and 
exogenous variables, involving as many as 17 co-evolving variables at a time.   
Understanding how these causal pathways evolve requires even more fine-grained 
analysis, incorporating geographic, as well as economic, political, and security 
approaches to conflict analysis.    
A key question for this study is whether the observed reference behaviors and 
their relationship to risk factors scale to lower levels. Conflict patterns at the first 
administrative level in Somalia suggest that they do, although with smaller data sets they 
contain more “noise”.  Conflict events in Galguduud (Figure 65) and Gedo (Figure 66) 
districts -- both relatively remote from resource bases and on the border with Ethiopia 
where balancing troop presence is strong -- exhibit Overshoot and Collapse behavior. In 
contrast, conflict events in Hiraan (Figure 67) and those of Banaadir (Figure 68), which 
contains Mogadishu, exhibit oscillatory behavior about an exponentially increasing mean.  
Both areas received the primary concentration of peacekeeping forces, aid, and diaspora 
income, and are at the economic epicenter of Somalia (both legitimate and illegitimate 
markets). Conflict patterns in Jubbada Hoose (Figure 69), which contains the port of 
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Kismayo, and Shabeellaha Dhexe (Figure 70), which contains smaller ports between 
Mogadishu and Kismayo, also exhibit primarily exponential growth.  Kenya 
peacekeeping troops, present in Jubbada Hoose, are suspected of pursuing their own 
entrepreneurial interests in the port of Kismayo, while peacekeeping troops have only 
recently reached the Shabeellaha Dhexe area, although humanitarian aid has reached 
there. Conflict dynamics closer to the political and security exhibit exponential growth, 
which may be explained by relatively easy access to resources and strong conflict drivers 
that reinforcing conflict that is balanced by delayed feedback from stronger presence of 
security forces and mediation efforts. Areas further from the political center with less 
access to resources exhibit overshoot and collapse or oscillatory behavior. There also 
appears to be a differentiation in patterns among different types of conflict events (Figure 
71).218  
Currently, longitudinal data on conflict risk factors at the administrative and 
village level does not exist at the micro-level to systematically test these hypothetical 
mechanisms through comparative regression analysis or comparative local level causal 
modeling. As more data at the micro-level becomes available in the future for conflict 
events, intervention factors, and socio-political-economic factors for the country, such 
comparative studies could be conducted.  
An alternative approach is to qualitatively assess whether these dynamic 
behaviors exist at the individual level, and if so, whether they are associated with similar 
causal mechanisms and risk factors as found at the higher scales.  Field research 
                                                
218 In Figures 65-71, CE1=battles with no transfer of territory; CE2=battle with change in control of 
territory; CE3=headquarters or base established; CE4=nonviolent transfer of territory; CE5=remote 
violence; CE6=violent protests; CE7=violence against citizens 
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conducted in Africa during the summer of 2014 confirm that the hypothesized causal 
mechanisms from the previous sections are valid, and provide important and interesting 
insights on how interventions and political solutions designed and implemented relatively 
independently at regional and national levels interact at local levels to affect conflict.  
 
    
Figure 65 Overshoot and Collapse: Galguduud        Figure 66 Overshoot and Collapse: Gedo 
 
 
Figure 67 Exp/Oscillations: Hiraan                Figure 68 Exp/Oscillations Banadadir  
 
       





   
Figure 71 Percentage of Violent Events within Administrative Levels Changes Over Time in 
Response to Different Local Responses to Political and Security Interventions 
 
Field Research and Results: Micro-level Perspectives on Interventions in the 
Somalia Conflict  
Field research with over 75 individuals and focus groups conducted in East Africa 
(Kenya, Ethiopia, Burundi, and Uganda) and European capitals (Geneva, Amsterdam) 
from July to September 2014 to develop micro-level perspectives of Somalia conflict 
dynamics and the effects of external interventions, with a primary focus on the ongoing 
conflict in South Central Somalia. Questions pertained to (1) the interview subjects’ 
understandings of local conflict dynamics, root causes, contributing factors, resources, 
and key stakeholders;  (2) the interview subjects’ understandings of their roles (if any) for 
intervening the conflict, goals and metrics for that intervention, challenges and barriers, 
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and local responses to those interventions; and (3) integrated impacts of aid and 
peacekeeping interventions on local level conflict dynamics in the short and long terms 
(Appendix C).  Sources included current and former government officials and 
representatives from US, Ethiopia, Somalia, and the EU; local and international NGO and 
donor agency specialists and staff; AMISOM peacekeeping officers and troops and 
authorizing organizations (e.g., AU, UN); US and EU military support personnel to 
AMISOM; local think tanks and policy research institutions in Ethiopia and Kenya; and 
individual members of the Somali refugee and diaspora communities.   Respondents 
expressed generally consistent views of conflict dynamics and portrayed several common 
crosscutting themes, but diverged in several important ways regarding root causes, policy 
priorities, and the likelihood of success of external interventions for promoting human 
security and sustainable conflict transformation.  
 
Conflict Dynamics 
Respondents general concur with the historic arc of Somalia conflict as presented in 
previous chapters and expressed consensus perceptions on key factors in the conflict 
dynamics.  These include (1) inter-clan squabbles over control of land, resources, and 
power as primary conflict drivers; (2) roles of regional actors pursuing their own self-
interests, and of aid design and delivery practices as conflict escalators; (3) inter-clan 
power asymmetries and vulnerability as producers of a security dilemma for IDPs, 
refugees and marginalized communities that Al Shabaab exploits (and that complicate 
disarmament and stabilization efforts); (4) tensions between peacemaking and state 
building initiatives for conflict management; and (5) the battle between Al Shabaab, 
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government institutions, traditional clans and external actors for legitimacy in conflict 
resolution.   
 
Local Level Conflict Dynamics, Peacebuilding, and State Building 
Conflict dynamics are much more complex with intertwined factors in the South 
Central regions of Somalia than in Somaliland or Puntland due to more diversity in clan 
groups, and with minority clans interspersed in pockets amidst majority clans (Figure 29). 
In the view of many local and INGO workers, the root causes of conflict at the local level 
are resource based, involving disputes between these clans over control of grazing lands 
and water, and are the primary reason that Al Shabaab has been able to remain 
entrenched in the region.  They believe that the international community is currently 
taking a great risk by focusing almost exclusively on state building and the political 
processes within the FGS and between the FSG and newly created member states to hold 
elections in August 2016 as the “long pole in the tent” for conflict resolution, largely 
ignoring peacebuilding initiatives to resolve these underlying root causes of conflict.219  
After more than two decades of conflict, they are concerned that negotiating power-
sharing arrangements between regional and central authorities without a clear path for 
how local voices from outside Mogadishu will be heard in the future to resolve root 
causes provides space for new “war lords” to emerge, and will undermine future 
reconciliation efforts necessary for sustainability and legitimacy of the new governing 
institutions.  
                                                
219 The current process for political solutions is represented in the “taming the beast” balancing feedback 
loop in Figure 49 of the previous section.  This loop is weakened when human security, which is degraded 
by the “feeding the beast” reinforcing loop as a result of conflict events that obtain from unresolved conflict 




Leaving root causes of local level conflicts unresolved has both immediate and long-
term consequences.  In the short term, there are only two readily available solutions for 
assuring control of resources – through militarization of society, or cooperation with Al 
Shabaab.  Several respondents described areas where every household has an AK-47 
worth more than $1000, even if they have no food.  In this setting, potential numbers of 
belligerents increase, as Al Shabaab may continue to derive legitimacy from among 
minority clans with grievances, and from minority groups and youth over perceptions of 
unaddressed injustice and corruption in traditional systems and the FSG, where elite 
actors are viewed with suspicion and distrust.   This is not good news for efforts to 
counter violent extremism.  
In the longer term, without resolution of land and resource ownership issues at the 
local level, communities are unable to build sustainable market structures necessary for 
self-reliance and resiliency necessary to withstand future shocks from natural disasters, 
resulting in decreased human security and increased risk of renewed conflict (Figure 49).  
They will remain dependent on government structures, and vulnerable to corruption and 
renewed conflict.  In addition, the state building process itself will institutionalize power 
relationships based on negotiated formulas of equitable representation in a new 
democratic system.  These will require newly formed polities to find processes by which 
to choose representatives, which will be particularly challenging if the underlying root 
causes of conflict within those polities have not been addressed.220 
                                                
220 The potential future conflict as a result of political solutions would follow the same structure as in 




On the other hand, others are concerned that efforts to resolve root causes at the local 
level now, prior to institutionalizing consensus power sharing and governance 
arrangements at the regional and national level, risks airing long-held grievances before 
there is a political will to resolve them,221 losing the current momentum to build that 
political will, and undermining the future credibility of any peacebuilding agreements 
that could be reached.  
 
Conflict Dynamics and Aid 
Most respondents concur that a critical test for the FSG to build credibility will be 
whether it demonstrates that it can be a constructive partner in aid projects through the 
mechanisms set up by the New Deal Compact, or it continues past practices of 
corruption, gatekeeping and massive exploitation of aid resources.222 There is across-the-
board consensus that while early interventions of the IC were successful in achieving 
humanitarian goals in the early phases of the Somalia conflict (e.g., 1992-1994), the 
practice of contracting with warlords, motivated by a sense of urgency for aid delivery, 
escalated conflict significantly and created repercussions still felt today.223 While 
UNOSOM maintained an apparent stance of neutrality by involving different militia 
leaders from the major clans, they made them gatekeepers and power brokers, 
undermining early opportunities for conflict resolution through traditional conflict 
                                                
221 This risk is represented in Figure 59 by the linkage between negotiation attempts and political solutions 
on number of belligerents.  If current negotiation attempts for political solutions fail as a result of trying to 
resolve root causes, numbers of belligerents could increase, and reverse the current downward trend in 
conflict events, potentially creating a tipping point to exponential growth.  
222 The dynamic relationship between aid diversion and the New Deal compact is represented in the 
“securing the land” balancing feedback loop in Figure 59. 
223 The practice of paying gatekeepers for to provide aid access is represented as the “security 
entrepreneurs” conflict reinforcing feedback loop in all the causal loop models of Figures 19, 34, 40, 49, 
and 59.  
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mechanisms in Somali society involving elders and informally understood arrangements 
between minority and majority clans.  
During the period of control by the ICU (1995-2006), Islamists are credited with 
allowing the UN and most humanitarian organizations access for aid distribution that was 
fair to the interests of minority clans. The ICU was relatively straightforward interlocutor 
for those organizations that were willing to work with them, using taxes to build and 
provide services to the communities as a whole, precluding inter-clan conflict over aid 
resources Without the intervention of the ICU, for example, if a minority clan received a 
food distribution, they would become a target for a majority clan.224 At the same time, 
Islamists created vulnerability and fragility by controlling the type of aid delivered, and 
from whom.  For example, the Islamists were known to allow other faith based 
organizations (including Christian) to deliver seeds and agricultural production into 
villages experiencing severe food insecurity and starvation, but not food drops from the 
World Food Program (WFP), ostensibly on the premise that receiving bags of rice and 
maize would make them weak dependents of the TFG and Western governments.  
However, few INGOs were active in South Central Somalia during this time. 
After the Ethiopian intervention in 2007 and the retreat of the ICU from Mogadishu, 
many more INGOs became involved in attempting aid delivery into Mogadishu, 
reinstituting the practice of using gatekeepers for security and access. The practice of 
creating and using gatekeepers to assure access for aid and development is flourishing 
today, although the key actors may no longer be the warlords of the major clan militias 
(although they can be), and sometimes appears in the guise of legitimacy.  Today there 
                                                
224 This corresponds to the “paying it safe” conflict balancing feedback loop in Figure 34.  
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are many gatekeepers - Al Shabaab, local Somali businessmen in Mogadishu, returning 
diaspora, and NGO and civil society organizations.  Most operate out of Mogadishu or 
Nairobi, and few of these organizations made excursions outside of these major urban 
areas until the past year. Many of these are perceived as not having legitimate concerns 
for the interests of local Somali people and only out for their own agendas.  
The most often cited offender on a large scale is the WFP,225 but the practice is 
ubiquitous from micro to macro scales. A veteran program manager at OXFAM 
described a cycle that he has observed to contribute to persistent conflict at the village 
level over decades in conflict settings including, but not restricted to, Somalia.  
Humanitarian aid workers going in to active conflict settings negotiate with local 
community leaders to provide physical security for aid delivery and distribution. The 
specifics of these contracts are often “off the books” and/or kept confidential to protect 
the identities of those providing services. The NGO field manager, however, requires that 
all parties to the conflict have equitable opportunity to participate in the pool of security 
providers organized by the local leaders to ensure that the delivery of aid does not 
exacerbate tensions.  All parties benefit in this “cooperative” security arrangement as 
long as it is perceived to be fair.   
Security incidents go down and food is delivered. Eventually, however, the 
international organization’s home office reduces the security budget as a result of 
decreased security incidents. The field manager bears the news to the local leader that 
funds have been cut and some people providing security may have to be let go. The result 
                                                
225 The practices of the WFP for placing large contracts with warlords and subsequent contributions to 
conflict were documented by the UN Monitoring Group for Somalia and Eritrea (Bryden, Laloum, & 
Roofthoot, 2010).   
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is either that local leaders (and community) instigate a few “security incidents” to create 
more of a demand for services, or that old tensions are rekindled in competition for the 
reduced resources, creating new security incidents.  The home office becomes alarmed; 
concerned that conflict will soon escalate, they bring field personnel home and put the aid 
program on hold until further notice. In most cases, they are back within a year or so, 
with new field personnel and program managers at the home office who start the cycle all 
over again.  In doing so, a local culture of entrepreneurship around the market for 
security drives predictable, episodic oscillations of low-level conflict. This cycle can last 
under the radar screen of the home office for decades, becoming an invisible local level 
driver in some persistent conflicts.  
 Most of the IGNOs and local NGOs, voiced concerns that these and other 
practices that fuel the “security entrepreneur” dynamic are quite widespread; with many 
feeling that in the current security environment there are no acceptable alternatives short 
of abandoning their humanitarian missions to those most in need. Some described 
managing the risk by developing trusted relationships in the communities they serve, 
relying on these relationships to screen out potential security providers that are 
“extremists”, and using only “moderates” who are not affiliated with Al Shabaab or local 
militias. However, this assumes that there is distinction between moderates and 
extremists, and that Al Shabaab and militia members can be differentiated clearly from 
other community members – two dichotomies that others described as patently false and 
reflects unfamiliarity with Somalia community dynamics, where “Al Shabaab and militia 
members may be terrorists by night and sons and daughters by day”. Some seek to 
minimize impact and mange risk by hiring local, trusted private security companies rather 
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than relying on community members or doing business with Al Shabaab.  However, these 
private security companies often negotiate “off the books” as described by OXFAM, 
while the hiring organization turns a blind eye to maintain plausible deniability. Some felt 
that AMISOM or the FSG would be a preferred option if there were mechanisms in place 
by which to call on them for help, but no such mechanisms currently exist.   
 The Life and Peace Institute (LPI) and the US AID described two alternative 
models that have met with success for aid, development and peace building projects. 
Both models rely on transparent, inclusive, grass roots, community-led processes that 
empower communities to own the success or failure of projects.  During the chaos in of 
2007, the LPI instigated the formation of a council of 100 political actors at the 
neighborhood level in Mogadishu that included traditional elders, AMISOM, and Al 
Shabaab, who agreed to minimize civilian casualties in the midst of bombardments, 
maximize accessibility to humanitarian relief, and try to maintain access to markets for 
humanitarian purposes.  Using a variation on traditional Somali conflict resolution 
mechanisms, and appealing to the desire that all three sides had for legitimacy, the 
council met with some success without LPI having to resort to bribes.  However, 
referring to the large external presence in Somalia today, the program manager that had 
overseen the LPI council in 2007 cautioned that currently, “the biggest problem in 
Somalia is the very rapidly changing context with different actors and alliances”.   Local 
actors now do “forum shopping” among NGOs and potential donors to find those most 
likely to be sympathetic to their grievances and needs.  Others describe the current battle 
for legitimacy in the eyes of local Somalis as being between Al Shabaab and the 
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international donor community, making the council model hard to replicate where Al 
Shabaab maintains control.  
 Since 2011, the USAID has developed a micro-level approach to this problem in 
south central Somalia through a grass-roots process supported by strong transparency 
measures. The US AID publically announces what financial resources will be made 
available to the community if they can come together (civil society, women’s groups, 
elders, etc.) and build consensus around what will be done, how it will be done, and who 
will manage it.  Networks of accountability are set up within existing local 
communications systems (e.g., radio stations and talk shows, meeting forum) and 
monitored by the community.  These projects, which range in size from $20,000 to 
$200,000 have been conducted successfully without resorting to bribes in areas free form 
the control of Al Shabaab.  As of fall 2014, access to more communities had been 
expanding as AMISOM gained more control of territory for the FSG, but had been 
inconsistent due to the status of some “liberated villages” as essentially garrison towns 
surrounded by territories still under the control of Al Shabaab. The lack of access to these 
villages by civilian development and humanitarian teams in the wake of peacekeeping 
operations was an oft-repeated concern and criticism.  
 Both of these models for designing and implementing aid programs rely on 
empowering local stakeholders beyond the security entrepreneurs, and address the issue 
of legitimacy and local level needs and interests, while being sensitive to the need for 
conflict management and security measures.226  The USAID goes the furthest with 
                                                
226 The potential for empowering local moderating groups to reduce conflict through its handling of aid is 
modeled through the link between aid commitment and likelihood of success and human security and 
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transparency, accountability and communication at the local level.  A third model used by 
SAFERWORLD in areas of limited access involves local communities in design and buy-
in but not project management. That model gives priority to projects with a strategic, 
long-term view, and applies a risk management framework drawing on lessons learned in 
Afghanistan227 in their design and approval.  The framework, which is being incorporated 
into project designs under the New Deal Compact, typically relies on outside 
management and engineering companies with proven records in conflict settings and 
strong monitoring processes for overseeing project implementation.   
A fourth model, used by donors in Turkey and the Arab world, involves building 
local and regional infrastructures that benefit Somali communities while at the same time 
fostering economic development opportunities with the donors (e.g., roads, ports, 
hospitals, schools, wells). While these provide immediate short-term benefits within 
communities, they create new gatekeepers with elite privileges and rarely incorporate 
mechanisms for monitoring how these future economic resources and opportunities are to 
be distributed, or conflict management over control of them. 
Many of the major actors in international aid community active in Somalia participate 
in the Somalia NGO consortium based in Nairobi, providing a regional mechanism to 
coordinate activities, share information, and work together on specific issues.228 The 
organization engages in collective advocacy with governments, UN agencies, donor 
                                                                                                                                            
moderating groups and belligerent legitimacy in the “taming the beast” balancing feedback loop in Figure 
59. 
227 The subject pointed out that two of the most important lessons learned from work in Afghanistan is the 
need for local monitoring mechanisms, and not to pay government salaries. Many projects in Afghanistan 
did not have monitoring mechanisms in place for up to 10 years.  
228 The consortium currently consists of 30 international organizations that include major players such as 
Adeso, CARE, Caritas, CEFA, IRC, MEDAIR, Mercy Corps, Save the Children, Solidarity International, 




groups; has developed a code of conduct and risk management; provides advise to local 
NGOs; and facilitates coordination between member organizations and with the NGO 
Safety Program that provides security management support to reduce risks to personnel 
and assets. In particular, the consortium provides a key link between security sector 
activities, such as AMISOM and the SNA.  While effective in serving these worthwhile 
functions, the organization seems to operate in a defensive atmosphere of mistrust and 
insecurity, resulting in lack of transparency and a reputation among some nonmembers 
for being more interested in ensuring that target burn rates can be met than coordination 
and cooperation. For example, access to the consortium database on resources, projects, 
and security concerns is limited only to members. Although the concerns are 
understandable, the lack of transparency, competition, and different cultures among 
donors, INGOs and NGOs was a recurrent theme that respondents say contribute to 
division and mistrust that exists between local communities, eternal actors, and the FSG, 
and that earn the collective INGOs the nickname “Nairobi warlords”.    
 
Conflict dynamics, peace operations, and aid 
Perceptions among respondents regarding AMISOM peace operations, conflict 
dynamics, and human security vary widely, ranging from enthusiastic support of an 
improved security environment, bravery of soldiers and their voluntary contributions to 
meeting humanitarian needs, to extreme distrust and disillusionment based on allegations 
of human rights abuses, self-interested agendas, corruption and collusion.  Most 
perceptions, however, are somewhere in the middle, viewing the operations as 
conditional successes for improving human security and providing space for the FSG in 
the state building process, but with serious reservations about inconsistency in strategies, 
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capacities and professionalism and long-term impact on conflict dynamics with no exit 
strategy. Some of these reservations are attributed to the organizational issues within the 
AU and AMISOM itself, some to individual TCC units, some to limited capacities in 
AMISOM due to funding and material constraints (i.e., support from the EU and US), 
some to the relationships between AU and the UN and its mission in Somalia, and some 
to the relationships between AMISOM and humanitarian organizations. 
The divergence of perceptions of AMISOM’s success can be traced to different 
views of legitimacy of AMISON’s primary mandate - eliminating Al Shabaab’s control 
over territory - compared to support mandates such as helping to secure territory for the 
FSG, protection of civilians, and facilitating aid to meet humanitarian and development 
needs.  Since early 2014, AMISOM has made limited progress in reducing Al Shabaab 
control over towns in villages in South Central Somalia outside of Mogadishu (primarily 
along the coast and borders as shown in Figure 58), but stabilization progress has lagged 
far behind, leaving communities sometimes more at risk than when under the control of 
Al Shabaab.  The lack of effective stabilization and degraded human security is attributed 
to several factors that include management issues, capacity issues, and cultural issues.  
AMISOM officers describe a key management issue to be lack of effective 
communication between AU and the “front line” for how decisions made at HQ (driven 
by interests of different international stakeholders in AMISOM) impact strategic and 
tactical goals on the ground.  The AU has first tier relationships with the UN as an 
authorizing organization and ultimate transition partner, with the EU as the primary 
funding organization, with the US as a key military advisor, and with the FSG as an 
operational partner. The diverse interests and competition among these organizations for 
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influence in Somalia can get in the way of strategic management of AMISOM operations. 
In addition, lack of effective coordination between the political component of AMISOM 
(responsible for community outreach and understanding local conflict contexts)229 and the 
military command, and lack of transparency and communication between AMISOM units 
(from different troops contributing countries)230 with different operational areas of 
responsibility, create both strategic and tactical management issues. 
The campaign, Operation Eagle, carried out in the spring of 2014 along the 
Southern coast and Ethiopian border of Somalia was frequently cited as example of 
management and communication problems that permeate AMISOM’s horizontal and 
vertical relationships.  A senior official of the Peace and Security Operations Department 
of the AU in Addis Ababa reported that UN dictated the campaign timeline for Operation 
Eagle, motivated in large part by the FSG timeline for Vision 2016.  AU HQ passed 
targets for the campaign down to AMISOM commanders, knowing that there would not 
be time for necessary preparations on the ground for stabilization capacities. The result 
was that there was no effective plan for securing and protecting the towns from return of 
Al Shabaab either from within the community or through the SNA, or plans for what to 
do with Al Shabaab captives or defectors. Stabilization issues in the wake of AMSIOM 
campaigns remain contentious, as the AMISOM military troops do not have the mandate 
                                                
229 Lack of coordination between the political, civil-military affairs component of AMISOM and the 
military was a major issue in 2011, when the Ugandan led AMISOM troops in the campaign that drove Al 
Shabaab from Mogadishu. Lacking local knowledge, AMISOM soldiers and officers had to move block by 
block through hostile neighborhoods learning who belonged to which clan or sub-clan and what their 
allegiances were prior to conducting any operations engaging Al Shabaab. The situation has presumably 
improved since the office moved from Nairobi to Mogadishu.   
230 For example, in 2012 the Commander of AMISOM in Mogadishu would not know exactly where 
Kenyan or Ethiopian troops were deployed in their areas of responsibility, what plans of engagement they 
had, or what local alliances were being negotiated. Unity of command continues to be a major issue today.  
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to remain as an occupying force and their policing capacities are extremely limited;231 
SNA capacities are also limited and not trusted by local communities;232 and the civilian 
aid community is reluctant to send in teams until there is peace and neutrality, which 
cannot exist while there is a risk of Al Shabaab’s return.233  
In these settings, AMISOM units from different TCCs use different strategies to 
stabilize towns. Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti units build on prior relationships with 
major clan leaders, whereas Uganda and Burundi units rely more on the SNA to take the 
lead in developing cooperative mechanisms within the community and then supporting 
these relationships through provision of humanitarian aid from their own supplies in lieu 
of stabilization projects that are long in coming. Both practices are criticized, however. 
The former for exacerbating clan-based grievances and creating new gatekeepers engaged 
in corruption and collusion;234 the latter for an inappropriate role as biased intervening 
parties and alleged instances of exploitation of the vulnerable and human rights abuses.235 
The deep tensions and distrust between AMISOM troops and the humanitarian 
community hampers resolution of the stabilization issues. In response, AMISOM and the 
                                                
231 See discussion on AMISOM limited policing capacities in previous section of Chapter 3.  
232 The SNA is often by local communities seen as an arm of Mogadishu or a competitive, majority clan 
militia (from whose ranks they have often come). 
233 The UN concerns are real, as evidenced by the increasing presence of hardened foreign fighters in the 
leadership of Al Shabaab, and increasing use of terrorism, targeted killings and assassinations.  This 
represents a significant change from relationships that the UN had with the ICU a decade ago.  
234 The most notorious and widely cited example of collusion between AMISOM troops and Al Shabaab is 
around the continuance of illegal trade activities from the port of Kismayo since Kenyan troops took 
control in 2012, supported by the Ras Kamboni clan militia.  The UN monitoring group estimates that at 
least $250 million worth of charcoal has been illegally shipped to the international market from the port in 
2013-2014. 
235 Initially, the AU initially strongly rejected Human Rights Watch allegations of rape and sexual 
exploitation by AMISOM that came out September 8, 2014, in the last days of my field research. A 
subsequent investigative team of the AU confirmed 2 of the 21 allegations, and recommended mechanisms 
to be put in place to address sexual exploitation abuse. African Union Press Release, April 21, 2015, Addis 
Ababa, “The African Union releases the key findings and recommendations of the report of investigations 
on sexual exploitation and abuse in Somalia”, 




UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) launched country 
specific guidelines to govern civil-military coordination in Somalia.236   However, all 
AMISOM troops interviewed – from commanding officers down to the front line soldiers 
- expressed frustration at the lack of cooperation with the humanitarian community and 
some of the boundaries implicit in the guidelines. These troops expressed a strong 
commitment to the mandate for protection of civilians, and providing “a conducive 
environment for humanitarian assistance to reach the Somali people.”  This commitment 
is motivated at least in part by recognition that doing so is critical to “win hearts and 
minds” within the villages they enter, and that they cannot do so if not allowed to share 
their food and medical supplies with people who are in need, who “cannot wait another 
day for help” that is often not forthcoming due to aforementioned security concerns of the 
humanitarian community and lack of stabilization support.  
Respondents from the humanitarian community expressed two criticisms of the 
AMISOM approach. First, they argue that it is the AMISOM operational strategies that 
create these dilemmas, and second, that AMISOM use of humanitarian relief is a ploy to 
gain trust in villages and induce denouncements of Al Shabaab, thereby putting villages 
at risk. All respondents (e.g., political, military, aid, academic) provided similar 
descriptions of the conflict dynamics between AMISOM and Al Shabaab. Prior to a 
campaign, AMISOM advertises its plans to liberate villages, so as to reduce the risk of 
civilian casualties (and thereby minimize risk of increasing local grievances). Al 
                                                
236 AMISOM, Press Release, “AMISOM and Humanitarian actors launch the Somalia Country Specific 
Guidelines to promote a clear distinction between Military across and Humanitarian actors,” November 24, 
2014, http://amisom-au.org/2014/11/amisom-and-humanitarian-actors-launch-the-somalia-country-specific-
guidelines-to-promote-a-clear-distinction-between-military-actors-and-humanitarian-actors/, Retrieved 
March 26, 2016.  
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Shabaab, anticipating defeat in direct confrontation, retreat into the surrounding 
countryside a day or two ahead of the troop advances.  In many cases, they threaten the 
local leaders to accompany them and take key resources from the villages. They only 
retreat “a little bit”, disappearing just outside the reach of the troops into the bush. The 
troops then march into the village where they meet little to no resistance, but also find 
little to no infrastructure for governance.  AMISOM seeks out the local leaders who are 
left, with whom they work to establish new systems for managing the peace, governance, 
and service delivery.  This may result in the creation of a new set of “gatekeepers”, who 
control the flow of services and resources as well as providing local physical security.  
These gatekeepers may have grievances of their own – being minority clans or persons of 
lower stature now elevated to unaccustomed positions of authority. 
Eventually, aid workers attempting to bring resources to the villages experience 
two new challenges.  The first is the development of relationships with the new set of 
security entrepreneurs, which usually involves some type of quid pro quo arrangement 
involving a distribution of resources. This is particularly difficult to do and maintain their 
principle of neutrality, as the new gatekeepers are now clearly working with AMISOM, 
who are not neutral.  In addition, Al Shabaab or their proxies now control the roads, and 
are able to set up roadblocks to prevent supplies from reaching the villages without 
exacting a “tax’ or and perhaps seize them for their own use.  In both instances, aid 
resources may be significantly diverted. Human security and resiliency of civilians and 
local government decrease in the villages as AMISOM moves on to the next campaign, 
while people are left more or less confined to their village under conditions that are worse 
than they were before. Humanitarian workers believe that this strategy has led to many 
Chapter 3 
 291 
instances of increased violence and deficits in human security in rural areas even as 
AMISOM proclaimed increasing victories and liberations from 2013-2014, making 
stabilization operations a high priority, but which have yet to be realized. These issues of 
trust and cooperation between the communities are further exacerbated by constant 
rotations of personnel involved in positions of day-to-day operational responsibilities.237 
 
Summary of Field Research 
 
Three crosscutting themes emerged from the field interviews: the need for conflict 
transformation and justice in addition to improved security and political stability; bridges 
from the local to the regional and national levels in addressing root causes of conflict; 
and transparency and accountability of external interventions in Somalia.   These three 
themes are interdependent and require harmonized approaches among external actors 
(especially between the different communities involved in peace operations and aid), and 
between external and local communities. 
The need for conflict transformation processes reflects a deep desire for justice 
that is not met by existing mechanisms in Somalia for conflict resolution (of which there 
are three) or the current political process of negotiation and power brokering for roles in 
the FSG.  Current processes focus on collective reconciliation, but apart form the Sharia 
courts, do not even consider a concept of justice, and do not give voice to individuals.  
Without such processes, the risk of conflict between clans will continue, and youth will 
                                                
237 AMISOM officers and troops rotate every 12-18 months; most humanitarian workers interviewed in 
Somalia and Nairobi stay in positions no more than 2 years, although there are some exceptions.  
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remain vulnerable to radicalization.238  As one Somali refugee described it, the current 
system administered by elders is based on past precedence and communal retribution, and  
“does not clear the hurt inside” of victims.  In his work for CARE, he would see 
perpetrators of rape go free after paying compensation to the fathers of rape victims, 
while the women would receive “nothing but the shame that they must bear for the rest of 
their lives.” Traditional systems also risk marginalizing wrongdoers, rather than 
apprehending them.  “If a young man does something wrong in his community’s eyes, Al 
Shabaab becomes a safe haven for him, to avoid facing the elders.”   The current success 
of peace operations will be lost if not followed by the establishment of institutions that 
address both individual and collective desires for justice. 
The need to address justice extends beyond the individual to local level 
communities and beyond. The lack of bridging mechanisms to address inclusiveness, 
relevance accountability, justice and security issues at different levels results in a 
situation where the solution to any of these issues “depends on where you sit.” Building 
consensus is extremely difficult, and clans remain locked within patterns of political 
infighting between regional and national interests(The Consequences of Political 
Infighting, 2013).  Many believe that the emergence of local level administrations with 
voices that can be heard at the same level as representatives in Mogadishu will be the 
only way that Somalis will come together.  There are currently no mechanisms for 
bridging dialogues at multiple levels or clear path for creating them.   
                                                
238 A recent report by Mercy Corps confirms these assessments, finding that youth are not radicalized as a 
result of economic grievances or lack of opportunity and poverty, but because they are angry at not having 
a voice in their futures and frustration with perceive self-interests and unresponsiveness of the traditional 
elder systems (Proctor, 2015).   
Chapter 3 
 293 
Sustainable conflict transformation and buy-in to mechanisms for justice require 
transparency about what external actors are doing where, what resources are being 
provided, who are the intended beneficiaries of those resources, who is accountable for 
managing those resources, and who is empowered to hold the mangers accountable. This 
is required at all levels, and is required now, not just for the future negotiated political 
structures.  Transparency is desired as much in security operations (e.g., AMISOM, SNA, 
local policing) as for humanitarian relief and development aid, and is key to winning 
legitimacy among the eyes of the Somalis.  Respondents acknowledged the risks that 
more transparency could create. However, most expressed a belief that in balance, more 
transparency nurtures critical buy-in to both peacebuilding and state building efforts than 
not, and is essential for more Somalis to eventually own these processes without resorting 
to violent conflict in the future. This belief is based on traditions of Somalis to respect 
collective decisions, as long as they have been involved in the process. 
These three crosscutting themes reveal one major finding of the field research.  
That is, the impacts that external interventions through peace operations and aid have on 
reducing persistent conflict and improving human security and resiliency are as much a 
function of how interventions are conducted as they are of what the interventions are.  
However, the international community tends to be evaluated through the opposite lens – 
with more emphasis on deciding, coordinating, and measuring what is done, and less on 
how it is done and whom the intervention will benefit most. At the very least, these 
should be given equal emphasis.  There are positive examples of where this is happening 
at multiple scales, but best practices are ad hoc and inconsistently applied in both the 




Collectively, the findings described in this chapter provide insights to answer the broad 
overarching question explored through this research, which is whether patterns in 
observed trends of persistent conflict can be explained by associations with dynamic 
endogenous system structures, and if so, how do external interventions interact with those 
structures to affect resiliency of conflict actors, and what are the policy implications.  The 
research findings answer the first two questions as described below. The third question, 
regarding policy implications, is discussed in the final chapter.  
1. Do existing predictors of conflict persistence (involving both internal and external 
factors) explain observed dynamics of civil conflict trajectories over time?  
Yes, regression analysis shows that state characteristics found in the literature are 
highly correlated with, and have strong explanatory power for, observed patterns of 
conflict persistence (overshoot and collapse, damped impulse, exponential, and 
oscillatory behaviors).  What is interesting is that the factors found to be most significant 
proxy a mix of micro and macro mechanisms. While most studies on conflict dynamics 
are conducted at either the macro or the micro level, it is the interaction between levels 
that produces some of the most important effects, such tipping points and shifts in 
polarity.  
This study finds that the likelihood of relatively shorter duration outcomes (e.g., 
overshoot and collapse and damped impulse) are consistently and significantly 
differentiated from the likelihood of longer duration outcomes (exponential or oscillatory 
behaviors) by positive correlations with higher levels of the ratio of state capacity to state 
reach (e.g., state security forces per km2), gender equality (proxy for cooperative 
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mechanisms), and smaller populations. In contrast, predictors based on state capacity 
alone (e.g., GDP per capita or oil income) or state reach alone (e.g. per cent urban 
population), governance (e. g., polity scores), social grievances or cohesion (e.g. social 
fragmentation or ethnic polarization), or economic opportunity cost (poverty depth) are 
not consistent differentiators between the likelihood of conflicts with shorter durations 
versus those with longer durations This result is attributed to underlying structures in 
overshoot and collapse and damped impulse with stronger conflict balancing loops 
provided by combinations of effective coercive mechanisms (state capacity and state 
reach) and cooperative mechanisms (gender equality) compared to exponential or 
oscillatory behaviors.   
The study finds evidence of differentiating conflict balancing mechanisms 
between the two outcomes with shorter durations as well.  Overshoot and collapse is 
significantly associated with lower state capacities (GDP per capita, population, state 
security forces), weaker governance (lower polity scores), higher economic opportunity 
costs (higher infant mortality rates and lower poverty rates) and less social cohesion 
(higher social fragmentation and lower ethnic polarization). Balancing mechanisms for 
overshoot and collapse are therefore more likely to derive from capacity limitations and 
resource constraints on state and challengers, combined with moderate opportunity costs. 
In contrast, damped impulse is positively correlated with higher state capacities, 
including oil, that result in balancing mechanisms primarily through coercion. Both are 
susceptible to conflict recurrence but through different pathways associated with the 
relaxation of their respective balancing mechanisms. Of the two, overshoot and collapse 
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is less likely to result in recurrence, due to correlation with higher cooperative capacity 
(proxied through gender equality) and increased opportunity costs. 
Finally, the study finds evidence of differentiating mechanisms between the two 
outcomes of longer durations. Exponential behavior, which is associated with higher 
intensity conflict, is differentiated from oscillatory behavior, by conflict type (being 
strongly and consistently correlated with conflict over governance or mixed issues 
involving both governance and territory), lower polity scores, population, state reach and 
capacity; less social cohesion; more forest sanctuary; and higher levels of gender equality 
and lower poverty depth.  These correlations show that exponential growth is more likely 
than oscillatory behavior when weak state balancing mechanisms are combined with 
more resource availability to support conflict.  Oscillatory behavior is more likely if the 
conflict is over contested territory, rather than political goals. 
Three of the four reference behaviors are manifested at the mesa- and micro-
levels within the case study of Somalia (overshoot and collapse, oscillatory behavior, and 
exponential growth). Causal modeling of these dynamic feedback structures in the five 
phases of the Somalia conflict based on process tracing are consistent with the macro 
level regression results for correlations between predicted risk factors, causal 
mechanisms and reference behaviors.  The consistency suggests that the explanatory 
framework based on dynamic system structures and reference behaviors, and the inferred 
associations with causal mechanisms, scale to explain within-country variations.  
Narratives from individual perspectives at the local level corroborate the presence and 
importance of the inferred mechanisms and the relationships between them (e.g., state 
capacity and reach, cooperative institutions, opportunity cost, availability of conflict 
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resources, social cohesion, conflict drivers) and emphasize that connections between 
these mechanisms at multiple levels are critical determinants of whether they become 
balancing or reinforcing influences on conflict.    
2. Do third party military peace operations and aid interventions in these conflicts 
interact to reduce or increase risk of persistent conflict?  
Yes, as found with the answer to the first question, military peace operations and 
aid interventions interact at the mesa- and micro levels to effect conflict persistence.  This 
study shows that what matters most in determining whether these interactions reduce or 
increase risk is how the interventions are implemented relative to each other, and not 
what the interventions are.  Macro level econometric analysis is not useful for seeing 
these effects, especially when different sequencing and lag times are involved.  
In macro level econometric analyses, peace operations by the UN and regional 
organizations (measured by the product of troop strength and mission months) are 
strongly and positively correlated with overshoot and collapse and damped impulse 
behaviors, and weakly correlated with exponential growth, independent of aid 
interventions. They are least likely in conflicts with oscillatory behavior.  Higher 
proportions of humanitarian aid to total aid are similarly correlated with equally higher 
likelihoods of overshoot and collapse, damped impulse, and exponential growth, relative 
to oscillatory behavior, independent of peace operations. These correlations are robust 
regardless of different controls used.  
However, the explanatory power of the econometric models of external 
interventions and conflict patterns is weak compared to those based on combined state 
and conflict characteristics. Moreover, various instruments constructed to test the 
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differentiating power of ratios of aid to peace operations in the cross-country regression 
analysis yield insignificant correlation results.239  By themselves, then, these macro level 
analyses indicate that endogenous structural conditions and conflict drivers are the 
primary determinants of conflict dynamics, which external interventions may amplify but 
not fundamentally change. 
The Somalia case study showed this proposition to be false. Historical process 
tracing, causal modeling and individual interviews of intervention actors and stakeholders 
in the Somalia conflict reveal significant and complex interdependencies between the 
effects of peace operations and aid interventions that change relative balances and 
interdependencies between mechanisms to yield different patterns of conflict persistence.  
These interdependencies, which have been both helpful and counter-productive for 
decreasing conflict risk and increasing human security, have been present in all phases of 
the Somalia conflict to significantly affect outcomes.  This is true independent of the 
degree of harmony between goals, mandates, and codes of conduct between peace 
operations and aid interventions.  
 Interactions between peace operations and aid interventions occur most often at 
the local level to affect security conditions and power relations, while coordination 
mechanisms to reduce the likelihood of increasing conflict that may obtain from them are 
most often found at higher levels. In addition, lack of transparency and trust between 
organizations often lead to uncertainty, confusion and stalemates that are exploited by 
                                                
239 Interestingly, the same is not true for state military expenditures relative to aid. The ratio of military 
expenditures to aid is found to be positively and significantly correlated with shorter duration outcomes 
(overshoot and collapse) compared to longer duration outcomes (exponential growth and oscillatory 
behavior). Higher military expenditures to aid is negatively correlated with exponential growth and higher 




conflict actors. Uncoordinated attempts to develop work around solutions can perturb 
local endogenous system structures, creating new conflict drivers that may persist far into 
the future, such as warlords and gatekeepers. 
A common thread between the macro level regression analysis, and micro level 
process tracing and field interviews, is the central importance of local level moderating 
groups as a balancing mechanism for reducing risk of persistent conflict.  Local level 
moderating groups have a strong influence on conflict drivers and legitimacy of 
intervention actors in all system structures, and are a key link between intervention actors 
and the likelihood of success of political solutions that must ultimately obtain for conflict 
resolution.  
The empowerment of local level groups relative to each other (e.g., between 
clans), and degree of cooperative mechanisms and inclusivity used within these groups 
varies significantly within and across administrative levels, as do the institutions they 
employ for conflict transformation.  Where these local level institutions do not meet 
individual and community desires for justice, political solutions alone are insufficient to 
bring an end to conflict. Different strategies employed by peace operations and aid 
interventions in these diverse local level contexts often generate counterproductive 





Chapter 4: Discussion of Research Results 
 
The research and analysis presented in this study are robust to many different 
model specifications, and have been tested for sensitivity to scale. Multiple sources have 
been used to corroborate quantitative data values and qualitative conflict dynamics.  As a 
result, some of the findings can be considered with high confidence for policy insights.  
However, there are still limitations to the findings.  Three considerations of research 
results are discussed below: limitations of the research, future research needed, and 
policy implications of the findings. Future research needs and policy implications are 
both substantive and methodological.  
 
Research Limitations 
Research limitations fall into three categories:  data quality and coverage, 
sensitivity and limitations of the methodology, and complexity.  Quality of data in 
conflict settings is always a concern, particularly in Africa where institutional capacity 
for generating data is limited.  While this study uses the best available resources, there 
are several variables for which the data quality is questionable, or there are no data.  The 
most significant are the capacities of state military forces, peace operations, and 
belligerents. In addition, lack of data at the subnational level for socio-economic-political 
conflict risk factors limits the ability to robustly test micro-level phenomenon, while 
proxies for state reach, social cohesion, and inclusivity of peacebuilding initiatives; and 
transitional justice initiatives.  
The quality of data on state military capacities varies significantly between 
countries. In some cases, the number of troops in the state armed forces reported is 
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unrealistically reported to be constant over the entire 25-year time period (e.g., Republic 
of Congo, Gabon, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Mali), while in others it is missing for many 
of the conflict years (e.g., Somalia, Liberia). Some countries report large numbers of 
militia and paramilitary but the relationship between those militias and paramilitaries to 
the state armed forces are not.  
Another problem with the data quality for approximating state military capacity is 
that military expenditures and troop sizes are only proxies for state capacity. These do not 
account for differences between countries in how military expenditures are used to build 
capacity, nor the quality of troops in national armed forces. There is a similar limitation 
on capacity of peace operations, as differences in quality of troops and training are not 
accounted for.  
A third problem is in assessing relative capacity between state and challengers. 
Estimates of numbers of persons actively engaged as belligerents are only provided by 
Military Balance Reports in 147 of the 810 observations, and are not provided at all by 
the ACLED or UCDP conflict databases.  As noted by other researchers, belligerents 
have asymmetric advantages that are only weakly approximated by difficulty of state 
reach in this research.  
Subnational level data are only just becoming available to conduct analysis of 
interactions between peace operations and aid interventions at the mesa- and micro 
levels.  However, as this research has shown, socio-economic-political factors are equally 
influential in conflict dynamics. There is currently no collection or storage of data on 
these important indicators at the subnational level. As a result of data limitations, there 
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are limitations on extension of the quantitative methodology to increasingly smaller 
scales.  
A second limitation is on the extension of the methodology to increasingly large 
N studies. This limitation results from the subjective analysis required for the 
categorizations of conflict dynamics into reference behaviors, which requires analytic 
judgment that cannot be automated.  
A third limitation is in the complexity that can be usefully modeled within the 
dynamic systems framework for policy relevance. Too much complexity generates 
models that in which the effects of policy decisions on system behavior are difficult to 
interpret. A general rule of thumb is to limit major stocks to 7 or less.  
 
Future Research Needs 
Future research needs are of three types: data collection, methodology, and 
understanding mechanisms represented by the proxy variables in this study.  Geo-
referenced, micro-level data on indicators of social demographics, economics, political 
and civil institutions, aid effectiveness, human security and well-being is required to test 
how the observed patterns of conflict dynamics are generated at local levels. In addition, 
research is needed for better indicators to for data collection and assessment of relative 
capacities between state forces, troops engaged in peace operations, and challengers.  
Even without new data, some new insights could be provided by future research 
that expands the methodology to include stochastic analyses, using the simulation model 
developed in this research to generate probabilistic resiliency landscapes. These 
landscapes could reveal likely human security outcomes as a result of trade-offs between 
timing, capacities, and level of interventions by peace operations and humanitarian aid 
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organizations, with variations on critical parameters such as effectiveness and legitimacy. 
The landscapes could support policy research by testing for robustness to resiliency 
metrics such as latitude, resistance, and precariousness, while being optimized for 
panarchy.  
A second avenue for fruitful research in the methodology is the incorporation of 
individual agency into models of the dynamic system structure driving conflict.  This can 
be done through the structural mechanisms for goal adjustments and delays. Several 
different approaches should be compared that include agent based modeling, game 
theoretic, and that are informed by field research on case studies to better understand 
mechanisms that influence individual decision-making.  
Understanding of causal mechanisms for how transparency and agency in 
individual decision-making at the grass roots level affects conflict dynamics is the third 
area where future research should be concentrated. The specific areas suggested by this 
study are scalable mechanisms for transparency, inclusivity, and accountability that can 
build new roles and platforms for civil society while honoring and utilizing traditional 
institutions effectively. The mechanisms for apparent transformation (e.g., Rwanda, 
Liberia, Burundi) should be assessed at the grass roots level and compared with those 
where conflict appears to be been damped but not transformed (e.g., Mali, Guinea) or 
continues to increase unabated (e.g., Somalia, DRC) or oscillating indefinitely (e.g., 
CAR, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Ivory Coast). Moreover, these mechanisms need to be 
studied for how they may be implemented in different contexts so as not to increase 
human insecurity and vulnerability.  
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One of the most robust and surprising findings of the macro level regression 
analysis is the strong correlation between different types of reference behaviors and 
gender inequality, and that this correlation is different than and independent of factors for 
corruption, polity, or institutional capacity.  The interpretation that gender equality may 
be a proxy for cooperative behavior and conflict management skills is reinforced by the 
qualitative analysis in the Somalia case study, and is consistent with findings and recent 
emphasis of the international communities engaged in peace and security as well as the 
development fields.  However, the research agendas of these two communities tend to be 
developed in isolation from each other and not to share results. There is an important 
challenge and opportunity to bridge the research agendas across these communities on the 
role of women in peacebuilding in particular, and between security and development in 
active conflict settings in general.  
Finally, many of the findings in this study are not new.  For example, the need for 
better cooperation and coordination between military operations and humanitarian aid 
workers in providing human security in active conflict settings is well known (as 
evidenced by the observation by Doyle and Sambanis (2006) that this is the single biggest 
policy gap in peacebuilding strategies). Many different approaches to cooperation and 
assistance between peacekeeping operations, humanitarian aid, and development have 
been attempted with no apparent consensus on best practices or even normative values 
between the communities. A final recommendation for research is to understand what the 
outcomes have been to different approaches to cooperation and coordination between 
security operation and humanitarian aid in conflict settings, what the metrics are for 
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evaluating these as successes or failures, and how these perceptions affect the likelihood 





Policy Implications  
This study has shown that conflict persistence derives from dynamic systems in 
which interactions between actors and their capacities are sometimes more important than 
the actors or capacities themselves. In other words, verbs can matter more than nouns.  
The international system is not lacking in capacity for reducing conflict persistence.  In 
the 25-year period covered by this study, a total of 17,000,000 troop missions months 
were engaged in 66 different peace operation missions in the 36 conflicts, while the 
international community contributed $680 billion in aid.  Indeed, writing on conflict in 
the Horn of Africa five years ago, Paul Williams concluded, “Lack of international 
engagement is not the crux of the problem. Rather, a significant part of the problem is 
that the type of engagement that has occurred has not built stable peace” (Williams, 
2011).  As previously concluded, how interventions are designed and implemented is at 
least as important for reducing the risk of conflict persistence and increasing resilience, as 
what they are.240  
Policy recommendations to increase the effectiveness of interventions in active, 
persistent violent armed conflict therefore should be about verbs, i.e., transformative 
processes, not about nouns, i.e., transformative capacities. Rather than evaluating levels 
of preferred capacities or types of interventions, this study recommends that it is more 
constructive to concentrate policy efforts for current peace operations and aid 
intervention policies on the following actions: 
1. Increase transparency, inclusivity, and accountability of current and future 
                                                
240 These findings echo the theme of Nobel laureate Amartya Sen on development as freedom (Sen, 2001), 
and are reinforced in a recent report by the OECD, admonishing that new approaches are needed for 
measuring aid efforts of the international community (Hynes & Scott, 2013).   
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policy strategies;  
2. Build bridges to horizontally and vertically integrate policy implementation 
across multiple levels; and  
3. Begin paving pathways towards conflict transformation and justice.  
 
Policy recommendation #1: Increase transparency, inclusivity, and accountability of 
interventions 
 
Increasing transparency, inclusivity, and accountability are interdependent, 
mutually reinforcing processes.  Transparency is increasingly recognized and endorsed 
conceptually at the highest policy levels in the development community, but less so 
within security and humanitarian aid communities in conflict settings.  Moreover, 
understanding of effective follow-through mechanisms at local levels is lacking. Creating 
effective transparency mechanisms for interventions in active conflict settings can be a 
tough sell at the implementation level, requiring cultural changes and overcoming 
significant policy resistance, but is essential in both peace operations and foreign aid if 
these interventions are to ultimately reduce risk of future conflict and increase resiliency. 
Lacking external transparency, peace operations are unlikely to reduce fear and 
uncertainty among the “peacekept”, encourage denouncement or defection of 
belligerents, or win legitimacy. Lack of internal transparency within peace operations 
complicates weak command and control mechanisms, precludes accountability, and 
hampers coordination with stabilization and peacebuilding efforts of civilian 
humanitarian aid organizations. Lack of transparency among aid organizations enables 
corruption, patronage, and exploitation that contribute to conflict persistence. 
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UN operations have more transparency than regional organizations involved in 
peace operations, with regular reporting mechanisms that are ultimately accessible to the 
general public. However, these mechanisms are not user friendly, and largely out of reach 
of many at the local level in conflict settings. Regular, transparent, two-way 
communication channels are required at local levels that can convey information about 
what is being done or is needed to protect people’s lives and human rights or redress 
grievances, and by whom.  
Transparency mechanisms in regional organizations, as exemplified by 
AMISOM, are minimal to non-existent. For example, data below the administrative level 
for troop deployments within specific areas of operation over time not only not accessible 
to the public, but also not even known to commanding officers of the different AMISOM 
units.241  Even more problematic are clear communications regarding the reality of 
security situations on the ground, as peace operations attempt to gain the critical 
confidence of local communities necessary for prevailing in counterinsurgency 
operations,242 and addressing lesson learned from peacekeeping failures to protect 
civilians.243 Transparency in regional peacekeeping operations and command structures 
in Africa, their relationships to domestic security capacities, and transformation pathways 
for stabilization operations are all necessary and achievable policy goals requiring a 
                                                
241 Personal communication, General Fred Mugisha, Kampala, Uganda, August 2014.  
242 For example, while AMISOM regularly reports substantial progress in security territory formerly under 
the control of Al Shabaab and weakening their capabilities, top US military commanders assess that the 
group continues to expand its terrorist agenda, and retains the ability to stage “almost daily lethal 
asymmetric attacks inside Somalia” in the face of “overstretched AMISOM forces” and a Somali National 
Army with “endemic deficiencies.” See Statement of General David M. Rodriguez, USA Commander, US 
AFRICOM, Senate Armed Services Committee, on March 8, 2016 (Rodriguez, 2016).  
243 For example, recent report by the UNHCR on failures of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to 
protect civilians from massive human rights abuses of the government’s “scorched earth policy,” following 




combination of political will, cultural adjustments, and prudence, and supported by 
infrastructure investments for sustainability. 
Transparency within the aid community active in conflict settings also varies 
widely. Reporting mechanisms for official development assistance by government donors 
and major INGOs are robust and increasingly accessible to the general public for 
monitoring, research, and policy planning.244 However, these mechanisms lack 
transparency beyond the first level of donors and providers, who increasingly push funds 
down to lower levels through civil society NGOs and other domestic actors.245  These 
funds are “extremely difficult to quantify and impossible to track, making it extremely 
difficult to fully account for funds and to assess the extent to which donors and 
international actors are working in partnership with local actors” (Randel, 2012).  Lack of 
transparency makes research and policy planning difficult, hampers coordination with 
peace operations, and can drive wedges among humanitarian actors and between 
humanitarian actors and peacekeepers that are exploited by belligerents (Aal, 2000).    
Increasing transparency of peace operations and foreign aid is also essential for 
getting the balance right between security and development during conflict and in 
immediate post-conflict periods. This study found that the ratio of security capacity to aid 
is a differentiating factor for the likelihood of conflict persistence, rather than either 
military or total aid expenditures alone. Higher ratios of security expenditures to aid are 
more likely to result in shorter duration conflicts, whereas lower levels are more likely to 
                                                
244 An example is AidData.org, which compiles and disseminates data and is used extensively in this 
research. 
245 This is especially true when funds are resourced through adaptive, pooled emergency response 
mechanisms.   From 2006 to 2011, conflict countries in Africa have been in the top ten recipients of such 
pooled funds for 5 out of 6 years (e.g., Somalia, Ethiopia, DRC, Kenya, Ivory Coast, Sudan, Uganda, 
Zimbabwe, Chad, and Niger).  
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be result in exponential growth or sustained low intensity conflict over long time periods. 
Transparency in security assistance provided by donors is as important as transparency 
within receiving organizations for getting this ratio right. Current US policies for building 
partner capacity through security sector assistance programs lack sufficient transparency 
mechanisms for monitoring and accountability, in spite of a proliferation of oversight 
committees, as exemplified with current situations in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq.246  
By itself, increasing transparency in conflict settings can reinforce both balancing 
and reinforcing mechanisms, creating risks of intensified conflict and insecurity 
(Strandow, 2014). Transparency must be accompanied by inclusivity and accountability 
to reduce the risk of conflict persistence. The most robust finding of the macro level 
regression analysis is the correlation of higher gender equality with reduced risk of 
conflict persistence. These macro level findings are supported by evidence from 
household surveys in conflicts in Uganda, Sudan, Nigeria, and Nepal shows that people’s 
sense of security depends not so much on who provides aid to whom and how much, but 
on whether the process is transparent and they know exactly what is going on (D'Onofrio 
& Maggio, 2015; Korb, 2008; Mazurana et al., 2014; Meier & Bond, 2006). 
Increased local ownership, inclusivity and participation of all sectors of society 
(elders, youth, women, and civil society) is a mantra found in almost every research study 
and set of policy recommendations for interventions in conflict settings, grounded in 
solid research and field experiences, (Blaydes & De Maio, 2010; Call, 2008; Fortna, 
2008; Mohamud & Kurtz, 2013; Proctor, 2015; Schirch, 2013) and instantiated as an 
                                                
246 See Statement for the Senate Armed Services Committee, “Department of Defense Security Cooperation 




international policy norm in the UN Security Resolution 1325 reaffirming the full 
participation of women in conflict resolution and peacebuilding.247   Inclusive processes 
are credited with conflict transformation in Burundi, Rwanda, and Liberia, and Somalia 
at both the local and national levels (Ball, 2014; Bradbury, 2009; Gizelis & Kosek, 2005; 
Howe, 1997; Menkhaus, 1996; Oker, 2008). In contrast, lack of inclusivity is a 
characteristic of persistent conflict, and a major contributor to mass atrocities and the rise 
of violent extremism (Marchal, 2009; McDoom, 2012; Menkhaus, 2009b).  Exclusionary 
policies, however, continue to plague many peacebuilding efforts, especially with respect 
to disarmament and reconciliation of armed groups in conflicts.248  
Finally, local polities must be empowered to hold accountable those who receive 
benefits from external interventions. Ultimately, this requires a shift from the principle 
that “he who has the gun controls the resources” to one that maintains “a country belongs 
to its people” (Wenar, 2015). In the highly militarized societies that characterize 
persistent conflict settings, this shift is difficult to say the least, and is at the heart of 
conflict transformation goals.  Often, there are few formal institutions with capacities to 
provide such accountability, nor are they necessarily the best path in cultures ripe with 
corruption. In these cases, informal institutions and civil society groups with local level 
buy-in are preferable vehicles for accountability, and can borrow strategies from both 
successful grassroots peacebuilding activities and playbooks of nonviolent activities 
(Bradbury, 2009; Paffenholz, 2010; Sharp, 2010). Security sector reform is key to 
                                                
247 See UN Office of the Special Advisor on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women (2000). , 
“Landmark resolution on Women, Peace and Security S/RES/1325.”  
248 For example, some researchers attribute the continued insurgency in Afghanistan to the exclusionary 
processes towards the Taliban in the processes that laid the foundations for a new government in 
Afghanistan after 2001.  
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whether such informal institutions and civil society groups can be effective accountability 
mechanisms.  Successful security sector reform, in turn, has been found to depend 
critically on the participation of civil society (Ball, 2014; Siegle, 2011; Wulf, 2004).  
 
Policy recommendation #2: Build bridges between micro-macro levels interventions 
that account for interconnected conflict dynamics 
External interventions in civil conflict target multiple sectors that are nested from 
the local community up through administrative regions to the national level (Figure 1).  
These interventions involve a complex array of international and domestic actors with 
different policies, goals, capacities, and operational experience that has been shown to 
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Figure 2 UN Peacekeeping Model249 
 
The INGOs, NGOs and private foundations shown in Figure 2 have become 
increasingly important in the aid community, with the proportion of the total international 
humanitarian response drawn from private funding increasing from 17% in 2006 to over 
30% in 2010 (Randel, 2012).  Similar trends exist in peace operations, in which the trend 
is to increasingly employ partnership operations, mixing UN, regional, ad-hoc bilateral 
partners and domestic forces in different phases of peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and 
peacebuilding (Bellamy & Williams, 2015). 
These different actors use many different formulas to determine sequencing 
strategies, target levels, and capacities of interventions.  Harmonizing these diverse 
policies is unlikely and may even be undesirable. Instead, networked bridges are needed 
between the different targets of interventions to create adaptive systems that diffuse 
conflict and support resilience.  These bridges must be compatible with (if not emerge 
from) existing social networks and provide flexible access to resources and collective 
responses to stress that are scalable from the individual to the national, without creating 
more gatekeepers and reinforcing security entrepreneurs, or adding otherwise 
                                                




unnecessary layers between donors and recipients.  The panarchy framework is an 
example that relates potential capacity to connectedness in adaptive cycles of 
conservation, release, reorganization, and exploitation in response to changing needs and 
conditions (Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3 Panarchy Framework for Resilience and Sustainability (Gunderson & Holling, 2001) 
 
During conflict, traditional connections are broken and capacities are depleted. As new 
capacities and systems take their place, transparent, inclusive, and accountable 
infrastructures are required with permeable boundaries, interconnectivity, and flexible 
mechanisms for access to resource that allow these adaptive cycles to emerge.  
The connection between peace operations and aid workers on the ground is 
particularly critical in active conflict settings. The Somalia case study shows that this 
connection is fragile, where it is not completely broken. Improving civil-military affairs 
must be a high priority backed by transparent and accountable resources for civilian-led 
security sector assistance, and transparent and accountable mechanisms for cooperative 
operations between aid organizations and regional peacekeeping troops.  Efforts to 
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improve this connection are often met with skepticism,250 challenge cultural norms within 
donor and recipient organizations, and pose two real concerns: (1) counterintelligence 
concerns of military troops, and (2) the deep tradition of neutrality in the humanitarian 
field. Overcoming these concerns is necessary for peace operations to win legitimacy, 
and for humanitarian aid organizations to reduce negative externalities of relief efforts in 
active conflicts. 
 
Policy recommendation #3: Begin paving pathways towards conflict transformation 
and justice.  
 
Many interventions in persistent conflicts are highly militarized and can lose sight 
of the ultimate objective, which is sustainable peace and security for the people.  Military 
peace operations involving counter-terrorism or counterinsurgencies in particular leave 
few avenues for de-escalation and narrow the space for conflict transformation. As peace 
operations and aid interventions apply principles of transparency, inclusivity and 
accountability in these settings, historic tensions, grievances, and injustices may come 
into the open before there are viable pathways for constructive engagement. However, 
absent these principles, intervention actors are used to marginalize, co-opt, or collude 
with various actors in hidden root causes, creating winners, losers, and future spoilers to 
peace processes.  
The Somalia case study provides multiple examples where immediate concerns 
for human security and political expediency have taken precedence over longer-term 
                                                
250 For example, after six years in the field, AMISOM developed its first formal policy on civil-military 
relations in fall of 2014.  This was met with distrust and skepticism by the NGO community in Nairobi, 
who viewed it as a ploy to exploit aid resources for the ‘hearts and minds” campaign.   
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peace objectives and social reconciliation.  Multiple conflict traps have emerged as a 
result—an entrenched war economy that fuels corruption and increases incentives for 
conflict, patronage systems that encourage political exclusion, security dilemmas that 
promote proliferation of illegal arms and dependency on external military forces, and a 
political reconciliation process that is viewed with suspicion and lacks grass-roots buy-in. 
Conflict transformation will be difficult as long as Al Shabaab and other belligerents are 
able to feed off the feelings of injustice and frustration these conflict traps produce. 
Pathways out of these conflict traps require at a minimum the application of the 
first two policy recommendations. In addition, they require patience and a commitment to 
long-term strategies that emphasize endogenous consensus building processes as much as 
outcomes, as exemplified by Somaliland and Puntland, where “slow and painstaking 
local peace and reconciliation conferences build on each other to form larger and 
economically viable regions in which political power, revenue and resources are shared 
relatively fairly between sub-clans and clans.”251  However, these processes do not 
guarantee justice for individuals in societies where traditional conflict resolution is based 
on collective mechanisms, and do not address the needs of the youth.  
This study found that male youth unemployment is inversely correlated with 
gender inequality, and is more likely to be correlated with exponential growth in conflict. 
Indeed, the precariousness of youth is cited by the UNDP as a major risk factor for future 
conflict in Somalia, noting that 
“…youth are major actors in the conflict, constituting the bulk of participants in 
militias and criminal gangs including Al Shabaab.  Lost opportunities, unclear 
identify and a growing sense of marginalization among a youth in an environment 
of state collapse, violent conflict and economic decline provide fertile ground for 
                                                
251 International Crisis Group (2014, p. 15). 
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youth radicalizations.  The same reason that have pushed young Somalis to join 
Al Shabaab have also drawn them to join street gangs” (Africa Center for 
Strategic Studies, 2012, p. 15). 
 
For conflict transformation to occur, these risks must ultimately be addressed through the 
creation of alternative futures for youth, and new avenues for individual justice that give 
a voice to the marginalized and provide healing to those who have been wronged.  Such 
avenues must be informed by normative perspectives that move beyond collective 
restitution, and emphasize the interdependent relationships between the individual and 
society (Robinson, 2011). 
 
Summary  
Almost two hundred years ago Vilfredo Pareto observed,  “The efforts of men 
(and women) are utilized in two different ways: they are directed to the production or 
transformation of economic goods, or else to the appropriation of goods produced by 
others.” This study shows that the dichotomy implied by Pareto between these two 
outcomes is false. In reality, cooperative, conflict balancing and coercive, conflict-
amplifying behaviors co-exist and interact through dynamic and complex mechanisms 
across multiple levels. These interactive mechanisms create many potential conflict traps 
that may be significantly affected by interactions between peace operations and aid 
interventions.  
Effective intervention policies to break free from any one of the many conflict 
traps must contribute to basic security needs, reinforce cooperative conflict-balancing 
mechanisms, and support the growth of endogenous conflict transformation structures. 
This study demonstrates two common conditions that create policy dilemmas for meeting 
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these three requirements simultaneously: (1) the means for meeting short-term human 
security needs (e.g., stronger state security capacity, military peace operations or aid 
interventions) may introduce perturbations that undermine the long-term effectiveness of 
existing, cooperative conflict-balancing mechanisms; and (2) existing cooperative 
conflict management mechanisms can be enmeshed with root causes of conflict, 
undermining the possibility of future conflict transformations.    
These insights are not new, and echo statements made by US AID in 2013 that 
“the immediate challenge is to integrate analytical efforts on conflict and food security 
with a view to shaping more effective interventions (in fragile states and conflict settings 
experiencing violent conflict).  Expanding commitments in these fragile or failing states 
pose serious trade-offs in terms of policy” (Simmon, 2013).  Many donor organizations 
(e.g., Mercy Corps, US AID, Catholic Relief Services, World Bank, UNDP) have 
developed conflict and resiliency assessment frameworks that attempt to guide analysts 
and policy makers in making these difficult decisions for their organizations.252  
The overarching finding of this research, however, is that there is no single rule of 
thumb, framework, or set of metrics for navigating this policy trade-space. While 
attention to outcomes is necessary, doing so at the expense of principles can exacerbate 
root causes of conflict and is likely to only increase conflict persistence.  Effective 
intervention policy to reduce conflict persistence must focus on principles of 
transparency, inclusivity, and accountability in operations; build scalable 
interconnectivity between intervention activities without creating more gatekeepers and 
                                                
252 Examples are Aid Delivery in Conflict-Affected IDA Countries: the Role of the World Bank, 2004; Cliffe 
& Roberts, 2011; Conflict Assessment Framework Version 2.0, 2012; Faubert et al., 2010; Irmer, 2009; 
Mohamud & Kurtz, 2013; USAID, 2013; Walker, Jacobstein, & Gomes, 2014.  
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security entrepreneurs, and pave pathways towards conflict transformation resulting in 




Appendix A: Selection of Conflict Cases and Reference 
Behaviors  
 
The first step in the quantitative analysis is to choose the pool of cases of conflict 
persistence, and then to categorize these conflicts according to reference behavior. This 
Appendix discusses the protocol used to select the pool of conflict cases and determining 
their reference behavior. The metadata for these conflicts is then presented, followed by a 
brief summary of the individual conflicts within each group of reference behaviors, 
accompanied by figures plotting the events over time for each conflict.   
 
Protocol for Selecting Cases of Persistent Conflict  
The cases for this research consist of thirty-four persistent conflicts in Africa from 
1989 – 2014, resulting in 810 conflict years.  These conflict cases are selected based on 
conflict persistence.  As used here, the term conflict persistence refers to situations in 
which violent armed conflict events (associated with the same incompatibility) 
continuously occur from year-to-year for more than ten years, or if two or more episodes 
of the same conflict occurs within a ten year time period, regardless of the time length of 
the episode or the length of time between episodes.  This is similar to (but more specific 
than) the definition used in the Human Security Report 2012, which defines a persistent 
conflict as “one that involves many years of fighting” (Mack, 2012).  Persistent conflicts 
may consist of sustained periods of active conflict, or may experience apparent “spells of 
peace” during which there are no observed or recorded violent conflict events, but during 
which time the causal mechanisms for conflict have not been resolved.  
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 The cases are constrained to Africa to take advantage of robust, subnational 
georeferenced data on conflicts in Africa (described in the next section) and because of 
the high number of cases of conflict persistence. The post Cold-War timeframe is chosen 
to avoid conflating intervention effects with those of covert military actors acting as 
Superpower proxies.  A timeframe of 25 years is chosen to ensure that conflict dynamics 
leading to recurrence after 10 or more are not overlooked.  This results in a sufficiently 
large data set to conduct statistically meaningful quantitative analysis.  
Three primary data sources were used to identify persistent, violent armed 
intrastate conflicts in Africa - the UCDP/Prio armed conflict dataset, the UCDP-
Georeferenced Event Dataset, and the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset.253  If 
a conflict was active (e.g., violent conflict events were recorded in one or more of these 
datasets) over a timespan of ten years or more, it was included as a persistent conflict.  
This resulted in the pool of 34 conflicts listed in Table 1.254   The set includes four 
countries with more than one persistent conflict—Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and the 
Central Africa Republic. In each of these cases, one conflict involved contestation among 
primarily political actors and/or citizens over governance issues, while territorial issues 
between ethnic or religious groups motivated at least one other.  
The definition for conflict persistence clearly relies on the protocol used within 
each database for counting conflict events, which in turn determines whether a conflict is 
considered active or not.  The frame of reference for counting conflict events in the 
                                                
253 These three datasets are described in Appendix B. 
254 Using this protocol, conflicts in Botswana, Comoros, Egypt, Eritrea, Djibouti, Ghana, Madagascar, 
Morocco, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, and Zambia were excluded from the study, as were other 
minor conflicts within the countries that did experience persistent conflict, but which did not meet the 
criteria of persistent conflict.   
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UCPD data sets and ACLED are different (see Appendix B).   The frame of reference for 
UCDP datasets is the conflict actor dyad, where at least one of the actors is the 
government.  The date and location of each conflict event between actors that results in a 
battle death comprises one record.  In contrast, the frame of reference for a conflict in 
ACLED is location. Each conflict event characterizes interaction between actors engaged 
in violent armed contestation at a location. Cross mapping of conflicts in ACLED and 
UCDP data was done on the basis of time, location, and actors involved in the conflict to 
determine the reference behavior pattern.  
Of the 34 conflicts included in the pool of cases, only two were not recorded as 
active, persistent conflicts in all three sets—Burkina Faso and Gabon. These two cases 
are included in ACLED but not the two UCDP datasets. The omission of these two cases 
from the UCDP datasets can be attributed to the different thresholds used in ACLED and 
UCDP for defining an active conflict. UCDP only recognizes a violent armed conflict 
when one party is the government and the other party is a recognized political or ethnic 
organization; events are only recorded when they result in battle-related fatalities. This 
threshold may overlook violent armed conflict due to longstanding popular unrest or 
government oppression against citizens who are actively engaged in civil resistance and 
who may affiliate from time to time with ethnic militia. The conflicts in Burkina Faso and 
Gabon are primarily of this nature.  Such conflicts may simmer for many years and 
suddenly erupt into organized violence, as shown by the coups in Burkina Faso in the fall 
of 2014 and again in 2015. The years of violent protests (and associated fatalities) that 




Determining Reference Behavior 
The fundamental concept of reference behavior in dynamic systems provides the 
framework for analyzing observed patterns of conflict persistence, measured through 
frequency of violent conflict events. Dynamic patterns of the 34 cases map to behavior 
archetypes “Overshoot & Collapse”, “Damped Impulse”, “Exponential Growth”, and 
“Sustained Oscillations”. “Overshoot & Collapse” and “Damped Impulse” are associated 
with early acceleration of conflict events that reach a tipping point, and usually result in 
shorter durations. However, if the basic conflict structure does not change, conflict risk 
and capability may accumulate even when there are no active conflict events, creating 
latent potential for recurrence through delayed feedback loops. “Exponential Growth” 
and “Sustained Oscillations” are associated with conflicts of relatively longer durations 
that reflect sustain conflict with no spells of peace.   
The outcome of interest for characterizing reference behavior is frequency of 
violent conflict events over the 25 years between 1989 and 2014. Conflict events over 
time are plotted and curve-fitted through regression analysis to determine the dominant 
reference behavior.  Exponential growth and oscillatory behaviors about a mean are 
straightforward based on the goodness of fits using exponential and polynomial (or 
sinusoidal) equations, respectively. Distinguishing between overshoot-and-collapse and 
damped-impulse requires additional regression analysis of behavior in the right side tail. 
Overshoot and collapse is reflected by a Weibull hazard function, whereas damped 




Statistical Analysis of Conflict Event Data and Summaries  
This section summarizes conflict event data trends used to select and categorize 
each conflict included in the pool of cases.  Statistical data on 1) number of conflict 
events, 2) actor types involved in interactions, 3) category of event type, and 4) time 
since triggering event are also examined to eliminate the possibility of unobserved 
conflict effects driving the econometric regression results.  
Tables 1 and 2 display the frequency distributions for conflict events, type of 
conflict interaction, primary actor type, and event types for each of the conflicts within 
the SD behavior groupings.  Data on interaction types and event types and are from 
ACLED.  ACLED records events as interactions between two primary actors. Actors are 
categorized as one of eight types as shown in Table 1 below.  Two numbers define 
interaction types, where the first number is lowest of the two actor types—regardless of 
which is perpetrator and which is victim.  If the event is a single actor event, involving no 
interaction, the second number coded is “0”. Each conflict event is categorized as one of 
the nine types shown in Appendix A, Table 2.  
 
Table 1 ACLED Actor Types Used to Define Interaction Types 
Actor Type Indicator Variable 
Government Force 1 
Rebel Force 2 
Political Militia 3 










Table 2 ACLED Event Type 
Event Type Indicator Variable 
Battle-No change of territory 1 
Battle-Non-state actor overtakes territory 2 
Battle – Government regains territory 3 
Headquarters or base established  4 
Non-violent activity by a conflict actor 5 
Violent Riots/protests 6 
Violence against civilians 7 
Non-violent transfer of territory  8 
Remote violence 9 
 
Some conflicts exhibiting overshoot and collapse or damped impulse appear to be 
in a state of stable peace, which may be a result of structural adjustments that shift the use 
of resources to predominantly productive capabilities, rather than destructive. Others are 
at risk of recurrence, depending on the power of the damping function over time or ability 
of the system to regain capacities.  Examples of conflicts where violence was originally 
damped but has seen recent recurrences are the Republic of the Congo and South Africa.  
Exponential growth and oscillatory behavior illustrate cases of persistent conflict with no 
break in violence. 
 
Overshoot and Collapse 
Conflicts with overshoot and collapse reference behavior are Chad, Liberia, South 
Africa-ANC, Namibia, Burundi, Rwanda. ACLED records a combined total of 6,904 
events from 1997-2014 for the conflicts in this category.  Of these, 5,459 are violent, 
resulting in a combined total of 36,534 fatalities. Conflict event interactions and types 
shown in Tables 3-4 share some similarities but also exhibit significant differences. 
Overall, violent conflict events occur primarily between government forces and rebel 
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forces. Involvement of political militia ranges from 6-30%.   Ethnic militias are 
insignificant.  Violence against citizens ranges from 20-60%.  
 


























Chad 1:2 45% 30% 3% 
Liberia  1:1 75% 6 3 
South Africa 1:400 25% 13% 5% 
Namibia 7:10 34% 7% 1% 
Burundi 8:5 85% 16% <1% 
Rwanda 1:2 60% 30% <1% 
 
Table 4 Summary of ACLED Event Types: Overshoot and Collapse Reference Behavior 
Conflict Highest Category of 
Event Types  (%) 
Type 1 Type 5 Type 6 Type 7 Ratio 
1:7 
Chad Battle no change 45% 1% 3% 37% 1:1 
Liberia Battle No Change 31% 5% 21% 21% 3:2 
South Africa Violent Riots & 
Protests 
2.5% 1.5% 75% 20% 1:10 
Namibia Violent Riots &Protests 16% 2% 62% 20% 4:5 
Burundi Battle No Change 47% 3% 2% 43% 1:1 




Overshoot and Collapse Conflict Data and Descriptions 
Chad 
 























































































Chad	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  Events	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  Con\lict	  Events,GDP	  	  
Data	  sources:	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  UCDP-­‐GED,	  World	  Bank	  




Figure 3 Liberia Conflict Events and Peace Operations 
 
 
Liberia has experienced two civil wars between 1989 and 2014.  The first lasted from 
1989 until 1997, and the second from 1999 until 2003.   The first civil war had its roots in 
a coup d’état in 1980 by Samuel Doe that overthrew the democratically elected 
government that included Charles Taylor.  Taylor initiated an uprising against the Doe 
government in 1989, during which time multiple factions emerged to fight for control of 
the government, committing atrocities against civilians on all sides in spite of the 
presence of peace keeping troops from the Economic Community Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG) supported by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 
and the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL).  Following several unsuccessful 
mediation attempts, the international community brokered a cease-fire in 1995, after 
which Taylor was elected president in 1997.   Low-level fighting continued, however, 
with Taylor backing rebels in neighboring Sierra Leone (using revenues from diamonds) 
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South Africa Antiapartheid struggle 
 
Figure 4 South Africa Conflict Events, GDP Growth  
 
The struggle against the oppressive apartheid regime in South Africa, led by the African 
National Congress (ANC), involved both violent and non-violent components until 
transition to democracy in 1994. Violent opposition against the government has roots in 
the militancy in the 1960s resulting in the jailing of ANC leaders (including Nelson 
Mandela) on charges of terrorism and treason; and the Soweto student uprising in 1974 
that resulted in the indiscriminant killing of hundreds of unarmed citizens by South 
African police.  Over time, labor, religious organizations, student organizations, militant 
white political organizations, aligned themselves with the black consciousness movement 
in opposition to the apartheid government of South Africa. The end of apartheid was 
triggered by the rise of DeKlerk to power in 1989 – 1991, who responded to the 
perceived demise of intellectual and moral commitment of the general populace to the 
apartheid regime, which occurred concurrently with the rise of black immigrants into the 
lucrative mining sector threatening the economy under policies of “separate 
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Klerk’s nationalist party ended in 1994, when an all-white referendum on ending 




Figure 5 Namibia Conflict Events, GDP Growth 
 
Namibia gained independence from South Africa in 1990.  The Caprivi Liberation Army 
was formed in 1994 with the goal of self-rule for the Lozi people inhabiting the Caprivi 
Strip between Namibia and Botswana.  The Namibian government accused the rebels of 
being allied with the Angolan rebel movement UNITA.   The movement gained 
momentum and in 1999 launched attacks on security facilities in the provincial capital of 
Caprivi.  The government declared a state of emergency, which was followed by hard 
crack down on rebels, alleged UNITA forces, and citizens.  The rise in conflict events in 
2011 involves primarily riots in the capital city of Windhoek and protests over food 
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Data	  Sources:	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  World	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Figure 6 Burundi Conflict Events, GDP 
 
 
Figure 7 Burundi Conflict Events and Peace Operations 
 
The Burundi civil war, lasting from 1993-2005, was a contest for power between the 
Tutsi-dominated army and armed Hutu Rebel groups, initiated by the assassination of 
democratically elected President Ndadye (Hutu) by Tutsi soldiers in October 1993 with 
widespread civilian causalities and spill over from Rwanda resulting in the 1995 































Burundi	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  Events,	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Data	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  World	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and replaced him with Buyoya, a Tutsi.  Buyoya represented the government in the 
internationally brokered Arusha accords signed in 2000.  A transitional national assembly 
was set up in 2002 with a power sharing agreement to bridge the ethnic divide that 
remained with the two main Hutu rebel groups refusing to sign the accords.  A peace 
agreement signed in 2003 called for integration of rebel soldiers with the national army. 
The agreement was supported by African Union peacekeepers from 2003-2004, with UN 
peacekeepers taking over from AU in 2004 and remaining through 2006.  Small rebel 
forces and the Imbonerakure, a countrywide armed youth militia continued low level 
fighting have continued fighting in spite of the peace agreement (Figure 31). The threat 
of widespread civil war reemerged in the Spring of 2015, when President Nkurunziza (a 
Hutu) announced that he would run for a third term, in spite of a constitution that limits 
him to two.  Inter-racial and inter-ethnic violence has risen in recent years among 
disgruntled shantytown dwellers and other disaffected groups in response to income 












Figure 8 Rwanda Conflict Events and GDP Per Capita 
 
 
Rwanda exhibits a second of overshoot and collapse observed at year 11 post-conflict, 
when a secondary steep rise is observed, immediately followed by another 
logarithmically decreasing collapse in number of violent events. 
 
Damped Impulse  
Conflicts with reference behavior categorized as a highly damped impulse are Angola, 
Sierra Leone, Lesotho, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Congo, CAR-Seleka. ACLED 
records a total of 9,845 events for the conflicts in this category, of which 5,967 are 
violent. Conflict event interactions and types are summarized in Tables 5 and 6.  There is 
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Angola 1:1 93% 3% 0 
Sierra Leone 3:2 74% 20% <1% 
Lesotho 1:20 22% 39% 1% 
Guinea 1:2 42% 9% 3% 
Guinea-Bissau 1:5 62% 6% <1% 
Mali 3:1 56% 8% 3% 
Congo 1:15 10% 77% <1% 
 
Table 6 Summary of ACLED Event Types: Damped Impulse Reference Behavior 
Conflict Highest Category of Event Types  Type 1 Type 5 Type 6 Type 7 
Ratio 
1: 7 
Angola Battle No Change  62% 1% 4% 17% 11:3 
Sierra Leone Battle No Change  42% 8% 6% 22% 2:3 
Lesotho Violent riots & protests 27% 3% 35% 33% 1:1 
Guinea Violence against citizens 24% 6% 32% 34% 3:4 
Guinea-
Bissau Battle no change 50% 8% 24% 13% 5:1 
Mali Battle no change 32% 14% 15% 26% 3:2 




Damped Impulse conflict descriptions and data 
Angola 
 




Figure 10 Disaggregated Angola Conflict Events, 1989 – 2014 
 
Several conflicts were active in Angola between 1989-2014.  The dominant 
conflict, initiated in 1975, was between pro-Soviet People's Movement for the Liberation 
of Angola (MPLA), the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) 
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States and Zaire—over control of the newly liberated country and its rich oil and mineral 
resources. Peace accords were reached 1991 and 1994, and there was a UN presence from 
1995 to 1999.  Renewed fighting between UNITA and the government ended in a 
ceasefire in 2002 followed by demobilization with UN oversight through 2003 (Figure 
33).  The International Crisis Group (ICGP attributes the collapse of UNITA as an 
effective fighting force to a combination of UN sanctions imposed from 1993-2002 and 
the death of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi in February 2002.  The conflict between FLEC 
separatists in the oil-rich Cabinda province was active from 1994-2009 at much lower 
levels than the conflict with UNITA (Figure 9).   
Angola events are strongly dominated by interactions between government and 
rebels (70%), followed by interactions between rebels and citizens (10%).  The majority 
of events are of type 1 – battles with no change of territory (62%), followed by type 7 – 
violence against civilians (17%).   Total number of events recorded in ACLED from 1997 




Sierra Leone  
 
Figure 11 Sierra Leone Conflict Events 
 
Sierra Leone was constitutionally declared a one-party state in 1978.  A brutal 
civil war in 1991 by Sankoh rebels as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), led by 
former military and supported by Charles Taylor of Liberia, resulted in a new constitution 
that adopted a multiparty system.  RUF funding was secured through conflict diamonds 
in the south and east areas of Sierra Leone under their control.  Subsequent military coups 
in 1992, 1996, and 1997 are attributed to failure of new governments to deal effectively 
with the RUF and disgruntled military.  In 1998, the West African ECOMOG 
intervention led by Nigeria drove the rebels out of the capital.   
Civil war prior was fueled in Sierra Leone by trade in diamonds. UN monitoring 
troops deployed in July 1999 to monitor the Lome Peace Agreement, negotiated by 
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diamonds in exchange for cessation of hostilities.255  Violence by rebels against 
peacekeeping troops continued through 2001, until RUF disarmament began following 
intervention by the UK.  The war was declared over and disarmament complete in 2002.  
Sierra Leone has since experienced relative peace and stability, as well as substantial 
economic growth, as shown by the steady rise in GDP per capita since the end of 
violence. 
In Sierra Leone, a steep rise in violent events/year peaks over a period of 1-3 
years, and is followed by logarithmically decreasing count over a period of at least ten 
years. Rebels were involved in 68% of Sierra Leone events, compared to government 
involvement in 6%. Interactions between rebels and citizens are moderately dominant 
events (30%); followed by events rebels with uncategorized interactions (20%); followed 
by interactions equally associated between rebels and outside forces (9%) and between 
political militia and citizens (10%).  The majority of events are of type 8 - remote 
violence (26%), followed by type 5 - non-violent events by conflict actors (23%) and 
type 7 - violence against civilians (21%).  Total number of events recorded in ACLED 
from 1997-2014 is 4,574; total number of events recorded from 1989-2011 in UCDP-
GED is 1416. 
                                                
255 UN peacekeeping troop buildup in Sierra Leone was incremental, beginning with 6,000 in 1998, 
increasing to 11,000 in February 2000 (UN Security Council Resolution 1289), to 13,000 in May 2000, and 






Figure 12 Lesotho Conflict Events, GDP Growth 
 
Coup d’etat quelled by South Africa Development Community 1998; threatened 
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Figure 14 Guinea-Bissau Conflict Events, GDP Growth, Military Expenditures 
 
The civil war from 1998 to 1999 was triggered by coup d’état against President Vieria, 
backed by neighboring states.  The initiating event for the coup clashes with separatists, 
during which some military were accused of supplying weapons to the separatists.  The 
military that were dismissed led the coup.  An internationally negotiated peace agreement 
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Figure 15 Mali Conflict Events, GDP Growth 
 
Mali experienced a sudden increase in conflict in 2011 when arms from the 
conflict in Libya flooded the northern sector where Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb was 
active.  Fighting between insurgents began January 2012 in North and South against 
Malian government, with insurgents in North demanding independence or greater 
autonomy.  Coup d’état in April 2012; rebels declared independence.  Islamic backed 
insurgents (who were resisted by Tuareg rebels) gained control of most cities in Northern 
Mali, with weapons coming from Libya.   French military and AU forces retook control 
from Islamists in 2013 in response to request by Mali government.  Peace deal signed 
between Tuareg rebels and government in July 2013 did not hold.  Ceasefire signed by 








































































































Mali	  Con\lict	  Events,	  GDP	  
Data	  Sources:	  ACLED,	  UCDP-­‐GED,	  World	  Bank	  




Congo – Brazzaville 
 
Figure 16 Republic of Congo Conflict Events, GDP Growth 
 
First civil war led by Ninja and Cobra militia following contested parliamentary 
elections in 1993 ended with peace accords in 1994.  Militia did not disarm; flow of arms 
from regional conflicts provided resources to rise of militia movement in face of high 
unemployment and political uncertainty.   Attempts to forcibly disarm the Cobra militia 
in 1997 led to second civil war among militia and government, which recruited Ukrainian 
mercenaries. UNITA-provided diamonds to government in return for Congolese support, 
prompting Angola to support the militia rebels, who were also supported by France. The 
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Conflicts with exponential growth reference behavior are Somalia, Nigeria- Boko 
Haram, Mozambique, Sudan, Cameroon, Gabon, DRC, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso.  
ACLED records a total of 32,681 events for the conflict in this category, of which 25,279 
are violent. Conflict event interactions and types are summarized in Tables 7 and 8.  
Compared to the previous two reference behaviors, political militia are more likely to be 
involved in conflict events compared to government or rebel forces.  
















Somalia 1:1 38% 38% 8% 
Nigeria- BH 0 8% 78% 13% 
Mozambique 0 14% 38% <1% 
Sudan 1:2 45% 22% 6% 
Cameroon 1:5 22% 21% 11% 
Gabon 0 10% 9% <1% 
DRC 2:3 64% 20% 4% 
Mauritania 1:3 22% 2% <1% 
Burkina Faso 0 12% 4% 6% 
 
Table 8 Summary of ACLED Event Types for Conflicts with  
Exponential Reference Behavior 
Conflict Highest Category of Event Types  (%) Type 1 
Type 
5 Type 6 Type 7 
Ratio 
1:7 
Somalia Battle no change 54% 7% 5% 29% 2:1 
Nigeria-BH Violence against citizens 14% 1% 0% 84% 1:6 
Mozambique Violent riots & protests 10% 8% 42% 39% 1:4 
Sudan Violence against citizens 34% 7% 13% 39% 1:1 
Cameroon Battle no change 35% 1% 30% 30% 1:1 
Gabon Violent riots & protests 5% 6% 70% 19% 1:4 
DRC Battle no change 38% 9% 6% 32% 1:1 
Mauritania Violent riots & protests 9% <1% 70% 9% 1:1 




Exponential Growth conflict descriptions and data 
Somalia 
 
Figure 17 Somalia Conflict Events 
 
Observed over 25 years, Somalia exhibits conflict escalation that is almost perfect 
exponential behavior.  However, as discussed in the case study, micro level patterns are 
observed within smaller time segments of the macro pattern. The resources to sustain 
conflict in Somalia have varied over the past twenty-five years, with different roles 
played by the international community. Conflict events escalated significantly from 2011 
– 2012 when the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) successfully dislodged 
Al Shabaab from the power base it had held in Mogadishu since 2006.256  At the same 
time, Kenyan troops entered Somalia to attack Al Shabaab rebels accused of kidnapping 
                                                
256 There was also a massive famine in 2011, brought on in part by the previous years of conflict that 
resulted in massive displacements.  
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foreigners on Kenyan soil.257 AMISOM presence in Somalia has since increased, driving 
Al Shabaab out of other strongholds, and a fragile federal government has been installed 
in Mogadishu supported by the international community.  Yet even so, violent events 
have continued to increase exponentially, as dynamics between other international (e.g., 
development and humanitarian aid workers), regional (e.g., peacekeeping troops) and 
local actors (e.g., politicians and war lords) continue to fuel new and old conflicts, and Al 




Figure 18 Mozambique Conflict Events 
 
                                                
257 For a timeline of the conflict in Somalia, see http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14094503.   
AMISOM is a regional peacekeeping mission operated by the African Union with the approval of the 
United Nations. The African Union’s Peace and Security Council created it in 2007 with an initial six-
month mandate that has been subsequently extended and expanded to 22,000 troops as of 2014.  Original 
troop contributing countries Uganda and Burundi were joined by Ethiopia in 2014 (http://amisom-
au.org/2014/01/ethiopian-troops-formally-join-amisom-peacekeepers-in-somalia/), Kenya in 2012 
(http://amisom-au.org/kenya-kdf/), and Djibouti in 2011 (http://amisom-au.org/djibouti/).  Troops from 
Sierra Leone joined AMISOM in 2013 
(http://english.cntv.cn/program/newsupdate/20130402/100693.shtml) but were called home in 2014 due to 
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Sudan	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Source:	  World	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Figure 24 Burkina Faso Conflict Events 
 
 







































Mauritania	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  World	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Burkina	  Faso	  Con\lict	  Events	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Source:	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  World	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Conflicts with reference behavior dominated by sustained oscillations (which may 
involve a rising or falling mean) are Ivory Coast, Ethiopia-ONLF, Nigeria-Political, 
Algeria, Guinea, Niger, Ethiopia-OLF, Kenya-Kikuyu and Turkana conflicts, CAR-
political, Senegal, Zimbabwe, and Uganda.   ACLED records a total of 19,899 events for 
the conflicts in this category, of which 15,178 are violent. Conflict event interactions and 
types are summarized in Tables 9 and 10 in Appendix A.   
 
Table 9 Summary of ACLED Interaction Types for Conflicts  
















Ivory Coast 30:2 41% 20% 5% 
Ethiopia-
ONLF/OLF 1:10 79% 3% 7% 
Nigeria-
Political 1:8 18% 44% 13% 
Algeria 4:5 74% 11% <1% 
Niger 3:5 52% 5% 3% 
Kenya -ethnic 3:2 16% 26% 50% 
CAR- Seleka 
rebel coalition 4:1 36% 6% <1% 
CAR-political 15:1 32% 37% 1% 
Senegal 1:1 45% 5% <1% 
Zimbabwe 0 23% 64% <1% 
Uganda 1:1 61% 5% 6% 
 
 
Table 10 Summary of ACLED Event Types for Conflicts with Sustained Oscillations 
Conflict Highest Category of Event Types  Type 1 Type 5 Type 6 Type 7 
Ratio 
1: 7 
Ivory Coast Violence against citizens 28% 3% 30% 33% 1:1 
Ethiopia-
ONLF, OLF Battle no change 64% 5% 10% 20% 11:1 
Nigeria-
Political Violence against citizens 34% 4% 23% 40% 3:4 
Appendix A 
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Algeria Battle no change 51% 6% 20% 21% 5:2 
Niger258 Violent riots & Protests 26% 3% 33% 20% 1:1 
Kenya – ethnic Battle no change 58% 15% 1% 25% 2:1 
CAR- Seleka 
rebel coalition 
Violence against citizens 23% 11% 8% 52% 2:5 
CAR-political Battle no change 36% 4% 12% 33% 1:1 
Senegal Battle no change 36% 4% 32% 27% 4:3 
Zimbabwe Violence against citizens 3% 6% 12% 77% 3:70 
Uganda Battle no change 40% 9% 11% 39% 1:1 
 
Oscillatory Behavior conflict data and descriptions 
 
Central African Republic  
 
Figure 25 Central African Republic Conflict Events, GDP Growth 
 
 
                                                































CAR	  Con\lict	  Events,	  GDP	  growth	  
Data	  Sources:	  ACLED,	  UCDP-­‐GED,	  World	  Bank	  
UCDP	  CAR	  Events	   ACLED	  CAR	  Events	  




























































































ACLED	  CAR	  Events	  
UCDP	  CAR	  Events	  
ALCED	  LRA	  CAR	  



































Ivory	  Coast	  Con\lict	  Events,	  GDP	  Growth	  	  
Data	  source:	  	  ACLED,	  	  World	  Bank)	  
ACLED	  Ivory	  Coast	   UCDP	  Ivory	  Coast	  




Figure 28 Ivory Coast Peace Operations 
 
Ethiopia-ONLF, Ethiopia –OLF   
 
Figure 29 Ethiopia Conflict Events 
 
Like Somalia, Ethiopia has a long history of corruption and civil war that is 
impacted significantly by regional actors.  However, in contrast to Somalia, the civil wars 
have been driven by secessionist goals rather than competition for consolidation of 
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the case of the Ogaden region (made up primarily of Somalis) but has made concessions 




Figure 30 Nigeria Conflict Events 





























































































Nigeria	  Political	  Con\lict	  Events	  













Figure 32 Niger Conflict Events 



































Algeria	  Con\lict	  Events	  and	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  
GDP	  Data	  source:	  World	  Bank	  
ACLED	  Algeria	  Events	   UCDP	  Algeria	  Events	  
GDP	  per	  Capita	   Linear	  (ACLED	  Algeria	  Events)	  



















































































































Niger	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  and	  Con\lict	  Events	  














































Kenya	  Con\lict	  Event	  Frequency	  	  
Ethnic	  versus	  Political	  
Turkana	  117+150+151+406	   Kikuyu	  100+227	  
Political	  501+1565	   Linear	  (Turkana	  117+150+151+406)	  
Linear	  (Kikuyu	  100+227)	  














































Con\lict	  Events	  and	  GDP	  Growth	  Rate:	  Senegal	  






Figure 35 Uganda Conflict Events 








































Uganda	  Con\lict	  Events	  and	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  
ACLED	  Uganda	   UCDP	  Uganda	   GDP	  per	  Capita	  
















































Zimbabwe	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  and	  Con\lict	  Events	  
UCDP	   ALED	   GDP	  per	  Capita	   Linear	  (ALED)	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Appendix B: Description of Data and Data Sources  
 
This appendix discusses the data sources used in this research, presents summary 
statistics for the three categories of variables used in the quantitative analysis – country 
level socio-economic and political risk factors, conflict characteristics, and intervention 
characteristics.  Country level socio-economic and political risk factors are derived 
primarily from the World Bank and the Polity IV project, respectively, except where 
noted.  Conflict statistics draw on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset, the 
UCDP/GED and ACLED.  These datasets are described, followed by summary statistics 
from UCDP/GED and ACLED on conflict events in the sample cases.  The fourth set of 
statistics is for peace operations.  Data on unilateral interventions is from the Regan 
(2002) dataset on foreign military interventions, the Correlates of War Project, and the 
UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset 2010-v1. An original data set on peace operations was 
created for this research, based on triangulated data from the SIPRI Multilateral Peace 
Operations Database, the International Peace Institute (IPI) Peacekeeping Database 
(Perry & Smith, 2013); official reports of the United Nations and other peace keeping 
organizations; published reports of news media and third-parties; and other scholarly 
research (Bellamy & Williams, 2011, 2015; Hultman et al., 2015; P. D. Williams, 2013). 
The fifth set of statistics describes aid and development trends in the pooled cases, based 
on information from AidData.org, ReliefWeb.int, and the OECD.   The final set of data is 
for IDPs and refugees, obtained from the International Institute for Security Studies 
Armed Conflict Database, built from data collected and reported by the International 




Data Sources  
Country-Level Conflict Risk Factors 
As described in Chapter 1, risk factors associated strictly with country 
characteristics involve governance capacity and reach, socio-economic conditions, and 
inequality.  Factors that have been shown in studies published in peer reviewed journals 
to have statistical correlation with conflict risk and duration in relevant contexts and that 
are associated with theoretical explanations of greed, grievance, and governance 
weakness were used as control variables.   
• Economic Factors: GDP per capita; GDP growth; % GDP commodity exports (oil, 
metals); illicit trade 
• Socio-economic factors: population size; population density; male secondary 
schooling; male youth unemployment, inequality; depth of poverty, presence of a 
dominant ethnic group with polarization of a minority;  
• Geographic factors: land mass; mountainous terrain; wars on borders;   
• Political factors: state reach (measured as % urban population, % access to 
electricity); governance (measured by both the Polity IV index and the World Bank 
CPIA index259),  
                                                
259 Polity IV measures regime type (autocracy to full democracy).   The Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment (CPIA) index of the World Bank Group rates countries annually against a set of 16 criteria 
grouped in four clusters: economic management, structural policies, policies for social inclusion and equity, 
and public sector management and institutions.  The economic management and the public sector 
management and institution clusters includes property rights and rule-based governance, quality of 
budgetary and financial management, efficiency of revenue mobilization, quality of public administration, 
and transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector; and environmental sustainability.  The 
structural policy cluster includes trade, financial, sector, and business regulatory environment. The social 
inclusion and equity cluster includes programs to build human resources through health and education 
services; equity of public resource use; and regulations to ensure gender equality.   The International 
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• Security Factors: annual military expenditures, military expenditures as percent of 
government spending, military expenditures as percent of GDP, military expenditures 
per capita; size of security forces 
 
World Bank Data 
 
The World Bank Open Data260 provides annual data used in this study on the following 
country level conflict risk factors:  GDP, GDP per capita, GDP growth, GDP share of 
lowest tenth percentile, commodity exports, population size and density, percent urban 
population and access to electricity, male and female secondary schooling, male youth 
unemployment, GINI index for inequality, CPIA index (including gender inequality and 
corruption), remittances, infant mortality, net migration, high estimates of internally 
displaced persons. Illicit trade in minerals is estimated from World Bank data.   
 
Trading Economics 
GDP and other economic data on Somalia is unavailable from World Bank for many of 
the conflict years of interest.   This study uses time series data from Trading Economics, 
a commercial database of macroeconomic statistics for 200 countries, with more than 
7000 financial and industry indicators from over 1000 sources updated hourly.261  
 
                                                                                                                                            
Development Association (IDA) resource allocation index (IRAI) is calculated based on the CPIA.   The 
minimum level regarded as adequate for development is 2.41 (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004) 
260 World Bank, “World Bank Open Data”, http://data.worldbank.org/, Retrieved June 2014 – February 
2016.  
261 Trading Economics, ‘Somalia Economic Indicators,” 




Missing data on commodity resource dependency as a percentage of GDP is estimated 
from values and analysis reported by the Economist, differentiated by oil, metals, and 
food.262  
 
United Nations Development Programme 
 
Annual statistical tables and country reports from the UNDP263 provide the following 
data for this study: human development index (HDI), (including gender differentiated in 
recent years), forest area, remittances inflow, net ODA as percent GDP, multi-
dimensional poverty index.   
Illicit Trade  
Illicit trade that fuels conflict is assumed to derive from four major sources:  drugs, 
minerals, wildlife, and arms.   Data on illicit drug trade since 1997 is from annual reports 
of the United Nations Office on Drug and Crime.264  Data on illicit mineral extraction and 
wildlife trafficking is estimated using triangulated data from World Bank, the UN, the 
OECD, the World Economic Forum, and the US Department of the Treasury sanctions 
program.265  
                                                
262 The Economist, August 12, 2015, “Commodity Dependency: A Risky State,” 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2015/08/commodity-dependency, data retrieved October 
2015.  
263 United Nations Development Programme, “Human Development Reports”, http://hdr.undp.org/en/data, 
Retrieved June 2014 – February 2016.  
264 United Nations Office on Drug and Crime, “World Drug Report 2015,” 
https://www.unodc.org/wdr2015/en/previous-reports.html. Data retrieved June 2014 - October 2015.  
265 UNDP-MONUSCO-OSEG. 2015. “Experts background report on illegal exploitation and trade in 
natural resources benefitting organized criminal groups and recommendations,” Final report. April 15, 
2015. http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/UNEP_DRCongo_MONUSCO_OSESG_final_report.pdf. 
Retrieved October 2015;  World Economic Forum, “State of The Illicit Economy Briefing Papers,” 2015. 





Ethnic Polarization and Social Fragmentation 
Data used in this study for ethnic polarization and social fragmentation draws on the 
databases created and published by Reynal-Querol (2001),266 Posner (2004),267 and the 
Minorities at Risk Project at the University of Maryland Center for International 
Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM). Reynal-Querol (2001) and Posner 
(2004) study the role of ethnicity and conflict on the poor economic performance of 
African countries.  Reynal-Querol (2001) find that indices based on social fragmentation, 
ethnic polarization, and/or religious diversity are better predictors of poor performance 
than more traditional indices based on ethno-linguistic diversity measures (ELF). Posner  
(2004) finds that a measure of ethnic fractionalization based on politically relevant ethnic 
groups does a better job of accounting for the effects of ethnic diversity on economic 
growth in Africa than does ELF. The Minorities at Risk (MAR) Project is a university-
based research project that monitors and analyzes the status and conflicts of politically 
active, marginalized and vulnerable communal groups since 1945 in all countries with a 
current population of at least 500,000. 268  
                                                                                                                                            
OECD, “OECD Task force on charting illicit trade”, Preliminary version 2015. 
http://www.oecd.org/gov/risk/illicit-trade-converging-criminal-networks.pdf. Retrieved January 2016; US 
Department of the Treasury, “Resource Center: Sanctions Program and Country Information,” 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/Programs.aspx. Retrieved October 
2015.  
266 British Library EThOS e-theses online service, “Ethnic and Religious Conflicts, political systems and 
growth,” http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?did=1&uin=uk.bl.ethos.271096, Data retrieved June 2015.  
267 Posner, Daniel, 2004. “Measuring Ethnic Fractionalization in Africa,” 
http://web.mit.edu/posner/www/papers/ethnic_fraction.pdf. Data retrieved June 2015.  
268 Minorities at Risk Project, 2009. “Minorities at Risk Dataset.” College Park, MD: Center for 
International Development and Conflict Management. Retrieved from 
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data.aspx on June 2015-September 2015. The project has proceeded in five 
phases since its inception, depending on the definition of groups included.  The last update in 2007 
broadened the definition of groups included, and reduced the size threshold to 100,000.  The MAR database 






SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 
The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database contains longitudinal data on military 
spending of 171 countries since 1988 (and NATO countries since 1949 or when they 
joined NATO).   The data for military expenditures by country is presented in current 
local price currency, constant US $(2011) and current US$ for calendar years and 
financial years.   Data in constant US$ (2011) per calendar year was used.  The database 
also provides military expenditure as share of GDP, per capita, and as percentage of 
general government expenditures.  SIPRI data is based on open sources and includes a 
questionnaire sent annually.  The questionnaire defines military expenditures as:  
“All current and capital expenditures on the armed forces, including peace 
keeping forces, defense ministries and other government agencies engaged 
in defense projects, paramilitary forces to be trained, quipped and 
available for military operations, and military space activities.” 
 
These expenditures include active and retired personnel and their families, operations and 
maintenance, procurements, military research and development, military construction, 
and military aid.  Excluded expenses are civil defense and current expenditures for 
previous activities.  
 
Military Balance Reports 
Annual Military Balance Reports published by the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies provide estimates of national army, total security sector troop size, and 
foreign troop presence, including peace keeping troops (The Military Balance 1999, 
1999; "The Military Balance 2002·2003," 2002; The Military Balance Report 2003·2004 
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2003; The Military Balance Report 2004-2005, 2004; The Military Balance Report 2005, 
2005; The Military Balance Report 2006, 2006; Military Balance Report 2007, 2007; The 
Military Balance Report 2008, 2008; The Military Balance Report 2009, 2009; The 
Military Balance Report 2010, 2010; The Military Balance Report 2011: The Annual 
assessment of global military capabilities and defence economics, 2011) . These are 
cross-checked with estimates from the UCDP/Prio Dyadic Conflict data set (Harbom, 
Melander, & Wallensteen, 2008) and peacekeeping data sources.  The reports also 
provide estimates of rebel troop sizes for 19 of the conflicts for a total of 195 conflict 
years. 
 
US Military Assistance 
Annual data on US military assistance is from the database on US military aid to foreign 
countries maintained by the Center for International Policy and supported by the Open 
Society Foundation.  The data provides breakdowns of US assistance to foreign militaries 
and police since 2000 that includes training, military equipment; financing, peacekeeping 
operations, excess defense articles, and counter terrorism operations.269   Definitions of 
assistance programs are taken from the US State Department and the Federation of 
American Scientists; Congressional reports provided by the FAS and Congressional 
websites are used for clarification and corroboration of US military assistance data.270  
 
 
                                                
269 Security Assistance Monitor, “A citizen’s guide to US security and defense assistance,” 
http://www.securityassistance.org/data/country/military/country/1996/2017/is_all/Africa. Retrieved June 
2014 - October 2015.  
270 Federation of American Scientists, “US Foreign Military Assistance Program Descriptions,” 
http://fas.org/asmp/profiles/aid/aidindex.htm.  Retrieved June 2015.  
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Civil Conflict Event Data 
Civil conflict statistics draws on four published conflict datasets: the UCDP/Prio 
Armed conflict Dataset, the UCDP/GED Africa dataset on conflict fatalities; the ACLED 
conflict event data set, and the SCAD dataset on political violence.  These datasets are 
described, followed by summary statistics from UCDP/GED and ACLED on conflict 
events in the pooled cases.   
 
UCDP/Prio Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2015 
UCDP/Prio records annual, country-level data on conflict dyadic interactions in 
all armed conflicts globally from 1946 to 2014, where an armed conflict is defined as: 
“a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory 
where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is 
the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.”    
 
A party is “either a government of a state or any opposition organization or 
alliance of organizations.”  An opposition organization is  “any non-governmental group 
of people having announced a name for their group and using armed force to influence 
the outcome of the stated incompatibility.”   The UCDP/Prio only deals with formally 
organized opposition, as the focus is on “armed conflict involving consciously conducted 
and planned political campaigns rather than spontaneous violence.”   In this respect, 
UCDP/Prio differs from both ACLED and SCAD. There are two types of 
incompatibilities in UCDP/Prio—that concerning control of territory or that concerning 
control of government (Gelditsch et al., 2002).   For each event, UCDP/Prio records the 
intensity of violence, according to the following categories: minor (25-1000 battle deaths 
during the course of the conflict), intermediate (25-1000 battle deaths in any given year), and 
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war (at least 1000 battle deaths per year).  
 
UCDP-GED version 1.5-2011, 1989-2010 
UCDP/GED provides georeferenced data on conflict events and fatalities for 
armed intrastate conflicts in Africa between 1989 and 2010 at the subnational level 
(down to administrative level 2).  Conflicts are defined and differentiated based on the 
actors and the issue involved.271   The unit of analysis for each conflict is a violent event 
involving the use of armed force by an organized actor against another organized actor, 
or against civilians, resulting in at least one direct death. These events are categorized as 
single-day, continuous, or summary events based on the known time duration within 
which the event occurred. Fatalities are categorized as side a (usually government), side b 
(rebel, militia), or citizen. Low, high, and best estimates of fatalities are provided 
(Sundberg, Lindgren, & Padskocimaite, 2010).   
 
ACLED Conflict Data  
ACLED provided georeferenced data on conflict events in Africa between 1997 
and 2014 at the subnational level (down to administrative level 2).  The unit of analysis is 
a conflict event, which may or may not involve violence or death.  ACLED differs from 
other conflict event databases in that it tracks interactions and outcomes between actor 
groups over space and time, providing insight into the dynamics of a conflict not 
available from other datasets.  
                                                
271 Several anomalous data entries were noted for actors attributed to conflicts in the course of conducting 
this research.  These anomalies involved actors attributed to the Burundi conflict ID number 90 and to 
Kenya conflict ID number 100.  
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There are seven event types (battles with no change of territory, battles in which a 
non-state actor overtakes territory, battles with government regaining control of territory, 
establishment of controlling presence (e.g., base or headquarters) in a territory, non-
violent activity by a conflict actor (e.g., negotiation, recruitment drive), riots and protests, 
violence against citizens, non-violent transfer of territory and remote violence). Actor 
types are government, rebels, militias, ethnic groups, political organizations and civilians.   
Interaction types are categorized according to dyadic pairs of primary actors for each 
event.    
ACLED codes estimated fatalities when reported by source material, with no 
distinction of victim type.  If source reports differ or are vague, the lowest number of 
fatalities is reported.  ACLED counting method for fatalities biases the total count 
downward, using the logic that most reports of fatalities are biased upward.   For 
example, if a report mentions “hundreds” of fatalities, ACLED records “100”.  If a report 
mentions dozens of fatalities, ACLED records “12”. Of the three datasets, only ACLED 
differentiates between different types of events to provide information on which type is 
more likely to produce civilian versus military fatalities, or to test for associations 
between type of conflict event and type of aid or presence of peacekeepers.  
 
Center for System Peace, Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research (INSCR) 
The Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research (INSCR) 272 was 
established to coordinate and integrate information resources produced and used by the 
Center for Systemic Peace. The following data resources were prepared by researchers 
                                                
272 Center for Systemic Peace, “INSCR Data Page”, http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html, 
Retrieved June 2014 – February 2016.  
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associated with the Center for Systemic Peace and are generated and/or compiled using 
open source information. These resources are made available as a service to the research 
community. All CSP/INSCR data resources have been cross-checked with other data 
resources to ensure, as far as possible, that the information recorded is accurate, reliable, 
and comprehensive.  The INSCR maintains databases downloadable in SPSS or Excel on 
forcibly displaced persons 1964 - 2008, major episodes of political violence 1946-2014, 
the Political Instability Task Force State Failure problem set 1955-2015, Polity IV 1800-
2014, coups d’état 1946-2014, and state fragility index 1995-2914. The INSCR data for 
Polity IV and coups d’état is used in this study.   
 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) and Refugee Data 
IDP and refugee data provide surrogate measures for perceived human security.  
Data used in this study is from UNHCR, ReliefWeb, and the Internal Displacement 
Monitoring Center (IDMC).  The IDMC is part of the Norwegian Refugee Council, an 
independent, NGO humanitarian organization recognized and is endorsed by the UN as a 
source for monitoring and analyzing internal displacement caused by conflict, general 
violence, human riots and natural hazards.   The IDMC provides annual country level 
data reports for inflows and outflows of IDPs and refugees, and their origins and 
destinations.  IDMC data aggregated by the International Institute for Strategic Studies 
(IISS) armed conflict dataset is used in this study.273  
 
 
                                                
273 International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), “Armed Conflict Database Monitoring Conflicts 
Worldwide”, https://acd.iiss.org/en/statistics/selectreporttype, Retrieved June 2014 – February 2016.  
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Foreign Aid Data 
AidData 
AidData274 provides an open source, searchable data portal and downloadable 
datasets at the national and subnational level of over one million past and present 
development finance activities from over 90 funding agencies and more than $40 trillion 
in funding for development. Aid projects are coded by type, donor, and implementing 
partner.   Pilot studies in select countries, including Somalia, Senegal, Uganda, and 
Nigeria DRC provide georeferenced aid projects to the first administrative level. Country 
level data is used for this study for all countries in Africa.   AidData also provides data 
for remittances, governance, and foreign direct investment that is used to triangulate and 




ReliefWeb is an online resource provided by United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) for humanitarian information on global 
crises and disasters since 1996.   Country specific data, updates, and reports are provided 
through downloadable “dashboard’ reports that summarize humanitarian needs, partner 
responses, and clusters of humanitarian funding requested and received, and major 
donors.275  
 
                                                
274 AidData Open Data for International Development, “Datasets”, http://aiddata.org/dashboard, Retrieved 
June 2014 – February 2016.  
275 ReliefWeb, http://reliefweb.int/.  Data retrieved June 2014 – January 2016. 
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Peace Operations Data 
This study compiles published data on peace operations into a new dataset for 
monthly troops numbers for the 66 peace operations in the conflict cases studies between 
1989-2014. These missions are of different types:  UN missions, African Union missions, 
other regional organizations (e.g., ECOWAS), ad hoc coalitions, and unilateral missions.  
The following publications are used to obtain data on monthly troop deployments.  
 
SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations (2000-2010)  
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) database on 
multilateral peace operations provides data on multilateral peace operations (both UN and 
non-UN) conducted around the world from 2000 – 2010. The included missions must 
meet the criteria for a peace operation, defined to be a mission under the authority of the 
UN and conducted by the UN or regional organizations or ad hoc coalitions sanctioned 
by the UN or authorized by a UN Security Council Resolution, with the state intention to 
(a) serve as an instrument to facilitate the implementation of peace agreements already in 
place, (b) support a peace process, of (c) assist conflict prevention and/or peace-building 
efforts.   Data contains start data, authorized troop numbers, budgets.  The dataset is 
available from SIRPI by request. 
 
 
International Peace Institute (IPI) UN Peacekeeping Database (1990-2015) 
The IPI peacekeeping database presents information on uniformed personnel 
contributions of contributing countries to UN missions by month, type and mission from 
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November 1990 to present and is updated monthly.276   The data is gathered from archival 
UN records.  Recent versions include financial and gender data.  
 
Supplemental Data on Peace Operations 
The following web-based resources are used to obtain mission monthly troop data 
from 1989 to 2014 for regional, ad-hoc, and unilateral peace operations:   
 
• International Institute for Strategic Studies:  Military Balance Reports 
 
• Mission Reports to the UN Security Council 
 
• EU Military Commission 
 
• African Union Peace and Security Department 
 
• AMISOM Daily Media Monitoring 
 
• Mission websites 
 




Regression Analysis Variables: Summary Data  
This section provides metadata, summary statistics and qualitative associations 
within the statistical datasets on conflict events in the pool of cases considered in the 
quantitative analysis.  
                                                
276International Peace Institute, “IPI Peacekeeping Database,” 




Conflict Events Metadata 
Comparison of Violent Conflict Event Count between Datasets 
For each conflict, Table 1 in the overview (p. 22) summarizes the following 
metadata: reference behavior, year of initiating event, conflict type, number of years in 
which there was violent conflict during the time period covered, number of recorded 
conflict events in ACLED (1997-2014), UCPD-GED (1989-2010), and total number of 
battle related fatalities (civilian and military). As illustrated, the pool of cases consists of 
a total of 584 ACLED violent conflict years compared to 470 violent conflict years in 
UCDP-GED, and a total of 51,883 ACLED violent conflict events compared to 20,621 
UCDP-GED violent conflict events.     
The metadata for number of conflict years, number of conflict events and battle 
related fatalities reported by the UCDP and the ACLED datasets are reasonably 
consistent, considering the different thresholds for counting when a conflict is active, 
what constitutes a conflict event, and the different time periods covered. The significantly 
higher number of events recorded by ACLED in Sierra Leone, Guinea, Ivory Coast, 
Guinea-Bissau, Zimbabwe can be attributed to the different threshold for counting 
conflict events during the peak of these conflicts. The significantly higher number of 
events recorded by ACLED for conflicts in Somalia, Mali, Sudan, Nigeria – Boko 
Haram, Kenya, the Central African Republic, Mauritania, Namibia, Cameroon, and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo can be attributed to a significant increase in violent 
activity in those conflicts after 2010, which are captured by ACLED but not by UCDP-
GED.  Similarly, the significantly lower count of events and fatalities recorded by 
ACLED for South Africa, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Algeria can be attributed to the fact that 
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episodes with large numbers of events and fatalities occurred in these countries prior to 
1997.  These are captured by UCDP-GED but not ACLED.  In spite of these differences, 
data from UCDP-GED and ACLED generate similar patterns of conflict events that result 
in the same reference behaviors.   
Patterns of violent conflict event type  
 
Figure 1 Conflict Event Types Across Cases 
 
 
Summary Statistics for Regression Analysis Variables 
Summary Statistics of Regression Analysis Variables by Conflict 
Table 1 Summary statistics for regression variables by conflict country 
   -> country_conflict = Angola_UNITA 
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
   ln_gdppc | 24 7.166918 .938907 5.845485 8.662742 
oilrents | 25 46.04 13.22397 20 70 
ssf_km2 | 25 97.18632 20.37713 52.16693 176.8489 
milexp_GDP | 22 .0556858 .0395576 .024479 .174476 
male_employ | 25 10.26 .1118034 10.1 10.6 







































































































ethnic_polar | 26 .5784615 .0431456 .57 .79 
ln_pop | 24 16.50333 .2361549 16.1232 16.88224 
gdp_growth | 24 5.592827 9.554885 -24.7 22.59305 
gdplowtenpc | 24 361.6541 457.66 27.6536 1405.358 
   polityIV_2 | 26 -2.461538 1.502818 -7 0 
cpia | 24 2.142403 .52714 1.3 2.783333 
corruption | 26 2.5 0 2.5 2.5 
low10GDPsh~e | 26 1.330385 .6205126 .8 2.5 
gender_equ~y | 17 3.088235 .2642971 2.5 3.5 
   frag | 26 .59 0 .59 .59 
   -> country_conflict = Burkina Faso 
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
   ln_gdppc | 25 5.852107 .4093805 5.263054 6.625638 
oilrents | 26 0 0 0 0 
ssf_km2 | 26 37.86982 4.161439 27.28938 41.94139 
milexp_GDP | 26 .0155743 .0042066 .0118858 .0274077 
male_employ | 24 5.195833 1.355658 0 6.4 
   urban | 26 19.84615 4.985517 14 29 
ethnic_polar | 0  
ln_pop | 26 16.316 .2207672 15.96492 16.68279 
gdp_growth | 25 5.474498 2.986568 -.6029285 11.01474 
gdplowtenpc | 25 87.7024 49.36227 38.03484 203.6301 
   polityIV_2 | 26 -2.269231 2.616222 -7 0 
cpia | 26 3.478979 .2881307 2.927 3.783333 
corruption | 26 3.35 0 3.35 3.35 
low10GDPsh~e | 26 2.239615 .2861955 1.8 2.7 
gender_equ~y | 26 3.5 0 3.5 3.5 
   frag | 26 .0226923 .1157085 0 .59 
   -> country_conflict = Burundi 
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
   ln_gdppc | 25 5.105237 .2523165 4.682266 5.587658 
oilrents | 26 0 0 0 0 
ssf_km2 | 26 1167.846 688.7712 288 2240 
milexp_GDP | 23 .0464347 .0181106 .0200809 .0803664 
male_employ | 26 10.27692 .1242826 9.9 10.4 
   urban | 26 8.653846 1.765045 6 12 
ethnic_polar | 26 .51 0 .51 .51 
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ln_pop | 25 15.7858 .1886573 15.511 16.13422 
gdp_growth | 25 1.297981 4.150113 -8 5.384657 
gdplowtenpc | 25 53.039 18.96149 34.56466 101.5015 
   polityIV_2 | 26 1.269231 4.754431 -7 6 
cpia | 25 3.011024 .538379 1.962 4 
corruption | 26 2.4 0 2.4 2.4 
low10GDPsh~e | 26 3.110769 .4265857 2.41 3.8 
gender_equ~y | 26 3.8 0 3.8 3.8 
   frag | 26 .25 0 .25 .25 
   -> country_conflict = Cameroon 
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
   ln_gdppc | 25 6.770867 .2642173 6.36835 7.193836 
oilrents | 25 7.24 2.067204 4 12 
ssf_km2 | 26 43.87223 9.588623 24.57627 50 
milexp_GDP | 26 .0137661 .0008622 .0122484 .0153261 
male_employ | 26 9.076923 2.382487 5 14 
   urban | 26 46.5 4.571652 39 54 
ethnic_polar | 26 .89 0 .89 .89 
ln_pop | 26 16.61802 .2018999 16.27655 16.94109 
gdp_growth | 24 2.33379 3.669432 -7.932067 5.561688 
gdplowtenpc | 25 225.3482 58.49887 145.7737 332.8 
   polityIV_2 | 26 -4.461538 1.30325 -8 -4 
cpia | 25 2.960194 .4391549 1.7 3.375 
corruption | 26 2.5 0 2.5 2.5 
low10GDPsh~e | 26 2.5 0 2.5 2.5 
gender_equ~y | 26 3.2 0 3.2 3.2 
   frag | 26 .58 0 .58 .58 
   -> country_conflict = Central African Republic 
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
   ln_gdppc | 25 5.881277 .2434047 5.526857 6.204409 
oilrents | 25 0 0 0 0 
ssf_km2 | 26 7.005936 2.591438 4.099679 12.86174 
milexp_GDP | 14 .0140275 .003746 .0104929 .0245038 
male_employ | 26 10.38462 .3015854 10.2 11.4 
   urban | 26 37.92308 .9347974 37 40 
ethnic_polar | 26 .79 0 .79 .79 
ln_pop | 25 15.11442 .1447664 14.86339 15.34513 
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gdp_growth | 25 1.141739 8.812098 -35.99997 8.907132 
gdplowtenpc | 25 48.87179 20.01389 26.59394 89.08669 
   polityIV_2 | 26 .5384615 4.110774 -7 5 
cpia | 25 2.464028 .2870929 1.638 3 
corruption | 26 2.5 0 2.5 2.5 
low10GDPsh~e | 26 1.338462 .3655975 .8 1.9 
gender_equ~y | 26 2.5 0 2.5 2.5 
   frag | 26 .21 0 .21 .21 
   -> country_conflict = Chad 
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
   ln_gdppc | 25 5.939526 .6747661 5.117103 6.960027 
oilrents | 11 32.72727 11.13635 12 46 
ssf_km2 | 0  
milexp_GDP | 22 .0311224 .0267406 .0091612 .1053988 
male_employ | 26 10.25769 .0757527 10 10.4 
   urban | 26 21.73077 .4523443 21 22 
ethnic_polar | 26 .66 0 .66 .66 
ln_pop | 25 15.97038 .2517983 15.56725 16.36693 
gdp_growth | 25 5.986699 8.879404 -15.70984 33.62937 
gdplowtenpc | 25 108.4368 50.4638 45.04986 187.6944 
   polityIV_2 | 26 -2.807692 1.52366 -7 -2 
cpia | 25 2.662709 .3888294 1.9 3.15 
corruption | 26 2 0 2 2 
low10GDPsh~e | 26 2.588462 .6482758 1.5 3.6 
gender_equ~y | 26 2.5 0 2.5 2.5 
   frag | 26 .59 0 .59 .59 
   -> country_conflict = Congo 
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
   ln_gdppc | 25 7.207728 .5614454 6.492493 8.147062 
oilrents | 25 53.6 11.48913 32 73 
ssf_km2 | 26 34.91992 1.522495 29.91202 36.36364 
milexp_GDP | 13 .0279242 .0117756 .0168718 .0557603 
male_employ | 26 10.27308 .0533495 10.2 10.4 
   urban | 26 59.57692 3.624065 54 65 
ethnic_polar | 26 .67 0 .67 .67 
ln_pop | 26 14.98761 .2022661 14.65875 15.32069 
gdp_growth | 25 3.042191 3.439617 -5.493076 8.751656 
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gdplowtenpc | 25 307.9156 222.8922 106.8311 759.7087 
   polityIV_2 | 26 -2.807692 4.12814 -8 5 
cpia | 25 2.578454 .3932576 1.7 3.041667 
corruption | 26 2.35 0 2.35 2.35 
low10GDPsh~e | 26 1.846154 .2641678 1.4 2.3 
gender_equ~y | 26 3 0 3 3 
   frag | 26 .12 0 .12 .12 
   -> country_conflict = Cote D'Ivoire 
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
   ln_gdppc | 25 6.825513 .2619045 6.401057 7.332328 
oilrents | 25 2.2556 2.448153 .02 7.8 
ssf_km2 | 26 57.86768 26.12337 42.13836 125.7862 
milexp_GDP | 18 .0141725 .0025788 .0079872 .0182292 
male_employ | 22 6.527273 1.070906 6.1 9.9 
   urban | 26 45.23077 4.580897 39 53 
ethnic_polar | 26 .43 0 .43 .43 
ln_pop | 25 16.58434 .1593911 16.27605 16.82692 
gdp_growth | 25 2.064115 3.712741 -4.38726 10.67409 
gdplowtenpc | 25 218.1114 50.41034 144.5955 321.0769 
   polityIV_2 | 26 -1.692308 4.379673 -9 4 
cpia | 25 2.873492 .4579556 2 3.625 
corruption | 26 2.4 0 2.4 2.4 
low10GDPsh~e | 26 2.303846 .121592 2.1 2.5 
gender_equ~y | 26 2.5 0 2.5 2.5 
   frag | 26 .43 0 .43 .43 
   -> country_conflict = Democratic Republic of the Congo 
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
   ln_gdppc | 27 5.44508 .426176 4.612079 6.11054 
oilrents | 22 2.618182 .7404223 1.1 3.8 
ssf_km2 | 27 37.36787 18.38933 21.17336 66.60785 
milexp_GDP | 18 .0158921 .0051914 .0042845 .023618 
male_employ | 27 14.34074 .1802972 13.8 14.6 
   urban | 27 36.37037 3.649533 30 42 
ethnic_polar | 27 .59 0 .59 .59 
ln_pop | 27 17.7498 .2380183 17.33488 18.13136 
gdp_growth | 27 .823375 6.474869 -13.46905 8.481957 
gdplowtenpc | 27 55.43744 22.63385 22.15251 99.128 
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polityIV_2 | 27 1.222222 4.135525 -9 5 
cpia | 26 2.130449 .7277016 1 2.975 
corruption | 27 2 0 2 2 
low10GDPsh~e | 27 2.2 0 2.2 2.2 
gender_equ~y | 27 2.7 0 2.7 2.7 
   frag | 27 .67 0 .67 .67 
   -> country_conflict = Ethiopia 
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
   ln_gdppc | 25 5.49761 .4725055 4.680245 6.375132 
oilrents | 26 0 0 0 0 
ssf_km2 | 24 188.025 78.84753 120 352.5 
milexp_GDP | 26 .0343883 .0275724 .0070117 .099346 
male_employ | 26 5.134615 .8717534 4.2 6.4 
   urban | 26 15.30769 1.934306 12 19 
ethnic_polar | 26 .78 0 .78 .78 
ln_pop | 25 18.02593 .2149277 17.65357 18.35988 
gdp_growth | 25 6.005926 6.460493 -8.67248 13.5726 
gdplowtenpc | 25 94.79802 47.4084 37.72877 199.6014 
   polityIV_2 | 26 -1.192308 2.713216 -8 1 
cpia | 26 3.085648 .5292995 1.8 3.675 
corruption | 26 2.7 0 2.7 2.7 
low10GDPsh~e | 26 3.480769 .0401918 3.4 3.5 
gender_equ~y | 26 3 0 3 3 
   frag | 26 .52 0 .52 .52 
   -> country_conflict = Gabon 
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
   ln_gdppc | 25 8.672158 .3869016 8.226591 9.385696 
oilrents | 25 39.08 6.903622 26 50 
ssf_km2 | 26 30.6944 5.507261 26.07004 37.15953 
milexp_GDP | 11 .014773 .0036002 .0088612 .0192011 
male_employ | 26 33.03846 3.043035 29.5 42.5 
   urban | 26 79.69231 5.938143 68 87 
ethnic_polar | 26 .52 0 .52 .52 
ln_pop | 26 14.0502 .1816857 13.73933 14.33886 
gdp_growth | 26 2.855803 3.852905 -8.932623 8.54531 
gdplowtenpc | 25 1701.608 724.6704 1009.548 3217.51 
   polityIV_2 | 26 -2.884615 3.11547 -9 3 
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cpia | 26 2.926923 .5196597 1 3.4 
corruption | 26 3.2 0 3.2 3.2 
low10GDPsh~e | 26 2.7 0 2.7 2.7 
gender_equ~y | 26 2.5 0 2.5 2.5 
   frag | 26 .11 0 .11 .11 
   -> country_conflict = Guinea 
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
   ln_gdppc | 25 6.021821 .160415 5.652606 6.242628 
oilrents | 26 0 0 0 0 
ssf_km2 | 26 50.31397 .2464624 50.20408 51.02041 
milexp_GDP | 15 .021819 .0083279 .0117267 .0377102 
male_employ | 26 2.780769 .565699 1.8 4.1 
   urban | 26 32.07692 2.855494 28 37 
ethnic_polar | 26 .84 0 .84 .84 
ln_pop | 26 15.9996 .2098096 15.56711 16.32312 
gdp_growth | 24 3.326746 1.37688 -.2801923 5.181603 
gdplowtenpc | 25 92.92769 28.77514 54.85295 164.5466 
   polityIV_2 | 26 -1.461538 2.77461 -7 4 
cpia | 26 2.91921 .234275 2.4 3.2 
corruption | 26 2.25 0 2.25 2.25 
low10GDPsh~e | 26 2.280769 .6112409 1.3 3.3 
gender_equ~y | 26 3.5 0 3.5 3.5 
   frag | 26 .4 0 .4 .4 
   -> country_conflict = Guinea-Bissau 
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
   ln_gdppc | 26 5.761222 .4330065 5.098647 6.491457 
oilrents | 27 0 0 0 0 
ssf_km2 | 27 304.2302 44.39321 230.3571 330.3571 
milexp_GDP | 16 .0135793 .0067734 .0018035 .0227928 
male_employ | 27 10.32963 .1381604 10.2 10.9 
   urban | 27 38.2963 6.626374 27 49 
ethnic_polar | 27 .53 0 .53 .53 
ln_pop | 27 14.13094 .1702604 13.84778 14.40358 
gdp_growth | 26 2.091592 6.924536 -28.09998 11.6 
gdplowtenpc | 26 77.86658 26.01812 40.95002 131.8968 
   polityIV_2 | 27 1.962963 4.839592 -8 6 
cpia | 26 2.710793 .1934482 2.4 3.3 
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corruption | 27 2.35 0 2.35 2.35 
low10GDPsh~e | 27 2.318519 .2572593 1.9 2.7 
gender_equ~y | 27 2.5 0 2.5 2.5 
   frag | 27 .05 0 .05 .05 
   -> country_conflict = Kenya 
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
   ln_gdppc | 25 6.240529 .4827864 5.405376 7.127302 
oilrents | 26 0 0 0 0 
ssf_km2 | 26 50.88009 1.032663 48.50615 51.3181 
milexp_GDP | 26 .0178696 .0040603 .0118697 .0288821 
male_employ | 26 16.87692 .0651628 16.8 17 
   urban | 26 20.57692 2.68586 16 25 
ethnic_polar | 26 .38 0 .38 .38 
ln_pop | 25 17.28301 .2017766 16.93641 17.60771 
gdp_growth | 25 3.50348 2.422614 -.799494 8.405699 
gdplowtenpc | 25 110.3547 67.00165 37.842 261.5575 
   polityIV_2 | 26 1.884615 6.313965 -7 9 
cpia | 26 3.484615 .3836931 2.6 4 
corruption | 26 3 0 3 3 
low10GDPsh~e | 26 1.85 .1726267 1.6 2.1 
gender_equ~y | 26 3.2 0 3.2 3.2 
   frag | 26 .47 0 .47 .47 
   -> country_conflict = Lesotho 
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
   ln_gdppc | 25 6.332769 .4270391 5.661415 7.109491 
oilrents | 26 0 0 0 0 
ssf_km2 | 25 66.66666 0 66.66666 66.66666 
milexp_GDP | 26 .0303647 .0078665 .0167727 .0492518 
male_employ | 26 32.35 3.970113 26.1 38.4 
   urban | 26 20.34615 4.068831 13 27 
ethnic_polar | 26 .34 0 .34 .34 
ln_pop | 26 14.43307 .0828223 14.26655 14.56182 
gdp_growth | 25 4.162024 1.854649 .4020317 7.255418 
gdplowtenpc | 25 55.49729 25.44414 25.87996 110.1172 
   polityIV_2 | 26 4.923077 5.563618 -7 8 
cpia | 25 3.303567 .3592395 2.2 3.75 
corruption | 26 3.5 0 3.5 3.5 
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low10GDPsh~e | 26 .9 0 .9 .9 
gender_equ~y | 26 4 0 4 4 
   frag | 26 0 0 0 0 
   -> country_conflict = Liberia 
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
   ln_gdppc | 25 5.154482 .5566696 4.171462 6.11884 
oilrents | 26 0 0 0 0 
ssf_km2 | 26 69.35096 47.94399 20.83333 135.4167 
milexp_GDP | 11 .0068288 .0024051 .0036176 .0119242 
male_employ | 26 3.903846 .5915949 3.4 5.7 
   urban | 26 47.80769 3.929572 43 58 
ethnic_polar | 26 .39 0 .39 .39 
ln_pop | 25 14.86428 .2643307 14.51183 15.27275 
gdp_growth | 25 5.103776 30.93215 -51.03086 106.2798 
gdplowtenpc | 7 79.37729 21.8235 50.35538 109.041 
   polityIV_2 | 26 2.192308 3.286569 -6 6 
cpia | 20 1.340417 1.078153 0 3.125 
corruption | 9 3 0 3 3 
low10GDPsh~e | 8 2.4 0 2.4 2.4 
gender_equ~y | 26 2.7 0 2.7 2.7 
   frag | 26 .55 0 .55 .55 
   -> country_conflict = Mali 
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
   ln_gdppc | 25 5.862546 .4130614 5.23564 6.52331 
oilrents | 26 0 0 0 0 
ssf_km2 | 26 9.815574 .6981423 6.393443 9.959017 
milexp_GDP | 24 .0155712 .0016741 .0134711 .0211201 
male_employ | 26 8.015385 1.646011 0 8.8 
   urban | 26 30.07692 5.106256 23 39 
ethnic_polar | 26 .42 0 .42 .42 
ln_pop | 26 16.27573 .2254594 15.9345 16.65377 
gdp_growth | 25 4.614097 3.635743 -2.139403 12.1 
gdplowtenpc | 25 105.624 71.18026 33.77377 237.4252 
   polityIV_2 | 26 5.038462 4.01478 -7 7 
cpia | 25 3.396468 .2689804 2.7 3.708333 
corruption | 26 3.35 0 3.35 3.35 
low10GDPsh~e | 26 2.565385 .6979641 1.4 3.7 
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gender_equ~y | 26 3.3 0 3.3 3.3 
   frag | 26 .08 0 .08 .08 
   -> country_conflict = Mauritania 
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
   ln_gdppc | 25 6.451617 .3399778 5.987807 7.023717 
oilrents | 8 8.125 5.743008 4 21 
ssf_km2 | 26 19.70874 1.086754 16.60194 20.26214 
milexp_GDP | 23 .0317877 .0071464 .0186244 .0401594 
male_employ | 26 45.03077 .526702 44.4 46.1 
   urban | 26 50.23077 5.826201 41 59 
ethnic_polar | 26 .54 0 .54 .54 
ln_pop | 26 14.85269 .2188289 14.49297 15.19418 
gdp_growth | 25 3.573989 3.713953 -4.044697 11.44466 
gdplowtenpc | 25 173.4823 83.65276 95.70253 336.8859 
   polityIV_2 | 26 -4.576923 2.500769 -7 4 
cpia | 25 3.279174 .4284537 2 3.9 
corruption | 26 2.6 0 2.6 2.6 
low10GDPsh~e | 26 2.526923 .3617266 2 3.1 
gender_equ~y | 26 3.9 0 3.9 3.9 
   frag | 26 0 0 0 0 
   -> country_conflict = Mozambique 
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
   ln_gdppc | 25 5.57871 .4703568 4.913727 6.405285 
oilrents | 25 .0508 .0668905 0 .16 
ssf_km2 | 25 24.37659 29.23128 2.544529 97.96438 
milexp_GDP | 26 .0174739 .0140965 .0080947 .0594349 
male_employ | 26 13.94231 .0757528 13.9 14.2 
   urban | 26 28.88462 2.250812 24 32 
ethnic_polar | 26 .5 0 .5 .5 
ln_pop | 25 16.74455 .2055739 16.41037 17.06719 
gdp_growth | 25 6.486377 3.534875 -5.104722 11.89893 
gdplowtenpc | 25 57.21358 24.46952 28.59064 108.9062 
   polityIV_2 | 26 2.807692 4.595817 -7 6 
cpia | 25 3.296585 .3522723 2.484959 3.741667 
corruption | 26 3 0 3 3 
low10GDPsh~e | 26 1.984615 .1488417 1.7 2.2 
gender_equ~y | 26 3.5 0 3.5 3.5 
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frag | 26 .3 0 .3 .3 
   -> country_conflict = Namibia 
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
   ln_gdppc | 25 7.950918 .398005 7.448269 8.646307 
oilrents | 25 0 0 0 0 
ssf_km2 | 23 449.8447 132.2458 203.5714 542.8571 
milexp_GDP | 25 .0317803 .0134247 .0175123 .0811324 
male_employ | 26 34.9 6.379593 29.3 55.4 
   urban | 26 34.26923 5.639558 27 45 
ethnic_polar | 0  
ln_pop | 26 14.44475 .161731 14.12367 14.69217 
gdp_growth | 25 4.158073 2.832063 -1.579539 12.26955 
gdplowtenpc | 25 366.0291 205.561 168.4614 796.4738 
   polityIV_2 | 26 6 0 6 6 
cpia | 26 3.5 0 3.5 3.5 
corruption | 26 3.5 0 3.5 3.5 
low10GDPsh~e | 26 1.146154 .1630479 .9 1.4 
gender_equ~y | 26 4.5 0 4.5 4.5 
   frag | 0  
   -> country_conflict = Niger 
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
   ln_gdppc | 25 5.514501 .2942873 5.076538 6.000125 
oilrents | 23 .8956522 2.538338 0 9.2 
ssf_km2 | 26 8.099404 .8428473 6.161138 8.451817 
milexp_GDP | 17 .0107422 .001407 .008614 .0134581 
male_employ | 26 7.3 0 7.3 7.3 
   urban | 26 16.5 .9486833 15 18 
ethnic_polar | 26 .7 0 .7 .7 
ln_pop | 26 16.29403 .2802274 15.85299 16.76592 
gdp_growth | 25 3.27864 4.059917 -6.516445 11.04123 
gdplowtenpc | 25 79.73917 29.72008 46.69342 141.2177 
   polityIV_2 | 26 3.076923 5.23009 -7 8 
cpia | 25 2.888 .5768593 1.7 3.5 
corruption | 26 2.95 0 2.95 2.95 
low10GDPsh~e | 26 3.05 .3062679 2.6 3.5 
gender_equ~y | 26 2.5 0 2.5 2.5 
   frag | 26 .22 0 .22 .22 
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-> country_conflict = Nigeria 
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
   ln_gdppc | 25 6.327552 .8971126 5.030936 8.008204 
oilrents | 25 32.92 10.91223 14 62 
ssf_km2 | 26 141.9569 40.11752 86.26373 178.022 
milexp_GDP | 26 .0077068 .0029066 .0040527 .0156455 
male_employ | 26 14.04231 .2610335 13.7 15 
   urban | 26 37 5.51362 29 47 
ethnic_polar | 26 .4 0 .4 .4 
ln_pop | 25 18.65543 .1893312 18.35004 18.97235 
gdp_growth | 25 5.776835 6.677702 -.6178506 33.73578 
gdplowtenpc | 25 161.624 165.0023 29.08447 571.0476 
   polityIV_2 | 26 .4230769 4.72587 -7 4 
cpia | 25 2.889784 .5325776 1.6 3.575 
corruption | 26 3 0 3 3 
low10GDPsh~e | 26 1.9 0 1.9 1.9 
gender_equ~y | 26 3 0 3 3 
   frag | 26 .55 0 .55 .55 
   -> country_conflict = Rwanda 
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
   ln_gdppc | 25 5.722675 .415322 4.879463 6.459381 
oilrents | 25 0 0 0 0 
ssf_km2 | 26 1511.859 941.474 258.3333 3208.333 
milexp_GDP | 26 .0284836 .0146344 .0110728 .0550917 
male_employ | 26 1 0 1 1 
   urban | 26 15.96154 7.356525 5 28 
ethnic_polar | 26 .4 0 .4 .4 
ln_pop | 25 15.92949 .232104 15.54961 16.28162 
gdp_growth | 25 5.18196 13.90936 -50.24807 35.22408 
gdplowtenpc | 25 64.04549 29.80675 24.99639 127.7332 
   polityIV_2 | 26 -4.692308 1.619117 -7 -3 
cpia | 25 3.209411 .7493623 1.2 3.925 
corruption | 26 3.4 0 3.4 3.4 
low10GDPsh~e | 26 1.911538 .0711445 1.8 2 
gender_equ~y | 26 3.8 0 3.8 3.8 
   frag | 26 .18 0 .18 .18 
   -> country_conflict = SIerra Leone 
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Variable | Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
   ln_gdppc | 25 5.627747 .4320048 5.034363 6.520564 
oilrents | 26 0 0 0 0 
ssf_km2 | 23 130.5573 53.21012 42.25352 211.2676 
milexp_GDP | 24 .0174054 .0089949 .0054304 .0366596 
male_employ | 26 7.153846 .1630479 6.6 7.2 
   urban | 26 40.92308 1.293772 39 43 
ethnic_polar | 26 .6 0 .6 .6 
ln_pop | 25 15.34644 .1632049 15.18153 15.6225 
gdp_growth | 25 2.583571 7.946066 -19.01291 26.26858 
gdplowtenpc | 25 84.49572 54.44933 32.13933 230.8467 
   polityIV_2 | 26 1.5 5.686827 -7 7 
cpia | 25 2.81446 .5771557 1.2 3.5 
corruption | 26 2.8 0 2.8 2.8 
low10GDPsh~e | 26 2.619231 .4647746 1.9 3.4 
gender_equ~y | 26 3 0 3 3 
   frag | 26 .52 0 .52 .52 
   -> country_conflict = Senegal 
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
   ln_gdppc | 25 6.560751 .2889313 6.125731 6.998123 
oilrents | 26 .001 .0012649 0 .004 
ssf_km2 | 26 87.31931 16.24583 50.58333 96.875 
milexp_GDP | 26 .0160598 .002079 .0133263 .0211206 
male_employ | 26 11.22692 .1079173 11.1 11.5 
   urban | 26 36.07692 2.057631 33 40 
ethnic_polar | 26 .56 0 .56 .56 
ln_pop | 26 16.14838 .2080178 15.80138 16.50149 
gdp_growth | 0  
gdplowtenpc | 25 174.7995 64.1297 96.07059 281.0942 
   polityIV_2 | 26 3.884615 4.283241 -1 8 
cpia | 25 3.381621 .4749643 2.3 3.816667 
corruption | 26 3.2 0 3.2 3.2 
low10GDPsh~e | 26 2.35 .2249444 2 2.7 
gender_equ~y | 26 3.5 0 3.5 3.5 
   frag | 26 .04 0 .04 .04 
   -> country_conflict = Somalia 
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
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ln_gdppc | 24 5.232882 .3098739 4.488636 5.700444 
oilrents | 27 0 0 0 0 
ssf_km2 | 12 7.735247 7.879234 3.189793 31.89793 
milexp_GDP | 0  
male_employ | 0  
   urban | 27 34.22222 3.226493 29 39 
ethnic_polar | 27 .68 0 .68 .68 
ln_pop | 27 15.85753 .1826566 15.65117 16.16856 
gdp_growth | 25 .413164 1.780485 -.3650562 8.849967 
gdplowtenpc | 0  
   polityIV_2 | 27 .037037 2.579229 -7 5 
cpia | 27 1.703704 .2503559 1.5 2 
corruption | 27 1.2 0 1.2 1.2 
low10GDPsh~e | 0  
gender_equ~y | 27 2.5 0 2.5 2.5 
   frag | 0  
   -> country_conflict = South Africa 
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
   ln_gdppc | 25 8.373742 .3422265 7.838142 8.997254 
oilrents | 25 .074 .0851959 0 .29 
ssf_km2 | 26 108.3911 63.96973 50.86491 228.9127 
milexp_GDP | 26 .0182551 .0088201 .0112536 .0435788 
male_employ | 26 43.64615 4.448841 30.7 52 
   urban | 26 57.80769 3.888642 52 64 
ethnic_polar | 26 .72 0 .72 .72 
ln_pop | 26 17.60073 .1375783 17.3562 17.80453 
gdp_growth | 25 2.51677 2.076533 -2.137042 5.585046 
gdplowtenpc | 25 467.1921 160.6853 253.549 808.0865 
   polityIV_2 | 26 8.346154 1.49512 4 9 
cpia | 26 3.9 4.53e-16 3.9 3.9 
corruption | 26 3.4 0 3.4 3.4 
low10GDPsh~e | 26 1.023077 .0651625 1 1.2 
gender_equ~y | 26 5 0 5 5 
   frag | 26 .39 0 .39 .39 
   -> country_conflict = Sudan 
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
   ln_gdppc | 26 6.627022 .6042854 5.777602 7.521806 
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oilrents | 23 10.18783 8.635872 0 27 
ssf_km2 | 25 77.2058 34.26397 40.03224 142.0204 
milexp_GDP | 17 .0297571 .0103015 .0095431 .0465648 
male_employ | 27 22.04444 .1601283 22 22.6 
   urban | 27 32.22222 1.502135 27 34 
ethnic_polar | 27 .7 0 .7 .7 
ln_pop | 27 17.17565 .211254 16.77538 17.48801 
gdp_growth | 26 3.846263 5.431544 -10.1 11.51573 
gdplowtenpc | 26 234.9567 145.6931 83.9758 480.4545 
   polityIV_2 | 24 -5.625 1.837117 -7 -2 
cpia | 25 2.036 .6143006 1 2.608333 
corruption | 0  
low10GDPsh~e | 27 2.6 0 2.6 2.6 
gender_equ~y | 27 2.2 0 2.2 2.2 
   frag | 27 .29 0 .29 .29 
   -> country_conflict = Uganda 
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
   ln_gdppc | 25 5.722363 .40718 5.024446 6.488248 
oilrents | 24 0 0 0 0 
ssf_km2 | 26 268.3327 47.98651 206.0914 355.33 
milexp_GDP | 26 .0232647 .0058916 .013242 .0391867 
male_employ | 26 5.073077 1.028614 3.2 6.8 
   urban | 26 12.73077 1.457606 11 16 
ethnic_polar | 26 .28 0 .28 .28 
ln_pop | 25 17.04263 .2430218 16.64416 17.44195 
gdp_growth | 25 6.781875 2.261461 3.141907 11.52324 
gdplowtenpc | 25 78.52796 35.63595 34.97977 157.769 
   polityIV_2 | 26 -3.307692 2.131089 -7 -1 
cpia | 25 3.653696 .3551989 2.9 4.1 
corruption | 26 2.55 0 2.55 2.55 
low10GDPsh~e | 26 2.353846 .0508392 2.3 2.4 
gender_equ~y | 26 3.5 0 3.5 3.5 
   frag | 26 .53 0 .53 .53 
   -> country_conflict = Zimbabwe 
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
   ln_gdppc | 25 6.37781 .2682779 5.790569 6.808471 
oilrents | 26 0 0 0 0 
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ssf_km2 | 0  
milexp_GDP | 12 .028455 .0156731 .0104069 .0733398 
male_employ | 26 12.41654 4.152184 7 20.2 
   urban | 26 32.57692 1.747526 28 35 
ethnic_polar | 26 0 0 0 0 
ln_pop | 26 16.34622 .1067647 16.13642 16.53982 
gdp_growth | 25 .5904741 8.192756 -17.66895 11.90541 
gdplowtenpc | 0  
   polityIV_2 | 0  
cpia | 25 2.573475 .6594844 1.4 3.4 
corruption | 26 1.35 0 1.35 1.35 
low10GDPsh~e | 0  
gender_equ~y | 26 2.7 0 2.7 2.7 
   frag | 26 0 0 0 0 
   -> country_conflict = algeria 
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
   ln_gdppc | 25 7.79542 .4667906 7.261676 8.58685 
oilrents | 25 19.2 6.557439 9 32 
ssf_km2 | 0  
milexp_GDP | 26 .0326342 .0099981 .0121083 .0535911 
male_employ | 26 32.84231 9.277248 19.1 46.1 
   urban | 26 61.57692 5.886752 51 70 
ethnic_polar | 26 .51 0 .51 .51 
ln_pop | 25 17.28135 .1227314 17.05719 17.4844 
gdp_growth | 25 2.844508 2.231274 -2.100001 7.2 
gdplowtenpc | 25 786.9953 398.4567 413.1463 1554.603 
   polityIV_2 | 26 -1.230769 3.128037 -7 2 
cpia | 26 2.911538 .58057 1.9 3.5 
corruption | 26 3.3 0 3.3 3.3 
low10GDPsh~e | 26 2.9 0 2.9 2.9 
gender_equ~y | 26 3.75 0 3.75 3.75 
   frag | 26 0 0 0 0 
 
Summary Statistics of Regression Variables by Reference Behavior Type 
Table 2 Summary Statistics of Regression Variables by Reference Behavior Type 
    -> SDTYPE = 1    
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Variable | Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      oilrents | 138 2.622101 9.387639 0 46 
ssf_km2 | 127 666.4571 787.446 20.83333 3208.333 
ln_pop | 152 15.76928 1.033962 14.12367 17.80453 
gdplowtenpc | 132 204.7288 205.1286 24.99639 808.0865 
polityIV_2 | 156 1.717949 5.233632 -7 9 
      gender_equ~y | 156 3.716667 .8962166 2.5 5 
ethnic_polar | 130 .536 .1344734 .39 .72 
frag | 130 .392 .16142 .18 .59 
type | 156 1.666667 .7477565 0 2 
forest | 156 16.36667 14.39294 7.6 48 
      ln_human_t~d | 147 -3.653881 2.318929 -8.638258 .0268071 
anninfmort~y | 156 127.2923 62.88798 41.4 299.6 
ln_mile~_aid | 127 -1.170656 1.878715 -6.31004 4.269493 
scaled_usm~t | 84 5.918993 12.45204 0 61.69116 
ln_gdppc | 150 6.37443 1.384321 4.171462 8.997254 
      ln_aid_per~p | 150 -2.449681 1.661112 -7.704463 .6880941 
scaled_unr~p | 156 25.9494 87.73772 0 946.96 
~l_sa_mm_tmp | 156 2.328256 4.651077 0 18 
      -> SDTYPE = 2      
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      oilrents | 181 13.76243 23.32128 0 73 
ssf_km2 | 178 99.91372 97.56806 6.393443 330.3571 
ln_pop | 180 15.36318 .8741671 13.84778 16.88224 
gdplowtenpc | 175 153.5185 221.6414 25.87996 1405.358 
polityIV_2 | 183 .9617486 5.226061 -8 8 
      gender_equ~y | 174 3.2 .4554106 2.5 4 
ethnic_polar | 183 .5681421 .1524555 .34 .84 
frag | 183 .2503279 .2270424 0 .59 
type | 183 1.797814 .4776265 0 2 
forest | 183 38.56831 25.35906 1 75 
      ln_human_t~d | 157 -3.685318 1.743677 -10.56152 -.6201745 
anninfmort~y | 182 162.9797 57.98401 47.1 265.2 
ln_mile~_aid | 134 -1.742229 1.5473 -6.813139 2.752157 
scaled_usm~t | 103 3.051039 12.85057 0 128.6283 
ln_gdppc | 175 6.274932 .7958725 5.034363 8.662742 
      ln_aid_per~p | 176 -2.14426 1.094035 -6.087308 .4951233 
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scaled_unr~p | 183 7.394742 29.52463 0 207.804 
~l_sa_mm_tmp | 183 9.342842 67.47227 0 652.8 
      -> SDTYPE = 3      
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      oilrents | 186 8.63543 13.45569 0 50 
ssf_km2 | 199 40.93076 35.00786 2.544529 178.022 
ln_pop | 215 16.24231 1.22032 13.73933 18.97235 
gdplowtenpc | 183 360.4065 606.5643 22.15251 3217.51 
polityIV_2 | 214 -1.742991 4.167201 -9 6 
      gender_equ~y | 217 2.992627 .5612824 2.2 3.9 
ethnic_polar | 191 .624555 .131328 .4 .89 
frag | 190 .2923684 .2489559 0 .67 
type | 217 1.769585 .6400205 0 2 
forest | 217 38.91613 26.89128 .3 85 
      ln_human_t~d | 191 -3.786984 2.599738 -10.34675 -.1758078 
anninfmort~y | 215 132.7856 41.77261 52.3 242.8 
ln_mile~_aid | 147 -1.822038 1.140986 -4.196683 1.153862 
scaled_usm~t | 123 16.21612 43.90459 0 246.6 
ln_gdppc | 207 6.360083 1.118649 4.488636 9.385696 
      ln_aid_per~p | 206 -2.32983 1.227956 -6.294655 .9429767 
scaled_unr~p | 216 31.94476 80.95439 0 399.72 
~l_sa_mm_tmp | 217 7.743318 34.016 0 264 
      -> SDTYPE = 4      
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      oilrents | 246 5.243967 11.46199 0 62 
ssf_km2 | 200 98.0124 93.86492 4.099679 355.33 
ln_pop | 248 16.82903 .9405953 14.86339 18.83417 
gdplowtenpc | 220 189.2305 260.8438 26.59394 1554.603 
polityIV_2 | 228 .1666667 4.7943 -9 9 
      gender_equ~y | 254 3.015354 .4465286 2.5 3.75 
ethnic_polar | 254 .4849606 .2332444 0 .79 
frag | 254 .2910236 .2165918 0 .55 
type | 254 1.771654 .5787949 1 3 
forest | 254 22.05591 17.1765 .7 48 
      ln_human_t~d | 238 -4.016205 2.2109 -10.96989 -.6172625 
anninfmort~y | 254 127.8043 60.32464 25.6 332.9 
ln_mile~_aid | 202 -1.348217 1.371804 -3.473125 3.375744 
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scaled_usm~t | 139 4.911637 7.847186 0 40.72273 
ln_gdppc | 245 6.245271 .7740691 4.680245 8.58685 
      ln_aid_per~p | 245 -2.596636 1.138982 -7.248315 -.8962762 
scaled_unr~p | 254 6.029776 23.37047 0 144.936 
~l_sa_mm_tmp | 254 3.558661 9.376932 0 63 
 
Correlation/Independence Check of Select Independent Variables  
The following correlations are evaluated using pairwise correlation statistical algorithms 
in STATA, conditioned on having statistical significance in the 90% confidence level to 
report correlation coefficients.  
 
• GDP 
o Strong positive correlation with population, military expenditure, 
landmass, aid 
o Weak positive correlation with US military assistance, percent GDP oil 
o Moderate negative correlation with aid per capita, humanitarian aid, 
number of regional and single actor troop-mission months 
• Polity  
o Weak, positive correlation with conflict involving religious extremists; 
military expenditure per capita, GINI coefficient 
o Weak negative correlation with conflict involving ethnic factions 
o Strong, negative correlation with oil income  
• Infant mortality 
o Strong positive correlation with coups, social fragmentation 
o Strong negative correlation with oil income, annual aid, military 
expenditure per capita, polity 
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• Institutional capacity (CPIA) 
o Weak negative correlation with peace agreements, type of war, sanctions, 
gender inequality 
o Weak positive correlations with number of marginalized groups, GDP 
growth, higher GDP per capita of lowest decile 
• Border Conflict 
o Strong negative correlation with oil rent, military expenditure per capita, 
annual aid 
o Strong positive correlation with number belligerents, ethnic conflict and 
social fragmentation 
• Number of belligerents has strong positive correlation with ethnic conflict, social 
fragmentation, and involvement of religious extremists 
• Military expenditure per capita has strong positive correlation with coups 
• US military assistance 
o Strong positive correlation with social fragmentation, number of 
belligerents, and annual aid 
o Weak positive correlation with GDP per capita of lowest decile 
o Moderate negative correlation with GDP per capita,  
• Annual combined aid  
o Strong negative correlation with coup 
o Strong positive correlation with social fragmentation, ethnic conflict, 
number belligerents, religious extremists 
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• State armed forces have strong positive correlation with ln GDP, percent GDP oil, 
military expenditures, military expenditures per capita, percent urban population 
(and access to electricity) 
• Ratio of military expenditures to humanitarian aid  
o Strongly and positively correlated with HDI, GDP per capita, oil as % 
GDP, change in infant mortality rates 
o Negatively correlated with military expenditures as % GDP, aid as % 
GDP, and gender inequality 
• Ratio of military expenditures to total aid 
o Positively correlated with GDP, HDI, state security forces and oil as % 
GDP 
o Negatively correlated with gender inequality, troop mission months of 
peace operations 
• Total aid and PK Mission months show a slight negative correlation (-.16) but the 





Figure 2 Independence Between Aid and Peace Keeping Mission Months. Aid Data Source: 
AidData.org 
 
• Total aid and # belligerent groups show a slight correlation (-.1) but with no 
statistical significance.  
• Annual humanitarian aid as percent of total aid has weak to moderate positive 
correlation with all types of peace operations, but is most strongly correlated with 
regional missions other than African Union (.32) and UN (.22).  
• UN PK Mission months, Regional PK mission months, and Coalition PK Mission 
months are independent from each other.    The number of PK missions and 
number of peace agreements or negotiated settlements is weakly correlated but 
the correlation is not statistically significant.  (See figure below)  
• Regional and single actor troop missions months have moderate positive 





Figure 3 Relationship Between Number of Peace Agreements and Negotiated Settlements and 
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Background 
My research examines the combined effects of third-party peacekeeping, humanitarian 
aid, and development interventions on resiliency of different actors in civil conflict, using 
Somalia as a case study.  Understanding the integrated effects of these interventions over 
time requires knowledge of what is happening on the ground among stakeholders and 
primary actors at the local and regional level, how these dynamics impact the broader 
conflict, and the result on both local and regional interests.   I will conduct interviews 
with program managers and researchers at the headquarters of key international 
organizations responsible for some of these interventions to glean their understanding of 
mandates, their theoretical frameworks for program design and assessing impacts, and 
access to available data on interventions and their effects on capacities where possible.   
Fight or Flight 
Several capital cities in Europe host international organizations and research institutions 
with long-standing interests and programs to address the Somali conflict and its impact 
on human security and resiliency of actors in conflict.  The United Nations (UN) Office 
in Geneva, with its focus on disarmament research (through UN Institute for 
Disarmament Research, or UNIDIR) and refugees (through the Office of the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees, or UNHCR) are of particular interest for assessing the 
capacity of fighters in the conflict, and the impact on those displaced by the conflict.  In 
addition, the Center on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding and the Small Arms 
Survey at the Graduate Institute of Geneva provide peacebuilding research to the UN on 
factors that potentially impact resiliency of conflict actors as well as the general 
populace.  
The Diaspora 
The UNDP has estimated that remittances from 
the Somali Diaspora exceeded $1B USD in 2004 
and has continued to rise ever since, representing 
as much as 25% of household income, with over 
40% of households receiving assistance.   In 




be a two-edged sword - supporting local clans in times of conflict as well as local 
reconciliation and state building.277  The distribution of these remittances and impacts on 
human security and conflict is a key variable in my research.  The Netherlands has 
received one of the largest influxes of Somalia Diaspora in Europe.  Since 1998, this 
community has organized to provide extensive interventions involving provision of 
services, building social capital, and advocacy in their homeland through the Himlio 
Relief and Development Association (HIRDA).  These programs, which are led by 
Somali’s in partnership with other international actors, are of great interest.  
 
Data Gathering and Interviews 
In Geneva, I will interview program managers and researchers associated with the 
following organizations on their programs in Somalia.  :  
• UNIDIR Weapons of Societal Disruption Program - engaged since January 2014 
with Federal Government of Somalia on weapons and ammunition management 
(WAM), as a result of the UN Security Council decision in 2013 to partially lift 
arms embargo in Somalia, in order to support the newly formed government 
• Small Arms Survey at The Graduate Institute of Geneva – conducting on-the-
ground research in Horn of Africa on the presence of small arms, and factors that 
impact legal and illicit trade 
• Center on Conflict, Development, and Peacebuilding at the Graduate Institute of 
Geneva – engaged in research on role of civil society and peacebuilding with 
focus on Somalia as a case study for last 20 years.  
• Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) – longitudinal data 
gathering on distribution of displaced persons and refugees from Somalia conflict, 
and UNHCR programs to provide services to the displaced and refugees.  
In The Netherlands, I will interview program managers associated with the relief and 
development programs managed by HIRDA in Somalia, with emphasis on how they 
mobilize the Somali Diaspora to be directly involved.  
 
Interview and Discussion Questions:  
The questions fall into three broad categories:   
• understanding perceived conflict drivers and impact from local and regional 
perspectives,  
• understanding the intended scope and outcomes of interventions, and factors that 
affect success in achieving those outcomes, and  
• relationships between peace operations, development, and humanitarian aid 
interventions.   
Observations of the impact of interventions on resiliency of different actors, challenges 
and opportunities in those interventions, and unintended consequences are of particular 
interest.   Sample questions are provided below.  
                                                





How Information Will Be Used:  
My dissertation explores how interventions impact conflict outcomes through intervening 
variables associated with resiliency.  Discussions and responses to interviews will inform 
a model to establish a baseline and examine alternative scenarios for sequencing and 
layering of interventions to achieve more stable equilibrium at local and regional levels.  
This model will then be used to test hypotheses and explore future policy options. 
 
Sample Discussion and Interview Questions 
 
Background 
What is the primary area of operations/concern for interventions? 
How long have you been concerned with/active in this area of operations?  
How do you interact with the local community in the area of operations? 
What is the local language and how do you deal with any differences? 
What conflict assessment method, if any, do you employ? 
 
Perspectives of Local Conflict Drivers 
1. What is the primary conflict in the area of operations?  What is your 
understanding of the root causes and conflict drivers?   How have those changed 
over time? What are contributing factors and how do they mitigate or amplify the 
drivers?  How do your activities address these root causes?  
2. What is your understanding of who the key stakeholders are in the conflict? 
a) What are the underlying interests of these stakeholders?    
b) What are their perceptions of the conflict?  
c) What actions have the different key stakeholders taken to support (or oppose) 
peacebuilding? What are their capacities for taking action?  
3. What are the primary sources and means of power (physical, military, spiritual, 
personal ability and skills, identity, social capital) of the key stakeholders and 
how do they use these resources in conflict?   
4. How do sources of power differ among identity groups in the area of operations?  
Men and women?  How do different groups use power over each other? Do some 
key stakeholders depend on other key stakeholders with more power (e.g., is there 
a power imbalance) and if so, how?    
5. Over time, what have been indicators of conflict escalation or de-escalation in 
your area of concern/operations? What are potential triggers or windows of 
opportunity (e.g., key events) remembered by one side or other that lead to 
conflict escalation?  
6. In your experience, are the key stakeholders open to change to reduce conflict in 
your area of operations, and what do they think is necessary to bring that change 
about?  How do their desired changes relate to your mission for reducing violence 




7. In your view, does your presence alter the power dynamics in the local 
community?  If so, in what way(s) and how are conflict drivers affected?  
8. In your experience, how do the drivers differ from the local to the regional and 
national scale?  
Peacebuilding (operations with respect to small arms, weapons, and ammunition 
management) 
1. What are the intended outcomes and metrics of success for your mission?   Who 
defines those?   Do you have any input?  How successful do you consider your 
mission to be today?  In the past?    
2. Effective peace operations have been attributed to the mechanisms described 
below.   In your experience, how do these relate to the motivations to manage 
weapons and ammunition in accordance with UN standards versus motivations to 
engage in diversion and illicit trade?  To what extent will these processes be 
important to the Federal Government of Somalia, the Somali National Army, and 
AMISOM peace keeping officers in their ability to stabilize and control territory 
in Somalia with assurances of security in the long term?   How do these 
motivations differ depending on the organization and the level within the 
organization and geography? Please be specific with examples if known.  
• Changing incentives for aggression relative to maintaining peace --especially 
through economic and political means  
− Peace dividends (e.g., socio/economic/political gains) for rank-and-file 
soldiers, political elite, and would-be spoilers 
− Influencing the perceptions of others regarding the legitimacy of 
different parties to the conflict 
− Military deterrence (increase cost of aggression) 
− Trip wire for enforcement missions from additional third parties 
− Condition aid upon compliance with peace operations 
• Alleviate fear and mistrust  
− Monitor compliance with cease-fires and rule of law, facilitate 
communication among parties in conflict, allow parties to signal 
intentions for peace 
• Prevent or control accidents or involuntary defection by hard-liners 
− Deter rogue groups, shift power towards moderates, ease 
communication, provide on-the-spot mediation, provide law and order, 
provide alternatives to escalation in response to alleged violations  
• Dissuade parties from political abuse and/or excluding the “other” from the 
political process 
− Monitor and/or train security sectors inclusively, monitor and/or run 
election processes, provide neutral interim administration, transform 
military groups into political operations 
 
3. What other factors contribute to the outcome of your operations that are not 
mentioned above?   
4. What factors are impediments to the success of your peace operations?   What 




5. Do you interact with groups that deliver humanitarian aid?   What is your role in 
those interactions?  Do those interactions significantly impact the outcomes of 
your peacekeeping mission (positively or negatively)?   In what specific ways?  
6. How does the involvement of troops from other countries, or of local militia, 
impact your ability to conduct effective operations?      
7. Do the peace operations at the local level in your area of operations have an 
impact on the larger scale in the region?  If so, how?  What do you think may be 
the implications for sustainability of peacebuilding operations?  
Humanitarian aid and development programs  
1. In your experience, what are the greatest immediate barriers and/or threats to 
human security? Using concrete examples, how does your mission address those 
barriers and/or threats? 
a) How does the ongoing conflict in Somalia specifically impact your mission in 
Ethiopia and elsewhere in the Horn, if at all?  
2. In carrying out your mission, what kind of interactions have you had with local 
population?  What have been the primary social structures through which you 
have been engaged in implementing humanitarian aid or development programs?  
a) Have your programs had a positive, negative, or mixed impact on human 
security and resiliency in the short, medium, and long term278?  In your view, 
what is the likelihood that these outcomes will be sustainable? 
b) What was the level of local involvement in these programs?  
c) What is your understanding of the intended goals of these programs?  How 
were those communicated to you?  
d) Do you know who is accountable for the management of these programs?  
e) In your experience, were there unintended consequences of these programs 
(positive or negative)?  If so, did they impact your peace operations?  If so, in 
what way(s)? 
f) How have these programs impacted local capacity building for peace 
building? Social cohesion? Community level trust?  National level trust?  
3. Based on what you know, what is the level of local support for these programs?  
Is the level of support consistent across the different stakeholders?  If not, who is 
more supportive and why?  
4. From what you have seen, what has been the impact (economically and 
materially) of these programs in the short, medium, and long term with respect to 
their intended objectives?   
5. How have these programs impacted relationships between people and institutions 
in positions of power at the local, regional, and national levels?  
6. From what you have seen, have these programs been perceived as being 
accountable and inclusive? What is perceived as positive and why?  What is 
perceived as negative and why? 
7. How have these programs affected social cohesion, trust  
a) within the local community  
                                                
278 Short term is 1 month – 1 year; medium term is 1 – 3 years; long term is 3 – 10 years 




b) with the national government  
8. Are other intervention programs addressing these barriers and/or threats? What is 
your relationship to those?  
9. Have interventions (peacekeeping, political, humanitarian, development) by other 
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Background 
My research examines the combined effects of third-party peacekeeping, humanitarian 
aid, and development interventions on resiliency of different actors in civil conflict, using 
Somalia as a case study.  Understanding the integrated effects of these interventions over 
time requires knowledge of what is happening on the ground among stakeholders and 
primary actors at the local and regional level, how these dynamics impact the broader 
conflict, and the result on both local and regional interests.  
 
Ethiopia is a key regional player with long-standing strategic interests in the Somali 
conflict.  These interests involve complex security and economic concerns that include 
the presence of Ethiopian Somalis in the Somali regional state of Ethiopia and their 
claims upon the Ethiopian government (supported by extremists in the conflict in 
Somalia), a large influx of Somali refugees from the conflict in South Central Somalia, 
and violent cross-border spillover from Somalia. Historic governance, cultural, and 
natural factors in the region (e.g., climate change) create stresses that exacerbate the 
conflict and complicate the pursuit of Ethiopia’s interests. 
 
As a result, Ethiopian has participated in various interventions in Somalia over the past 
two decades, and is currently participating in peace operations to address national and 
human security concerns, is providing humanitarian aid and sanctuary for refugees, and is 
a regional leader in development initiatives to reduce the risk of conflict by fostering a 
stable and productive environment in the Horn of Africa.  These initiatives involve many 
different sectors – government, civil society, private enterprises, international and 
regional non-governmental organizations, and academia.   I wish to engage a cross-
section of key stakeholders in Ethiopia who are (or have been) involved these initiatives.   
Specific areas of interest are:  
 
• Ethiopian scholars and analysts within academia and think tanks who study issues 
that arise around the Somali conflict and Ethiopian efforts to resolve them.  
• United Nation organizations in Ethiopia that run humanitarian aid and 
development programs for Somalis:  
− UNOPS, UNDP, WFP, World Bank, UNHCR, International Labor 
organization  
• Ethiopian military involvement in the African Union Mission to Somalia 
(AMISOM) 
− Training and deployment of peace keeping troops 




• NGOs and CSOs in Ethiopia working on humanitarian aid and development to 
address Somali conflict and/or reduce its impact in Ethiopia (refugees in Ethiopia 
and/or direct services in Somalia) 
− Examples: Mercy Corps, Medecins San Frontiers Switzerland; Oxfam, Save 
the Children, CARE 
• Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Office of the Facilitator for 
Somalia Peace and National Reconciliation 
Desired Profiles of Interview Subjects 
Humanitarian Aid and Development 
• Senior scholars and researchers in the area of regional peace keeping and security  
• Decision makers responsible for strategic analysis of conflict and organization’s 
role and those who advise them 
• Ethiopian foreign service officials and diplomats in the area of regional peace 
keeping, security and development 
• Program managers responsible for designing and implementing initiatives and 
those who advise them 
• Practitioners who provide services in the field and those who support them 
Peace Operations in AMISOM 
• Senior officers and soldiers at battalion and command unit levels engaged in 
stabilization and protection missions  
• Officers providing training, mentoring and advisory support to Somalia Police 
Force and Somalia National Army  
• Soldiers on the ground in Somalia involved in securing humanitarian corridors, 
logistics, and/or escorting convoys for the delivery of aid  
• Civil-military affairs officers or soldiers assigned to interface with civilians and/or 
the AMISOM civilian components in Somalia for non-security assistance  
• Instructors who train troops to deploy for AMISOM missions.  
Interview and Discussion Questions:  
The questions fall into three broad categories:   
• understanding conflict drivers and impact from local and regional perspectives,  
• understanding the intended scope and outcomes of interventions, and factors that 
affect success in achieving those outcomes, and  
• relationships between peace operations and humanitarian aid interventions.   
Observations of the impact of interventions on resiliency of different actors, challenges 
and opportunities in those interventions, and unintended consequences are of particular 
interest.   Sample questions are provided below.  
How Information Will Be Used:  
My dissertation explores how interventions impact conflict outcomes through intervening 
variables associated with resiliency.  Discussions and responses to interviews will inform 
a model to establish a baseline and examine alternative scenarios for sequencing and 
layering of interventions to achieve more stable equilibrium at local and regional levels.  





Sample Discussion and Interview Questions 
Background 
1) What is the primary area of operations/concern for interventions? 
2) How long have you been concerned with/active in this area of operations?  
3) How do you interact with the local community in the area of operations? 
4) What is the local language and how do you deal with any differences? 
5) What conflict assessment method, if any, do you employ? 
Perspectives of Local Conflict Drivers 
1. What is the primary conflict in the area of operations?  What is your 
understanding of the root causes and conflict drivers?   How have those changed 
over time? What are contributing factors and how do they mitigate or amplify the 
drivers?  How do your activities address these root causes?  
2. What is your understanding of who the key stakeholders are in the conflict? 
a) What are the underlying interests of these stakeholders?    
b) What are their perceptions of the conflict?  
c) What actions have the different key stakeholders taken to support (or oppose) 
peacebuilding? What are their capacities for taking action?  
3. What are the primary sources and means of power (physical, military, spiritual, 
personal ability and skills, identity, social capital) of the key stakeholders and 
how do they use these resources in conflict?   
4. How do sources of power differ among identity groups in the area of operations?  
Men and women?  How do different groups use power over each other? Do some 
key stakeholders depend on other key stakeholders with more power (e.g., is there 
a power imbalance) and if so, how?    
5. Over time, what have been indicators of conflict escalation or de-escalation in 
your area of concern/operations? What are potential triggers or windows of 
opportunity (e.g., key events) remembered by one side or other that lead to 
conflict escalation?  
6. In your experience, are the key stakeholders open to change to reduce conflict in 
your area of operations, and what do they think is necessary to bring that change 
about?  How do their desired changes relate to your mission for reducing violence 
and bringing peace and security to their community?  
7. In your view, does your presence alter the power dynamics in the local 
community?  If so, in what way(s) and how are conflict drivers affected?  
8. In your experience, how do the drivers differ from the local to the regional and 
national scale?  
Peace Operations 
1. What are the intended outcomes and metrics of success for your mission?   Who 
defines those?   Do you have any input?  How successful do you consider your 




2. Effective peace operations have been attributed to the mechanisms described 
below.   To what extent are these processes important to the outcomes of your 
operations? Please be specific with examples.  
• Changing incentives for aggression relative to maintaining peace --especially 
through economic and political means  
− Peace dividends (e.g., socio/economic/political gains) for rank-and-file 
soldiers, political elite, and would-be spoilers 
− Influencing the perceptions of others regarding the legitimacy of 
different parties to the conflict 
− Military deterrence (increase cost of aggression) 
− Trip wire for enforcement missions from additional third parties 
− Condition aid upon compliance with peace operations 
• Alleviate fear and mistrust  
− Monitor compliance with cease-fires and rule of law, facilitate 
communication among parties in conflict, allow parties to signal 
intentions for peace 
• Prevent or control accidents or involuntary defection by hard-liners 
− Deter rogue groups, shift power towards moderates, ease 
communication, provide on-the-spot mediation, provide law and order, 
provide alternatives to escalation in response to alleged violations  
• Dissuade parties from political abuse and/or excluding the “other” from the 
political process 
− Monitor and/or train security sectors inclusively, monitor and/or run 
election processes, provide neutral interim administration, transform 
military groups into political operations 
 
3. What other factors contribute to the outcome of your operations that are not 
mentioned above?   
4. What factors are impediments to the success of your peace operations?   What 
would be the most effective way to overcome those impediments? 
5. Do you interact with groups that deliver humanitarian aid?   What is your role in 
those interactions?  Do those interactions significantly impact the outcomes of 
your peacekeeping mission (positively or negatively)?   In what specific ways?  
6. How does the involvement of troops from other countries, or of local militia, 
impact your ability to conduct effective operations?      
7. Do the peace operations at the local level in your area of operations have an 
impact on the larger scale in the region?  If so, how?  What do you think may be 
the implications for sustainability of peacebuilding operations?  
Humanitarian aid and development programs  
1. In your experience, what are the greatest immediate barriers and/or threats to 
human security? Using concrete examples, how does your mission address those 
barriers and/or threats? 
a) How does the ongoing conflict in Somalia specifically impact your mission in 





2. In carrying out your mission, what kind of interactions have you had with local 
population?  What have been the primary social structures through which you 
have been engaged in implementing humanitarian aid or development programs?  
 
a) Have your programs had a positive, negative, or mixed impact on human 
security and resiliency in the short, medium, and long term279?  In your view, 
what is the likelihood that these outcomes will be sustainable? 
b) What was the level of local involvement in these programs?  
c) What is your understanding of the intended goals of these programs?  How 
were those communicated to you?  
d) Do you know who is accountable for the management of these programs?  
e) In your experience, were there unintended consequences of these programs 
(positive or negative)?  If so, did they impact your peace operations?  If so, in 
what way(s)? 
f) How have these programs impacted local capacity building for peace 
building? Social cohesion? Community level trust?  National level trust?  
3. Based on what you know, what is the level of local support for these programs?  
Is the level of support consistent across the different stakeholders?  If not, who is 
more supportive and why?  
4. From what you have seen, what has been the impact (economically and 
materially) of these programs in the short, medium, and long term with respect to 
their intended objectives?   
5. How have these programs impacted relationships between people and institutions 
in positions of power at the local, regional, and national levels?  
6. From what you have seen, have these programs been perceived as being 
accountable and inclusive? What is perceived as positive and why?  What is 
perceived as negative and why? 
7. How have these programs affected social cohesion, trust  
a) within the local community  
b) with the national government  
8. Are other intervention programs addressing these barriers and/or threats? What is 
your relationship to those?  
9. Have interventions (peacekeeping, political, humanitarian, development) by other 
third party actors impacted your operations?   If so, which ones and how?  
 
                                                




Field Research Plan: Peace Operations in Somalia: Interviews with 
Burundi and Uganda AMISOM Peacekeeping Forces 
	  
Nancy Kay Hayden 
PhD Candidate 
University of Maryland School of Public Policy 
 
August 12, 2014 
 
Background 
My research examines the combined effects of peace operations, humanitarian aid, and 
development on civil conflict, and the ability of participants in conflict and local 
populations to adapt and recover from conflict.  I am using Somalia as a case study.   My 
research goal is to develop a framework to improve understanding of the long-term 
consequences of these types of interventions.  The purpose of the framework will be for 
policy analysis.   
 
Understanding the effects of peace operations and humanitarian aid in conflict requires 
knowing what is happening on the ground at the local level.  These interviews will 
provide unique insights of the local level consequences from the viewpoint of the 
Burundi troops in their support role to AMISOM.  
 
Sample Discussion and Interview Questions 
I will ask you three types of questions:  
• Questions about background for your area of responsibility during deployment 
• Questions about causes of conflict in your area of responsibility   
• Questions about your operations, and how relationships at the village level and 
with humanitarian aid organizations humanitarian affected your operations 
 
Background 
1.  What was your area of responsibility for AMISOM? 
2. What was the time period of your deployment?  
3. What was the local language and how did you manage communications? 
4. What were your relationships with the local community during your 
deployment, if any? 
 
Causes of Conflict  
1. Who were the combatants and what do you think was the main reason for 
conflict in your area?  Did this change over time?  What other factors 
contributed to conflict?  Did your operations change the situation regarding 




2. Who do you think are the most powerful persons that influence what happens 
in the conflict in your area (for example, who finances the conflict, or those 
who can make peace)?  Who are the persons that are most affected by the 
conflict in your area?  
a. What are the interests of these different persons (political, social, 
economic, security)?    
b. What have these persons done to support (or oppose) your AMISOM 
operations? What are their resources (for example, physical, militia, 
spiritual authority, personal ability and skills, identity, social capital) 
where do they get these resources, and how do they use them?  
3. How did sources of power differ among groups in your area of responsibility?  
4. What were signs of conflict escalation (or de-escalation) in your area of 
operations? What are potential triggers or opportunities that lead to conflict 
escalation or de-escalation?  
5. Who were the persons with most influence in the area willing to compromise 
to reduce conflict?   Did this help your mission for reducing violence and 
bringing peace and security to their community?  
 
Peace Operations 
1. Mission purpose and success 
a. What was the purpose of your mission?    
b. What were the measures of success? Who defined those measures?   
Did you have a contribution for defining measures of success?   
c. How successful was your mission?  Did the success last over time?     
2. How important were any of the factors or processes below for success of your 
operations? Please be specific with examples.  
a. Dominant military power, combat capability and resources 
b. Changing motivations of the local persons to support peace instead of 
violence   
c. Providing peace dividends for potential spoilers 
d. Threat of additional military operations from neighboring countries 
e. Promise of humanitarian aid  
f. Reduce fear and mistrust and provide more security 
g. Detect defection  
h. Provide local stability – for example,  
i. Mediation between different groups,  
ii. Support law and order,  
iii. Monitor for human rights abuses 
iv. Help in reconstruction for local community 
3. What other factors affected the success of your peace operations (positively or 
negatively)?    
a. What did you do to overcome the negative factors and what was the 
result? 
4. Did your battalion support organizations (NGOS) that deliver humanitarian 




outcomes of your peacekeeping mission (positively or negatively)?   In what 
ways?  
5. Did the presence of other military troops or local militia affect your 
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Background 
My research examines the dynamics of third-party peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, and 
development interventions and their combined effects on resiliency of different actors in 
civil conflict, using Somalia as a case study.  Understanding the integrated effects of 
these interventions over time requires knowledge of what is happening on the ground 
among stakeholders and primary actors at the local and regional level, how these 
dynamics impact the broader conflict, and the result on both local and regional interests.  
 
Kenya has long-standing strategic interests in the Somali conflict that include instability 
in south central Somalia and operations in the port of Kismayo, cross-border spillover of 
violence and extremism, one of the world’s largest refugee camps in northeast Kenya, 
and absorption of displaced persons living as refugees in major urban cities such as 
Nairobi.   These interests intertwine with domestic politics in Kenya and affect stability.  
In addition, many International Nongovernmental Organizations (INGOs) that provide 
humanitarian aid or support peace operations in Somalia have their program offices in 
Nairobi.  Some, such as the United Nations and World Bank, have dual mandates: (1) 
provide humanitarian relief aid in Somalia and to displaced persons within Kenya, and 
(2) support development initiatives that reduce the risk of conflict in Somalia by fostering 
a stable and productive environment with respect for rule of law and human rights.  Some 
local Somalia NGOs also operate out of Nairobi due to security concerns.  
 
The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) maintains offices and conducts 
security and peacekeeping training in Nairobi.   Many other government organizations 
and embassies until very recently have also managed their operations in Somalia from 
Nairobi.      
These initiatives involve many different sectors – government, civil society, private 
enterprises, international, regional, and local non-governmental organizations, and 
academia.    
 
I will engage a cross-section of key stakeholders in Nairobi from all of these different 
organizations – NGOs, government, and military – to discuss their interventions in 
Somalia and the impacts.  Targeted stakeholders are:  
 
• Scholars and analysts within academia and think tanks in Kenya (and Somalia) 
who study issues that arise around the Somali conflict and regional efforts to 




• United Nation organizations in Kenya (and Somalia) that run humanitarian aid 
and development programs for Somalis (UNSOM, UNSOA, UNDP, World Bank, 
UNHCR, OCHA, UNIDIR) 
•  African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) 
− Training and deployment of peace keeping troops (UN peace support training 
center IPSTC, Civilian-military affairs) 
• Government donor program offices (e.g., US AID, DIFD) 
• NGOs and CSOs in Kenya (and Somalia) working on humanitarian aid and 
development to address Somali conflict and/or reduce its regional impact (Mercy 
Corps; Oxfam, Save the Children, CARE, SAFERWORLD, Refugees 
International, Catholic Relief Services, HAVOYOCO, HIRJA, SEDHURO, 
Somalia NGO Consortium) 
• Official mediation efforts, such as those through Intergovernmental Authority for 
Development (IGAD) Somalia Peace Facilitation Office 
• Local populace affected by conflict and interventions and the choices they make 
 
Desired Profiles of Interview Subjects 
Humanitarian Aid and Development (international and local partners) 
• Senior scholars and researchers in the area of regional peace keeping and security  
• Decision makers responsible for strategic analysis of conflict and organization’s 
role and those who advise them 
• Kenya foreign service officials and diplomats in the area of regional peace 
keeping, security and development 
• Program managers responsible for designing and implementing initiatives and 
those who advise them 
• Practitioners who provide services in the field and those who support them 
• Affected populations 
Peace Operations in AMISOM 
• Senior officers and soldiers at battalion and command unit levels engaged in 
stabilization and protection missions  
• Officers providing training, mentoring and advisory support to Somalia Police 
Force and Somalia National Army  
• Soldiers on the ground in Somalia involved in securing humanitarian corridors, 
logistics, and/or escorting convoys for the delivery of aid  
• Civil-military affairs officers or soldiers assigned to interface with civilians and/or 
the AMISOM civilian components in Somalia for non-security assistance  
• Instructors who train troops to deploy for AMISOM missions.  
• Affected populations 
Government donors 
 
Interview and Discussion Questions:  
The questions fall into three broad categories:   




• Understanding the intended scope and outcomes of interventions, and factors that 
affect success in achieving those outcomes, and  
• Relationships between peace operations and humanitarian aid interventions.   
Observations of the impact of interventions on resiliency of different actors, challenges 
and opportunities in those interventions, and unintended consequences are of particular 
interest.  
How Information Will Be Used:  
Discussions and responses to interviews will inform a model to examine scenarios for 
sequencing and layering of interventions to achieve more stable equilibrium at local and 
regional levels.  This model will then be used to test hypotheses and explore future policy 
options.   The analysis will be presented as a dissertation thesis to the University of 
Maryland and may be published as an academic article.  
 
Sample Discussion and Interview Questions 
Background 
1. What is the primary area of operations/concern for interventions? 
2. How long have you been concerned with/active in this area of operations?  
3. How do you interact with the local community in the area of operations? 
4. What is the local language and how do you deal with any differences? 
5. What conflict assessment method, if any, do you employ? 
 
Perspectives of Local Conflict Drivers 
1. What is the primary conflict in the area of operations?  What is your 
understanding of the root causes and conflict drivers?   How have those changed 
over time? What are contributing factors and how do they mitigate or amplify the 
drivers?  How do your activities address these root causes?  
2. What is your understanding of who the key stakeholders are in the conflict? 
a) What are the underlying interests of these stakeholders?    
b) What are their perceptions of the conflict?  
c) What actions have the different key stakeholders taken to support (or oppose) 
peace building? What are their capacities for taking action?  
3. What are the primary sources and means of power (physical, military, spiritual, 
personal ability and skills, identity, social capital) of the key stakeholders and 
how do they use these resources in conflict?   
4. How do sources of power differ among identity groups in the area of operations?  
Men and women?  How do different groups use power over each other? Do some 
key stakeholders depend on other key stakeholders with more power (e.g., is there 
a power imbalance) and if so, how?    
5. Over time, what have been indicators of conflict escalation or de-escalation in 




opportunity (e.g., key events) remembered by one side or other that lead to 
conflict escalation?  
6. In your experience, are the key stakeholders open to change to reduce conflict in 
your area of operations, and what do they think is necessary to bring that change 
about?  How do their desired changes relate to your mission for reducing violence 
and bringing peace and security to their community?  
7. In your view, does your presence alter the power dynamics in the local 
community?  If so, in what way(s) and how are conflict drivers affected?  
8. In your experience, how do the drivers differ from the local to the regional and 
national scale?  
 
Peace Operations 
1. What are the intended outcomes and metrics of success for your mission?   Who 
defines those?   Do you have any input?  How successful do you consider your 
mission to be today?  In the past?    
2. Effective peace operations have been attributed to the mechanisms described 
below.   To what extent are these processes important to the outcomes of your 
operations? Please be specific with examples.  
• Changing incentives for aggression relative to maintaining peace --especially 
through economic and political means  
− Peace dividends (e.g., socio/economic/political gains) for rank-and-file 
soldiers, political elite, and would-be spoilers 
− Influencing the perceptions of others regarding the legitimacy of 
different parties to the conflict 
− Military deterrence (increase cost of aggression) 
− Trip wire for enforcement missions from additional third parties 
− Condition aid upon compliance with peace operations 
• Alleviate fear and mistrust  
− Monitor compliance with cease-fires and rule of law, facilitate 
communication among parties in conflict, allow parties to signal 
intentions for peace 
• Prevent or control accidents or involuntary defection by hard-liners 
− Deter rogue groups, shift power towards moderates, ease 
communication, provide on-the-spot mediation, provide law and order, 
provide alternatives to escalation in response to alleged violations  
• Dissuade parties from political abuse and/or excluding the “other” from the 
political process 
− Monitor and/or train security sectors inclusively, monitor and/or run 
election processes, provide neutral interim administration, transform 
military groups into political operations 
 
3. What other factors contribute to the outcome of your operations that are not 
mentioned above?   
4. What factors are impediments to the success of your peace operations?   What 




5. Do you interact with groups that deliver humanitarian aid?   What is your role in 
those interactions?  Do those interactions significantly impact the outcomes of 
your peacekeeping mission (positively or negatively)?   In what specific ways?  
6. How does the involvement of troops from other countries, or of local militia, 
impact your ability to conduct effective operations?      
7. Do the peace operations at the local level in your area of operations have an 
impact on the larger scale in the region?  If so, how?  What do you think may be 
the implications for sustainability of peace building operations?  
 
Humanitarian aid and development programs  
1. In your experience, what are the greatest immediate barriers and/or threats to 
human security? Using concrete examples, how does your mission address those 
barriers and/or threats? 
a) How does the ongoing conflict in Somalia specifically impact your mission in 
Kenya, if at all?  
2. In carrying out your mission, what kind of interactions have you had with local 
population?  What have been the primary social structures through which you 
have been engaged in implementing humanitarian aid or development programs?   
Please give specific examples.  
a) Have your programs had a positive, negative, or mixed impact on human 
security and resiliency in the short, medium, and long term280?  In your view, 
what is the likelihood that these outcomes will be sustainable?   
b) What was the level of local involvement in these programs?  
c) What is your understanding of the intended goals of these programs?  How 
were those communicated to you?  
d) Do you know who is accountable for the management of these programs at the 
local level?  
e) In your experience, were there unintended consequences of these programs 
(positive or negative) on human security?  If so, did they impact your 
operations?  If so, in what way(s)? 
f) How have these programs impacted local capacity building for peace 
building? Social cohesion? Community level trust?  National level trust?  
3. Based on what you know, what is the level of local support for these programs?  
Is the level of support consistent across the different stakeholders?  If not, who is 
more supportive and why?  
4. From what you have seen, what has been the impact (economically and 
materially) of these programs in the short, medium, and long term with respect to 
their intended objectives?   
5. How have these programs impacted relationships between people and institutions 
in positions of power at the local, regional, and national levels?  
                                                
280 Short term is 1 month – 1 year; medium term is 1 – 3 years; long term is 3 – 10 years 




6. From what you have seen, have these programs been perceived as being 
accountable and inclusive? What is perceived as positive and why?  What is 
perceived as negative and why? 
7. How have these programs affected social cohesion, trust  
a) Within the local community  
b) With the national government  
8. Are other intervention programs addressing these barriers and/or threats? What is 
your relationship to those?  
a) Have these interventions had a positive, negative, or mixed impact in the on 
your programs in the short, medium, and long term?  In your view, what is the 
likelihood that the outcomes from these other humanitarian aid or 
development interventions will be sustainable? 
9. Have conflict interventions (peacekeeping, political, humanitarian, development) 






Addendum for AMISOM Operation Eagle in Spring 2014 
These questions are specific to the recent campaign, if they have not already come up in 
previous discussions.  
1. Which programs have targeted the newly liberated areas of Somalia?   
a) How has the campaign impacted these programs?  
2. Are there particular concerns with program implementation that will require 
modification as a result of the campaign? How are these addressed?  
3. Are the metrics used for resiliency in other programs relevant in the immediate 
aftermath of liberation of these Somali regions?  If not, what are the more appropriate 
measures?  
4. Has the campaign impacted other programs in Kenya or Somalia not specifically 
targeted to these areas?  If so, how?   
5. Are there additional programs that you would suggest be implemented to improve 
human security in the newly liberated areas?   What are the barriers to implementing 
those programs?   
6. What additional programs or actions by other parties or organizations would make 
your work more effective in addressing human security concerns around the Somali 
conflict?  
 
Addendum for New Deal Compact 2013 
These questions are specific to the recent pilot program by the development community, if 
it has not already come up in the previous discussions.  
 
 
Addendum for New Government 2013 and US Recognition 
These questions are specific to the recent political progress in formalizing and 
consolidating power of the national government, if they have not already come up in 
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My research examines the combined effects of past third-party peacekeeping, 
humanitarian aid, and development interventions on resiliency of different actors in civil 
conflict, using Somalia as a case study.  Understanding the integrated effects of these 
interventions over time requires knowledge of what has happened on the ground among 
stakeholders and primary actors at the local and regional level, how these dynamics 
impacted the broader conflict, and the result on both local and regional interests.  
 
Interview Subjects 
The desired profiles of interview subjects are:  
Humanitarian Aid and Development 
• Senior scholars and researchers in the area of regional peace keeping and security  
• Donor organization decision makers responsible for strategic analysis of conflict, 
the organization’s role and those who advise them 
• Program managers within donor organizations responsible for designing and 
implementing initiatives and those who advise them 
• Foreign service officials and diplomats in the area of regional peace keeping, 
security and development 
• Practitioners who provide services in the field and those who support them 
• Recipients of aid and development services 
Peace Operations  
• Senior officers and soldiers who have been engaged in the African Union Mission 
to Somalia (AMISOM) 
• Program managers, researchers, and decision makers for United Nations  
• Officers providing training, mentoring and advisory support to Somalia Police 
Force and Somalia National Army  
• Soldiers on the ground in Somalia involved in securing humanitarian corridors, 
logistics, and/or escorting convoys for the delivery of aid  
• Civil-military affairs officers or soldiers assigned to interface with civilians and/or 
the AMISOM civilian components in Somalia for non-security assistance  





I will conduct field research in the Netherlands (NGOs representing the Somalia Diaspora 
Community), Ethiopia (headquarters for regional and international organizations for 
peacekeeping, aid and development in Somalia; national support to AMISOM 
peacekeeping mission) Burundi (national support to AMISOM peacekeeping mission), 
and Kenya (headquarters for regional and international organizations for peacekeeping, 
aid and development in Somalia; national support to AMISOM peacekeeping mission).  
 
Ethiopia and Kenya are key regional players with long-standing strategic interests in the 
Somali conflict.  These interests involve complex security and economic concerns that 
include the presence of Ethiopian Somalis in the Somali regional state of Ethiopia and 
their claims upon the Ethiopian government (supported by extremists in the conflict in 
Somalia), a large influx of Somali refugees from the conflict in South Central Somalia, 
and violent cross-border spillover from Somalia. Historic governance, cultural, and 
natural factors in the region (e.g., climate change) create stresses that exacerbate the 
conflict and complicate the pursuit of both Ethiopia and Kenya’s interests. 
 
As a result, Ethiopia and Kenya have participated in various interventions in Somalia 
over the past two decades, and are currently participating in peace operations to address 
national and human security concerns, are providing humanitarian aid and sanctuary for 
refugees, and are regional leaders in development initiatives to reduce the risk of conflict 
by fostering a stable and productive environment in the Horn of Africa.  These initiatives 
involve many different sectors – government, civil society, private enterprises, 
international and regional non-governmental organizations, and academia.   I wish to 
engage a cross-section of key stakeholders in both Ethiopia and Kenya who are (or have 
been) involved these initiatives.   Specific areas of interest are:  
• Scholars and analysts within academia and think tanks who study issues that arise 
around the Somali conflict and efforts to resolve them.  
• United Nation organizations that run humanitarian aid and development programs 
for Somalis:  
− UNOPS, UNDP, WFP, World Bank, UNHCR, International Labor 
organization  
• Military involvement in the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) 
− Training and deployment of peace keeping troops 
− Civilian-military affairs 
• NGOs and CSOs working on humanitarian aid and development to address 
Somali conflict and/or reduce its impact in Ethiopia and Kenya (refugees and/or 
direct services in Somalia) 
− Examples: Mercy Corps, Interpeace; Life & Peace Institute, Nairobi Peace 
Initiative, Oxfam, Save the Children, CARE 
• Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Offices 
 
Interview and Discussion Questions:  
The questions fall into three broad categories:   




• understanding the intended scope and outcomes of interventions, and factors that 
affect success in achieving those outcomes, and  
• relationships between peace operations and humanitarian aid interventions.   
Observations of the impact of interventions on resiliency of different actors, challenges 
and opportunities in those interventions, and unintended consequences are of particular 
interest.  
 
How Information Will Be Used:  
My dissertation explores how interventions impact conflict outcomes through intervening 
variables associated with resiliency.  Discussions and responses to interviews will inform 
a model to establish a baseline and examine alternative scenarios for sequencing and 
layering of interventions to achieve more stable equilibrium at local and regional levels.  
This model will then be used to test hypotheses and explore future policy options. 
 
Questions 
These questions will derive from (1) the US AID framework for assessing conflict 
drivers, and (2) theoretical hypotheses regarding different mechanisms that influence the 
impact of peace operations, humanitarian aid, and development interventions by third 
parties in conflict settings; how these mechanisms interact among different types of 
interventions to influence resiliency of different actors in conflict; and how the dynamics 
of conflict are shaped by the resiliency of these actors in conflict.  
 
Background 
1. What is the primary area of operations/concern for interventions? 
2. How long have you been concerned with/active in this area of operations?  
3. How do you interact with the local community in the area of operations? 
4. What is the local language and how do you deal with any differences? 
5. What conflict assessment method, if any, do you employ? 
 
Perspectives of Local Conflict Drivers 
1. What is the primary conflict in the area of operations?  What is your 
understanding of the root causes and conflict drivers?   How have those changed 
over time? What are contributing factors and how do they mitigate or amplify the 
drivers?  How do your activities address these root causes?  
2. What is your understanding of who the key stakeholders are in the conflict? 
a) What are the underlying interests of these stakeholders?    
b) What are their perceptions of the conflict?  
c) What actions have the different key stakeholders taken to support (or oppose) 




3. What are the primary sources and means of power (physical, military, spiritual, 
personal ability and skills, identity, social capital) of the key stakeholders and 
how do they use these resources in conflict?   
4. How do sources of power differ among identity groups in the area of operations?  
Men and women?  How do different groups use power over each other? Do some 
key stakeholders depend on other key stakeholders with more power (e.g., is there 
a power imbalance) and if so, how?    
5. Over time, what have been indicators of conflict escalation or de-escalation in 
your area of concern/operations? What are potential triggers or windows of 
opportunity (e.g., key events) remembered by one side or other that lead to 
conflict escalation?  
6. In your experience, are the key stakeholders open to change to reduce conflict in 
your area of operations, and what do they think is necessary to bring that change 
about?  How do their desired changes relate to your mission for reducing violence 
and bringing peace and security to their community?  
7. In your view, does your presence alter the power dynamics in the local 
community?  If so, in what way(s) and how are conflict drivers affected?  
8. In your experience, how do the drivers differ from the local to the regional and 
national scale?  
 
Humanitarian aid and development programs  
1. In your experience, what are the greatest immediate barriers and/or threats to 
human security? How does your mission address those barriers and/or threats? 
2. Are other intervention programs addressing these barriers and/or threats? What is 
your relationship to those?  
3. In carrying out your mission, what kind of interactions have you had with local 
population?  What have been the primary social structures through which you 
have been engaged in implementing humanitarian aid or development programs?  
4. Have interventions (peacekeeping, political, humanitarian, development) by other 
third party actors impacted your operations?   If so, which ones and how?  
a) Have these programs had a positive, negative, or mixed impact in the on your 
operations in the short, medium, and long term281?  In your view, what is the 
likelihood that the humanitarian aid or development operations will be 
sustainable? 
b) Who at was the level of local involvement in these programs?  
c) What is your understanding of the intended goals of these programs?  How 
were those communicated to you?  
d) Do you know who is accountable for the management of these programs?  
e) In your experience, were there unintended consequences of these programs 
(positive or negative)?  If so, did they impact your peace operations?  If so, in 
what way(s)? 
f) How have these programs impacted local capacity building for peace 
building? Social cohesion? Community level trust?  National level trust?  
                                                




5. Based on what you know, what is the level of local support for these programs?  
Is the level of support consistent across the different stakeholders?  If not, who is 
more supportive and why?  
6. From what you have seen, what has been the impact (economically and 
materially) of these programs in the short, medium, and long term with respect to 
their intended objectives?   
7. How have these programs impacted relationships between people and institutions 
in positions of power at the local, regional, and national levels?  
8. From what you have seen, have these programs been perceived as being 
accountable and inclusive? What is perceived as positive and why?  What is 
perceived as negative and why? 
9. How have these programs affected social cohesion, trust  
a) within the local community  
b) with the national government  
 
Peace Operations 
1. What are the intended outcomes and metrics of success for your mission?   Who 
defines those?   Do you have any input?  How successful do you consider your 
mission to be today?  In the past?    
2. Effective peace operations have been attributed to the mechanisms described 
below.   To what extent are these processes important to the outcomes of your 
operations? Please be specific with examples.  
• Changing incentives for aggression relative to maintaining peace --especially 
through economic and political means  
− Peace dividends (e.g., socio/economic/political gains) for rank-and-file 
soldiers, political elite, and would-be spoilers 
− Influencing the perceptions of others regarding the legitimacy of 
different parties to the conflict 
− Military deterrence (increase cost of aggression) 
− Trip wire for enforcement missions from additional third parties 
− Condition aid upon compliance with peace operations 
• Alleviate fear and mistrust  
− Monitor compliance with cease-fires and rule of law, facilitate 
communication among parties in conflict, allow parties to signal 
intentions for peace 
• Prevent or control accidents or involuntary defection by hard-liners 
− Deter rogue groups, shift power towards moderates, ease 
communication, provide on-the-spot mediation, provide law and order, 
provide alternatives to escalation in response to alleged violations  
• Dissuade parties from political abuse and/or excluding the “other” from the 
political process 
− Monitor and/or train security sectors inclusively, monitor and/or run 
election processes, provide neutral interim administration, transform 





3. What other factors contribute to the outcome of your operations that are not 
mentioned above?   
4. What factors are impediments to the success of your peace operations?   What 
would be the most effective way to overcome those impediments? 
5. Do you interact with groups that deliver humanitarian aid?   What is your role in 
those interactions?  Do those interactions significantly impact the outcomes of 
your peacekeeping mission (positively or negatively)?   In what specific ways?  
6. How does the involvement of troops from other countries, or of local militia, 
impact your ability to conduct effective operations?      
7. Do the peace operations at the local level in your area of operations have an 
impact on the larger scale in the region?  If so, how?  What do you think may be 









Interview Subject Consent Form 
Project	  Title	  
	  
Resiliency in Civil Conflict	  
Purpose	  of	  the	  Study	   This academic research is being conducted by Nancy Hayden 
(PI), a PhD candidate from the Center for International and 
Security Studies at the University of Maryland, College Park, 
Maryland, USA.  The purpose of this research is to 
understand how peace operations and humanitarian aid 
activities combine to affect capacity and security of (i) local 
communities and (ii) combatants in armed civil conflict 
situations. The information collected in the study will be used 
to build a model of interventions and their impact on peace 
and security.  
Procedures	   This research involves one-on-one interviews and discussions 
between you and the PI and regarding your work to reduce 
armed civil conflict or its impact in Somalia. You will 
participate in one interview with the PI lasting approximately 
one hour.   The PI will ask you questions of four types: (1) 
questions to understand your view of local conflict drivers, 
(2) questions to understand the expected outcomes of your 
activities (peace operations, humanitarian aid, and/or 
economic development) and (3) questions to understand your 
views of the relationship between different types of activities 
and their outcomes at local and national levels for peace and 
security.   
 
Some sample questions are: 
1) What is the primary focus of your activities and what is 
your understanding of the main causes of conflict in this area?  
How have these changed over time?  Do your activities try to 
change these drivers?  
2) Who are the leaders in the community where you have 
been active, and what are their sources of power? How do 
they use these resources for peace or conflict?  
3) What processes are important to the success of your 
activities?   Specifically, do you find an of the following to be 
important, and if so, how do you try to make them happen:  (i) 
change incentives for violent behavior to incentives for 
peaceful, cooperative behaviors; (ii) reduce fear and mistrust; 
(iii) prevent conflict escalation through accidents; (iv) 
persuade leaders to be more inclusive in political processes?  
4) What are the biggest challenges for achieving success in 




5) How do you interact with other groups working to reduce 
conflict and its impact in Somalia? Do these interactions have 
positive, negative, or neutral affects on your success?  
If participant agrees, the PI may contact them by email or 
phone at a later time for clarification of their responses.  
 
Discussions will be conducted in English or French, 
depending your preference.   When conducted in French, a 
translator will be employed.  The PI will record your answers 
with hand written notes and, if you agree, also by audiotaping.  
You do not have to agree to audiotaping your answers to 
participate.  
Potential	  Risks	  and	  
Discomforts	  
Potential risks and discomfort from participating in this 
research are expected to be minimal above what you 
encounter participants in normal day-to-day activities. One 
potential risk is accidental breach of confidentiality if 
requested.  To mitigate this risk, your personal information 
will be redacted from tapes and notes if you request 
confidentiality below.   Another is that during recruitment, 
you may experience discomfort in declining to participate.   
This risk will be mitigated by not disclosing whether you 
have agreed to participate unless you give consent to have 
your identity used in publications.    If you perceive additional 
risk during the course of the interview/discussion, or 
experiences discomfort, you may end the interview/discussion 
immediately.   Your responses will not be shared you’re your 
employer or supervisor unless your consent is given to use 
your identity in publications. 
Potential	  Benefits	  	   There are no direct benefits from participation in this 
research.  We hope that, in the future, others might benefit 
from your answers to this study through improved 
understanding of how interventions impact resiliency of 
actors in conflict, and new policy analysis tools for assessing 
likely conflict outcomes.  
Confidentiality	   The PI will record information on digital audiotapes and in 
hand-written notebooks.  Digital recordings will be 
transferred daily to a password-protected laptop backed up to 
an encrypted, password protected external hard drive. All 
notebooks, recording equipment, storage disks, and laptop 
will be kept in a locked room or office when not in the 
personal possession of the PI.  Only the PI and her advisor 
will access to raw data with personally identifiable 
information.  However, your information may be shared with 
representatives of the University of Maryland, College Park 
or governmental authorities if you or someone else is in 




personally identifiable data will be kept in a locked office 
until completion of the dissertation defense, or up to two 
years, whichever comes first.  After completing the 
dissertation defense, if you do not consent to public release of 
participation, all of your personally identifiable information 
will be discarded or redacted from data.  
Request for Confidentiality: Check one of the following:  
_______ My identity, participation, and comments are 
public knowledge and can be used in publications.  
_______I request that my identity and participation be 
kept confidential and that my comments and observations 
not be associated with my identify in publications.   
Right	  to	  Withdraw	  and	  
Questions	  
Your participation in this research is completely voluntary.  
You may choose not to take part at all.  If you decide to 
participate in this research, you may stop participating at any 
time.  If you decide not to participate in this study or if you 
stop participating at any time, you will not be penalized or 
lose any benefits to which you otherwise qualify.  
If you decide to stop taking part in the study, if you have 
questions, concerns, or complaints, or if you need to report an 
injury related to the research, please contact the investigator:  
Nancy	  Hayden	  
Van	  Munching	  Hall	  Room	  4139,	  University	  of	  Maryland	  
College	  Park,	  Maryland	  20742	  
Email:	  nhayden@umd.edu;	  T:	  505-­‐250-­‐6895 
Participant	  Rights	   If you have questions about your rights as a research 
participant or wish to report a research-related injury, please 
contact:  
 
University of Maryland College Park  
Institutional Review Board Office 
1204 Marie Mount Hall 
College Park, Maryland, 20742 
 E-mail: irb@umd.edu   
Telephone: 301-405-0678 
 
This research has been reviewed according to the University 
of Maryland, College Park IRB procedures for research 
involving human subjects. 
Statement	  of	  Consent	   Your signature indicates that you are at least 18 years of age; 
you have read this consent form or have had it read to you; 
your questions have been answered to your satisfaction and 
you voluntarily agree to participate in this research study. 
You will receive a copy of this signed consent form. 




Signature	  and	  Date	   NAME OF PARTICIPANT 
[Please Print] 
Statement	  of	  Consent	   SIGNATURE OF PARTICIPANT 
 




Interview Subject Consent Form-French 
Project	  Title	  
	  
La résilience dans les conflits civils	  
Purpose	  of	  the	  Study	   Cette recherche académique est menée par Nancy Hayden 
(PI), un candidate au doctorat du Centre d'études 
internationales et de sécurité à l'Université du Maryland, 
College Park, Maryland, USA. Le objectif de cette recherche 
est de comprendre comment les opérations de paix et les 
activités humanitaires se combinent pour affecter la capacité 
et la sécurité de (i) les communautés locales et (ii) 
combattants dans les situations de conflit civil armés. Les 
informations recueillies dans l'étude sera utilisée pour 
construire un modèle d'interventions et de leur impact sur la 
paix et la sécurité. 
Procedures	   Cette recherche consiste à un-à-un entretiens et des 
discussions entre vous et le PI au le sujet de votre travail pour 
réduire les conflits civils armés ou son impact en Somalie. 
Vous participerez à un entretien avec le PI durée 
approximative une heure. PI poser questions de quatre types: 
(1) questions pour comprendre votre point de vue de les 
facteurs qui causent de conflits locaux, (2) des questions pour 
comprendre les résultats attendus des vos activités (les 
opérations de paix, l'aide humanitaire, et / ou développement 
économique) et (3) des questions pour comprendre votre point 
de vue de la relation entre les différents types d'activités 
influent sur les résultats aux niveaux local et national pour la 
paix et la sécurité. 
 
Quelques exemples de questions sont les suivantes: 
 1) Quel est l'objectif principal de vos activités et quelle est 
votre compréhension des principales causes des conflits dans 
ce domaine? Comment ont-ils évolué au fil du temps? Vos 
activités essaient de changer ces principales causes?  
2) Qui sont les leaders de la communauté et quelles sont leurs 
ressources pour etre en pouvoir? Comment utilisent-ils ces 




3) Quels sont les processus sont importants pour le succès de 
vos activités? Plus précisément, trouvez-vous une des actions 
suivantes pour être important, et si oui, comment essayez-
vous de les réaliser: (i) les changements des incitations à un 
comportement violent à des incitations pour les 
comportements de coopération pacifiques; (ii) réduire la peur 
et la méfiance; (iii) d'empêcher l'escalade du conflit par des 
accidents; (iv) persuader les dirigeants à être plus inclusive 
dans les processus politiques?  
4) Quels sont les principaux défis pour atteindre le succès 
dans vos activités?  
5) Comment avez-vous interagissez avec d'autres groupes de 
travail pour réduire les conflits et son impact en Somalie? Ne 
ces interactions ont positif, négatif, ou neutre effets sur votre 
succès?  
 
Si le participant est d'accord, la PI peut les contacter par email 
ou par téléphone à un moment plus tard pour la clarification 
de leurs réponses. 
 
Les discussions se tiendront en français ou en anglais, selon la 
votre préférence. Lorsqu'elle est effectuée en français, un 
traducteur sera employée. Le PI  enregistrer vos réponses 
avec des notes écrites à la main et, si vous êtes d'accord, aussi 
par l'enregistrement audio. Vous n'avez pas à accepter 
l'enregistrement audio de vos réponses à y participer. 
Potential	  Risks	  and	  
Discomforts	  
Les risques potentiels et l'inconfort de participer à cette 
recherche devraient être minimes dessus de ce que vous  
rencontrez  aux activités normales au jour le jour. Un risque 
potentiel est la violation accidentelle de la confidentialité à la 
demand. Pour atténuer ce risque, vos informations 
personnelles sera expurgé des bandes et des notes si vous 
demandez la confidentialité ci-dessous.  Une autre est que lors 
du recrutement, vous pouvez ressentir une gêne en refusant de 
participer. Ce risque sera atténué en ne divulguant pas si vous 
avez accepté de participer à moins que vous donner son 
consentement pour que votre identité utilisés dans des 
publications.  Si vous percevez des risques supplémentaire au 
cours de l'entretien / discussion, ou des expériences inconfort, 
vous pouvez mettre fin à l'entretien / discussion 
immédiatement. Vos réponses ne seront pas partagées vous 
êtes votre employeur ou le superviseur à moins que votre 





Potential	  Benefits	  	   Il n'y a pas de bénéfices directs de la participation à cette 
recherche. Nous espérons que, dans l'avenir, d'autres 
pourraient bénéficier de cette étude par une meilleure 
compréhension de la façon dont l'impact des interventions 
résilience des acteurs en conflit, et de nouveaux outils 
d'analyse des politiques pour évaluer les résultats de conflit 
probables. 
Confidentiality	   La PI enregistrer des informations sur des cassettes audio 
numériques et les ordinateurs portables manuscrites. Les 
enregistrements numériques seront transférés tous les jours 
pour un ordinateur portable protégé par un mot de passe 
sauvegardé à un, protégé par mot disque dur externe crypté. 
Tous les ordinateurs portables, le matériel d'enregistrement, 
des disques de stockage, et un ordinateur portable seront 
conservés dans une chambre ou bureau verrouillé lorsqu'il 
n'est pas dans la possession personnelle de la PI. Seule la PI et 
sa conseiller auront accès aux données brutes des 
informations personnellement identifiables. Toutefois, votre 
information  peut être partagée avec les représentants de 
l'Université du Maryland, College Park ou les autorités 
gouvernementales si vous  ou une autre personne est en 
danger ou si le besoin de le faire par la loi américaine. 
Données non publiées, personnellement identifiables seront 
conservés dans un bureau verrouillé jusqu'à la fin de la 
défense de thèse, ou jusqu'à deux ans, selon la première 
éventualité. Après avoir terminé la défense de thèse, si vous 
ne consentez pas à la diffusion publique de la participation, 
toutes vos informations personnellement identifiables seront 
rejetées ou expurgée de données.  
Demande de confidentialité: Vérifier une des opérations 
suivantes:  
_______ Mon identité, la participation et les commentaires 
sont de notoriété publique et peuvent être utilisés dans des 
publications.  
 _______Je demande que mon identité et de participation 
resteront confidentielles et que mes commentaires et 
observations ne soient pas associés à mon identifier dans 
les publications.  
Right	  to	  Withdraw	  and	  
Questions	  
Votre participation à cette recherche est entièrement 
volontaire. Vous pouvez choisir de ne pas participer du tout. 
Si vous décidez de participer à cette recherche, vous pouvez 
cesser de participer à tout moment. Si vous décidez de ne pas 
participer à cette étude ou si vous cessez de participer à tout 
moment, vous ne serez pas pénalisé ou perdre des avantages 
sociaux auxquels vous êtes admissible autrement. Si vous 




questions, des préoccupations ou des plaintes, ou si vous avez 
besoin de déclarer une blessure liée à la recherche, s'il vous 
plaît communiquer avec la PI:  
Nancy	  Hayden	  
Van	  Munching	  Hall	  Room	  4139,	  University	  of	  Maryland	  
College	  Park,	  Maryland	  20742	  
Email:	  nhayden@umd.edu;	  T:	  505-­‐250-­‐6895 
Participant	  Rights	   If you have questions about your rights as a research 
participant or wish to report a research-related injury, please 
contact:  
 
University of Maryland College Park  
Institutional Review Board Office 
1204 Marie Mount Hall 
College Park, Maryland, 20742 
 E-mail: irb@umd.edu   
Telephone: 301-405-0678 
 
This research has been reviewed according to the University 
of Maryland, College Park IRB procedures for research 
involving human subjects. 
Statement	  of	  Consent	   Votre signature indique que vous êtes au moins 18 ans; vous 
avez lu ce formulaire de consentement ou avez eu de vous 
lire; vos questions ont été répondues à votre satisfaction et 
vous acceptez volontairement de participer à cette étude. 
Vous recevrez une copie de ce formulaire de consentement 
signé. Si vous acceptez de participer, s'il vous plaît signer 
votre nom ci-dessous. 
Signature	  and	  Date	   Nom du PARTICIPANT 
[S’il vous plait imprimer] 
Statement	  of	  Consent	   SIGNATURE du PARTICIPANT 
 












Supporting Document for Hayden IRB Application:  Impact of Interventions in 
Somali Conflict on Resiliency of Local and Regional Actors – Discussion Topics and 
Semi-structured interview questions 
 
Discussion Topics and Semi-Structured Interview Questions 
These questions derive from (1) the US AID framework for assessing conflict drivers, 
and (2) theoretical hypotheses regarding different mechanisms that influence the 
impact of peace operations, humanitarian aid, and development interventions by third 
parties in conflict settings; how mechanisms interact among different types of 
interventions to influence resiliency of different actors in conflict; and how the 
dynamics of conflict are shaped by the resiliency of these actors in conflict.  
 
Background 
1. What was the primary area of operations/concern for interventions? 
2. How long have you been/were you concerned with/active in this area?  
3. How did you interact with the local community in the area of operations? 
4. What was the local language and how do you deal with any differences? 
5. What conflict assessment method, if any, did you employ? 
 
Perspectives of Local Conflict Drivers 
1. What was the primary conflict in the area of operations?  What is your 
understanding of the root causes and conflict drivers?   How did those changed 
over time? What were the contributing factors and how did they mitigate or 
amplify the drivers?  How did your activities address these root causes?  Have 
those changed in the present? 
2. What is your understanding of who the key stakeholders have been in the 
conflict? 
a) What were the underlying interests of these stakeholders?    
b) What were their perceptions of the conflict?  
c) What actions did the different key stakeholders take to support (or oppose) 
peacebuilding? What were their capacities for taking action?  
d) What is their current role?  
3. What were the primary sources and means of power (physical, military, spiritual, 
personal ability and skills, identity, social capital) of the key stakeholders and 
how did they use these resources in conflict? Did your interventions change 
those?  If so, how?  
4. How did sources of power differ among identity groups in the area of operations?  
Men and women?  How did different groups use power over each other? Do some 
key stakeholders depend on other key stakeholders with more power (e.g., is there 




5. Over time, what have been indicators of conflict escalation or de-escalation in 
your area of concern/operations? What were potential triggers or windows of 
opportunity (e.g., key events) remembered by one side or other that led to conflict 
escalation?  
6. In your experience, were the key stakeholders open to change to reduce conflict in 
your area of operations, and what did they think was necessary to bring that 
change about?  How did their desired changes relate to your mission for reducing 
violence and bringing peace and security to their community?  
7. In your view, did your presence alter the power dynamics in the local community?  
If so, in what way(s) and how were conflict drivers affected?  
8. In your experience, how did the drivers differ from the local to the regional and 
national scale?   
 
Peace Operations 
1. What were the intended outcomes and metrics of success for your mission?   Who 
defined those?   Did you have any input?  How successful do you consider your 
mission to have been?  
2. Effective peace operations have been attributed to the mechanisms described 
below.   To what extent were these processes important to the outcomes of your 
operations? Please be specific with examples.  
• Changing incentives for aggression relative to maintaining peace --especially 
through economic and political means  
− Peace dividends (e.g., socio/economic/political gains) for rank-and-file 
soldiers, political elite, and would-be spoilers 
− Influencing the perceptions of others regarding the legitimacy of 
different parties to the conflict 
− Military deterrence (increase cost of aggression) 
− Trip wire for enforcement missions from additional third parties 
− Condition aid upon compliance with peace operations 
• Alleviate fear and mistrust  
− Monitor compliance with cease-fires and rule of law, facilitate 
communication among parties in conflict, allow parties to signal 
intentions for peace 
• Prevent or control accidents or involuntary defection by hard-liners 
− Deter rogue groups, shift power towards moderates, ease 
communication, provide on-the-spot mediation, provide law and order, 
provide alternatives to escalation in response to alleged violations  
• Dissuade parties from political abuse and/or excluding the “other” from the 
political process 
− Monitor and/or train security sectors inclusively, monitor and/or run 
election processes, provide neutral interim administration, transform 
military groups into political operations 
 
3. What other factors contributed to the outcome of your operations that are not 




4. What factors were impediments to the success of your peace operations?   What 
would be the most effective way to overcome those impediments? 
5. Did you interact with groups that deliver humanitarian aid?   What was your role 
in those interactions?  Did those interactions significantly impact the outcomes of 
your peacekeeping mission (positively or negatively)?   In what specific ways?  
6. Did the involvement of troops from other countries, or of local militia, impact 
your ability to conduct effective operations?   If so, how and to what extent?   
7. Did the peace operations at the local level in your area of operations have an 
impact on the larger scale in the region?  If so, how?  What do you think may 
have been the implications for sustainability of peacebuilding operations?  
 
Humanitarian aid and development programs  
1. In your experience, what are the greatest immediate barriers and/or threats to 
human security? How did your mission address those barriers and/or threats? 
2. Were other intervention programs addressing these barriers and/or threats in your 
area? What was your relationship to those?  
3. In carrying out your mission, what kind of interactions did you have with local 
population?  What were the primary social structures through which you engaged 
in implementing humanitarian aid or development programs?  
4. Did interventions (peacekeeping, political, humanitarian, development) by other 
third party actors impact your operations?   If so, which ones and how?  
a) Did these programs had a positive, negative, or mixed impact in the on your 
operations in the short, medium, and long term282?  In your view, what is the 
likelihood that the humanitarian aid or development operations have been 
sustainable? 
b) What was the level of local involvement in these programs?  
c) What is your understanding of the intended goals of these programs?  How 
were those communicated to you?  
d) Do you know who was accountable for the management of these programs?  
e) In your experience, were there unintended consequences of these programs 
(positive or negative)?  If so, did they impact your peace operations?  If so, in 
what way(s)? 
f) Did these programs impact local capacity building for peace building? Social 
cohesion? Community level trust?  National level trust? If so, how?  
5. Based on what you know, what was the level of local support for these programs?  
Was the level of support consistent across the different stakeholders?  If not, who 
was more supportive and why?  
6. From what you have seen, what has been the impact (economically and 
materially) of these programs in the short, medium, and long term with respect to 
their intended objectives?   
                                                
282 Short term is 1 month – 1 year; medium term is 1 – 3 years; long term is 3 – 10 years 




7. How have these programs impacted relationships between people and institutions 
in positions of power at the local, regional, and national levels?  
8. From what you have seen, have these programs been perceived as being 
accountable and inclusive at the local level? What was perceived as positive and 
why?  What was perceived as negative and why? 
9. How did these programs affected social cohesion, trust  
a) within the local community  







Supporting Document for Hayden IRB Application:  Simplified Peacekeeping 
Questions 
 
Background Information and Questions 
 
Interview Subjects: 
This research requires two different levels of understanding:  (1) what is happening on 
the ground at the local level and (2) how the local level and higher-level structures affect 
each other. The case study interviews will provide information from the viewpoint of 
peacekeeping troops and officers supporting AMISOM, from the viewpoint of program 
managers in Non-Governmental Organizations who provide humanitarian relief, and 
from the viewpoint of organizations who provide economic development aid.  
 
Interview Questions:  
The following questions fall into three broad categories:  (1) understanding the subject’s 
perspective of local conflict drivers, (2) understanding the intended outcomes of activities 
(peace operations, humanitarian aid, and/or economic development) and (3) 
understanding how the relationship between different types of activities affect outcomes 
at local and national levels for peace and security.   
 
I. Local Conflict Drivers 
1) Where is the primary focus of your activities?  
2) What is your understanding of the main cause of conflict in this area? How have 
those changed over time? Are your activities intended to change these conflict 
drivers?  
3) What is your understanding of who the key stakeholders are in the conflict? 
4) What are the primary sources of power of the key stakeholders and how do they use 
these resources in conflict?   
5) How do sources of power differ among groups in the area of your activities?  
6) What have been indicators of conflict escalation or de-escalation in your area?  
7) Are the key stakeholders open to change to reduce conflict, and what do they think is 
necessary to bring that change about?  
8) Does your presence change the relationships of power in the local community?  If so, 
in what way and how are conflict drivers affected?  
9) How do the drivers differ from the local to the regional and national levels?   Where 
do your activities have the most impact?   
 
II. Peace Operations 
1) What are the expected outcomes for your activities and how do you measure success?   
Who defines these measures of success? How successful do you consider your 
activities to be in the past and in the present?  
2) Have the following processes been important to the achieving successful outcomes in 
your activities?  If they have been important, please describe how.  
• Change motivation for aggressive behavior to motivation for peaceful and 
cooperative activities 




• Prevent accidental escalation of conflict  
• Persuade leaders to be more inclusive in political processes 
3) Are there other processes or factors that you use to create successful outcomes for 
your activities?   
4) What factors create problems for your activities?   What is the best way to overcome 
these factors? 
5) Do you have contact with any of these other groups working in Somalia?  If yes, what 
is your role? Does this contact change how you carry out your activities and the 
outcome of your activities?  In what ways?  
(1) Peace keeping troops from other countries,  
(2) Organizations that deliver humanitarian aid?    
(3) Organizations that provide economic development aid?  
6) Do the peace operations at the local level in your area of operations have an impact 
on the larger scale in the region?  If so, how?  What do you think may be the 
implications for sustainability of peacebuilding operations?  
 
III. Interactions with Local Population  
1) How do you interact with the local population?  
2) What is the level of local involvement in your programs? What is the level of popular 
local support for these programs?  Is the level of support the same for all people?  If 
not, who is more supportive and why?  
3) Do you think your activities have changed relationships between different people in 
positions of power at the local level?  
4) Do you think the local people believe that these programs are well managed, fair, and 
open to everyone? If your answer is yes, what do you think is the most important 
reason why?  If no, what are the problems? 
5) Do your activities change the level of trust and helpfulness between local people  
a. and others within the local community  
b. with the national government?    
If your answer is yes, is the change positive or negative?    How does this change 
happen?  
6) What are the greatest challenges to human security?   Are the activities helping to 
overcome these challenges?  If your answer is yes, how do they help?  If your answer 
is no, do the activities make it harder to overcome challenges?    How?  
 
IV. General question 
1) What is the local language and how do you deal with any differences?  












I am a PhD Candidate at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy in College Park, 
Maryland, USA. I am conducting academic research on how peace operations, humanitarian aid 
and economic development interventions affect armed civil conflict.  My case study is the Somalia 
conflict and interventions of regional and international actors.    
 
I will be in XXXX from XXXXX conducting field research.  I request a meeting during that time-
frame with you or other individuals in XXXXXXXX Office who can discuss your views of XXXX 
policy and intervention actions, as well as the roles of other actors and their impacts on resiliency 
and stabilizing parts of Somalia, the Somali region of Ethiopia, and borders with neighboring 
countries.  I expect the interview to last approximately one hour.   The meeting may be 
conducted in your office or in a public location acceptable to you such as my hotel, the local 
university, or a convenient coffee shop.  
 
For background, you can read about me and my research on my 
blog:http://civilconflictstudies.net/research/  I have also attached a short abstract.   
 
Can you please advise if it would be possible to arrange meetings?  I will be happy to provide 
additional background information on my research or myself if that would be helpful.    
 
I have coordinated this research and meetings with relevant US Embassies abroad, and in the DC 
area with the US State Department’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations and will be 
relating my dissertation to their conflict assessment framework, using concepts of system 
dynamics and resiliency.   
 
Thank you very much for your help.  Please let me know when you have received this email and 
who might be the most appropriate person to follow up with.   
 
 
Nancy K. Hayden 
Graduate Fellow, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) 
PhD Candidate, International Security and Economics  
Asst. Director, Morocco Education Abroad 
Van Munching Hall Room 4139 















Script for recruiting military officers and personnel as interview subjects 
 
 
The Burundi military forces are committed to advancing education and training initiatives 
in support of development and regional stability.  In that spirit, you are requested to 
consider participating in academic research on the role of peacekeeping operations in 
Somalia being conducted by Ms. Nancy Hayden.  Ms. Hayden is pursuing this research to 
complete her doctoral dissertation at the Center for International and Security Studies at 
the University of Maryland in the USA.   Her research promises to provide important 
insights of interest on the connections between security, humanitarian aid, and 
development activities for reducing armed civil conflict.   
 
A research abstract is attached.   You can also read more about Ms. Hayden’s research on 
her blog site: www.civilconflictstudies.net   
 
Interviews are expected to last no more than an hour and take place in a mutually agreed 
upon place between XXX and XXX in Bujumbura.    Ms Hayden speaks French but will 
also employ a translator fluent in both French and Kirundi.  
 
Your involvement is completely voluntary.  If you are willing to participate please 
contact Ms. Hayden directly to arrange for the time and location.  At that time she will 
provide you with more background and sample questions, as well as a consent form.   
 
















- 1 - Generated on IRBNet
1204 Marie Mount Hall






 INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD
 
DATE: August 6, 2014
  
TO: Nancy Hayden
FROM: University of Maryland College Park (UMCP) IRB
  
PROJECT TITLE: [621968-1] Resiliency in Civil Conflict: Mixed Methods Research on Dynamics
of Past Interventions
REFERENCE #:  
SUBMISSION TYPE: New Project
  
ACTION: APPROVED
APPROVAL DATE: August 6, 2014
EXPIRATION DATE: August 5, 2015
REVIEW TYPE: Expedited Review
  
REVIEW CATEGORY: Expedited review category # 6 and 7
  
Thank you for your submission of New Project materials for this project. The University of Maryland
College Park (UMCP) IRB has APPROVED your submission. This approval is based on an appropriate
risk/benefit ratio and a project design wherein the risks have been minimized. All research must be
conducted in accordance with this approved submission.
This submission has received Expedited Review based on the applicable federal regulation.
Please remember that informed consent is a process beginning with a description of the project and
insurance of participant understanding followed by a signed consent form. Informed consent must
continue throughout the project via a dialogue between the researcher and research participant. Federal
regulations require each participant receive a copy of the signed consent document.
Please note that any revision to previously approved materials must be approved by this committee prior
to initiation. Please use the appropriate revision forms for this procedure which are found on the IRBNet
Forms and Templates Page.
All UNANTICIPATED PROBLEMS involving risks to subjects or others (UPIRSOs) and SERIOUS and
UNEXPECTED adverse events must be reported promptly to this office. Please use the appropriate
reporting forms for this procedure. All FDA and sponsor reporting requirements should also be followed.
All NON-COMPLIANCE issues or COMPLAINTS regarding this project must be reported promptly to this
office.
This project has been determined to be a Minimal Risk project. Based on the risks, this project requires
continuing review by this committee on an annual basis. Please use the appropriate forms for this
procedure. Your documentation for continuing review must be received with sufficient time for review and
continued approval before the expiration date of August 5, 2015.





Appendix D: Model Specifications for Simulating System 
Dynamics 
 
The correlation between risk factors and reference behaviors are incorporated into 
a dynamic system model of the underlying structures to simulate conflict behavior, 
measured as frequency of events, in response to different intervention strategies, and to 
test the strength of hypothesized mechanisms for generating the reference behaviors.   
Sensitivity studies using the model examine the plausibility of the proposed causal 
mechanisms to obtain the different reference behaviors, and assesses the likely resiliency 
of belligerents under a variety of initial conditions and intervention strategies involving 
aid and military peace operations. This model is tested on micro level data of the Somalia 
conflict that exhibits variations between the four reference behaviors seen at country 
levels.  These strategies are evaluated in terms of their potential to create balancing or 
amplifying feedback loops for conflict violence and human insecurity.  
The system dynamic model is built using VENSIM 6.3G PLE simulation software 
developed by Ventana Systems, Inc. in collaboration with Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology for causal tracing in complex systems and analyzing dynamic feedback 
models.283   There are three primary steps in building the model:  developing the 
structure, formulating equations to describe interactions between components in the 
structure, and verification of the model logic.  The model builds on the basic conflict 
structures in the literature discussed in Chapter 1, developing new feedback structures to 
                                                
283 VENSIM PLE is system dynamics software that is free for educational use, downloadable at 
http://vensim.com/vensim-personal-learning-edition/.  VENSIM is one of two standard modeling packages 





incorporate insights from the econometric analysis and field research, and to test for the 
effects of peacekeeping operations, foreign aid, and displacements.  Equations to describe 
interactions between structural components are inferred from theoretical considerations 
and hypothesized mechanisms. In most cases, some type of beta function, Weibull hazard 
function, or growth function is used.  In some cases, where no convenient mathematical 
representation exists, normalized tables are constructed from data.  These tables are used 
by VENSIM to interpolate relational functions. Verification tests of model coherency are 
conducted using the software tool, SDM-DOC.284  
First, the model is tested for ability to replicate the basic reference behaviors 
associated with the conflict risk factors without interventions.   Sensitivity to different 
staging and interactions between interventions is then assessed through simulation 
experiments that allow risk factors to co-evolve. These results are compared to evidence 
from different stages of the Somalia conflict at different levels of granularity.   Insights 
from the model suggest intervention strategies most likely to be successful at generating 
balancing feedback loops that result in sustained collapse of conflict and transformation 
of conflict actors, and what combination of factors are most likely to lead to feedback 
loops that increase resiliency of conflict actors and result in either exponential conflict 
growth or indefinitely sustained adaptive behaviors and prolonged conflict. 
 
                                                
284 SDM-DOC is verification software developed at Argonne National Laboratories to provide 
documentation of all equations and graphical data in VENSIM models, and test model quality and 




Glossary of Technical Terms 
 
Carrying Capacity: the population that a system can support, as determined by the 
amount of resources available in the environment and the resource requirements 
of the population.   
 
Damped impulse: is a reference behavior arising from a type of oscillatory structure 
characterized by a system that, when perturbed by an impulse, is locally stable:  
the perturbation will cause the system to oscillate but it will eventually return to 
the same equilibrium.   
 
Expanding oscillations: is a reference behavior in which small disturbances tend to create 
instability, moving the system farther away from equilibrium with large 
oscillations, often constrained within some type of limits.   
 
Exponential growth: a system reference behavior arising from positive, self-reinforcing 
feedback, in which larger quantity results in greater net increase, further 
augmenting quantity and leading to ever-faster growth rates.  In pure exponential 
growth, the doubling time is constant.   
 
Feedback loop: a closed chain of causal influences within a system that may be either 
amplifying (causing positive growth in a variable) or balancing (negative growth 
in a variable).   Feedback loops are the basic unit of analysis of a dynamic system 
structure. 
 
Goal-seeking: a system reference behavior arising from a combination of positive growth 
feedback loops counteracted by negative loops that seek balance, equilibrium, or 
stasis in line with a goal or desired state.   Goal-seeking behavior in which 
corrective action is exactly proportional to the goal-gap results in exponential 
decay.  
 
Latitude: the maximum amount a system (or its subsystems) can be changed before 
crossing a threshold, which, if breached, makes recovery difficult or impossible. 
 
Oscillatory: a reference behavior arising from structure characterized by both amplifying 
(positive) and balancing (negative) feedback loops, in which state of system 
constantly overshoots its goal or equilibrium state, reverses, then undershoots, and 
so on.  Overshoot and undershoot are caused by delays in perceptions, decisions, 
actions, information.  
 
Overshoot and collapse: a system reference behavior characterized by initial exponential 
growth in which the carrying capacity of the system is eroded by unsustainable 
growth rates, resulting in eventual population decline and extinction if capacity 





Panarchy: the degree to which cross-scale interactions among interdependent elements 
affect nested adaptive cycles of growth, accumulation, restructuring, and renewal, 
accounting for different timescales of dynamics.  This heuristic emphasizes that 
disturbance is part of development of resilient systems, and that periods of 
gradual change and rapid transition coexist and complement one another.  
 
Precariousness: how close the current state of the system is to a threshold 
 
Reference Behavior (or mode): an archetypal pattern of the change in a system state 
variable or output over time.  The three most fundamental reference behavior 
types are exponential, goal seeking, and oscillation.  Each is generated by a 
characteristic feedback structure.  These feedback structures can be combined and 
interact to yield additional, common reference behaviors (e.g., growth with 
overshoot, overshoot and collapse, damped impulse, and S-shaped growth). 
 
Resiliency:  The original socio-ecological definition of resilience introduced by Holling 
(1973) is the capacity for relationships within systems to persist within a 
particular stability domain (where there are multiple possible stable equilibrium 
domains) in the face of change due to ecological processes, random events, or 
heterogeneities of scale. Folke (2011) discusses expanded definitions for 
resiliency that now include the capacity for self-organization and adaptive 
learning for renewal, re-organization, innovation and development to discover and 
reach new, higher performing equilibrium states (domains) as a result of changes 
in the environment. 
 
Resistance: the ease or difficulty of changing a system  
 
S-Shaped growth: a reference behavior characterized at first by exponential growth 
followed by growth rates that slow to an equilibrium level as carrying capacity is 
reached and that information is communicated through balancing feedback loops 
to control growth rates.  S-Shaped growth requires that there be no delays and that 
carrying capacity is fixed; this implies nonlinear interaction between positive and 
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